GIFT  OF 
Miss   J.   T.   Vinther 


NOTICES  OF  THE  PRESS. 


"The  task  has  been  ably  performed.  *  *  *  The  full  treat- 
ment of  American  examples  will  make  the  work  indispensable  to 
the  American  student,  and  will  not  diminish  its  interest  in  the  eyes 
of  European  readers,  who  will  find  here  a  mine  of  new  and  valu- 
able matter  bearing  upon  the  practical  handling  of  armies  in  the 
field."— The  Nation. 

"Upon  all  that  concerns  troops  in  action,  the  author  has  in- 
deed brought  together  a  mass  of  valuable  information,  which  he  has 
marshalled  with  skill,  and  we  warmly  commend  his  volume  as  full 
of  instruction  and  suggestion  for  students." — Army  and  Navy  Oa- 
zitte,  London. 

"A  most  valuable  and  timely  treatise  on  a  difficult  subject, 
which  has  been  dealt  with  by  Captain  Wagner  in  a  masterly  man- 
ner."— Army  and  Navy  Journal. 

"Captain  Wagner  is  an  earnest  student;  his  lectures  at  the 
School  of  Application  are  distinguished  by  their  thoroughness  and 
p  rspicuity,  and  he  is  worthy  of  the  distinction  he  has  acquired  as 
a  teacher  of  military  science.  The  work  will  prove  a  valuable  as- 
sistant to  military  students  at  and  away  from  the  class-room." — 
Army  and  Navy  Register. 

"  'Organization  and  Tactics'  gives  the  gist  of  what  has  been 
discussed,  worked  out,  and  approved  by  the  ablest  soldiers  during 
years  that  have  produced  more  change  in  our  art  than  in  any  other 
trade  or  calling." — Journal  of  the  U.  8.  Cavalry  Association. 


"No  man's  personal  experiences  can  be  so  valuable  as  the  com- 
pared and  collated  experiences  of  many  men." — Maurice. 


(7th  Edition,  1906.) 


Organization  and  Tactics 


BY 

ARTHUR  L.  WAGNER, 

LATE    COLONEL,    MILITARY  SECRETARY'S    DEPARTMENT,    GENERAL    STAFF,   U.  8. 

ARMY  ;    INSTRUCTOR  IN  THE  ART  OF  WAR  AT  U.  8.  INFANTRY  AND  CAVALRY 

SCHOOL  ;  GOLD  MEDALIST  OF  THE  MILITARY  SERVICE  INSTITUTION 

OF     THE    UNITKD    STATES;     AUTHOR     OF     "THE     SERVICE    OF 

SECURITY        AND       INFORMATION,"       "THE     CAMPAIGN 

OF  KONIGGRATZ,"  ETC. 


REVISED  BY 

CAPT.  MALJN  CRAIG,  1st  Cav.,  CAPT.  HERBERT  J.  BREES, 

1st  Cav.,  and  FIRST  LIEUT.  LESLIE  A.  I. 

CHAPMAN,  1st  Cav. 


Officially  recommended  from  the  Headquarters  of  the  Army 
to  Officers  subject  to  examination  for  promotion. 


FRANKLIN  HUDSON  PUBLISHING  CO., 

1014-1016  WYANDOTTE  ST., 

KANSAS  CITY,  MO., 

1906. 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  yeai  1894,  by 

ARTHUR  L.   WAGNER, 
In  the  office  of  the  librarian  of  Congress,  at  Washington,  D.  C 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1906,  by 

FRANKLIN  HUDSON  PUBLISHING  CO., 
In  the  office  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress,  at  Washington,  D.  C. 


GIFT  OF 


FRANKLIN  HUDSON  PUB.  CO 
KANSAS  CITY,  MO. 


PREFACE  TO  THE  SECOND  EDITION. 


The  cordial  reception  accorded  to  the  first  edition  of 
"Organization  and  Tactics"  encourages  the  author  to  offer 
a  new  edition  with  the  hope  that  it  may  ontinue  to  re- 
ceive the  favor  of  military  ttudents. 

Profiting  by  an  experience  of  two  years  in  using  the 
work  as  a  text-book  at  the  U.  S.  Infantry  and  Cavalry 
School,  and  by  the  kind  suggestions  of  American  and  Eng- 
lish critics,  the  author  has  made  a  few  changes  in  the 
text,  but  they  are  not  sufficient  to  effect  any  material 
change  from  the  first  edition. 

The  author  desires  here  to  expess  his  obligations  to 
First  Lieutenant  J.  T.  Dickman,  3d  Cavalry,  and  First 
Lieutenant  A.  L.  Mills,  1st  Cavalry,  assistant  instructors 
in  Art  of  War  at  the  U.  S.  Infantry  and  CavrJry  School, 
for  valued  assistance  in  preparing  the  new  edition  of  this 
work  f  s  the  press. 

U.  S.  Infantry  and  Cavalry  School, 
Fort  Leavenworth,  Kansas, 
February  5,  1897. 


921584 


PREFACE  TO  THE  FIRST  EDITION. 


The  best  school  for  acquiring  a  knowledge  of  organi- 
zation and  tactics  is  that  furnished  by  actual  experience 
in  war.  If  a  nation  were  constantly  engaged  in  hostilities, 
it  could  always  find  qualified  military  leaders  among  its 
many  veterans,  who,  having  passed  through  the  test  jf 
camp,  siege,  and  battle,  and  having  served  in  all  grades, 
under  all  circumstances,  could  readily  derive  from  their 
own  experience  a  guide  by  which  to  shape  their  action  in 
any  contingency  that  might  arise.  Fortunately  for  the 
happiness  of  the  human  race,  such  schools  of  perpetual 
warfare  do  not  exist;  but,  as  war  is  an  occurrence  to 
which  all  nations  are  subject,  as  the  duration  of  the  long- 
est conflict  is  but  a  brief  period  in  the  life  of  an  actor 
therein,  as  the  intervals  of  peace  are  so  long  that  the  par- 
ticipators in  one  war  are,  if  living,  generally  only  superan- 
nuated observers  of  the  next,  it  follows  that  if  an  officer 
would  prepare  himself  to  be  of  service  to  his  country,  he 
must  attentively  consider  the  recorded  experience  of  those 
who  have  learned  war  from  the  actual  reality,  and  must 
accumulate  by  reading  and  reflection  a  fund  of  military 
knowledge  based  upon  the  experience  of  others.  Any 
work  on  the  art  of  war  must,  to  be  of  value,  be  based 
primarily  upon  actual  facts;  and,  to  be  worthy  of  attea- 
tion,  its  theories  must  be  logical  deductions  from  experi- 
ence gained  on  the  field  of  battle. 

In  this  work,  the  author  has  sought  to  give  historical 
illustrations  and  examples  as  vouchers,  so  to  speak,  for 
the  soundness  of  his  premises  or  for  the  correctness  of  his 
assertions.  Where  changes  in  arms  and  equipments  have 
brought  into  existence  conditions  as  yet  untried  in  war, 
he  has  endeavored  to  collect  and  to  weigh  carefully  the 
opinions  of  the  best  military  authorities  of  both  hemi- 
spheres, and  to  adopt  such  views  as  seem  to  him  to  be  the 

VI 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  vn 

logical  outcome  of  the  stated  conditions.  But,  as  every 
war  has  its  surprises,  and  every  conflict  brings  forth  some- 
thing as  yet  unforeseen,  it  must  be  admitted  that  any 
theory  as  to  the  tactics  to  be  employed  under  the  new 
conditions  of  war  may  possibly  be  demolished  in  the  very 
next  collision  of  armed  forces.  Only  those  tactical  meth- 
ods which  are  based  on  actual  experience,  and  which  may 
be  used  again  under  the  same  or  very  similar  conditions, 
can  be  advocated  with  confidence. 

If  armies  were  always  composed  of  men  having  the 
same  physical  and  moral  qualities,  the  same  arms  and 
equipments,  the  same  animating  impulses,  and  the  same 
degree  of  discipline;  and  if  then  the  operations  were  al- 
ways conducted  in  the  same  theater,  and  the  battles  were 
always  fought  on  the  same  terrain,  rules  might  be  confi- 
dent^ prescribed  for  the  conduct  of  all  military  operations, 
and  war  wooild  become  almost  an  exact  science.  But  the 
conditions  vary  in  nearly  every  respect;  no  two  battles 
are  fought  in  the  same  way;  and  the  most  carefully  ma- 
tured plans  have  to  be  quickly  altered  to  meet  new  and 
unforeseen  circumstances.  Human  nature  alone  remains 
the  same;  all  else  is  subject  to  many  and  great  alterations. 
For  this  reason,  the  caution  will  often  be  found  in  the  fol- 
lowing pages,  that  the  line  of  conduct  to  be  adopted  will 
depend  upon  the  circumstances  of  the  action  and  the  na- 
ture of  the  terrain.  No  fear  of  criticism  for  this  frequent 
repetition  is  entertained;  the  only  anxiety  in  this  regard 
is  that  the  caution  may  not  have  been  repeated  often 
enough. 

It  may  be  asked  then,  What  is  the  use  of  prescribing 
"normal  formations,"  since  everything  is,  after  all,  de- 
pendent upon  the  circumstances  of  each  case?  The  an- 
swer is  simple:  They  furnish  a  standard,  in  the  main  cor- 
rect, from  which  an  officer  in  action  can  vary  according  to 
the  conditions  presented,  and  they  do  not  leave  him  alto- 
gether without  a  guide.  They  furnish  a  basis  upon  which 
a  commander  may  construct  his  own  formations;  and  their 
value  depends  upon  the  indisputa^e  fact  that  it  is  much 
more  difficult  to  create  a  system  in  the  turmoil  of  conflict 


vui  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

than  it  is  to  alter  and  adapt  to  circumstances  a  system 
already  existing,  and  suited  to  many  conditions,  though 
far  from  being  applicable  to  all. 

Our  best  military  les-sons  must  be  sought  in  the  his- 
tory of  wars  that  were  fought  under  conditions  most  sim- 
ilar to  those  likely  to  be  encountered  by  us  in  the  near 
future.  For  this  reason,  in  endeavoring  to  draw  from  the 
experience  of  the  past  a  guide  for  the  future,  preference 
has  been  given  to  those  conflicts  most  recent  in  date,  and 
to  those  fought  on  a  terrain  similar  to  that  on  which  our 
armies  must  contend  in  future  conflicts.  The  tactical  de- 
ductions contained  in  this  work  have,  therefore,  been 
based  mainly  upon  the  history  of  the  War  of  Secession 
and  the  recent  European  conflicts,  though  more  remote 
campaigns  have  been  found  to  convey,  in  more  than  one 
instance,  a  valuable  illustration  of  a  tactical  truth.  Of 
even  more  value  than  the  written  records  of  history  are 
the  ideas  of  living  soldiers  derived  from  their  own  expe- 
rience in  campaign  and  battle.  The  author  has  accord- 
ingly sought  to  gain,  by  means  of  correspondence  or  per- 
sonal interview,  a  knowledge  of  the  views  held  on  many 
tactical  matters  by  distinguished  soldiers  of  our  own  Army, 
who,  having  passed  through  the  great  Civil  War,  have 
accumulated  an  invaluable  fund  of  tactical  knowledge  from 
their  own  experience.  His  inquiries  have  met  with  full 
and  courteous  replies  from  many  officers  whose  opinions 
are  entitled  to  the  greatest  weight,  and  he  is  thus  enabled 
to  give  to  his  work  a  much  greater  value  than  it  could 
otherwise  hope  to  possess. 

A  good  understanding  of  the  tactics  of  an  arm  being 
impossible  without  some  knowledge  of  its  history,  it  has 
been  deemed  advisable  to  present  an  historical  summary 
of  the  tactics  of  modern  infantry,  cavalry,  and  field  artil- 
lery. It  is  believed  that  these  chapters  constitute  a  valua- 
ble feature  of  the  book;  but  they  are  intended  for  indi- 
vidual perusal  rather  than  for  use  in  the  section-room, 
and  may  be  omitted  when  the  work  is  used  as  a  text-book, 
without  destroying  the  symmetry  or  continuity  of  the  rest 
of  the  course. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  ix 


NOTE. 


The  author  has,  in  some  cases,  expressed  in  foot-notes  his 
obligations  to  officers  who,  in  reply  to  his  inquiries,  have  favored 
him  with  information  on  various  points.  He  desires  here  to  extend 
his  thanks  especially  to  Brigadier-General  Wesley  Merritt,  U.  S.  A.; 
Colonel  H.  S.  Hawkins,  20th  Infantry;  Brevet  Brigadier-General 
Guy  V.  Henry,  5th  Cavalry;  Major  H.  C.  Hasbrouck,  4th  Artillery; 
Major  Arthur  MacArthur,  A.  A.  G.;  Brevet  Major  W.  A.  Kobbe,  3d 
Artillery;  and  Captain  E.  S.  Godfrey,  7th  Cavalry— for  valued  criti- 
cism and  comments  on  several  chapters  of  the  work  which  appeared 
in  the  Journal  of  the  U.  8.  Cavalry  Association,  and  in  pamphlet 
form. 

To  Lieutenant-Colonel  C.  R.  Greenleaf,  Lieutenant-Colonel  A. 
A.  Woodhull,  and  Major  J.  Van  R.  Hoff,  Medical  Department,  he  is 
indebted  for  information  relative  to  the  organization  of  the  hospital 
service  in  the  field;  and  he  is  under  similar  obligations  to  Captain 
J.  G.  D.  Knight,  C.  E.,  and  Captain  C.  W.  Whipple,  Ordnance  De- 
partment, for  information  in  regard  to  their  respective  corps. 

He  is  also  indebted  to  Captain  Eben  Swift,  5th  Cavalry,  and 
Lieutenant  Carl  Reichmann,  9th  Infantry,  assistant  instructors  in 
Military  Art  at  the  U.  S.  Infantry  and  Cavalry  School  (in  which 
the  advanced  sheets  of  most  of  the  chapters  have  been  used  in  the 
course  of  instruction),  for  a  number  of  valuable  suggestions,  which 
he  has  adopted. 

To  Lieutenant  C.  B.  Hagadorn,  23d  Infantry,  he  is  greatly 
obliged  for  the  preparation  of  the  figures  with  which  the  work  is 
illustrated. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 


EXPLANATORY  NOTE. 


United  States  Infantry  and  Cavalry  School  and  Staff  College, 
Fort  Leavenworth,  Kansas,  March  1,  1906. 

The  author  of  this  book,  the  late  Colonel  A.  L.  Wagner,  Gen- 
eral Staff,  U.  S.  A'rmy,  while  on  duty  as  assistant  commandant  at 
this  School,  collected  data  and  solicited  the  assistance  of  the  Col- 
lege in  a  proposed  revision  thereof.  He  was  soon  ordered  to  Wash- 
ington and  assigned  to  duty  with  the  Army  War  College.  Here  he 
found  himself  so  completely  occupied  that  he  could  devote  no  at- 
tention to  anything  else. 

His  untimely  death  occurred  shortly  afterwards,  and  his  pub- 
lisher then  visited  me  for  the  purpose  of  asking  advice  and  assist- 
ance in  securing  the  revision  Colonel  Wagner  had  contemplated. 

A  number  of  officers,  considered  well  qualified  to  undertake 
the  work,  were  mentioned  to  the  publisher,  and,  at  his  request,  I 
wrote  to  the  widow  of  Colonel  Wagner  to  ascertain  her  wishes  in 
the  premises.  The  names  of  the  officers  whom  I  had  mentioned  to 
the  publisher,  among  them  several  each  from  the  Infantry  and  Cav- 
alry branches  of  the  Service,  were  submitted  to  Mrs.  Wagner's 
choice.  She  expressed  a  preference  that  the  work  should  be  under- 
taken by  the  three  officers  whose  names  appear  on  the  title-page, 
because  they  were  honor  and  distinguished  graduates  of  the  In- 
fantry and  Cavalry  School  and  graduates  of  the  Staff  College,  and 
also  because  they  were  stationed  at  the  same  post,  where  they  could 
collaborate  with  each  other. 

It  was  further  agreed  that  the  work  of  these  three  officers 
should  be  submitted  to  the  assistant  commandant,  Major  Eben  Swift, 
12th  Cavalry,  and  to  those  instructors  of  the  Department  of  Mili- 
tary Art  who  had  been  engaged  in  teaching  the  subject  of  Organiza- 
tion and  Tactics.  The  proof-sheets  as  corrected  by  the  revisers 
were  submitted  to  those  officers,  and  they  went  over  the  revision 
carefully  prior  to  publication. 

J.  F.  BELL, 
Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  Army, 

Commandant. 


LIST  OF  BOOKS 

CONSULTED  IN  THE  PREPARATION  OP  THIS  WORK. 


Across  the  Continent  with  the  Fifth  Cavalry — Price. 

Annals  of  the  Sixth  Pennsylvania  Cavalry — Gracey. 

Armies  of  Asia  and  Europe — Upton. 

Armies  of  To-day — Merritt,  Wolseley,  Exner,  Lewal,  and  others. 

Art  of  War — Jomini  (tr.  by  Mendell  and  Craighill). 

Army  and  Navy  in  the  Civil  War — Scribner's  Series. 

Artillery  Drill  Regulations,  U.  S. 

Artillery:  Its  Progress  and  Present  Condition — Lloyd  and  Hadcock. 

Batailles  et  Principaux  Combats  de  la  Guerre  de  Sept  Ans — Decker 

(tr.  by  De  Peretsdorf). 
Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War. 

Campaigns  of  Lieutenant-General  Forrest — Jordan  and  Pryor. 
Campaigns  of  Stuart's  Cavalry — McClellan    (H.  B.). 
Campaigns  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac — Swinton. 
Cavalry  Drill  Regulations,  U.  S. 
Cavalry  in  Modern  War — Trench. 
Cavalry:   Its  History  and  Tactics — Nolan. 
Cavalry  Outpost  Duties — De  Brack   (tr.  by  Carr). 
Commentaries — Caesar. 

Duties  of  the  General  Staff — Bronsart  von  Schellendorf. 
Elements  of  Modern  Tactics — Shaw. 
Esprit  des  Institutions  Militaires — Marmont 
Etudes  sur  la  Tactique — Grivet. 
Field  Artillery— Pratt. 
Field  Artillery  Fire— White. 

German  Artillery  in  the  Battles  near  Metz — Hoffbauer. 
Great  Campaigns  in  Europe — Adams. 
History  of  Cavalry — Denison. 
History  of  Europe — Alison. 
History  of  Frederick  the  Great — Carlyle. 
History  of  Minty  and  the  Cavalry— Vale. 
History  of  Morgan's  Cavalry — Duke. 
History   of  the   Campaign   of   1866    in   Germany — Prussian   Official 

Account. 

XI 


xii  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

History  of  the  American  Civil  War — Draper. 

History  of  the  Civil  War  in  America— Comte  de  Paris. 

History  of  the  Consulate  and  Empire — Thiers. 

History  of  the  Crimean  War — Hamley. 

History  of  the  Crimean  War — Kinglake. 

History  of  the   Franco-German  War — Borbstaedt    (tr.   by   Dwyer). 

History  of  the  Franco-German  War — Prussian  Official  Account. 

History  of  the  Franco-German  War — Von  Moltke   (tr.  by  Bell  and 

Fischer). 

History  of  the  Peninsula  War — Napier. 
History  of  the  Soudan  Campaign — Colyille. 
History  of  the  Tenth  New  York  Cavalry — Preston. 
History  of  the  Thirty  Years'  War— Gindely. 
History  of  the  United  States — Adams. 
History  of  the  War  with  Mexico — Ripley. 
Historical  Sketch  of  Artillery,  U.  S.  Army— Birkhimer. 
Infantry  Drill  Regulations,  U.  S. 
Infantry  Fire:   Its  Use  in  Battle — Batchelor. 
Infantry  Fire  Tactics — Mayne. 

Journal  of  the  Military  Service  Institution  of  the  United  States. 
Journal  of  the  Royal  United  Service  Institution. 
Journal  of  the  U.  S.  Cavalry  Association. 
Journal  of  the  United  Service  Institution  of  India. 
L'Arme'e  Americaine — De  Chanal 
L'Exercice  et  les  Manoeuvres  de  1'Infanterie — French  Official  Book, 

1894. 

La  Fortification  du  Champ  de  Bataille— Brialmont. 
Les  Elements  de  la  Tactique — Meckel   (tr.  by  Monet). 
Letters   on   Artillery — Prince   Kraft  zu   Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen    (tr. 

by  Walford). 
Letters   on    Cavalry — Prince    Kraft    zu    Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen    (tr. 

by  Walford). 
Letters   on   Infantry — Prince   Kraft   zu   Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen    (tr. 

by  Walford). 

Life  of  Andrew  Jackson — Parton. 
Life  of  Frederick  the  Great— Brackenbury. 
Life  of  Napoleon — Jomini   (tr.  by  Halleck). 
Life  of  Washington— Irving. 
Life  of  Zachary  Taylor — Howard. 
Manual  of  Military  Field  Engineering — Beach. 
Maximes  de  Guerre — Napoleon. 
McClellan's  Own  Story— McClellan   (G.  B.). 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  xm 

Memoirs  of  Baron  de  Marbot — Marbot. 

Memoirs  of  General  P.  H.  Sheridan — Sheridan. 

Memoirs  of  General  W.  T.  Sherman — Sherman. 

Memoirs  of  General  U.  S.  Grant — Grant. 

Methodes  de  Guerre  Actuelles,  et  vers  la  Fin  du  XIXe  Siecle— 

Pierron. 

Military  Antiquities— Grose. 

Military  Art  and  History — Duparcq   (tr.  by  Cullum). 
Military  Transport — Furse. 
Minor  Tactics — Clery. 
Modern  Artillery— Owen. 
Modern  Tactics — Gall. 

Modern  War — Derre"cagaix   (tr.  by  Foster). 
New  Tactics  of  Infantry — Von  Scherff. 
Official  Records  of  the  Rebellion. 
Ordnance  Notes. 

Ordnance  and  Gunnery — Benton. 
Ordnance  and  Gunnery — Bruff. 
Ordnance  and  Gunnery — Meigs  and  Ingersoll. 
Operations  of  War — Hamley. 
Partisan  Life  with  Mosby — Scott. 
Precis  de  la  Campagne  de  1859  en  Italie — Falk. 
Precis  of  Modern  Tactics — Home. 
Preliminary  Tactics — Baker. 
Proceedings  of  the  Royal  Artillery  Institution. 
Quatre  Bras,  Ligny,  and  Waterloo— Gardner. 
R£glement  sur  la  Service  des  Armies  en  Campagne — De  Savoye. 
Reports  of  the  British  Naval  and  Military  Operations  in  Egypt,  1882 

— Goodrich. 

Reports  of  the  Chief  of  Ordnance,  U.  S.  A.,  for  1891-92. 
Sam  Houston  and  the  War  of  Independence  in  Texas — Williams. 
School  and  Army  in  France  and  Germany — Hazen. 
Soldiers'  Pocket  Book — Wolseley. 

Souvenirs  du  Capitaine  Denis  Charles  Parquin— Parquin. 
Strategy  and  Grand  Tactics — Dufour   (tr.  by  Craighill). 
Tactical  Deductions  from  the  War  of  1870-71 — Boguslawski. 
The  Battles  of  Plevna— Von  Trotha  (MS.  translation  by  Reichmann). 
The  Cavalry  in  the  Battle  of  Vionville-Mars-la-Tour— Kaehler   (MS. 

translation  by  Reichmann). 
The  Cavalry  Division  as  a  Body  in  the  Fight— Hoenig  (tr.  by  Lev- 

erson). 


xiv  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

The  Chilean  Revolution  of  1891 — Sears  and  Wells. 

The  French  Cavalry  in  1870 — Bonie. 

The  Nation  in  Arms — Von  der  Goltz. 

The  Progress  of  Tactics  from  1859  to  1890,  and  the  Attack  of  the 

Future — Boguslawski   (tr.  by  Gawne). 

The  Russian  Army  and  Its  Campaigns  in  Turkey — Greene. 
The  Story  of  a  Cavalry  Regiment;  Fourth  Iowa  Veteran  Volunteers 

—Scott. 

The  Story  of  the  Fifty-fifth  Illinois  Infantry — Crooker. 
The  Tactics  of  Field  Artillery— Von  Schell. 
Three  Main  Military  Questions  of  the  Day— Havelock. 
Tactique  de  Combat  des  Trois  Armes — Brialmont. 
The   Warfare   of   the   Future — Forbes    (in   the   Nineteenth   Century 

Magazine). 

Troops  in  Campaign — Official. 
War — Clausewitz. 
War — Maurice. 
War  Reminiscences — Mosby. 


ADDITIONAL  LIST  OF  AUTHORITIES 
CONSULTED  BY  THE  REVISERS. 


Administration,  Organization  and  Tactics  Made  Easy — Banning. 

Army  of  the  Swiss  Confederation,  Manuscript  Translation,  by 
Foerster. 

Austro-Hungarian  Army,  The,  Manuscript  Translation,  by  Black. 

Belgian,  Bulgarian,  and  Danish  Armies,  The,  Manuscript  Transla- 
tion, by  Bussche. 

Brevities;   Italy,  Austro-Hungary,  Manuscript  Translation,  by  Oden. 

Bulletin  of  Military  Notes,  No.  3,  War  Department  Publication. 

Cavalry  Drill  Regulations,  U.  S.  Army,  1902. 

Cavalry  Tactics  of  To-day — Andrew. 

Conduct  of  a  Contact  Squadron — de  Biensau. 

Field  Service  Regulations,  U.  S.  Army,  1905. 

Firing  Regulations,  U.  S.  Army,  1904. 

From  the  Yalu  to  Port  Arthur— Wood. 

German  Army,  The,  Manuscript  Translation,  by  Allen. 

History  of  the  Third  Pennsylvania  Cavalry,  Historical  Committee. 

Infantry  Drill  Regulations,  U.  S.  Army,  1904. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  xv 

International  Encyclopedia. 

Japanese  Army,  The,  Manuscript  Translation — Tupes. 

Jena  or  Sedan,  Manuscript  Translation,  by  Norton. 

Journals  of  the  Military  Service  Institution  of  the  United  States. 

Journals  of  the  U.  S.  Cavalry  Association. 

Journals  of  the  U.  S.  Infantry  Association. 

Lectures  on  Organization  and  Tactics,  Infantry  and  Cavalry  School 

and  Staff  College,  1904,  1905. 
Letters  on  Applied  Tactics — Griepenkerl. 
Letter  on  Strategy — Prince  Kraft  zu  Hohenlohe  Ingelflngen. 
Manual  of  the  Service  of  Security  and  Information — Anderson. 
Military  Reminiscences  of  the  Civil  War — Cox. 
Military  System  of  Spain,  1903,  Manuscript  Translation,  by  Neisser. 
Military  System  of  Sweden,  1903,  Manuscript  Translation,  by  Neisser. 
Military  System  of  the  Swiss  Federation,  1903,  Manuscript  Transla- 
tion, by  Neisser. 

Napoleon  as  a  General — Count  Yorck  von  Wartenburg. 
New  Field  Artillery  Materiel,  The,  Its  Characteristics  and  Powers— 

Spaulding. 
News  from  the  Austro-Hungarian  Army,  Manuscript  Translation,  by 

Norton. 
News  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Army,   Manuscript  Translation,  by 

Oden. 

Notes  from  the  Belgian  Army,  Manuscript  Translation,  by  Johnston. 
Norwegian  Army  of  1904,  Manuscript  Translation,  by  Oden. 
Practical  Field  Exercises  in  Tactics  and  Strategy — Wisser. 
Provisional   Manual   of  Drill   Regulations   for   Mountain    Artillery, 

1903,  Manuscript  Translation,  by  Wood. 
Report  of  the  Chief  of  Ordnance,  U.  S.  Army,  1905. 
Reorganization  of  the  English  Army,   Manuscript  Translation,   by 

Keesling. 
Reorganization  of  the  Spanish  Army,  Manuscript  Translation,   by 

Gilbert. 
Reorganization  of   the   Spanish   Army   and   the   Military   Services, 

Manuscript  Translation,  by  Aultman. 

Russian  Army  of  1903,  The,  Manuscript  Translation,  by  Girard. 
Status  of  the  French  Army  in  Comparison  with  the  German  Army, 

Manuscript  Translation,  by  Point. 
Tactics  of  To-day — Callwell. 
Transportation  of  Troops  and  Material — Baker. 
Truth  about  the  War,  The — Taburno. 
War  in  Practice — Baden-Powell. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


CHAPTEE  I. 

INTRODUCTION. 

PAGE. 

Strategy.  — Tactics.  — Logistics.  — Military  Engineering.  — Minor 
Tactics  and  Grand  Tactics. — Maneuver  Tactics  and  Fighting 
Tactics. — Organization  and  Tactics 1 

CHAPTEE  II. 
ORGANIZATION  AND  DISCIPLINE. 

Tactical  Organization. — The  Line. — Infantry. — Artillery. — Cav- 
alry.—The  Arms  Combined. — The  Army  Corps. — The  Army. 
— Proportions  of  the  Three  Arms. — Special  Troops. — Engin- 
eers.— Signal  Corps. — Medical  Department. — Military  Police. 
— Mounted  Couriers. — The  Train. — Ammunition  Supply. — 
Wagon  Trains.  —  Supply  Columns.  —  Reserve  Supply  Col- 
umns.— Location  of  Trains  on  the  March. — Total  Transporta- 
tion of  the  Division.— The  Staff.— The  Military  Staff.— The 
Administrative  Staff. — Tabular  Statement. — Rank  and  Com- 
mand.— Recruitment. — Discipline S 

CHAPTEE  III. 

CHARACTERISTICS  OP  THE  THREE  ARMS. 

Infantry. — Powers  and  Limitations  of  Infantry. — Arms  and  Ac- 
tion.— Intrenching  Tool. — Pace  of  Infantry. — Essential  Qual- 
ities of  Infantry. — Cavalry. — Shock  Action. — Dismounted 
Fire  Action. — Mounted  Fire  Action  with  Carbine. — Independ- 
ent Action. — Classes  of  Cavalry. — Arms. — Pace  of  Caval- 
ry.—  Powers  and  Limitations  of  Cavalry.  —  Mounted  In- 
fantry.—  Artillery. —  Classification. —  Arms. —  Pace  of  Artil- 
lery.— Powers  and  Limitations  of  Artillery.— Range. — Kinds 
of  Fire. — Projectiles. — Fuses. — Use  of  Different  Projectiles. — 
Field  Mortars. — Rapid-Firing  Guns.— Machine  Guns. — Cover 
for  Guns 43 

XVII 

—2— 


xvin  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

CHAPTER  IV. 

INFANTRY  IN  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE. 

PAGE. 

The  Offensive. — General  Theory  of  the  Attack. — The  Firing  Line. 
— Measures  for  Its  Control. — Fire  Discipline. — Long-Range 
Fire. — Time  of  Opening  Fire. — Volley  Firing. — Individual 
Fire. — Cover. — Rushes. — Composition  of  the  Firing  Line. — 
Scouts. — The  Support. — Object  of  the  Support. — Strength  of 
the  Support. — Distance  from  the  Firing  Line. — Formation  of 
the  Support. — Reinforcement  of  the  Firing  Line.— The  Re- 
serve.— The  Object  of  the  Reserve. — Formation  of  the  Re- 
serve.— Distance  of  the  Reserve  from  the  Bodies  in  Front. — 
Reinforcement  by  the  Reserve. — Strength  of  the  Reserve. — 
The  Second  Line. — Object  of  the  Second  Line. — Strength  of 
the  Second  Line. — Distance  from  the  First  Line. — Command. 
— The  Third  Line. — Objective  of  the  Third  Line. — Command. 
— Distance  from  the  Second  Line. — Strength. — The  Regi- 
ment of  Infantry  in  Attack. — The  Brigade  of  Infantry  in  At- 
tack.— General  Rules. — Summary. — Flank  Attacks. — The  De- 
fensive.— The  Firing  Line. — Preliminary  Dispositions.— Long- 
Range  Fire. — The  Objective  of  Fire. — The  Support. — The  Re- 
serve.— The  Second  Line. — The  Third  Line. — Counter  At- 
tacks.— The  Main  Reserve. — Guarding  the  Flanks. — Strength 
of  the  Three  Lines. — The  Selection  and  Occupation  of  the 
Position. — The  Use  of  Hasty  Intrenchments  by  Infantry. — 
Relative  Advantages  of  the  Offensive  and  Defensive. — The 
Defensive. — The  Offensive. — The  Withdrawal  from  Action. 
— The  Supply  of  Ammunition  on  the  Field. — Action  of  In- 
fantry against  Cavalry 63 

CHAPTER  V. 

CAVALRY  IN  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE. 

Preliminary  Discussion. — The  Charge  in  Line. — Formation. — 
Pace  and  Conduct  of  the  Attack. — Influence  of  the  Terrain. — 
Ground  Scouts  and  Combat  Patrols. — Flank  Attacks. — Time 
for  Attack. — The  Charge  in  Column  and  as  Foragers. — Cav- 
alry against  Cavalry. — Cavalry  against  Infantry. — Formation 
for  Attack. — The  Use  of  Cavalry  against  Infantry  Not  a 
Thing  of  the  Past.— Cavalry  against  Artillery. — Formation 
for  Attack. — Measures  to  Be  Taken  on  Capturing  a  Battery. 
—Defensive  Use  of  Shock  Action. — Dismounted  Action. — 
Increased  Value  of  Dismounted  Action. — Formation. — Offen- 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.    •  xix 

PAGE. 

sire  Action. — Defensive  Action. — Mounted  Fire  Action. — 
Cavalry  Raids. — When  Raids  Are  Practicable. — Composi- 
tion and  Preparation  of  a  Raiding  Force. — Conduct  of  the 
Raid. — Destruction  of  Communications. — Summary 119 

CHAPTER  VI. 

ARTILLERY  IN  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE. 
General  Theory  of  the  Employment  of  Artillery  in  Attack. — The 
Tactics  of  Field  Artillery. — Tactical  and  Technical  Handling. 
— Position. — Reconnaissance  of  Position. — Changes  of  Posi- 
tion.— Opening  Fire. — Objective. — Reconnaissance  of  Hostile 
Position. — Concentration  of  Fire. — Fire  Control. — Duties  of 
Battery  and  Battalion  Commanders. — The  Artillery  Duel. — 
Preparation  for  Infantry  Attack. — Supporting  the  Infantry 
Attack. — The  Advance  to  New  Positions. — Occupation  of  the 
Hostile  Positions. — Use  of  Horse  Batteries. — Withdrawal  in 
Case  of  Repulse. — Artillery  in  Defense. — The  Position. — Fire 
Control. — Use  in  Advance  Posts  and  Positions. — Division  of 
Batteries. — Time  of  Opening  Fire.— Sectors  of  Fire. — Declin- 
ing the  Duel. — Repelling  the  Infantry  Assault. — Flanking 
Fire. — Withdrawal  of  Guns. — Artillery  on  the  March. — Posi- 
tion in  Column. — Use  in  Advance  Guards. — Use  in  Rear 
Guards. — Use  in  Flank  Guards. — Outpost  Duty. — Summary 
of  General  Principles  Governing  the  Employment  of  Artil- 
lery in  Battle 153 

CHAPTER  VII. 

THE  THREE  ARMS  COMBINED. 

The  Offensive. — The  Plan  of  Battle. — Relative  Advantages  of  the 
Offensive  and  Defensive. — Direction  of  the  Attack. — Frontal 
Attack. — Flank  Attack. — Piercing  the  Enemy's  Front. — 
Orders  of  Battle. — Points  of  Attack. — Strategical  Considera- 
tions.— Tactical  Considerations. — Formulation  of  the  Plan 
of  Battle. — The  Order. — The  Commander. — The  Reserve. — 
The  Three  Arms  in  Attack. — Preparatory  Stage. — The  Deci- 
sive Action. — The  Occupation  of  the  Position.— The  Pursuit. 
— Withdrawal  after  Repulse. — Summary. — The  Three  Arms 
in  Defense. — The  Position. — The  Ground  in  Front  of  the  Po- 
sition.— The  Position  Proper. — The  Ground  in  Rear  of  the 
Position. — Requirements  of  a  Good  Position.— Orders  of  Bat- 
tle.— The  Concave  Order. — The  Convex  Order. — The  Crotchet 
Order.— Formulation  of  the  Plan  of  Defense.— The  Order. — 


xx  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

PAGE. 

The  Preparatory  Stage. — The  Decisive  Action. — The  Counter- 
Attack— The  Withdrawal— Night  Attacks 181 

CHAPTEE  VIII. 
CONVOYS. 

Definition  and  Classification  of  Convoys. — Convoys  by  Land. — 
Wagon  Trains. — Organization. — March  of  the  Convoy. — 
Camps. — The  Escort. — The  Advance  Cavalry. — The  Advance 
Guard. — The  Main  Body. — The  Rear  Guard. — The  Defense  of 
the  Convoy. — The  Attack  of  Convoys. — Convoys  of  Prison- 
ers.— Convoys  by  Railroad.— Convoys  by  Water 229 

CHAPTEE  IX. 

HISTORICAL  SKETCH  OP  MODERN  INFANTRY. 
The  Middle  Ages. — The  Introduction  of  the  Musket. — The  Thirty 
Years  War. — The  Wars  of  Louis  XIV. — The  Wars  of  Fred- 
erick the  Great, — The  American  Revolution. — The  Napole- 
onic Era. — The  Crimean  War. — The  Italian  War. — The  War 
of  Secession.  —  The  Austro  -  Prussian  War.  —  The  Franco- 
German  War. — The  Russo-Turkish  War. — Recent  Changes. .  247 

CHAPTEE  X. 

HISTORICAL  SKETCH  OF  MODERN  CAVALRY. 
The  Middle  Ages.— The  Thirty  Years  War.— The  Wars  of  Louis 
XIV. — The  Wars  of  Frederick  the  Great. — The  Napoleonic 
Era. — The  Crimean  and  Italian  Wars. — The  War  of  Seces- 
sion.— Confederate  Partisan  Cavalry. — The  Regular  Caval- 
ry.— The  Confederate  Cavalry. — The  United  States  Caval- 
ry.— Mounted  Infantry. — The  Austro-Prussian  War. — The 
Franco-iCterman  War. — The  Russo-Turkish  War. — Conclu- 
sions  283 

CHAPTEE  XL 

HISTORICAL  SKETCH  OF  FIELD  ARTILLERY. 

Ancient  Missile  Machines. — Early  Cannon. — The  Franco-German- 
Spanish  Wars.  —  The  French  Religious  War.  —  The  Thirty 
Years  War. — The  Wars  of  Louis  XIV. — The  Wars  of  Fred- 
erick the  Great. — The  Reforms  of  Gribeauval. — The  Napole- 
onic Era. — The  British  Artillery. — The  Crimean  War. — The 
Italian  War. — The  War  of  Secession. — The  Austro-Prussian 
War. — The  Franco-German  War. — The  Russo-Turkish  War  .32? 

Questions 368 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 


CHAPTER  1. 

INTRODUCTION. 

"Not  many  officers  are  required  to  exercise  strategy,  but  it  is 
with  tactics  that  most  of  us  have  to  deal." — Boguslawski. 

The  two  great  divisions  of  the  Art  of  War  are  Strategy 
and  Tactics. 

Strategy  is  the  art  of  moving  an  army  in  the  theater  of 
operations,  with  a  view  to  placing  it  in  such  a  position,  rel- 
ative to  the  enemy,  as  to  increase  the  probability  of  victory, 
increase  the  consequences  of  victory,  or  lessen  the  conse- 
quences of  defeat. 

Tactics  is  the  art  01'  disposing  and  maneuvering  troops 
on  the  field  of  battle. 

The  Art  of  War  also  embraces  Logistics  ai-d  Military 
Engineering;  the  former  comprising  everything  relating  to 
the  movement  and  supply  of  armies,  and  the  latter,  all  that 
pertains  to  fortification  and  siege  operations.  Logistics  be- 
longs mainly  to  the  province  of  Strategy,  while  Military 
Engineering  pertains  chiefly  to  the  domain  of  Tactics.  Lo- 
gistics, it  is  true,  runs  almost  imperceptibly  from  strategy 
into  tactics,  and  military  engineering,  especially  that  part 
relating  to  permanent  fortification,  furnishes  a  great  ele- 
ment to  be  considered  in  strategical  questions.  Still  it  is 
essentially  correct  to  assign  the  former  to  the  province  of 
strategy  and  the  latter  to  that  of  tactics. 

Sooner  or  later,  all  strategical  operations  must  termi- 
nate in  a  battle ;  for,  as  a  rule  almost  without  exception,  no 
army  will  surrender  without  a  final  resort  to  the  chances  of 
the  battle-field,  however  desperate  its  strategical  situation 
may  be.*  Tactics  is  therefore  the  necessary  complement 
of  strategy,  and  the  most  brilliant  strategical  movements 

*The  surrender  of  Mack  at  Ulm  supplies  an  exception  to  this 
rule;  but  it  furnishes  no  exception  to  the  disgrace  that  inevitably 
overtakes  a  general  who  yields  without  a  last  effort  to  extricate 
himself  from  strategic  toils  by  a  vigorous  resort  to  battle. 


2  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

must  be  fruitless  if  they  be  not  supplemented  with  success- 
ful tactical  operations. 

Tactics  is  often  divided  into  Minor  Tactics  and  Grand 
Tactics ;  the  first  relating  to  the  movements  of  small  bodies 
and  the  tactics  of  separate  arms,  while  the  latter  includes 
the  combination  of  the  several  arms  and  the  handling  of 
armies  in  battle.  This  division  of  the  subject  is  not  an  es- 
sential one,  however,  as  the  general  principles  of  tactics  are 
the  same  whether  the  body  of  troops  considered  be  large  or 
small.  Tactics  may  also  be  divided  into  Maneuver  Tactics 
and  Fighting  Tactics;  the  first  relating  to  the  movements 
by  which  troops  are  brought  into  position  on  the  field  of 
battle,  and  the  second  having  reference  to  the  formations 
for  attack  and  defense  and  the  handling  off  troops  in  actual 
battle.  Maneuver  Tactics  furnishes  the  connecting  link 
between  strategy  and  tactics,  as  it  consists  entirely  of  drill 
movements,  which,  being  also  employed  in  marching,  per- 
tain as  well  to  strategy;  moreover,  it  forms  the  transition 
from  the  movements  in  the  theater  of  operations  to  thosa 
of  actual  conflict.  All  essentials  of  maneuver  tactics  can 
be  learned  from  the  Drill  Regulations;  but  fighting  tactics, 
or  tactics  proper,  requires  more  extended  consideration. 

Strategy  is  largely  independent  of  all  details  of  organi- 
zation, arms,  etc.,  of  the  army;  but  tactics  varies  with  all 
such  details,  and  a  consideration  of  the  organization  of 
armies  and  the  weapons  and  general  characteristics  of  the 
several  arms  of  the  service  is,  therefore,  a  necessary  pre- 
liminary to  the  study  of  the  methods  of  handling  troops  on 
the  field  of  battle.  For  this  reason,  the  subjects  of  Organ- 
ization and  Tactics  are  here  treated  together. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  3 

CHAPTER  II. 

ORGANIZATION  AND  DISCIPLINE. 

"The  advantages  of  military  science  and  discipline  cannot  be 
exerted  unless  a  proper  number  of  soldiers  are  united  into  one  body 
and  actuated  by  one  soul." — Gibbon, 

A  perfect  army  would  be  one  in  which  each  part  could 
respond  to  the  will  of  the  commander  as  quickly  and  cer- 
tainly as  the  muscles  of  the  body  respond  to  the  impulse  of 
the  brain.  The  more  closely  a  military  force  approaches  to 
this  impossible  ideal,  the  more  does  it  merit  the  title  of  an 
army;  and  the  farther  it  recedes  from  it,  the  more  certainly 
does  it  become  a  mere  armed  mob,  highly  susceptible  to  the 
influence  of  chance,  and  uncertain  in  its  action,  even  when 
opposed  by  a  foe  no  better  than  itself. 

It  is  not  sufficient  that  an  army  be  composed  of  intel- 
ligent, well-instructed,  brave,  and  obedient  soldiers,  well 
armed  and  equipped.  There  is  a  limit,  quickly  reached,  to 
the  size  of  the  command  that  can  be  controlled  directly  bj 
one  man;  and  the  proper  direction  of  an  army  requires  that 
it  should  be  divided  primarily  into  units  small  enough  to 
be  controlled  by  the  voice,  and  influenced  by  the  example, 
of  their  leaders.  These  units  are  grouped  into  larger  units, 
and  these  again  into  still  larger  ones,  ^ach  group  under  its 
special  commander;  steps  being  thus  formed,  as  it  were, 
by  which  the  will  of  the  commander  of  the  army  can  de- 
scend to  touch  the  lowest  soldier.  Tactical  organization 
may,  therefore,  be  defined  as  the  arrangement  of  an  army 
for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  its  most  prompt  and  powerful 
action  in  response  to  the  will  of  the  commander. 

The  entire  theory  of  organization  rests  upon  the  prin- 
ciple of  individual  responsibility  and  subordination,  so  that, 
no  matter  how  small  or  how  great  the  number  of  individ- 
uals gathered  together,  some  one  is  responsible,  to  whom 
the  others  must  be  subordinate.  This  responsibility  and 
subordination  are  the  great  factors  in  the  control  of  the 
army. 


4  OBGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

THE  LINE, 

Infantry. — The  tactical  unit  on  which  the  organization 
of  an  army  should  be  based  is  the  largest  body  of  troops 
that  can  be  directly  commanded  by  a  single  leader.  It  is  the 
basis  of  organization  for  the  tactical  handling  of  troops  in 
the  field.  Used  in  this  connection,  it  appears  to  be  the 
smallest  body  of  infantry  capable  of  carrying  out  a  definite 
object  in  the  attack  through  its  several  phases. 

The  battalion  was  formerly  regarded  as  the  tactical 
unit;  but  in  most  of  the  European  armies  and  the  Army  of 
Japan  its  place  in  this  respect  has  been  taken  by  the 
company  of  150  to  250  men.  In  the  Napoleonic  wars  the 
French  battalion  of  about  500  men  seems  to  have  been  a 
very  satisfactory  unit.*  With  the  murderous  fire  and  ex- 
tended order  of  the  present  day,  a  smaller  unit  is  necessary 
than  in  the  early  part  of  the  last  century,  and  the  large 
company  of  the  continental  ajrmies  is  undoubtedly  better 
than  their  battalion  as  a  tactical  unit.  The  British  Co*n 
pany  of  3  officers  and  113  men  is  regarded  as  too  small  as  a 
tactical  unit,  while  their  battalion  of  eight  companies  would 
appear  to  be  unwieldy,  but  their  half-battalion  or  wing  cor- 
responds very  closely  with  the  battalion  in  the  United 
States  Army. 

Our  small  battalion  has,  in  an  indirect  but  positive 
way,  been  approved  by  our  own  experience  in  war.  General 
Schofield  is  of  the  opinion  that  our  deplorable  methods  of 
recruitment  in  the  War  of  Secession  (by  which  veteran 
regiments  were  allowed  to  dwindle  away)  were  not  without 
a  partly  redeeming  feature;  for  the  unwieldy  battalions, 
consisting  each  of  a  full  regiment,  were  reduced  to  flexible, 
well-seasoned,  small  battalions,  easily  handled,  and  furnish- 
ing, quite  by  accident,  the  tactical  unit  which  should  have 
been  adopted  at  the  beginning  and  constantly  maintained 
On  our  greatest  battle-fields  the  best  work  was  done  by 
these  small  regiments,  which  were,  in  fact,  excellent  tac- 
tical units. 


*At  Rivoli  the  French  battalions  were  each  about  300  mem 
strong.  At  Austerlitz  each  battalion  numbered  550.  Althougk 
sometimes  reaching  a  paper  strength  of  700  men,  the  battalions 
were  much  oftener  under  than  over  the  strength  of  500. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  5 

It  may,  then,  be  safely  assumed  that  the  best  organiza- 
tion for  our  infantry  requires  companies  of  about  125  men 
each,  and  battalions  of  four  companies — this  organization 
being  most  in  accord  with  the  teaching  of  our  own  experi- 
ence and  with  the  conditions  of  the  modern  battle-field.  As- 
suming this  as  our  company  and  battalion  organization,  the 
battalion  is  the  natural  tactical  unit. 

The  almost  universal  division  of  the  battalion  is  into 
four  companies.  The  company  is  sometimes  designated 
as  a  "fighting  unit"  or  "unit  of  combat,"  but  these  designa- 
tions seem  quite  superfluous;  the  battalion  is  the  tactical 
unit,  and  the  company  is  merely  a  convenient  fraction  there- 
of. The  company  is  divided  into  two  platoons,  each  under 
command  of  a  lieutenant;  the  platoon  is  again  divided  into 
two  sections,  each  under  command  of  a  sergeant;  and  the 
section®  are  finally  divided  into  squads  of  8  men  each. 
The  squad  is  the  smallest  aggregation  of  soldiers.* 

The  company  is  the  largest  organization  in  which  the 
commander  is  in  immediate  contact  with  the  soldiers.  The 
captain  has  direct  charge  of  the  instruction,  drill,  clothing, 
and  subsistence  of  his  men,  being  assisted  by  his  lieuten- 
ants; and  the  company  may,  therefore,  be  regarded  as  the 
administrative  unit.  The  most  efficient  armies  are  those 
in  which  the  captains  are  given  the  greatest  latitude  in  the 
methods  of  instructing  and  providing  for  their  companies, 
and  held  to  the  most  rigid  accountability  for  their  good 
condition  and  military  efficiency. 

There  is  a  limit  to  the  number  of  battalions  that  can 
be  conveniently  handled  by  one  man,  and  experience  has 
placed  this  limit  at  three  or  four.  The  regiment  is  an  im- 
portant administrative  as  well  as  tactical  body.  As  a  rule, 
it  is  the  largest  organization  whose  component  parts  are 
unchangeable;  it  is  the  only  organization  in  the  army  per- 
manent enough,  and  at  the  same  time  of  sufficient  import- 
ance, to  have  a  history;  it  is  the  first  body  large  enough  to 

*In  the  United  States  Army  the  infantry  company,  at  full 
war  strength,  consists  of  1  captain,  1  first  lieutenant,  1  second  lieu- 
tenant, 1  first  sergeant,  1  quartermaster  sergeant,  6  sergeants,  10 
corporals,  2  cooks,  2  musicians,  1  artificer,  105  privates;  total,  3 
officers  and  128  enlisted. 


6  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

insure  a  diversity  of  talents  on  the  part  of  its  officers;  and 
it  is  the  body  around  which  the  strongest  esprit  de  corps 
clusters.*  Tactically,  it  is  a  necessity;  for  a  brigadier 
general  can  easily  command  three  regiments  where  he 
would  find  the  control  of  nine  battalions  a  matter  of 
much  difficulty.** 

The  brigade  is  the  largest  organization  composed  ex- 
clusively of  infantry.  In  the  United  States  Army  it  consists 
of  three  regiments,  and  has,  therefore,  a  strength,  in  round 
numbers,  of  4,700  rifles.  Though  composed  of  only  one 
arm  of  the  service,  the  brigade  almost  invariably  acts  in 
conjunction  with  the  other  arms;  and  when  detached  it 
usually  has  some  artillery  attached  to  it.  In  the  Franco- 
German  War  the  Germans  invariably  attached  artillery  to* 
detached  brigades;  the  artillery,  in  the  case  of  a  brigade 
acting  as  an  advance  guard,  usually  consisting  of  two  bat- 
teries. In  the  War  of  Secession  both  the  Union  and  Con- 
federate Armies  had  at  first  one  battery  permanently  as- 
signed to  each  brigade;  but  a  brief  experience  sufficed  to 
condemn  the  system  of  brigade  artillery,  which  disappeared 
entirely  before  the  end  of  1863. 

Artillery. — The  tactical  unit  of  artillery  is  the  battery. 
The  modern  tendency  seems  to  be  toward  the  four-gun  bat- 
tery, although  Great  Britain  and  Germany  still  retain  the 
six-gun  organization  and  the  Eussians  adhere  to  their  eight- 
gun  battery.  France  has  adopted  the  four-gun  battery  for 
a  portion  of  her  artillery,  retaining  six  for  the  other  bat- 

*Von  der  Goltz. 

**The  war  organization  of  an  infantry  battalion  in  the  United 
States  Army  consists  of  1  major,  1  adjutant  (first  lieutenant), 

1  quartermaster  and  commissary    (second   lieutenant),   1   sergeant 
major  and  4  companies;   total,  15  officers  and  513  enlisted. 

The  regiment  consists  of  1  colonel,  1  lieutenant-colonel,  1  ad- 
jutant (captain),  1  quartermaster  (captain),  1  commissary  (cap- 
tain), 1  sergeant-major,  1  quartermaster  sergeant,  1  commissary 
sergeant,  2  color  sergeants,  20  mounted  orderlies,  a  band  (consist- 
ing of  1  chief  musician,  1  principal  musician,  1  drum  major,  4  ser- 
geants, 8  corporals,  1  cook,  and  12  privates),  and  3  battalions;  total, 
50  commissioned  and  1,592  enlisted. 

Each  regiment  of  the  volunteer  Army  shall  have  1  surgeon, 

2  assistant  surgeons,  and  1  chaplain.     (G.  O.  38,  A.  G.  O.,  1898.) 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 


teries.  The  United  States  has  definitely  adopted  the  bat- 
tery of  four  guns.* 

Batteries  rarely  work  alone,  but  are  united  in  battal- 
ions of  two  or  three.  Our  battalion  of  three  field  batteriea 
corresponds  to  the  German  and  British  "brigade  divis- 
ion." The  tendency  in  the  United  'States  is  to  restore  the 
regimental  organization  for  the  field  artillery,  although 
at  present  the  battalion  is  the  administrative  unit  for 
the  field  artillery  and  the  artillery  district  for  the  coast 
artillery. 

Cavalry. — In  most  armies  the  tactical  unit  of  cavalry 
is  the  squadron  of  150  sabers.  In  the  United  States  Army 
the  squadron  has  a  war  strength,  in  round  numbers,  of  400 
sabers,  and  is  divided  into  four  troops.  Marmont's  dic- 
tum, based  upon  his  great  experience  in  war,  that  96  is 
the  largest  number  of  mounted  men  that  a  single  leader  can 
effectively  handle,  would  indicate  our  troop  as  the  proper 
tactical  unit.  The  squadron  is,  however,  generally  consid- 
ered as  our  tactical  unit,  as  the  troop,  unless  at  full  war 
strength  (which  would  rarely  be  the  case),  would  be  too 
small.  Neither  our  troop  nor  our  squadron  seems  to  be  as 
satisfactory  a  unit  for  pure  cavalry  action  as  the  squadron 
of  150  sabers,  which,  owing  to  the  casualties  of  war,  rarely 
has  more  than  100  troopers  present  for  duty;  but  when  dis- 
mounted action  is  considered,  the  squadron  of  four  troops 
is  quite  as  important  a  tactical  unit  for  cavalry  as  the  bat- 
talion is  for  infantry.  As  in  the  infantry,  the  regiment  is 
both  an  administrative  and  a  tactical  organization;  indis- 
pensable in  the  former  quality,  and  necessary  in  the  latter 
as  a  tactical  link  between  the  squadron  and  the  brigade. 


*The  organization  of  a  field  battery  in  the  United  States  Army 
in  time  of  war  is  as  follows:  1  captain,  2  first  lieutenants,  1  sec- 
ond lieutenant,  1  first  sergeant,  1  quartermaster  sergeant,  1  stable 
sergeant,  6  sergeants,  12  corporals,  2  cooks,  4  artificers,  2  musi- 
cians, 131  privates;  total,  4  officers  and  160  enlisted  men.  The  bat- 
tery contains  4  guns,  12  caissons,  2  battery  wagons,  1  forge  wagon, 
and  1  store  wagon.  The  artillery  battalion  consists  of  1  major, 
1  adjutant  (first  lieutenant),  1  quartermaster  and  commissary  (sec- 
ond lieutenant),  1  veterinarian,  1  sergeant-major,  and  3  batteries. 
Under  the  law,  all  batteries  of  field  artillery,  including  siege  and' 
mountain  batteries,  have  the  same  organization. 


8  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

The  United  States  cavalry  regiments  consist  of  three 
squadrons  each.*  The  cavalry  regiments  of  the  French  and 
German  armies  consist  of  five  squadrons  (of  150  men  each), 
only  four  of  which  go  into  the  field,  the  fifth  being  retained 
at  the  regimental  depot.  The  British  regiment  is  organized 
in  three,  or  in  some  cases  four,  service  squadrons,  and  & 
reserve  squadron  made  up  of  the  band,  machine  gun  de- 
tachment, employed  men,  recruits,  and  young  horses.  The 
field  strength  of  the  British  regiment  of  cavalry  is  536,  all 
ranks. 

In  the  United  States  Army  the  regiment  is  the  largest 
cavalry  organization  entirely  independent  of  the  other 
arms.  The  cavalry  brigade,  consisting  of  two  or  three  regi- 
ments (three  being  the  normal  formation)  has  two  bat- 
teries of  horse  artillery  attached  when  acting  independ- 
ently. Our  cavalry  brigade  has  practically  the  same 
strength  as  the  German,  Austrian  or  French  cavalry  divis- 
ion, to  which  at  least  one  battery  of  horse  artillery  is  al- 
ways attached. 

The  cavalry  division  in  the  United  States  Army  con- 
sists of  3  cavalry  brigades,  6  batteries  of  Lorse  artillery, 
1  company  of  engineers  (mounted),  1  company  of  signal 
corps  (mounted),  1  ammunition  column,  1  supply  column, 
and  2  field  hospitals  (with  light  transportation). 

Apparently,  it  is  not  contemplated  by  the  present  Field 
Service  Regulations  that  Cavalry  corps  will  ever  be  organ- 
ized. The  cavalry  division  has  a  strength  in  round  num- 
bers of  10,000  sabers  in  addition  to  the  artillery  and  special 

*The  troop,  at  war  strength,  consists  of  1  captain,  1  first  lieu- 
tenant, 1  second  lieutenant,  1  first  sergeant,  1  quartermaster  ser- 
geant, 6  sergeants,  8  corporals,  2  cooks,  2  farriers  and  blacksmiths, 
1  saddler,  1  wagoner,  2  trumpeters,  and  76  privates;  total,  3  officers 
and  100  enlisted.  The  squadron. consists  of  1  major,  1  adjutant  (first 
lieutenant),  1  quartermaster  and  commissary  (second  lieutenant), 
1  squadron  sergeant  major,  and  4  troops;  total,  15  officers  and 
401  men.  The  regiment  consists  of  1  colonel,  1  lieutenant-colonel, 
1  adjutant  (captain),  1  quartermaster  (captain),  1  commissary 
(captain),  2  veterinarians,  1  sergeant-major,  1  quartermaster  ser- 
geant, 1  commissary  sergeant,  2  color  sergeants,  a  band  (consist- 
ing of  1  chief  musician,  1  chief  trumpeter,  1  principal  musician, 
1  drum-major,  4  sergeants,  8  corporals,  1  cook,  and  11  privates), 
and  3  squadrons;  total,  50  commissioned  and  1,236  enlisted. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  9 

troops.  This  body  of  cavalry  is  practically  as  large  as  any 
which  has  ever  been  organized  in  the  United  States.  The 
entire  cavalry  force  under  Sheridan  in  the  Shenandoah 
Valley  numbered  less  than  12,000  "present  for  duty,"  while 
Wilson's  command  in  1865  numbered  about  13,000  sabers. 
These  two  were  the  largest  bodies  of  cavalry  under 
one  command  during  the  War  of  Secession.  During  the 
Napoleonic  Wars  large  bodies  of  cavalry  were  frequently 
employed.  In  the  invasion  of  Russia  in  1812  Murat  com- 
manded a  cavalry  reserve  composed  of  four  corps  and  ag- 
gregating 40,000  men.  This  use  of  cavalry  has  now  prac- 
tically disappeared.  In  the  Austro-Prussian  War  of  1866 
the  Prussian  cavalry  was  assembled  into  two  corps,  ag- 
gregating 7,200  sabers;  but  the  result  did  not  encourage 
this  organization,  and  four  years  later  the  German  cavalry, 
operating  in  France,  worked  altogether  by  divisions.  It  is 
possible,  however,  that  sometimes  cavalry  corps  will  be 
organized  from  two  or  more  depleted  divisions. 

The  Arms  Combined. — The  division  is  composed  of  ail 
arms  of  the  service,  but  is  known  as  an  "infantry  division," 
not  only  because  it  contains  the  largest  proportion  of  that 
arm,  but  also  as  a  means  of  distinguishing  it  from  one  com- 
posed of  cavalry  and  horse  artillery.  The  division  is  both  a 
tactical  and  an  administrative  unit.  It  forms  the  basis 
of  army  organization  and  should  be  complete  in  all  its 
parts  and  capable  of  acting  independently  at  any  time. 
When  brigades  are  detached,  they  will  be  supplied  with  a 
due  proportion  of  the  auxiliary  arms  and  services  corre- 
sponding to  their  independent  functions  and  the  nature  of 
the  special  service  expected.  The  division  consists  of  3 
brigades  of  infantry,  1  regiment  of  cavalry,  9  batteries  of 
field  artillery  (which  shall  be  organized  as  a  provisional 
repment  of  field  artillery),  1  battalion  of  engineers,  1  com- 
pany of  signal  corps,  4  field  hospitals,  1  ammunition  col- 
umn (composed  of  3  sections  of  21  wagons  each,  for  small- 
arms  ammunition,  and  2  sections  of  21  wagons  each,  for 
artillery  ammunition  and  stores),  1  supply  column  (com- 
posed of  3  wagon-trains  of  27  wagons  each),  1  pack-train. 


10  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

The  cavalry  assigned  to  the  division  is  known  as  the 
divisional  cavalry.  Additional  artillery  may  be  assigned 
to  the  division  to  the  extent  demanded  by  the  nature  of 
the  operations  in  prospect.  The  divisional  artillery  is  un- 
der the  command  of  the  general  commanding  the  division, 
and  passes  from  his  control  only  under  circumstances 
which  will  be  considered  later. 

The  Army  Corps. — The  army  corps  is  a  strategical  unit. 
It  should  be  complete  in  all  its  parts,  and  constitute  an 
army  in  itself,  capable  of  acting  independently  at  any 
time,  and  always  able  to  act  promptly  as  a  whole.  It  is 
formed  by  the  combination  of  two  or  three  divisions  and 
the  assignment  of  the  necessary  military  and  administrat- 
ive staffs.  Depending  upon  the  nature  of  the  operations, 
additional  reserves  of  ammunition,  stores,  equipment,  and 
food  supplies  may  be  formed  and  a  balloon-train  and  horse 
depot  attached  to  the  corps.  The  horse  batteries  of  the 
divisions  may  be  combined  into  a  separate  command,  and 
as  corps  artillery  remain  under  the  direct  control  of  the 
corps  commander. 

Brigades  in  divisions  and  divisions  in  army  corps  re- 
ceive numerical  designations  upon  organization;  for  exam- 
ple, First  Brigade  Second  Division;  Third  Division  Fourth 
Army  Corps.  Army  corps  are  organized  only  by  special 
authority  from  the  President,  and  are  numbered  in  sequence 
of  the  date  of  their  organization. 

The  strength  of  the  regiments,  brigades,  and  divisions 
varies  in  the  armies  of  different  nations;  but  the  size  of  the 
corps  is  practically  the  same  throughout  the  armies  of  the 
world,  it  being  everywhere  approximately  30,000  strong. 
Its  paper  strength  exceeds  this  in  all  armies,  but  it  is  the 
manifest  intention  in  every  case  to  have  a  fighting  strength 
of  30,000  men  in  actual  campaign.  As  a  result  of  his  ex- 
perience, General  Sherman  declares  that  the  corps  should 
never  be  allowed  to  fall  below  a  strength  of  25,000  men. 
In  very  rare  cases  only  may  it  be  advisable  to  reduce  its 
strength.  In  the  campaign  of  1864,  in  Virginia,  the  five 
corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  were  consolidated  into 
three,  of  nearly  25,000  infantry  each.  Of  this  organization 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  11 

General  Humphreys  says:  aln  a  country  so  heavily  wooded 
as  that  in  which  the  operations  were  to  be  conducted,  five 
infantry  corps  of  about  15,000  each  would  have  been  a  ju- 
dicious organization,  owing  to  the  difficulty  of  communica- 
tion between  the  corps  commanders  and  the  subordinate 
commanders  in  a  battle  in  such  a  country,  and  the  conse- 
quent difficulty  of  prompt  and  efficient  control  of  extensive 
lines  of  battle,  especially  at  critical  moments,  or  when  un- 
foreseen exigencies  occurred."*  It  should  be  observed  that 
the  region  in  which  these  small  corps  would  have  been  pref- 
erable was  densely  wooded,  and  probably  offered  altogether 
the  most  difficult  theater  ever  operated  in  by  modern  armies. 
The  strength  of  30,000  men  for  a  corps  has  not  been 
assumed  by  accident.  A  corps  of  the  given  strength  forms, 
in  ordinary  marching  formation,  a  column  about  fifteen 
miles  long,  the  infantry  being  in  fours,  the  cavalry  in  twos, 
and  the  guns  and  caissons  being  in  single  file.**  When  the 
corps  is  marching  on  a  single  road,  its  rear  is  consequently 
about  a  day's  march  from  the  head  of  the  column.  A 
greater  strength  of  the  corps  would,  therefore,  make  the 
column  so  long  that  its  head  could  be  defeated  before  its 
rear  could  arrive  on  the  field.  The  strength  assumed  may 
therefore  be  regarded  a>s  a  maximum.  Considerations  of 
marching  and  deployment  also  render  it  undesirable  to 
have  a  corps  of  a  smaller  size.  The  number  of  parallel  roads 
within  supporting  distance  of  each  other  is  limited,  and  ex- 
perience has  shown  that  it  is  rarely  practicable  to  march 
an  army  so  as  to  have  less  than  30,000  men  to  a  road.  To 
reduce  the  size  of  the  corps  would,  therefore,  necessitate 
the  marching  'of  two  or  more  corps  on  the  same  road,  which, 
far  from  mitigating  the  evil  of  having  the  rear  of  the  col- 
umn at  a  great  distance  from  the  head,  would  only  aggra- 
vate it,  even  though  the  aggregate  of  the  column  should  not 
exceed  30,000  men;  for  the  trains  of  the  first  corps  must 

*"The  Virginia  Campaign  of  1864-65,"  p.  4. 

**With  the  present  organization  of  the  United  States  Army  a 
division  with  all  trains  will  occupy  a  road  space  of  about  eleven 
miles;  an  army  corps,  with  all  its  auxiliary  troops  and  trains,  about 
thirty-five  miles. 


12  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

either  precede  the  second  or  be  separated  from  their  own 
corps  by  it.  In  the  former  case,  the  rear  of  the  second 
corps  would  be  considerably  more  than  a  day's  march  from 
the  head  of  the  column,  and  its  progress  to  the  front  would 
be  retarded  by  the  intervening  wagons;  in  the  latter  case, 
the  first  corps  would  be  separated  from  its  supplies,  which 
often  would  not  reach  it  for  days  at  a  time. 

The  Army. — When  the  force  operating  in  the  theater  is 
large,  a  final  orgarization  larger  than  a  corps  becomes  nec- 
essary. When  two  or  more  army  corps  are  united  under 
the  command  of  a  single  chief,  they  constitute  an  army. 
One  or  more  cavalry  divisions  usually  form  a  part  of  such 
an  organization.  In  considering  the  proper  strength  of  an 
army,  the  general  consensus  of  opinion  among  military 
writers,  supported  by  the  practice  of  nations,  is  that  a 
single  army  should  not  exceed  150,000  fighting  men.  Ex- 
perience has  demonstrated  that  very  large  armies  have  less 
cohesion  and  flexibility  than  smaller  ones,  and  the  rapidly 
increasing  difficulties  of  command  soon  tax  the  ability  of 
the  average  leader.  Larger  armies  have  been  formed  many 
times,  but  usually  under  force  of  circumstances  and  to 
meet  exceptional  conditions.  Where  the  force  put  in  the 
field  exceeds  this  number,  it  is  customary  to  divide  it  into 
two  or  more  separate  armies,  and  where  these  separate 
armies  have  the  same  objective,  to  combine  their  opera- 
tions under  a  general-in-chirf.  This  principle  of  the  divis- 
ion of  large  combatant  forces  into  several  armies  has  been 
exemplified  in  all  recent  campaigns,  was  practiced  by  both 
the  North  and  the  South  in  the  Rebellion,  and  by  the  Jap- 
anese in  Manchuria.  With  the  latter,  each  army  was  formed 
by  the  combination  of  several  divisions,  no  corps  having 
been  organized. 

Proportions  of  the  Three  Arms. — According  to  Napoleon, 
if  the  infantry  of  an  army  were  represented  by  unity,  the 
artillery  should  be  one-eighth  and  the  cavalry  one-fourth, 
or,  in  a  mountainous  country,  one-fifth.  In  the  German 
Army  at  the  present  time  the  cavalry  compared  to  the  in- 
fantry is  about  one-fifth  and  the  artillery  nearly  one-fourth. 
In  the  French  Army  these  proportions  are  approximately 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  13 

the  same.  With  an  active  army  in  the  field,  the  proportion 
of  cavalry  would  probably  be  considerably  greater,  for  large 
numbers  of  infantry  and  artillery  are  often  held  in  garri- 
son or  on  the  lines  of  communication,  while  the  cavalry  is 
almost  entirely  at  the  front. 

The  question  of  the  proper  proportion  of  the  three 
arms  cannot,  however,  be  definitely  determined,  for  it  de- 
pends upon  many  considerations,  such  as  the  nature  of  the 
theater  of  operations,  the  composition  of  the  enemy's  forces, 
the  special  adaptability  of  the  people  of  the  country  to 
one  arm  or  another,  and  even  upon  the  casualties  of  the 
campaign.  In  a  comparison  of  many  field  armies  of  the 
past  century,  if  the  infantry  be  represented  by  unity,  the 
cavalry  has  varied  usually  from  one-fourth  to  one-tenth, 
the  artillery  from  2  to  5  guns  to  1,000  infantry,  and  even 
these  limits  are  often  exceeded. 

The  proportion  of  artillery  is  generally  from  3  to 
4  guns  for  every  1,000  men  of  the  other  arms  of  the 
service;*  but  in  a  mountainous  or  heavily  wooded  country 
this  proportion  would  have  to  be  reduced,  as  it  would,  in- 
deed, in  any  country  where  the  roads  are  few  and  poor.  In 
Lombardy,  in  1859,  the  French  found  it  impossible,  owing 
to  *he  narrow  roads  and  marshy  fields,  to  get  all  their 
guns  into  action,  although  they  had  only  3  guns  to  1,000 
men.  The  heavy  woods  of  Virginia  offered  equal  or  greater 
obstacles.  General  Grant  says:  "Artillery  is  very  useful 
when  it  can  be  brought  into  action,  but  it  is  a  very  burden- 
some luxury  where  it  cannot  be  used.  Before  leaving 
Spottsylvania,  therefore,  I  sent  back  to  the  defenses  of 
Washington  over  100  pieces  of  artillery,  with  the  horses 
and  caissons.  This  relieved  the  road  over  which  we  were 
to  march  of  more  than  200  six-horse  teams,  and  still  left 
us  more  artillery  than  could  be  advantageously  used."** 

*The  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  United  States  Army,  In  his  report 

for   1905,   recommends   that   the   proportion   be    3    guns  for   every 

1,000    infantry.      The    General    Staff   believes    that    3%  would    be 
nearer  the  proper  proportion. 

**"Memoirs,"  Vol.  IL,  p.  241. 


14  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

In  Sherman's  march  to  the  sea,  and  in  his  subsequent 
campaign  in  the  Carolinas,  his  artillery  was  reduced  to  1 
gun  to  every  1,000  men  of  the  other  arms.  On  the  oth- 
er hand,  the  Germans,  in  1870,  had  nearly  4  guns  to 
1,000  men  of  other  arms,  and  used  them  with  great  ef- 
fect. The  difference  between  the  "dirt"  roads  of  the 
Southern  States  and  the  broad  and  hard  chaussees  of  France 
is  sufficient  to  account  for  this  difference  in  the  proportion 
of  artillery. 

In  the  latter  part  of  a  campaign,  the  proportion  of  ar- 
tillery is  generally  greater  than  at  the  beginning.  The 
brunt  of  the  fighting  falls  upon  the  infantry,  however  dar- 
ingly, vigorously,  and  effectively  the  artillery  may  be  used. 
The  infantry  divisions  are  rapidly  depleted,  while  the  num- 
ber of  guns  practically  remains  the  same;  for  the  destruc- 
tion of  materiel  is  comparatively  slight.  In  the  Franco- 
German  War,  notwithstanding  the  admirable  recruiting 
methods  of  the  Germans,  the  army  corps  of  the  invading 
army  were  at  times  reduced  temporarily  to  15,000,  or  even 
as  low  as  7,000  men,  while  the  number  of  gun^  remained 
unchanged.  Nor  was  this  increased  proportion  undesirable; 
for  an  infantry  weak  in  numbers  or  morale  needs,  even 
more  than  ever,  the  support  of  a  large  and  efficient  artillery. 

While  the  proportion  of  artillery  to  the  infantry  can- 
not be  definitely  fixed,  it  may  be  safely  prescribed  that  the 
guns  with  an  army  should  be  as  many  as  can  be  promptly 
brought  upon  the  field  of  battle  and  effectively  used  thero. 
Malvern  Hill  and  Sedan  bear  witness  that,  under  favorable 
circumstances,  artillery  may,  almost  alone,  crush  an  op- 
posing army. 

The  proportion  of  cavalry  varies  exceedingly.  In  Sher- 
idan's army  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley  the  cavalry  com- 
prised somewhat  less  than  one-fifth  of  the  entire  force.  In 
Sherman's  march  to  the  sea  it  formed  only  one-fifteenth  of 
the  army.  When  the  Germans  entered  France  in  1870,  their 
cavalry  constituted  between  one-ninth  and  one-eighth  of 
their  entire  strength,  the  three  German  armies  (aggregat- 
ing 447,000  men)  containing  336  squadrons.  On  the  sub- 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  15 

ject  of  the  proper  proportion  of  cavalry,  Hohenloke  says: 
"Considering  the  great  importance  of  the  possession  of  a 
large  mass  of  cavalry,  and  the  immense  advantage  which  a 
superior  force  of  cavalry  will  give  us  at  once  over  the 
enemy,  in  that  it  will  blindfold  him  and  open  our  eyes,  will 
shut  him  in  closely  and  give  us  all  freedom,  and  will  tie  his 
hands  while  it  will  assist  us  to  strike,  we  cannot  have  too 
many  cavalry.  The  answer  to  the  question  is,  therefore, 
simple:  We  must  have  as  many  regiments  of  cavalry  as 
possible."  With  us  the  proportion  should  be  such  as  to 
enable  our  cavalry  speedily  to  overwhelm  any  to  which  it 
may  be  opposed,  whatever  the  proportion  may  be  to  the 
other  arms.*  The  extended  use  that  may  be  made  of  cav- 
alry in  raids  and  in  dismounted  fighting  would  render  it 
much  easier  to  have  the  proportion  too  small  than  too 
large.** 

SPECIAL  TROOPS. 

The  troops  of  the  Engineer  and  Signal  Corps,  the  Med- 
ical Department,  and  the  Quartermaster's  Corps  (if  there 
be  one)  may  be  classed  as  special  troops.  To  this  classifica- 
tion belong  also  troops  employed  in  the  construction  and 
management  of  military  railroads;  but  in  the  service  of  the 
United  States  the  duties  performed  elsewhere  by  these 
troops  would  probably  be  performed  by  the  Quartermas- 
ter's Department,  or  by  people  in  the  employment  of  the 
railroad  companies. 

Engineers. — In  the  United  States  Army  the  engineers 
perform  the  duties  of  sappers,  miners,  and  pontoniers.***  In 

*The  Mexican  Army  can  put  in  the  field  8,000  regular  cav- 
alry. This  can  be  increased  from  the  reserve  of  the  permanent 
Army  and  the  general  reserve  to  26,000.  This  is  the  largest  force 
of  cavalry  that  our  armies  seem  at  all  likely  to  encounter. 

**In  a  letter  to  the  author,  General  James  H.  Wilson,  the  dis- 
tinguished cavalry  commander,  says:  "I  do  not  doubt  that  a  prop- 
erly organized  army  should  have  one-third  cavalry,  or  that,  all 
other  things  being  equal,  that  army  which  has  the  largest  pro- 
portion of  cavalry  will  win  in  the  next  great  war." 

***This  refers,  of  course,  to  engineers  with  an  army  in  the 
field.  The  engineers  also  serve  in  the  sea-coast  defense,  and  have 
charge  of  the  torpedo  system. 


16  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

the  War  of  Secession,  owing  to  the  presence  of  many  skilled 
mechanics  in  the  ranks  of  the  line,  and  the  lack  of  a  suffi- 
cient body  of  engineer  troops,  the  engineers  were  obtainel 
mainly  by  details  from  the  infantry;  and  it  was  found  best 
to  make  the  details  permanent,  as  the  troops  once  instructed 
in  engineer  duties  were  hard  to  replace,  and  were  more 
valuable  as  engineers  than  they  would  have  been  as  infant- 
ry. In  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  the  men  were  de- 
tailed individually  from  the  different  regiments,  and  then 
grouped  into  an  engineer  brigade.  In  the  Army  of  th^3 
Potomac  the  better  plan  of  detailing  organizations  was 
adopted;  the  Fifteenth  and  Fiftieth  New  York  Volunteers, 
which  had  an  unusual  number  of  sailors  and  mechanics  in 
their  ranks,  being  detailed  by  General  McClellan  as  engi- 
neers, and  remaining  on  that  duty  during  the  war.  In  the 
campaign  in  the  Carolinas  there  were  two  small  regiments 
of  volunteer  "engineers  and  mechanics"  attached  to  Sher- 
man's headquarters.  In  every  case  the  engineer  troops 
were  trained  as  infantry,  and  were  available  as  such  in  case 
of  emergency,  but  they  were  not  habitually  so  used. 

In  the  campaign  in  Virginia,  in  1864,  the  Engineer 
Brigade  (Fifteenth  anl  Fiftieth  New  York  Volunteers)  was 
attached  to  General  Grant's  headquarters,  and  during  the 
campaign  to  the  James  it  was,  as  a  body,  kept  at  the  Engi- 
neer Depot  at  Washington.  Eleven  companies  of  the  Fif- 
tieth New  York  were,  however,  detached  and  assigned  to 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  being  united  with  the  engineer 
battalion  (regular),  under  the  command  of  the  chief  engi- 
neer of  that  army.  One  company  of  these  volunteer  en- 
gineers, with  a  bridge-train,  was  attached  to  each  corps. 
The  remaining  companies  and  the  engineer  battalion,  in 
charge  of  the  reserve  ponton-  and  tool-train,  were  at 
Meade's  headquarters.  The  corps  bridge-train  was  able  to 
span  a  stream  300  yards  wide;  the  capacity  of  the  reserve 
train  much  exceeded  this.  A  bridge  across  the  James  Riv- 
er, between  Windmill  Point  and  Fort  Powhatan,  thrown 
by  the  troops  of  the  latter,  was  over  700  yards  in  length. 

In  the  German  Army  each  division  has  a  bridge-train 
with  materiel  for  a  bridge  35  meters  long,  and  the  army 
corps  has  a  larger  train,  able  to  throw  a  bridge  125  meters 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  17 

in  length;  the  length  of  the  combined  bridge- trains  of  the 
corps  being  thus  195  meters,  or  about  213  yards. 

Combining  the  results  of  German  experience  with 
those  of  our  own,  it  may  be  said  that  each  division  should 
have  a  battalion  of  engineer  troops  and  a  bridge-train 
capable  of  spanning  a  stream  100  yards  wide.  This  is 
considerably  in  excess  of  the  proportion  of  engineers  in 
our  armies  in  the  War  of  Secession;  but  there  is  no  danger 
of  having  too  many  engineer  soldiers  attached  to  an  army, 
as  they  are  always  useful,  often  indispensable,  and  in  an 
emergency  can  serve  as  infantry.  A  portion  of  the  engi- 
neers and  bridge-train  might  be  assigned  to  a  brigade  when 
detached,  but  such  partition  of  the  bridge-train  should  not 
be  habitual.  It  may,  then,  be  prescribed  that  the  bridge- 
train  of  the  division  should,  as  a  rule,  be  kept  intact;  that 
provision  should  be  made  for  uniting  the  bridge-trains  of 
the  several  divisions  under  the  chief  engineer  of  the  corps 
whenever  such  combination  may  be  expedient;  and  that  it 
may  often  be  advisable  to  maintain  a  reserve  of  engineer 
soldiers  and  materiel  at  the  headquarters  of  the  corps  or 
army.  Advance  guard  and  reserve  bridge-trains  will  be  as- 
signed to  the  engineer  troops  of  divisions,  army  corps,  and 
armies  as  occasion  mav  squire. 

The  engineer  troops  of  a  division  will  consist  of  one 
battalion  of  four  companies — viz.,  three  pioneer  companies 
and  one  ponton  company.* 

*A  pioneer  company  consists  of  1  captain  (mounted),  1  first 
lieutenant  (mounted),  1  first  lieutenant,  1  second  lieutenant,  1  first 
sergeant,  1  quartermaster  sergeant,  2  sergeants  (mounted),  3  cor- 
porals (mounted),  1  cook  (mounted),  9  privates  first  class  (mount- 
ed), 9  privates  second  class  (mounted),  10  sergeants,  15  corporals, 

1  cook,  2  musicians,  55  privates  first  class,  55  privates  second  class; 
total,  4  officers  and  164  enlisted. 

The  three  pioneer  companies  will  each  have  4  pack-mules  and 

2  wagons  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  entrenching  tools,  explosives, 
etc.    The  organization  of  the  ponton  company  will  be  the  same  as 
for  pioneer  companies,  except  that  the  mounted   detachment  con- 
sists of  2  sergeants  and  3  corporals. 

The  battalion  consists  of  1  major,  1  adjutant  (captain),  1 
quartermaster  and  commissary,  1  sergeant-major,  1  quartermaster 
sergeant,  4  companies;  total,  19  officers  and  658  enlisted. 


18  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

Signal  Corps. — The  signal  corps  is  charged  with  the 
management  of  the  field  telegraph,  the  field  telephones, 
wireless  stations,  military  balloons,  and  the  service  of  sig- 
naling generally.  A  company  of  signal  troops  is  attached 
to  eachj  division  and  consists  of  1  captain,  3  first  lieu- 
tenants, 1  first  sergeant,  1  quartermaster  sergeant,  20 
sergeants  first  class,  40  sergeants,  10  corporals,  74  pri- 
vates, and  4  cooks.  This  organization  is  contemplated 
in  the  Field  Service  Regulations,  United  States  Army, 
1905,  but  no  organization  for  tlie  signal  company  has 
yet  been  provided  for  by  law.  A  detachment  of  the 
company  will  have  charge  of  visual  signaling  for  the 
division  with  flag,  torch-light,  flash-light,  rockets,  and  heli- 
ograph. Details  will  also  be  required  to  form  a  signal 
detachment  at  corps  headquarters.  The  remainder  of  the 
company  will  have  charge  of  the  construction,  repair,  and 
operation  of  telegraph  and  telephone  lines  at  the  front 
and  on  the  lines  of  communication  connecting  with  civil 
lines. 

Medical  Department. — To  each  regiment  of  cavalry  or 
infantry  are  assigned  3  medical  officers,  3  non-com- 
missioned officers,  and  9  privates  of  the  hospital  corps; 
to  each  squadron  of  cavalry  or  battalion  of  infantry 
are  assigned  1  medical  officer,  1  non-commissioned  officer, 
and  1  private;  to  a  battery  of  field  artillery,  1  medical 
officer,  1  non-commissioned  officer,  and  1  hospital  corps 
private;  to  the  engineer  battalion,  2  officers,  2  non- 
commissioned officers,  and  6  privates;  to  the  signal  com- 
pany, 1  officer,  1  non-commissioned  officer,  and  1  private; 
at  the  headquarters  of  each  brigade  are  attached  3  offi- 
cers, 3  non-commissioned  officers,  and  6  privates. 

There  are  assigned  to  the  headquarters  of  the  divis- 
ion 2  officers,  1  non-commissioned  officer,  and  6  privates. 
In  addition,  the  medical  organization  of  the  division  in- 
cludes 4  field  hospitals,  each  comprising  1  major,  2  cap- 
tains, 4  lieutenants,  1  sergeant  first  class  (senior  ser- 
geant), 1  sergeant  (assistant  to>  the  quartermaster),  1 
sergeant  (wagonmaster),  1  private  first  class  (black- 
smith), 1  private  first  class  (saddler),  3  privates  first 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  19 

class  (orderlies),  1  hospital  section,  and  1  ambulance  co  m- 
pany  section;  total,  7  officers  and  118  enlisted.  The 
transportation  of  each  field  hospital  consists  of  10  am- 
bulances, 8  escort  wagons,  and  4  pack-mules. 

The  duties  of  the  bearers  are  to  establish  a  dressing 
station  as  near  to  the  firing  line  as  the  presence  of  cover 
will  permit,  and  to  carry  or  guide  the  wounded  to  it.  Here 
the  wounded  receive  such  bandaging  and  attendance  as 
is  necessary  before  their  removal  to  the  field  hospital,  to 
which  they  are  conveyed  by  the  ambulance  section.  The 
field  hospital  is  stationed  about  three  miles  in  rear  of  the 
firing-line  of  each  brigade.  The  capacity  of  each  of  these 
field  hospitals  is  108  beds,  or,  by  the  use  of  bed-sacks,  216. 

The  service  of  the  rear  eventually  converts  the  field  hos- 
pitals into  stationary  hospitals,  releasing  the  materiel  and 
personnel.  It  takes  care  of  the  sick  and  wrounded  and  of 
their  transfer  to  home  stations. 

General  hospitals,  to  which  the  sick  and  wounded  are 
sent  for  extended  treatment,  are  established  farther  to  the 
rear,  either  at  the  base  of  operations  or  at  convenient 
points  on  the  line  of  communication  with  the  base.  They 
are  not,  as  a  rule,  under  the  charge  of  the  general  com- 
manding the  army  in  the  field;  but  he  should  detail  suit- 
able officers  of  the  medical  or  other  staff  corps  to  hunt  out 
malingerers  and  shirks  who  would  otherwise  hang  around 
the  hospitals  indefinitely.  At  the  beginning  of  the  cam- 
paign of  1813  in  Spain,  confidential  officers,  commissioned 
by  Wellington  to  detect  abuses  in  the  general  hospitals, 
returned  so  many  skulkers  to  duty  that  a  sHgle  division 
alone  recovered  600  bayonets  in  a  month.*  Similar  meth- 
ods were  successfully  employed  by  General  iSchofield  in 
the  Army  of  the  Ohio  in  1864. 

Military  Police. — In  most  armies  the  military  police,  or 
gendarmery,  constitute  a  body  of  special  troops;  but  in  the 
armies  of  the  United  States  it  has  been  customary  to  detail 
organizations  for  duty  as  provost  guard,  preference  being 
given  to  regiments  or  battalions  which  have  suffered  se- 

*Napier. 


20  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

verely  in  action,  and  especially  to  those  which  have  con- 
ducted themselves  with  great  credit.  It  is  believed  that  in 
an  American  army  this  system  would  produce  better  results 
than  one  based  on  the  employment  of  special  gendarmery. 

The  provost  guard  of  an  army  corps  is  of  varying  size, 
but  rarely  exceeds  a  full  battalion  or  a  depleted  regiment. 
In  an  independent  division  it  is  rarely  more  than  a  full 
company  or  a  weak  battalion.  In  the  Army  of  the  Poto- 
mac, under  General  Meade,  the  provost  guard  consisted  of 
two  regiments  of  cavalry  and  three  of  infantry;  none,  how- 
ever, of  full  strength.  In  the  Franco-German  War  the 
headquarters  guard  at  the  King's  headquarters  consisted 
of  a  detachment  of  military  gendarmery  and  a  force  of  250 
infantry  and  180  cavalry. 

Mounted  Couriers. — To  avoid  an  undue  tax  upon  the 
strength  of  the  cavalry  for  courier  duty,  there  are  assigned 
to  each  regiment  of  infantry  20  mounted  couriers,  whose 
duties  are  limited  to  the  transmission  of  orders  and 
intelligence.  They  are  required  to  be  good  riders  on  all 
kinds  of  ground,  and  to  be  thoroughly  educated,  both  the- 
oretically and  practically,  in  the  duties  of  scouts  and  cou- 
riers. Their  special  duties  are  to  maintain  the  necessary 
communication  in  battle  between  different  bodies  of  troops 
of  the  same  or  neighboring  commands,  to  transmit  orders 
over  great  distances,  and  to  perform  scouting  and  messen- 
ger duty  on  the  march  and  with  the  advance  posts,  or  in 
battle.  Each  courier  carries  a  revolver,  and  should  be  pro- 
vided with  a  map-case  and  field-glass.  No  provision  has 
as  yet  been  made  in  our  army  for  the  attachment  of 
mounted  couriers  to  brigade  and  division  headquarters, 
which  service  has  hitherto  been  rendered  by  the  divisional 
cavalry,  correspondingly  decreasing  its  efficiency. 

THE  TRAIN. 

Ammunition  Supply.  —  Arrangements  should  be  made 
for  promptly  supplying  the  infantry  with  at  least  270 
rounds  of  ammunition  per  man,  and  the  artillery  with  460 
rounds  per  gun.  The  men  carry  on  their  persons  90 
rounds  of  cartridges,  the  battalion  ammunition  wagons 
carry  60  additional  rounds  per  man,  and  120  rounds  more 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  21 

per  man  are  carried  in  the  ammunition  column.  With 
each  field  battery  354  rounds  per  gun  are  carried  (36 
in  each  limber,  and  318  in  each  of  the  12  caissons),  the 
remaining  106  rounds  per  gun  being  with  the  ammunition 
column.  The  same  number  of  rounds  per  gun  is  provided 
for  the  horse  batteries,  which  when  necessary  in  a  cavalry 
action  draw  ammunition  from  the  limbers,  the  ammunition 
so  used  being  replaced  as  soon  as  practicable  from  the 
caissons.  Cavalry  divisions  are  provided  with  light  ammu- 
nition columns  carrying  cartridges  for  the  rifles  and  am- 
munition for  the  horse  batteries.  While  engaged  in  recon- 
naissance, the  number  of  ammunition  wagons  is  regulated 
by  the  commanding  officer.  In  many  cases  the  ammunition 
for  cavalry  detachments  is  carried  by  pack-trains. 

The  ammunition  column  is  attached  to  the  division 
and  is  under  the  charge  of  an  artillery  officer.  It  is  com- 
posed of  three  sections  of  21  wagons  each  for  small- 
arms  ammunition,  and  two  sections  of  21  wagons  each 
for  artillery  ammunition  and  store®.  The  sections  for 
the  artillery  should  have  for  their  personnel  trained  artil- 
lerists, this  portion  of  the  column  forming  a  reserve  of 
men  and  horses  for  the  batteries. 

Ammunition  columns  refill  from  ordnance  trains,  which 
load  at  principal  depots  on  the  lines  of  communication  or 
at  a  railway  terminus,  and  follow  the  army  under  orders 
from  the  commander-in-chief. 

WAGON-TRAINS. 

Baggage,  tentage,  at  least  two  days'  rations,  and  the 
extra  ammunition  of  the  troops  are  carried  in  wagons  which 
are  assigned  to  the  units  and  remain  in  their  charge.  The 
standard  wagon  is  the  four-mule  army  wagon,  usually 
known  as  the  escort  wagon.  The  load  should  not  exceed 
3,000  pounds  on  good  roads;  for  average  conditions,  2,500 
pounds  is  considered  a  fair  load.  The  normal  allowance 
is  as  follows: 

For  the  corps  headquarters,  4  escort  wagons;  for 
each  division,  3;  for  each  brigade,  2;  for  the  headquar- 
ters for  each  regiment,  2;  for  each  battalion  of  infantry 
or  artillery  or  squadron  of  cavalry,  1;  for  each  company 


22  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

of  infantry,  1;  for  each  troop  of  cavalry,  2;  for  each  bat- 
tery, 3.  The  allowance  of  all  other  mounted  troiops  cor- 
responds to  that  of  cavalry;  for  all  other  foot  troops  to 
that  of  infantry. 

Each  company  wagon  carries  two  days'  rations,  and 
forage  for  the  team.  The  additional  wagon  assigned  to 
each  troop  of  cavalry  is  loaded  with  forage.  Allowing 
850  pounds  for  tentage  and  250  pounds  for  officers'  baggage, 
and  350  pounds  for  cooking  utensils  in  addition,  the  aver- 
age weight  of  2,500  pounds  is  reached. 

This  is  known  as  the  regimental  train  in  contradis- 
tinction to  the  light  train,  which  comprises  the  led  horses, 
battalion  ammunition  wagons,  and  regimental  ambulances. 
The  ammunition  wagons  are  distributed  1  to  each  bat- 
talion of  infantry,  and  2  to  each  regiment  of  cavalry. 

The  number  of  wagons  with  the  troops  may  be  in- 
creased in  order  to  carry  additional  war  materiel  and  sup- 
plies and  to  overcome  special  difficulties  of  climate  or  tem- 
perature, or  to  transport  sick  and  wounded.  More  fre- 
quently, however,  a  reduction  in  the  allowance  will  be 
rendered  necessary  by  the  lack  of  means  of  transportation, 
by  the  nature  of  the  country  or  the  condition  of  the  roads. 
In  active  campaign,  the  tentage  will  usually  be  stored  at 
the  temporary  base,  and  the  allowance  of  wagons  reduced 
to  the  barest  necessities.  The  wagons  thus  released  may 
be  utilized  to  form  additiona1  trains  in  the  supply  column. 
The  wagons  remaining  with  the  regiments  will  then  be 
divided  into  two  groups — those  carrying  rations  exclu- 
sively and  those  carrying  utensils  and  baggage.  The  va- 
rious artillery  carriages  of  field  and  siege  batteries,  as 
well  as  all  ammunition  wagons  attached,  are  not  counted 
as  part  of  the  regimental  train.  Conditions  of  service  will 
frequently  render  necessary  a  departure  from  the  stand- 
ard of  equipment,  but  this  will  be  clone  only  under  author- 
ity of  the  Secretary  of  War. 

Supply  Columns. — In  addition  to  the  above,  each  di- 
vision has  a  supply  column,  ordinarily  divided  into  three 
sections  of  27  wagons  each.*  Each  of  these  sections 

*A  wagon-train  is  composed  of  1  wagonmaster,  2  assistant 
wagonmasters,  i  farrier  and  blacksmith,  1  cook,  1  watchman,  28 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  23 

carries  one  day's  rations  and  forage  for  its  division, 
These  columns  form  a  rolling  reserve  of  three  days'  rations 
and  forage.  When  it  is  necessary  to  make  issues  to  the 
regimental  trains,  one  section  of  each  column,  called  a 
supply  section,  moves  up  to  the  troops  at  the  end  of  the 
day's  march;  the  other  two  sections,  called  the  reserve  sec- 
tions, remain  about  a  half-day's  march  in  rear.  When  beef 
on  the  hoof  accompanies  an  expedition,  it  may  be  attached 
to  the  supply  column. 

Reserve  Supply  Column. — When  the  distance  from  rail- 
way stations  or  magazines  renders  it  desirable,  additional 
supply  columns  carrying  not  less  than  three  days'  rations 
and  forage  will  be  organized.  These  supplies  are  under 
the  control  of  the  commander-in-chief  and  come  into  use 
especially  at  the  time  of  concentration  of  troops  for  action. 
When  the  army  is  stationary,  the  supply  columns  transfer 
stores  from  the  magazines  to  the  troops. 

Location  of  Trains  on  the  March. — The  light  trains  usu- 
ally march  with  the  battalions  to  which  they  pertain. 
When  no  conflict  with  the  enemy  is  anticipated,  the  light 
trains  of  the  battalions  may  be  united  with  that  of  the 
regiment  under  charge  of  an  officer,  the  whole  marching  in 
rear  of  the  regiment.  The  wagons  for  regimental  head- 
quarters are  attached  to  the  regimental  train.  The 
wagons  carrying  the  other  headquarters  baggage  and 
supplies  usually  march  at  the  head  of  the  assem- 
bled regimental  trains,  but  the  means  of  transporta- 
tion for  a  general  officer  and  his  staff  may  be  or- 
dered to  march  separately.  The  field  telegraph,  field 
post-office,  and  provost  guard  wagons  accompany  the 
headquf.rters  transportation.  On  ordinary  marches  the 
regimental  trains  follow  a  mile  or  two  in  rear  of  the 
column  if  practicable,  but  at  the  end  of  the  day's  march, 
or  in  the  evening,  they  will  be  brought  up  so  that  camp 
may  be  formed  and  supplies  iss/ued.  The  ammunition 

teamsters,  112  draft-mules,  5  saddle-mules,  27  wagons;  total,  34 
personnel. 

A  pack-train  is  composed  of  1  packmaster,  1  cargador,  1  far- 
rier and  blacksmith,  1  cook,  10  packers,  14  saddle-mules,  50  pack- 
mules,  1  bell-mare;  total,  14  personnel. 


24  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

wagons  for  cavalry  march  with  the  horse  batteries.  The 
ammunition  column  of  the  division  follows  in  rear  of 
the  main  body,  being  separated  therefrom  by  the  field 
hospitals  and  bridge-trains.  The  supply  columns  remain 
about  a  day's  march  in  rear  of  the  troops  as  long  as 
local  supplies  are  available  to  replenish  the  regimental 
train;  otherwise  they  will  march  about  a  half-day's  march 
in  rear  of  the  column. 

Total  Transportation  of  the  Division. — The  number  of 
wagons  accompanying  an  army  is  necessarily  very  great, 
as  can  ba  seen  from  the  authorized  transportation  for  a 
division,  which  comprises  a  total  of  476  escort  wagons  and 
51  ambulances,  in  addition  to  the  materiel  of  the  signal 
corps  company  and  the  advance  guard  and  reserve  bridge- 
trains. 

The  number  of  wagons  accompanying  a  German  arm.v 
corps,  as  given  by  Bronsart  von  Schellendorf,  is  775  two- 
horse,  261  four-horse,  and  469  six-horse  wagons.  This  ma;? 
be  regarded  as  a  minimum  estimate.  Colonel  Exner.  on 
the  same  subject,  says:  "While  it  has  been  the  constant 
aim  of  the  authorities  to  reduce  the  number  of  wagons  to 
what  absolute  necessity  requires,  the  train  of  an  army 
corps  at  present  comprises  at  least  1,700  wagons  and  6,000 
horses." 

In  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  the  number  of  wagons 
in  1862,  was  in  the  proportion  of  49  to  1,000  men.  In  1864 
it  had  been  reduced  to  34,  and  in  the  final  campaign  to  22, 
to  1,000  men.  This  was  at  the  rate  of  less  than  700  to  a  full 
corps  of  30,000  combatants,  with  its  complete  allowance 
of  special  and  train  troops.  It  should,  however,  be  observed 
that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  generally  operating  at 
only  a  short  distance  from  its  base.  Moreover,  American 
armies  have  usually  had  fewer  impedimenta  than  those  of 
Europe. 

The  service  of  the  train  should  be  performed  by  men 
regularly  enlisted  in  a  quartermaster's  corps.  If  such  a 
corps  does  not  exist,  the  service  must  be  performed  by 
men  detailed  from  the  line  or  by  hired  civilians.  The  for- 
mer method  is  open  to  the  serious  objection  that  it  would 
reduce  the  fighting  strength;  the  latter  is  objectionable  as 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  25 

a  matter  of  discipline.  The  following  description  of  the  con- 
dition of  affairs  in  the  United  States  Army  during  the  War 
of  Secession  deserves  attention:  "As  soon  as  our  regiments 
arrived  at  their  posts,  details  began  to  be  made  for  all  th^ 
uses  of  administration — details  in  the  trains,  in  the  hos- 
pitals, at  headquarters,  for  engineers,  for  telegraph  corps, 
for  the  post-office,  for  ordnance  duty,  for  permanent  hos- 
pitals, for  store-houses,  for  bake-houses,  as  clerks,  as  me- 
chanics, as  sick-bearers.  Then  came  that  greatest  of  all 
enemies  of  'fighting  strength  reports,'  a  quartermaster's 
department.  .  .  .  The  worst  of  all  this  was  that  so- 
called  staff  officers,  at  the  heads  of  these  departments, 
would  by  some  means  learn  the  names  of  the  best  men  in 
the  regiments,  who,  by  their  character,  gave  tone  to  all 
about  them,  and  these  men  would  be  detailed  by  name,  un- 
til a  regiment  would  be  left  at  the  end  of  six  months  with 
a  full  complement  of  officers,  1,000  men  on  its  rolls,  and 
about  300  in  its  ranks,  and  these  tLe  miserable  remainder 
after  subtracting  its  best  components."* 

The  extent  to  which  this  evil  of  taking  men  away  from 
the  colors  was  carried  has  hardly  been  adequately  set  forth 
in  the  above  quotation.  In  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland, 
out  of  a  total  strength  of  122,708  men,  8,184  were  present 
on  extra  or  special  duty.,  and  12,962  absent  on  detached 
service,  making  a  total  of  21,146  men,  or  more  than  17 
per  cent  of  the  entire  army,  detached  from  the  fighting 
organizations.  The  extravagance  of  such  details  was 
marked;  the  number  of  men  in  the  special  services  being 
greater,  by  at  least  one-third,  than  would  have  been  the 
case  had  the  same  service  been  performed  by  organizations 
of  specially  trained  troops.  If  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland 
had  had  in  its  ranks  at  Chickamauga  all  the  men  needlessly 
detached  from  the  colors,  the  result  of  that  great  battle 
might  have  been  different. 

THE  STAFF. 

The  commanding  general  is  charged  with  the  mainte- 
nance of  the  efficiency  of  his  army  and  the  proper  conduct 

*General  Hazen  in  "The  School  and  the  Army  in  France  and 
Germany." 


26  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

of  military  operations;  and  his  responsibility  extends  to 
multifarious  details,  a  personal  supervision  of  which  is  be- 
yond the  physical  and  mental  power  of  any  one  individual. 
The  army  must  be  clothed,  fed,  paid,  provided  with  medical 
attention,  and  supplied  with  ammunition;  discipline  must 
be  maintained  and  enforced  by  legal  methods;  the  condition 
of  the  army  must  be  constantly  known  by  its  chief;  informa- 
tion of  the  enemy  must  be  gained;  the  orders  of  the  com- 
mander must  be  accurately  drawn  up  and  promptly  com- 
municated; and,  on  the  field  of  battle,  the  commander  must 
have  means  of  obtaining  prompt  reports  from  every  por- 
tion of  his  command,  and  needs  someone  to  represent  him 
in  emergencies  where  the  issuing  or  interpretation  of  an 
order  may  not  admit  of  a  reference  of  the  matter  to  the 
personal  attention  of  the  chief. 

These  details  are  attended  to  by  the  staff;  and  on  the 
quality  of  the  staff  depends  in  the  highest  degree  the  effi- 
ciency of  the  army.  "The  staff  is  to  the  army  what  steam 
is  to  a  locomotive.  The  machine  itself  may  be  of  the  high- 
est order,  the  engineer  who  directs  it  may  be  a  man  of 
first-class  talent,  but  without  the  motive  power  of  steam 
it  is  merely  a  huge  collection  of  well-polished  material."* 
In  the  German  Army  an  alternation  of  staff  and  line  duty 
is  so  arranged  that  a  staff  officer  can  never  lose  touch  with 
the  line.  Indeed,  an  intimate  connection  of  the  staff  and 
line  is  essential  to  the  efficiency  of  the  former,  and  it  may 
in  general  be  said  that  nothing  is  more  injurious  to  the 
efficiency  of  an  army  than  the  complete  segregation  of  the 
staff  and  line. 

The  composition  and  duties  of  the  several  staff  corps 
of  the  United  States  Army  are  set  forth  in  the  Army  Reg- 
ister and  in  the  Army  and  Field  Service  Regulations. 

The  most  important  member  of  the  staff  is,  as  the 
name  implies,  the  chief  of  staff,  who  should  enjoy  the 
complete  confidence  of  the  commanding  general  and  a  con- 
siderable degree  of  independence  in  the  performance  of  his 
ordinary  duties.  It  is  his  function  to  relieve  the  com- 
mander of  all  annoyance  in  regard  to  details,  and  thus 
leave  the  mind  of  the  latter  free  to  grapple  with  the  stra- 

*Wolseley. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  27 

tegical  and  tactical  problems  which  continually  confront 
him.  He  elaborates  the  arrangements  for  exploration  and 
protection  and  for  the  marching,  fighting,  and  camping  or 
quartering  of  the  troops,  establishes  the  service  of  informa- 
tion concerning  the  theater  of  war  and  the  enemy's  forces, 
collects  important  material  for  the  reports  of  operations 
and  the  subsequent  history  of  the  war,  and  exercises  a  gen- 
eral supervision  over  all  records  and  returns  and  the  sup- 
ply of  suitable  maps.  He  should  be  informed  at  all  times 
as  to  the  state  of  supplies  and  the  strength,  armament, 
equipment,  health,  marching  powers,  and  morale  of  the 
troops  and  be  prepared  to  render  a  report  thereon.  He 
issues  instructions  to  the  provost-marshal-general  and  to 
the  commander  of  the  base  and  line  of  communications 
of  the  army,*  draws  up  the  orders  for  special  reconnais- 
sances, raids,  and  detached  service,  and  administers  through 
intelligence  officers  the  intelligence  service,  which  com- 
prises within  its  functions  the  field  post-office,  the  secret 
service,  the  subject  of  reconnaissance,  and  the  collection, 
preparation,  and  distribution  of  military  information,  in- 
cluding maps  and  sketches.  He  performs  such  special 
functions  as  may  be  delegated  to  him  by  the  commanding 
general.  In  these  duties  he  is  assisted  by  such  officers 
of  the  general  staff,  military  secretary's  department,  and 

*For  each  territorial  army  or  important  expeditionary  force 
about  to  take  the  field,  a  base  will  be  selected  and  equipped  and 
a  service  of  a  line  of  communications  organized,  both  to  be  under 
the  control  of  the  commanding  general  of  the  field  army  or  expe- 
dition except  when  otherwise  ordered  by  the  War  Department. 

An  officer  of  appropriate  rank  will  be  designated  to  the  imme- 
diate command  of  the  base  and  line  of  communications  and  the 
necessary  troops  and  personnel  will  be  placed  under  his  orders. 
He  will  be  aided  by  a  suitable  staff  and  by  such  of  the  following 
subordinate  chiefs  as  may  be  required: 

(a)     A  commander  at  the  base; 

(&)     A  chief  of  transportation; 

(<?)     A  chief  of  the  railway  service; 

0$)     A  chief  of  transport  by  water; 

(e)  A  chief  commissary  of  base  and  line  of  communications; 
(0     A  chief  ordnance  officer; 

(fir)     A  chief  paj^master; 
(h)     A  chief  medical  officer; 

(f)  A  chief  of  telegraph  and  telephone  service; 

(fc)     A  provost-marshal  of  base  and  line  of  communications 


28  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

inspector-general's  department  as  may  be  necessary.  The 
duties  of  chiefs  of  staff  of  smaller  commands  than  those  of 
an  army  are  similar  to  those  just  detailed. 

It  is  not  the  duty  of  the  chief  of  staff  to  prepare  a  plan 
of  campaign  or  battle  for  his  chief;  his  opinions,  like  those 
of  any  other  subordinate,  should  be  given  only  when  called 
for.  Instances  have,  it  is  true,  been  often  mentioned  where 
the  chief  of  staff  was  commander  in  all  but  name,  but  such 
cases  have  been  extremely  rare  and  not  always  well 
authenticated.* 

The  Military  Staff. — The  military  staff  of  the  command- 
ing general  of  an  army  will  consist  of  the  aides  authorized 
by  law  (the  personal  staff),  the  chief  of  staff,  officers  of  the 
general  staff,  the  military  secretary's  and  inspector-gen- 
eral's departments,  the  chiefs  of  artillery,  cavalry,  engi- 
neers, and  signal  corps,  and  a  provost-marshal-general. 

In  time  of  war  the  essential  requisites  for  an  aide-de- 
camp are  intelligence,  presence  of  mind,  and  mental  readi- 
ness, combined  with  energy,  courage,  discretion,  tact,  and 
good  health.  The  aide  should  have  a  military  education, 
should  be  a  good  horseman,  and  should  always  be  able  to 
give  a  clear  statement  of  the  military  situation  in  any  part 
of  the  field  or  theater  which  he  may  have  visited. 

The  provost  -  marshal  -  general  receives  his  orders 
through  the  chief  of  staff,  makes  such  written  reports  as 
may  be  required,  and  is  charged  with  the  preservation  nf 
a  proper  police  throughout  the  army  and  on  the  lines  of 
communication,  and  with  the  protection  of  the  inhabitants 
from  pillage  and  violence.  He  keeps  a  list  and  description 
of  all  non-military  persons  and  camp-followers  and  watches 

*Schwartzenberg's  chief  of  staff,  Radetzky,  was  given  the 
credit  for  planning  the  battle  of  Leipsic,  but  afterwards  the  credit, 
for  Radetzky's  own  great  victory  at  Novara  was  given  to  his  chief 
of  staff,  Hess.  Bliicher  was  unable  to  comprehend  the  simplest 
strategical  combination,  and  was  totally  dependent  upon  Gneisenau 
for  his  plans;  and  it  is  well  known  that  Von  Moltke  was  the  real 
commander  of  the  army  of  which  King  William  was  the  nominal 
chief;  but,  in  most  cases,  the  chief  of  staff  has  been  a  valuable 
manager  of  details  and  nothing  more.  Frederick  the  Great  was 
his  own  chief  of  staff,  and  the  same  was  true  of  General  Sherman 
at  a  later  date;  but  neither  of  these  commanders  ever  had  an 
army  of  the  magnitude  of  those  that  now  take  the  field. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  29 

their  conduct;  follows  the  column  on  the  march  and  brings 
up  stragglers,  arrests  skulkers  and  fugitives  from  the 
battle-field,  and  takes  charge  of  all  prisoners  of  war  and 
deserters  from  the  enemy.  For  these  purposes,  he  exer- 
cises supervision  over  the  provost  guard  and  military  police. 

The  chief  signal  officer  has  charge  of  the  military  tele- 
graph, signal  stations,  and  balloons,  and  is  in  general  com- 
mand of  all  signal  troops  of  the  army. 

The  chief  of  artillery  has  general  charge  of  the  artil- 
lery materiel  of  the  army,  is  the  inspector  of  the  artillery, 
and  is  the  principal  assistant  of  the  commanding  general 
in  everything  pertaining  to  that  arm.  He  does  not  exer- 
cise actual  command,  except  when  assigned  to  it  by  the 
commanding  general. 

The  chief  of  cavalry  should  be  in  active  command  of 
all  the  cavalry  belonging  to  the  army;  and  should  habitu- 
ally remain  in  person  with  the  force  under  his  command. 
The  distant  and  semi-independent  operations  of  the  cav 
airy  render  it  imperative  that  he  should  not  be  tied  down 
to  the  staff  of  the  general  commanding  the  army,  but  that 
he  should  exercise  the  functions  of  an  independent  com- 
mander under  the  orders  of  the  general  commanding,  or 
with  his  acquiescence  in  the  absence  of  orders.* 

The  duties  of  the  chief  engineer  of  an  army  are  in 
general  as  follows:  he  shall  furnish  all  engineering  infor- 
mation required  by  his  commanding  general;  he  may  be 
called  upon  to  assist  in  the  selection  of  lines  of  attack 
or  of  positions  for  defense;  he  supervises  the  location  and 
design  of  the  more  important  field  works  and  may  be 
charged  with  their  construction;  he  is  in  general  charge  of 
the  engineering  features  of  all  siege  operations,  unless  an- 
other officer  is  especially  designated  for  that  purpose;  he 
is  responsible  for  the  construction  and  repair  of  the  inil- 

*Chiefs  of  cavalry  who  have  been  kept  at  headquarters,  as 
Pleasonton  was  under  Meade,  and  whose  functions  have  practically 
been  limited  to  those  of  a  staff  officer,  have,  in  our  service,  gen- 
erally been  failures;  while  those  have  been  successful  who  have 
actively  commanded  the  larger  cavalry  units  and  delegated  the 
3taff  duties  to  an  inspector  of  cavalry.  The  position  of  the  Con- 
federate chief  of  Cavalry,  Stuart,  in  the  Army  of  Northern  Vir- 
ginia, is  a  model  which  can  be  safely  followed. 
—4— 


30  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

itary  roads  and  bridges,  and  for  the  construction,  repair, 
and  operation  of  railroads  in  the  theater  of  operations;  he 
will  execute  the  demolitions  required  by  the  general  in- 
structions or  the  specific  orders  of  the  commanding  gen- 
eral; to  him  may  be  assigned  the  selection  and  preparation 
of  the  permanent  camps  and  any  other  duties  requiring 
knowledge  of  an  engineering  nature.  To  carry  out  his  du- 
ties he  should  have  a  sufficient  force  of  military  assist- 
ants, ample  funds  in  his  charge,  and  authority  to  employ 
necessary  civilian  labor  and  assistance.  The  duties  of  the 
chief  of  engineers  as  regards  the  command  of  troops  are 
analogous  to  those  of  the  chief  of  artillery.  The  duties  of 
engineer  officers  on  the  staffs  of  corps  and  division  com- 
manders are  similar  in  all  respects  to  those  of  the  chief 
of  engineers  of  an  army,  differing  only  in  scope  and  degree. 

The  Administrative  Staff. — The  administrative  staff  will 
consist  of  superior  officers  of  the  quartermaster's,  subsist- 
ence, pay,  medical,  ordnance,  and  judge-advocate-generaPs 
departments,  with  such  subordinate  officers  as  may  be  re- 
quired. A  mustering  officer  will  be  attached  to  the  head- 
quarters of  each  army  or  army  corps,  and  to  each  division 
or  separate  brigade  an  assistant  mustering  officer. 

The  chief  quartermaster  is  responsible  for  providing 
the  army  with  forage,  transportation,  clothing,  camp  and 
garrison  equipage,  and  for  the  management  of  the  trains. 

The  chief  commissary  of  subsistence  is  charged  with 
providing  food  for  the  army,  and  the  chief  paymaster  '3 
responsible  for  the  payment  of  the  troops. 

The  medical  director-general  has  charge  of  the  hospital 
and  ambulance  service,  and  everything  pertaining  to  the 
care  of  the  sick  and  wounded.  The  troops  of  the  hospital 
corps  are  under  his  command.  Any  civilian  society  for  the 
aid  of  the  sick  and  wounded  (such  as  the  Sanitary  Com- 
mission during  the  War  of  Secession)  should  be  required 
to  have  a  representative  at  the  headquarters  of  the  com- 
manding general,  as  a  sine  qua  non  to  its  official  recogni- 
tion, or  even  toleration.  Such  representative  should  be 
held  responsible  for  the  equitable  distribution  of  all  sup- 
plies contributed  to  the  sick  and  wounded  by  the  society, 
and  to  this  end  should  be  required  to  confer  with  the  med- 
ical director-general. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  31 

The  chief  ordnance  officer  is  charged  with  the  supply 
of  ammunition,  arms,  artillery  carriages,  and  equipments 
for  the  troops  of  the  three  arms. 

The  judge-advocate  at  the  headquarters  of  the  army 
supervises  the  proceedings  of  courts-martial,  military  com- 
missions, courts  of  inquiry,  etc. 

The  mustering  officer  is  charged  with  making  all  mus- 
ters into  and  out  of  the  military  service,  and  exercises  gen- 
eral supervision  o/er  all  muster  and  pay  rolls. 

It  is  the  rule  in  most  armies  for  the  chiefs  of  the  staff 
departments  of  an  army  in  the  field  to  communicate  with 
the  heads  of  their  respective  departments  at  the  War  Office 
through  the  chief  of  staff  of  the  army  with  which  they  are 
serving.  It  is  deemed  necessary  that  every  staff  officer 
should  feel  that  the  commander  of  the  army  with  which  hf» 
is  serving  is  first,  and  above  all,  his  chief.  The  avoidance 
of  friction,  and  perhaps  the  safety  of  the  army  itself,  re- 
quires that  there  should  be  nothing  with  the  army  that  is 
not  under  the  control  of  its  commander.  Among  the  many 
evils  of  organization  in  the  French  Army  in  1870-71 — evils 
sufficient  to  neutralize  bravery  and  make  victory  impossible 
—the  independence  of  the  several  military  departments 
was  one  of  the  most  prominent.  Vinoy  says:  "The  segre- 
gation of  the  various  military  departments,  despite  the  zeal 
of  each,  produced  everywhere  difficulties  and  delays  which 
were  irritating  and  much  to  be  regretted.  The  artillery 
and  engineers  during  the  siege  [of  Paris]  were  entirely 
distinct  from  and  independent  of  the  commanding  officers 
of  corps  and  divisions,  and  the  confusion  consequent  on 
these  arrangements  caused  disastrous  consequences.  Bat- 
teries were  often  built,  armed,  and  even  opened  fire,  with- 
out the  commandant  of  the  troops  in  the  immediate  vicin- 
ity being  informed;  the  batteries  being  thus  unsupported 
and  in  danger  of  capture." 

In  the  supply  departments  this  condition  of  affairs  led 
to  still  greater  evils;  and  in  the  military  renaissance  of 
France,  following  her  crushing  disasters,  a  change  in  the 
methods  of  administration  was  effected.  All  commanders 
of  army  corps  in  time  of  peace,  and  all  commanders  of 
armies  in  time  of  war,  have  absolute  control  over  the  sup- 
plies necessary  for  their  troops.  The  officer  of  a  supply  de- 


32  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

partment  on  the  staff  of  such  a  commander  merely  has  to 
submit  his  observations  to  the  general  and  ask  his  orders 
in  writing.  These  orders  received,  the  responsibility  of  the 
staff  officer  ceases,  no  matter  how  extraordinary  the  act  of 
the  general  may  be;  the  latter  alone  is  responsible  to  the 
Minister  of  War.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  staff  officers  of  the 
supply  departments  to  keep  their  chiefs  at  the  War  Office 
promptly  and  fully  informed  of  tie  needs  of  the  army,  and 
to  see  that  there  is  no  unnecessary  delay  in  obtaining  and 
issuing  the  needed  supplies.  It  is  the  great  object  and  duty 
of  the  entire  staff  to  secure  the  harmonious  action  of  all 
parts  of  the  army  towards  a  common  end. 

The  staff  of  a  commander  should  never  be  any  larger 
than  necessity  absolutely  demands.  The  most  successful 
generals  have,  as  a  rule,  had  small  but  carefully  selected 
and  efficient  staffs.  Bronsart  von  Schellendorf  (probably 
the  first  authority  in  existence  on  the  .ubject  of  staff  duty) 
says:  "There  cannot  be  the  slightest  doubt  that  the  addi- 
tion of  every  individual  not  absolutely  required  on  a  staff 
is  in  itself  an  evil.  In  the  first  place,  it  unnecessarily 
weakens  the  strength  of  a  regiment  from  which  an  officer 
is  taken;  and  again,  it  increases  "he  difficulty  of  providing 
the  staff  with  quarters,  which  tells  on  the  troops  which 
may  be  quartered  in  the  same  place;  and  these  are  quite 
ready  enough,  as  it  is,  to  occasionally  look  with  a  certain 
amount  of  dislike — though  in  most  cases  it  is  entirely  un- 
called for — on  the  personnel  of  the  higher  staffs.  Finally,  it 
should  be  remembered — and  this  is  the  most  weighty  argu- 
ment against  the  proceeding — that  idleness  is  at  the  root  of 
all  mischief.  An  unnecessarily  numerous  staff  of  officers  can 
not  always  find  duty  and  occupation  sufficient  for  its  men- 
tal and  physical  welfare;  and  its  superfluous  energies  soon 
make  themselves  felt  in  every  conceivable  kind  of  objec- 
tionable YvTay.  Experience,  at  any  rate,  shows  that  when- 
ever a  staff  is  unnecessarily  numerous,  the  ambitious  be- 
fore long  take  to  intrigue,  the  litigious  soon  produce  gen- 
eral friction,  and  the  vain  are  never  satisfied.  These  feel- 
ings, so  common  to  human  nature,  even  if  all  present,  are 
considerably  counteracted  if  the  persons  to  whom  they  ap- 
ply have  plenty  of  hard  work.  Besides,  the  numbers  of  the 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  33 

staff  being  few,  there  is  all  the  greater  choice  in  the  selec- 
tion of  the  men  who  are  to  fill  posts  on  it."* 

General  Grant's  staff,  in  the  Virginia  campaign,  con- 
sisted of  1  chief  of  staff,  2  military  secretaries,  7  aides- 
de-camp,  2  assistant  adjutants-general,  1  inspector-general, 
1  chief  quartermaster,  with  1  assistant  quartermaster,  1 
chief  commissary  of  subsistence,  with  1  assistant  commis- 
sary of  subsistence,  1  chief  engineer,  1  provost-marshal- 
general,  and  1  assistant  provost-marshal-general.  In  rank, 
the  staff  consisted  of  5  brigadier-generals,  1  colonel,  9  lieu- 
tenant-colonels, 4  captains,  and  1  lieutenant;  total,  20  offi- 
cers. This  was  a  thoroughly  good  working  staff.  It  does 
not  seem  to  have  contained  a  superfluous  member,  nor  to 
have  lacked  a  necessary  one. 

The  staff  of  an  army  corps  consists  of  1  chief  of  staff, 
colonel  of  the  general  staff  corps;  2  assistants  of  the  chief 
of  staff,  majoirs  or  captains;  1  adjutant-general,  lieuten- 
ant-colonel; 1  chief  of  engineers,  lieutenant-colonel;  1  in- 
spector-general, lieutenant  colonel:  1  chief  quartermaster, 
lieutenant-colonel;  1  chief  commissary,  lieutenant-colonel; 
1  judge-advocate,  lieutenant-colonel;  1  chief  surgeon,  lieu- 
tenant-colonel; 1  chief  signal  officer,  lieutenant-colonel;  1 
chief  ordnance  officer,  lieutenant-colonel;  1  assistant  adju- 
tant-general, captain;  3  aides,  captains  or  lieutenants. 

In  addition  to  these,  the  following  will  generally  be 
necessary  in  time  of  war:  1  chief  of  artillery,  brigadier- 
general;  1  provost-marshal,  field  officer;  1  mustering  offi- 
cer, field  officer. 

An  officer  of  the  pay  department  may  be  designated  as 
chief  paymaster  of  an  expeditionary  corps;  usually,  how- 
ever, the  payment  of  troops  will  be.  arranged  for  from 
army  headquarters. 

The  staff  of  a  division  consists  of  1  chief  of  staff,  lieu- 
tenant-colonel or  major  of  the  general  staff  corps;  1  adju- 
tant-general, major;  1  engineer  officer,  major;  1  inspector- 
general,  major;  1  chief  quartermaster,  major;  1  chief  com- 
missary, major;  1  chief  surgeon,  major;  1  chief  ordnance 
officer,  major;  1  chier  signal  officer,  major;  3  aides,  captains 

*"The  Duties  of  the  General  Staff"  (translated  by  Hare),  Vol. 
II.,  p.  35. 


34 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 


or  lieutenants;  1  provost-marshal,  captain;  1  mustering  offi- 
cer, captain;  1  judge-advocate,  major  or  captain. 

The  senior  artillery  officer  of  the  division  is  ex  officio 
chief  of  the  artillery  of  the  divis-'on. 

The  iStaff  of  a  brigade  consists  of  1  adjutant-general, 
captain;  1  quartermaster,  captain;  1  commissary,  captain; 
1  surgeon,  major;  2  aides,  lieutenants. 

Staff  officers  will  organize  the  clerical  force  and  other 
personnel  necessary  for  the  administration  of  their  serv- 
ices in  the  corps  as  well  as  in  the  division  and  brigade; 
deficiencies  existing  after  assignment  of  the  general  serv- 
ice and  civil  service  list  and  the  non-commissioned  staff 
will  have  to  be  supplied  by  details  from  the  troops.  It 
cannot  be  too  often  said,  nor  too  strongly  emphasized,  that 
the  fighting  force  should  be  left  intact,  and  that  all  en- 
croachments upon  it  by  details  should  be  jealously  guarded 
against.  Nothing  but  death,  disease,  or  capture  by  the  en- 
emy should  ever  reduce  the  number  of  effectives  with  the 
colors. 

The  following  table  gives  the  strength  and  compo- 
sition of  a  division  of  the  United  States  Army  at  war 
strength,  exclusive  of  the  trains  of  the  engineer  and  sig- 
nal troops: 


0 

Medical 
Dept. 

Enlisted 
Combatants. 

1  Civilian 
Employees. 

Wagons. 

Ambulances. 

1 

i 

r* 

rf 

0> 

n 

i 

73 

1 
1 

3 
£ 

1 

Division  Headquarters. 
3  Brigades  Infantry.  .  .  . 
1  Regiment  Cavalry.  .  .  . 
9  Batteries  Field  Artil- 
lery   
1  Battalion  Engineers.  . 
1  Company  Signal  Corps. 
4  Field  Hospitals 

16 

480 
50 

50 
19 
4 

2 

30 
3 

9 
2 
1 

28 

7 
117 
12 

18 

8 

472 

21 
12 

3 

186 
31 

32 
5 
1 
32 

186 

12 

780 
128 

132 
20 
4 
288 
816 

2,180 

39 

603 
1,388 

1,536 
103 
36 
104 
1 

3,810 

14,328 
1,236 

1,446 
658 
150 

9 

1 

1 

'40 

'ie 

64 

Trains.         

546 

619 

Totals  

75 

636 

18,818 

579  476 

51 

80 

No  positive  data  are  available  on  which  to  base  the  estimate  of 
the  number  of  general  service  clerks  needed  for  the  different  head- 
quarters. The  above  is  believed  to  be  not  far  from  the  required  number 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  35 

RANK  AND  COMMAND. 

The  rank  of  the  commanders  of  the  different  organiza- 
tions should  be  as  follows:  The  company  should  be  com- 
manded by  a  captain;  the  battalion,  by  a  major;  the  regi- 
ment, by  a  colonel;  the  brigade,  by  a  brigadier-general;  the 
division,  by  a  major-general;  and  the  army  corps,  by  a  lieu- 
tenant-general. An  army  should  be  commanded  by  a  gen- 
eral, and  an  aggregation  of  armies,  by  a  general  in  chief. 

In  the  United  States  Army  rank  has  never  been  com- 
mensurate with  command.  In  the  War  of  Secession  major- 
generals  commanded  divisions,  army  corps,  and  armies;  and 
General  Grant,  while  commanding  forces  aggregating  more 
than  a  million  men  actually  under  arms,  and  operating  over 
a  theater  extending  from  the  Potomac  to  the  Kio  Grande, 
had  only  the  rank  proper  for  the  commander  of  an  army 
corps.  This  incongruity  was  without  a  single  advanta- 
geous feature,  and  was  open  to  several  cogent  objections. 
Justice  to  the  military  leaders  should  have  given  to  them 
rank  corresponding  to  their  responsibilities,  and  the  inter- 
ests of  discipline  would  have  been  subserved  by  not  re- 
quiring generals  to  serve  under  the  orders  of  commanders 
holding  the  same  grade  as  themselves.  In  Napoleon's 
armies  the  generals  cheerfully  served  under  marshals,  and 
the  marshals  loyally  obeyed  the  orders  of  the  Emperor*, 
but  the  conduct  of  marshals  serving  under  marshals  was 
often  insubordinate,  and  not  infrequently  led  to  disaster. 

RECRUITMENT. 

The  diminution  of  the  effective  strength  of  an  army 
commences  with  the  very  leginning  of  a  campaign,  ami 
generally  reaches  its  maximum  at  the  time  of  greatest 
fighting,  which  is  generally  also  the  period  of  the  greatest 
fatigue  and  hards-hip,  and  the  worst  sanitary  conditions. 
In  addition  to  the  losses  by  battle,  death  and  disability 
from  disease  and  exhaustion  reduce  the  list  of  effectives,* 

*"The  Guard  Corps  left  the  Rhine  on  the  3d  of  August  with 
a  strength  of  about  30,000  bayonets.  It  lost  nearly  8,000  at  St 
Privat,  and  350  in  the  battle  of  Sedan,  while  on  the  morning  of 
that  action  it  numbered  only  13,000  men;  on  the  day  of  the  invest- 
ment of  Paris  it  had  only  9,000  bayonets.  Thus  over  12,000  in- 
fantry were  deficient,  owing  to  losses  from  fatigue." — HoTienlohe* 


36  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

and  straggling  and  desertion  assist,  to  a  greater  or  less 
degree,  in  depleting  the  strength  of  the  army.  Some  means 
must,  then,  be  adopted  to  make  good  the  losses  of  war,  or 
the  army  will,  sooner  or  later,  be  brought  to  a  standstill 
from  sheer  exhaustion. 

There  are  two  general  methods  of  recruiting  an  army: 
1st.  By  replacing  the  losses  in  each  regiment  with  recruits 
from  its  own  regimental  depot;  2d.  By  adding  new  regi- 
ments to  the  army.  The  first  system  is  undoubtedly  the 
best,  and  is  the  one  adopted  in  all  the  great  armies  of 
Europe.  Recruits  joining  an  old  organization  speedily 
learn  their  duties,  and  take  the  tone  of  their  more  experi- 
enced comrades,  from  whom  they  acquire,  almost  uncon- 
sciously, a  great  deal  of  practical  military  information  that 
is  neither  taught  on  the  drill-ground  nor  learned  from 
books;  they  are  at  once  under  the  command  of  experienced 
officers,  and  they  are  inspired  by  the  esprit  de  corps  of  a  reg- 
iment that  has  a  history  and  has  gained  confidence  from 
experience. 

The  second  system  was  generally  employed  in  the  armies 
of  the  United  States  during  the  War  of  Secession,  and  it 
has  met  with  universal  condemnation.  Veteran  regiments 
were  allowed  to  dwindle  away,  while  new  ones  were  raised 
in  which  all,  from  the  colonel  down,  had  to  learn  their  du- 
ties together.  As  a  result,  the  old  organizations  were  often 
ineffective  for  want  of  numerical  strength,  and  the  new 
ones  were  inefficient  for  want  of  military  training.  All  to- 
gether, the  system  was  so  costly,  so  pernicious,  and  so  de- 
moralizing that  it  may  be  regarded  as  a  thing  of  the  past, 
and  the  depot  system  may  be  assumed  as  the  one  that  will 
be  adopted  in  our  future  wars. 

In  addition  to  the  organization  already  given,  each  reg- 
iment of  infantry  should  have  a  depot  battalion,  to  which 
all  recruits  should  be  assigned  for  clothing,  equipment, 
instruction  and  drill.  The  depot  battalion  should  have  its 
full  quota  of  officers,  who  might,  from  time  to  time,  be 
replaced  by  invalided  officers  from  the  front.  The  depot 
battalion  should  be  kept  at  full  strength,  troops  drawn 
from  it  being  replaced  by  fresh  recruits.  Whenever  the 
casualties  of  the  regiment  amount  to  10  per  cent,  requi- 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  37 

sition  should  immediately  be  made  on  the  depot  battalion 
for  enough  men  to  replace  the  losses,  and  the  reinforcing 
detachment  should  be  sent  from  the  depot  to  the  front 
under  charge  of  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers,  who 
might  either  be  required  to  join  the  regiment  or  return  to 
the  depot,  according  to  the  necessities  of  the  case. 

Each  regiment  of  cavalry  should  have  a  corresponding 
depot  consisting  of  two  troops ;  and  each  artillery  regiment, 
one  consisting  of  two  batteries. 

DISCIPLINE. 

In  addition  to  proper  organization,  good  discipline  i3 
an  indispensable  condition  to  the  efficiency  of  an  army. 
Discipline  is  that  quality  possessed  by  efficient  soldiers 
which  causes  each  to  appreciate  and  accept  without  ques- 
tion the  powers  and  limitations  cf  his  rank;  which  inspires 
each  with  confidence  in  the  military  steadfastness  of  his 
comrades,  and  makes  obedience  to  his  lawful  superiors  a 
second  nature.  The  object  of  discipline  is  in  every  case 
the  same — to  cause  the  army,  under  all  circumstances,  to 
respond  promptly,  and  with  united  effort,  to  the  will  of  the 
commander;  but  the  means  to  be  adopted  vary  with  the 
nature  of  the  troops.  With  intelligent  and  zealous  vol- 
unteers, discipline  becomes  mainly  a  matter  of  instruction 
and  guidance;  with  unwilling  conscripts  and  venal  "substi- 
tutes," a  dread  of  the  consequences  of  disobedience  must 
be  made  to  exceed  a  fear  of  the  enemy,  and  discipline  must 
be  strict  and  severe.  It  is  not  necessary  here  to  consider 
the  details  of  promoting  and  enforcing  discipline;  such  de- 
tails can  be  found  in  the  Army  Regulations,  the  Articles 
of  War,  and  treatises  on  military  law.  Some  general  re- 
marks on  the  subject  may  not,  however,  be  out  of  place. 

Both  rewards  and  punishments  are  used  as  means  of 
promoting  discipline;  the  former  being,  as  a  rule,  more 
efficacious  than  the  latter,  as  they  appeal  more  strongly 
to  the  pride,  self-respect,  and  better  nature  of  the  soldiers, 
though  the  latter  are  necessary  for  many  men  whose  coars- 
er nature  renders  them  insensible  to  the  influences  of  praise 
or  reward. 

In   administering  punishment  it   should  be  borne   in 


38  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

mind  that  circumstances  in  the  field  are  not  the  same  as 
in  garrison.  Many  minor  offenses,  for  which  adequate  pun- 
ishment is  provided  in  the  latter  case,  must  be  overlooked 
in  the  former;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  grave  military  of- 
fenses, such  as  cowardice,  insubordination,  and  willful  neg- 
lect of  duty,  must  be  punished  in  the  field  with  promptness 
and  unrelenting  severity.  In  every  case  the  spirit,  rather 
than  the  letter,  of  the  'aw  should  be  observed;  and  the 
punishment  should  be  suitable  to  the  offense,  and  calcu- 
lated to  serve  as  a  deterrent  example  to  others.  Punish- 
ment ordered  by  a  subordinate  should  never  be  remitted 
by  a  commander;  but,  if  it  be  unjust,  the  subordinate  should 
be  privately  ordered  to  remit  it  himself.  Discipline  requires 
that  nothing  should  be  done  by  any  officer  to  weaken  the 
authority  of  any  other,  whether  he  be  a  senior  or  a  junior. 

lA  commander  should  never  give  an  order  when  there 
is  reason  to  believe  that  its  execution  will  be  impossible; 
for  the  soldiers,  becoming  accustomed  to  disobeying  or- 
ders through  necessity,  will  fall  into  the  habit  of  disre- 
garding those  that  can  be  obeyed,  and  discipline  will  be 
ruined.  An  order,  once  given,  should  not  be  revoked,  or 
in  any  manner  changed,  unless  it  be  evident  that  its  exe- 
cution in  its  original  form  would  lead  to  disastrous  re- 
sults; for  soldiers  will  soon  lose  confidence  in  a  leader  who 
seems  to  indicate  by  frequent  changes  in  his  orders  that 
he  does  not  know  his  own  mind.  When  the  end  in  view 
justifies  it,  any  sacrifice,  however  great,  may  be  demanded 
of  soldiers;  but  useless  sacrifices  of  life,  or  even  of  com- 
fort, should  be  carefully  avoided.  Soldiers  should  not, 
however,  be  in  any  way  pampered,  but  the  full  measure  of 
their  proper  duty  should  be  exacted;  for  idleness  and  in- 
dulgence are  scarcely  inferior  to  hardship  and  suffering  as 
an  inspiration  to  discontent.  In  the  matter  of  prompt  obe- 
dience to  orders  and  regulations  every  officer  should  be  an 
example  to  his  men,  and  should  remember  constantly  that 
obedience  is  the  very  corner-stone  of  the  military  edifice. 

Drill  is  an  important  means  of  promoting  discipline* 
but  it  is  merely  one  of  the  means,  not  the  end.  Many 
militia  organizations  noted  for  expertness  in  certain  drills 
are  not  in  a  high  state  of  discipline,  and  faultless  evolu- 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  39- 

tions  are  often  seen  executed  on  the  stage  by  totally  undis- 
ciplined people.  Drill  is  an  indispensable  means  of  im- 
parting military  instruction  and  promoting  military  effi- 
ciency, but  well-drilled  troops  are  not  necessarily  (though 
usually)  well-disciplined  soldiers. 

There  are  certain  outward  signs  which  are  generally 
evidences  of  discipline,  chief  of  which  are  a  careful  atten- 
tion to  the  requirements  of  military  etiquette  and  cere- 
monious marks  of  deference  to  one's  lawful  military  supe- 
riors. But  while  these  visible  indications  of  the  existence 
of  discipline  are  highly  desirable  and  should  be  sedulously 
cultivated,  they  must  not  be  confounded  with  the  desired 
quality  itself.  The  lest  evidences  of  true  discipline  are  -found 
in  the  unmurmuring  endurance  of  hardships  ly  the  soldiers,  and 
in  their  willing,  energetic,  and  intelligent  efforts  to  perform  their 
whole  duty  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy.  A  minimum  of  strag- 
glers on  the  march  and  of  skulkers  in  battle  is  the  best 
proof  of  good  discipline.  General  De  Chanal  says  of  the 
Union  Army  in  the  War  of  Secession:  "At  the  core,  and  in 
all  that  is  essential,  its  discipline  is  as  good  as,  if  not 
better  than,  that  of  the  European  armies;  but  it  has  not 
the  external  marks,  and  an  observer  who  merely  passes 
through  the  American  army  may  thus  be  deceived."*  Only 
he  who  can  perceive  the  difference  between  outward  signa 
and  inward  essence,  and  who  appreciates  the  fact  that  dis- 
cipline is  not  secured  among  all  troops  by  the  application 
of  the  same  inflexible  rules,  can  command  the  best  efforts 
of  an  army. 

"There  is  a  soul  to  an  army,"  says  General  Sherman, 
"as  well  as  to  the  individual  man,  and  no  general  can  ac- 
complish the  full  work  of  his  army  unless  he  commands  the 
soul  of  his  men  as  well  as  their  body  and  legs."  To  appeal 
to  and  control  this  soul  of  the  army,  the  commander  must 
thoroughly  understand  his  men,  and  know  the  motives 
which  brought  them  into  the  ranks  and  the  impulses  which 
rouse  their  ambition. 

When  CaBsar,  finding  his  troops  dismayed  by  the  re- 
port that  the  German  barbarians  whom  they  were  to  en- 

*"L'Arm6e   Americaine,"   p.    243. 


40  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

counter  were  a  race  of  giants,  declared  that  those  who 
wished  to  remain  behind  might  do  so,  but  that  he  and  the 
Tenth  Legion  would  march  against  the  enemy,  he  made  a 
direct  appeal  to  the  pride  of  the  designated  legion,  and  in- 
spired the  emulation  of  the  others  in  such  a  manner  as  to 
rouse  the  very  soul  of  his  army. 

The  greatest  leaders  have  always  felt  the  pulse  of  their 
armies,  as  it  were,  and  have  keenly  touched  the  national 
characteristics  of  their  troops.  Different  nations  need  dif- 
ferent inspiration.  The  stirring  addresses  and  orders  of 
Napoleon  were  admirably  calculated  to  rouse  the  enthu- 
siasm of  French  troops,  but  such  appeals  would  doubtless 
be  coldly  received  by  British  soldiers,  who  could  be  more 
strongly  influenced  by  an  appeal  to  their  self-respect  or 
their  sense  of  duty  than  by  any  sentimental  ideas  of  glory. 
An  imitation  of  Napoleonic  addresses  by  an  American  com- 
mander would  be  quite  as  likely  to  excite  ridicule  as  en- 
thusiasm; but  a  suitable  appeal  to  the  American  soldier 
has  rarely  failed  to  receive  a  satisfactory  response  on  the 
battle-field. 

The  order  issued  by  General  Sherman  to  his  army  on 
the  eve  of  its  departure  from  Atlanta,  on  the  famous  March 
to  the  Sea,  shows  a  thorough  appreciation  of  the  nature 
of  American  troops.  It  reads  as  follows:  "The  general 
commanding  deems  it  proper  at  this  time  to  inform  the  offi- 
cers and  men  of  the  Fourteenth,  Fifteenth,  Seventeenth, 
and  Twentieth  Corps  that  he  has  organized  them  into  an 
army  for  a  special  purpose  known  to  the  War  Department 
and  to  General  Grant.  It  is  sufficient  for  you  to  know  that 
it  involves  a  departure  from  our  present  base,  and  a  long 
and  difficult  march  to  a  new  one.  All  the  chances  of  war 
have  been  considered  and  provided  for,  as  far  as  human 
sagacity  can.  All  he  asks  of  you  is  to  maintain  that  disci- 
pline, patience,  and  courage  which  have  characterized  you 
in  the  past;  and  ho  hopos,  through  yon,  to  strike  a  blow 
at  our  enemy  that  will  have  a  material  effect  in  produc- 
ing what  we  all  so  much  desire,  his  complete  overthrow. 

He  hopes  to  lead  you  to  achievements  equal 

in  importance  to  those  of  the  past."  There  is  here  no  ap- 
peal to  a  love  of  glory,  a  sense  of  duty,  a  greed  of  spoil, 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  41 

or  a  spirit  of  revenge.  The  address  is  a  plain  appeal  to  the 
common  sense,  pride,  i  nd  patriotism  of  the  American  sol- 
dier, and  how  well  it  was  answered  history  attests. 

Hatred  of  and  resentment  towards  the  enemy  are 
potent  stimulants  to  the  ardor  of  soldiers,  and  these  senti- 
ments can  be  appealed  to  in  all  armies.  Many  diverse  sen- 
timents may  influence  the  same  army. 

The  personal  influence  of  the  commander  should  be 
felt.  He  should  be  known  by  his  troops  and  regarded  a& 
the  impersonation,  or  at  least  the  chief  representative,  of 
the  cause  for  which  the  army  is  fighting.  He  should  culti- 
vate the  morale  of  his  troops  as  carefully  as  he  provides 
for  their  food,  clothing,  and  ammunition.  In  the  Crimean 
War  the  British  commanders  (Lord  Eaglan  and  General 
Simpson)  were,  in  this  respect,  all  that  a  commander  should 
not  be.  "During  the  siege  of  Sebastopol,"  says  Wolseley, 
"I  verily  believe  that  a  large  proportion  of  our  men  did 
not  know  the  name  of  the  general  officer  commanding, 
They  seldom  saw  him;  he  did  not  live  amongst  them.  If 
he  had  feelings  in  common  with  them,  they  did  not  know 
it.  No  touching  appeals  were  made  to  their  feelings  of 
honor  and  patriotism.  All  our  attention  was  bestowed  on 
their  stomachs,  and  the  result  was  we  never  got  much  out  of 
our  men,  and  that  in  August,  1855,  our  army  was  in  a  dis- 
creditable condition  of  demoralization."* 

The  best  of  discipline  may  be  shattered  by  making 
demands  upon  the  troops  beyond  their  capacity  of  endur 
ance.  Want,  distress,  and,  above  all,  useless  hardships  and 
unnecessary  and  costly  attacks,  are  destructive  of  disci 
pline.  General  Grant  truly  remarks  that  "no  man  is  so 
brave  that  he  may  not  meet  such  defeats  and  disasters  as 
to  discourage  him  and  dampen  his  ardor  for  any  cause,  no 
matter  how  just  he  deems  it."**  Wellington's  troops, 
flushed  with  the  great  victory  of  Salamanca,  were  so  dis- 
heartened by  a  series  of  unsuccessful  assaults,  and  by 
suffering  from  inclement  weather  in  the  trenches  of  Bur- 
gos, that  the  siege  works  were  neglected,  insubordination 
gained  ground,  and  discipline  was  almost  ruined.  Unsuo- 

*"Soldiers'  Pocket-Book,"  p.  5. 
**"Memoirs,"  Vol.  II.,  p.  419. 


42  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

cessful  operations  in  other  parts  of  the  theater  compelled 
the  abandonment  of  the  siege;  and  Wellington,  in  an  out- 
burst of  angry  denunciation,  declared  that  discipline  had 
deteriorated  during  the  campaign  in  a  greater  degree  than 
he  had  ever  witnessed  o^  read  of  in  any  army.  Yet  his  army 
at  Salamanca  was  an  unusually  well-disciplined  and  super- 
latively brave  one. 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  doubtless  one  of  the 
bravest  and  best  disciplined  in  existence;  yet  the  effect 
produced  upon  it  by  the  useless  slaughter  at  Cold  Harbor 
was  disheartening  in  the  extreme.  An  ill-considered  attack 
"all  along  the  line"  was  repulsed  with  the  loss  of  some 
12,000  men,  in  about  ten  minutes,  during  which  time  the 
loss  of  the  enemy  was  trifling.  An  order  to  renew  the  as- 
sault was  sent  to  the  corps  commanders,  and  by  them 
transmitted  in  the  usual  manner  to  their  subordinates. 
But  the  limit  of  endurance  had  been  .reached,  and  the  sol- 
diers, who  had  fought  valiantly  on  many  a  bloody  field, 
recognized  the  hopelessness  of  further  effort,  and,  remain- 
ing silent  and  immovable,  they  ignored  the  order.  That 
the  spirit  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  not  crushed 
by  such  occurrences  is  proof  that  its  discipline  was  of  the 
highest  kind. 

For  the  enforcement  of  discipline,  in  so  far  as  the  pre- 
vention and  punishment  of  military  crimes  is  concerned, 
rules  can  be,  and  are,  prescribed;  but  for  that  higher  dis- 
cipline which  calls  forth  the  supreme  efforts  of  self-denial 
and  daring — which,  in  fact,  controls  the  soul  of  an  army 
— there  is  no  law  of  universal  application;  justice,  kind- 
ness, firmness,  earnestness,  a  solicitous  regard  for  the 
physical  welfare  of  the  troops,  an  appreciation  of  what 
men  can  do  and  what  is  beyond  their  power,  a  deep  knowl- 
edge of  human  nature,  an  understanding  of  the  national 
characteristics,  a  visible  willingness  to  share  all  the  dan- 
gers and  hardships  to  which  the  men  are  exposed,  an  ap- 
preciation of  the  special  conditions  under  which  the  army 
is  acting,  and  a  thorough  sympathy  with  the  motives  which 
inspire  the  best  efforts  of  the  soldiers  are  requisite  on  the 
part  of  the  commander.  A  knowledge  of  human  nature  is 
half  of  the  science  of  war. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  43 

CHAPTER  III. 

CHARACTERISTICS   OF   THE   THREE   ARMS. 

"A  general  looks  on  the  different  arms  as  instruments  for 
attaining  his  object,  precisely  as  a  carpenter  regards  his  tools; 
but  no  good  carpenter  would  use  his  chisel  as  a  saw,  or  his  mal- 
let as  a  hammer." — Home. 

IN  FANTRY. 

Powers  and  Limitations  of  Infantry. — Both  numerically 
and  in  the  effects  of  its  action,  the  infantry  is  the  most 
important  part  of  an  army.  It  can  operate  on  all  kinds 
of  ground;  it  is  equally  adapted  to  offensive  or  defensive 
action,  and  it  can  act  either  at  a  halt  or  in  motion.  It  is 
more  easily  equipped,  more  cheaply  maintained,  more  quick- 
ly made  efficient,  and  is  more  nearly  independent  than  any 
other  arm.  The  efficiency  of  an  army  is  mainly  measured 
by  the  efficiency  of  its  infantry,  and  the  Austro-Prussian 
War  of  1866  showed  that  the  deficiency  of  infantry  cannot 
be  counterbalanced  by  the  skill  and  daring  of  the  cavalry 
or  the  devoted  heroism  of  the  artillery. 

Infantry  is,  however,  limited  to  the  pace  of  the  indi- 
vidual man,  and  its  effective  action  is  confined  to  the  range 
of  the  rifle.  An  army  composed  exclusively  of  infantry 
could  not  keep  informed  of  the  movements  of  an  adversary 
possessing  cavalry,  and  infantry  unaided  by  artillery  might 
be  crushed  by  the  enemy's  guns  before  it  could  become 
effectively  engaged. 

Arms  and  Action. — The  arms  of  the  infantry  are  the 
rifle  and  bayonet,  and  its  action  consists  of  fire,  shock,  and 
a  combination  of  the  two.  Of  these  the  fire  action  is  the 
most  important,  though  a  position  is  rarely  carried,  and 
an  assault  is  rarely  repulsed,  except  when  fire  action  is 
supplemented  by  real  or  threatened  shock.  Actual  shock 
has  been  comparatively  rare,  as  the  defenders  have  usu- 
ally given  way  or  the  assailants  retired  before  bayo- 
nets could  be  crossed;  but  +h2  recent  Russo-Japanese  War 
has  demonstrated  repeatedly  that  stubborn  infantry  be- 


44  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

hind  field-works  cannot  be  driven  from  their  intrenched 
position  without  actual  shock.  The  moral  effect  of  a 
threatened  collision  is,  however,  decisive  in  many  cases, 
the  defeated  side  retreating  to  avoid  a  shock  which  seems 
inevitable,  and  which  it  feels  unable  to  withstand.  In 
rare  cases,  fire  action  alone  may  decide  a  battle,  as  at 
New  Orleans,  in  1815,  where  the  British,  unable  to  carry 
Jackson's  works,  had  no  alternative  but  to  reernbark  and 
abandon  the  invasion.  But  such  exceptions  only  mark  the 
rule.  At  Waterloo,  notwithstanding  their  heavy  losses 
from  the  British  fire,  the  French  were  broken  only  by  the 
shock  of  the  counter-charge;  and  Fredericksburg  was  not 
decisive,  because  the  terrible  effects  of  the  Confederate 
fire  were  not  supplemented  by  a  counter-attack. 

The  fire  of  the  breech-loading  rifle  is  sensibly  felt  at 
a  distance  of  more  than  2,500  yards  and  becomes  serious 
at  about  1,800  yards,*  but  it  is  only  at  1,200  yards  that 
the  fire  becomes  really  effective.  At  600  yards  it  may  be 
called  decisive,  while  at  300  yards  and  under  it  is  prac- 
tically annihilating. 

The  bayonet  is  valuable  as  a  weapon  of  last  resort. 
Its  possession  implies  a  means  of  conducting  a  hand-to- 
hand  conflict,  and  its  value  often  depends  as  much  upon 
moral  effect  as  upon  actual  shock.  Jomini  says  that  in 
his  long  experience  in  the  Napoleonic  wars  he  saw  actual 
bayonet  conflicts  only  at  the  heads  of  columns  which  en- 
countered each  other  unexpectedly  in  villages  or  defiles-, 
and  Boguslawski  declares  that  in  the  Franco-German  War 
bayonets  were  never  crossed  in  the  open  field,  and  but 
seldom  in  village  and  wood  fights.  On  the  other  hand, 
General  Hancock  states  that  in  the  desperate  fighting  at 
the  "Bloody  Angle,"  at  Spottsylvania,  most  of  the  dead 
were  victims  of  the  bayonet.**  The  abolition  of  the  bayo- 

*At  Gorni-Dubnik  the  Russian  Guards  began  to  suffer  loss  at 
3,000  paces,  and  at  2,000  paces  their  men  fell  rapidly. 

**"The  interior  of  the  intrenchments  presented  a  terrible  and 
ghastly  spectacle  of  dead,  most  of  whom  were  killed  by  our  men 
with  the  bayonet  when  they  penetrated  the  works.  So  thickly 
lay  the  dead  at  this  point  that  at  many  places  the  bodies  were 
touching  and  piled  upon  each  other." — Official  Report  of  Major- 
General  W.  8.  Hancock,  U.  8.  A. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  45 

net  has  been  advocated  by  some  military  authorities,  but, 
in  view  of  its  frequent  use  in  actual  combat  as  exemplified 
in  the  recent  campaign  in  Manchuria,  and  of  its  undoubted 
moral  effect  in  causing  the  troops  to  feel  that  the  enemy 
has  no  superiority  over  them  by  being  armed  with  J_he  bay- 
onet and  that  they  will  not  be  totally  helpless  if  then- 
ammunition  be  expended,  its  retention  is  unquestionably 
necessary.  The  men  should  be  carefully  trained  in  its  use. 

Intrenching  Tool. — The  intrenching  tool'  now  forms  an 
indispensable  part  of  the  equipment  of  the  infantry  soldier, 
and  for  the  first  time  is  now  supplied  in  the  United  States 
Army  as  part  of  the  regular  equipment. 

Napoleon  says  that  a  soldier  should  never  be  separated 
from  his  musket,  his  cartridges,  his  knapsack,  his  rations 
for  at  least  four  days,  and  his  intrenching  tool.*  This 
estimate  of  the  value  of  the  intrenching  tool  by  the  great- 
est of  soldiers,  notwithstanding  the  small  part  played  by 
intrenchments  in  the  wars  of  the  Republic  and  Empire,  is 
significant.  In  the  War  of  Secession  the  art  of  construct- 
ing hasty  intrenchments  was  brought  to  great  perfection, 
and  the  extensive  use  of  such  intrenchments  has  been 
noted  by  every  historian  of  that  conflict.  General  Howard 
says:  "No  regiment  was  long  in  front  of  Johnston's  army 
without  having  virtually  as  good  a  breast-work  as  an  en- 
gineer could  plan.  There  was  a  ditch  before  the  embank- 
ment and  a  strong  log  revetment  behind  it,  and  a  heavy 
'top  log'  to  shelter  the  heads  of  the  men.  I  have  known  a 
regiment  to  shelter  itself  completely  against  musketry  and 
artillery,  with  axes  and  shovels,  in  less  than  an  hour  after 
it  reached  Hs  position."**  This  lesson  was  tardily  learned 
in  Europe  when,  thirteen  years  later,  it  vas  taught  by  the 
Turks,  and  the  intrenching  tool  is  now  carried  by  the  in- 
fantry of  all  civilized  armies.  The  experiences  of  the  two 
most  recent  wars  have  shown  that  all  troops,  from  the 
most  advanced  skirmishers  to  the  reserves,  must  intrench 
on  the  field  to  avoid  ruinous  losses  from  small-arms  and 
artillery  fire.  The  construction  of  hasty  field  intrench- 

*"Maximes  de  Guerre." 

**"Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War,"  Vol.  IV.,  p.  307. 


46  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

ments  is  no  less  essential  to  the  attacking  force  than  to 
the  defense. 

Pace  of  Infantry. — At  drill  the  pace  of  infantry  is  at 
the  rate  cf  100  yards  a  minute.  In  advancing  to  attack, 
this  pace  would  probably  be  maintained  before  opening 
fire.  Advancing  while  firing,  but  without  seeking  cover, 
the  pace  would  be  reduced  to  40  yards,  and  advancing  by 
rushes,  to  20  yards  a  minute. 

The  maximum  pace  to  be  relied  upon  in  marching  is 
about  3  miles  an  hour,  or  88  yards  a  minute.  At  double 
time  the  pace  is  increased  to  5  miles  an  hour,  or  147  yards 
a  minute;  but  this  pace  should  not  be  kept  up  more  than 
two  or  three  minutes  at  a  time,  and  should  never  be  re- 
sorted to  except  in  emergencies,  as  the  men  would  not  only 
be  fatigued,  but,  if  brought  immediately  into  action,  would 
be  blown,  and  unable  to  use  their  rifles  with  good  effect. 

The  marching  pace  of  infantry,  in  good  condition  and 
on  good  roads,  may,  then,  be  taken  at  3  miles  an  hour. 
Heat  and  bad  roads  reduce  the  rate  of  marching  to  a  great 
but  uncertain  degree.  In  great  heat  and  dust  the  rate 
would  probably  be  reduced  to  little  more  than  2  miles  an 
hour.  Strong  head  winds  and  driving  rain-storms  from  the 
front  make  similar  reductions  in  the  pace.  Sandy,  muddy 
and  slippery  roads  also  reduce  the  pace;  but  severe  cold 
(except  where  the  roads  are  icy  or  cut  up)  generally  accel- 
erates it.  The  average  rate  of  march  of  infantry,  includ- 
ing halts,  is  from  2J  to  2f  miles  an  hour,  but  while  actu- 
ally marching  the  pace  may  generally  be  assumed  at  3 
miles  an  hour. 

Essential  Qualities  of  Infantry. — A  consideration  of  the 
tactics  of  infantry  will  be  reserved  for  another  chapter. 
It  is  sufficient  here  to  observe  that  the  value  of  the  in- 
fantry depends  upon  the  effectiveness  of  its  fire  action  and 
upon  its  ability  to  avoid  destructive  losses  from  the  fire 
of  the  enemy.  The  infantry  soldier  must,  therefore,  be 
carefully  trained  in  fire  discipline,  in  tactical  maneuvers, 
and  in  seeking  and  constructing  cover;  must  be  armed  with 
a  magazine  rifle;  must  carry  at  least  ninety  rounds  of  cart- 
ridges on  his  person;  must  be  equipped  with  a  serviceable 
intrenching. tool;  and  must  be  provided  with  a  bayonet  and 
trained  in  its  use. 


OBGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  ,       47 

CAVALRY. 

The  action  of  cavalry  consists  of  shock  action,  dis- 
mounted fire  action,  mounted  fire  action,  and  independent 
action. 

Shock  Action. — If  not  armed  with  fire-arms  and  trained 
in  their  use,  cavalry  is  limited  to  shock  action,  in  which 
case  it  is  of  value  only  offensively  and  in  motion.  When 
shock  action  is  employed,  the  effect  depends  upon  the  com- 
bination of  mass  and  velocity,  and  the  horse  must  be 
regarded  as  the  trooper's  principal  weapon,  the  force  of 
concussion  being  supplemented  by  the  use  of  the  revolver, 
saber,  or  lance. 

Dismounted  Fire  Action. — In  order  that  it  may  not  be 
helpless  on  the  tactical  defensive,  that  its  use  may  not  be 
limited  to  the  few  and  fleeting  opportunities  of  making 
an  effective  charge,  and  that  it  may  be  capable  of  independ- 
ent operations,  cavalry  must  be  armed  with  a  good  maga- 
zine carbine  or  rifle,  and  well  trained  in  its  use.  The  oppor- 
tunities for  dismounted  fire  action  are  many.  An  important 
point  may  be  quickly  seized  by  cavalry  and  held  until  the 
infantry  can  come  up ;  a  sorely  beset  body  of  infantry  can  be 
reinforced  quickly  by  the  cavalry,  which  can  then  add  at 
least  three-fourths  of  its  carbines  to  the  infantry  firing-line; 
bodies  of  partisan  troops  and  infantry  behind  barricades 
can  be  dislodged,  and,  in  general,  dismounted  fire  action 
gives  to  cavalry  an  independence  and  a  power  which  add 
immeasurably  to  its  value. 

Mounted  Fire  Action  with  the  Carbine. — Mounted  fire  ac- 
tion is  not  frequently  used,  but  it  is  nevertheless  of  suffi- 
cient value  to  be  considered  seriously,  and  there  is  nothing 
to  justify  the  assertion  of  some  European  writers  that  the 
trooper's  carbine  should  never  be  fired  from  the  saddle 
except  as  a  signal. 

The  carbine  may,  in  fact,  be  used  from  the  saddle,  not 
only  in  signaling,  but  by  skirmishers  in  pushing  back  a 
retiring  line  of  the  enemy,  or  in  covering  a  retreat  when 
the  pursuit  is  so  active  and  so  strong  as  to  make  it  unsafe 
to  dismount  and  inexpedient  to  charge.  Mounted  fire  action 
was  thus  used  with  success  by  the  cavalry  division  near 
Kearneysville,  in  August,  1864,  in  falling  back  before  the 


48  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

Confederate  cavalry  supported  by  four  divisions  of  Con- 
federate infantry. 

Instances  of  effective  mounted  fire  action  are,  how- 
ever, extremely  rare.  In  the  battle  of  the  Thames,  in  1813, 
a  charge  of  the  Kentucky  mounted  troops,  using  the  rifle, 
was  quickly  repulsed  by  the  enemy,  and  dismounted  fire 
action  was  then  successfully  resorted  to  by  the  repulsed 
riflemen.  It  is  said  that,  in  1849,  the  Cossacks,  in  charg- 
ing, fired  a  volley  from  their  carbines  just  before  the  mo- 
ment of  shock,  and  then,  quickly  throwing  the  carbine  ove^ 
the  shoulder,  drew  saber.  They  were  thus  victorious  over 
the  famous  Hungarian  cavalry.  Mounted  fire  action  was 
also  used  with  effect  on  several  occasions  by  the  Cossacks 
against  Tcherkesses  in  1877;  but  these  instances  are  either 
not  well  authenticated,  or  occurred  under  exceptional  cir- 
cumstances, for  the  best  Russian  authorities,  while  ad- 
vocating the  use  of  the  carbine  dismounted,  discourage 
mounted  fire  action.  Under  certain  conditions,  mounted 
fire  action  with  the  carbine  may  have  a  positive  value,  and 
it  should  not,  therefore,  be  ignored  in  cavalry  instruction; 
but  it  may  be  safely  prescribed  that  it  should  never  be  used 
in  line  of  battle,  and  never,  under  any  circumstances,  when 
either  shock  action  or  dismounted  fire  action  is  practicable. 

Independent  Action. — It  implies  no  disparagement  of  the 
value  of  cavalry  on  the  battle-field  to  say  that  the  most 
important  service  of  mounted  troops  is  in  that  class  of  du- 
ties known  as  "independent  action";  for  on  this  action  the 
safety  of  the  army  and  the  soundness  of  the  plans  of  the 
commanding  general  madnly  depend.  Independent  action 
embraces  all  scouting,  reconnoitering.  and  raiding  duty, 
whether  by  a  great  force  of  cavalry  acting  as  a  screen  in 
front  of  the  army,  by  a  raiding  column,  a  mere  patrol,  or 
even  a  single  scooit.  The  subject  of  raids  will  be  discussed 
in  a  subsequent  chapter.  The  other  features  of  independ- 
ent action  are  elsewhere  considered.* 

Classes  of  Cavalry. — Cavalry  is  divided  into  heavy,  me- 
dium, and  light  cavalry,  and  is  also  classified  according  to 

*In  "The  Service  of  Security  and  Information,"  Chapters 
IV.  and  V. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  49 

its  arms,  equipments,  and  training,  as  cuirassiers,  lancers, 
hussars,  and  dragoons.  Heavy  cavalry  consists  of  large 
men  mounted  on  heavy  horses;  and  light  cavalry,  of  small 
and  active  men  mounted  on  horses  selected  for  their  fleet- 
ness,  agility,  and  endurance.  The  former  are  mainly  for 
shock  action,  and  the  latter  are  designed  principally  for 
independent  action.  Among  European  troops,  the  English 
Household  Cavalry  may  be  regarded  as  typical  heavy  cav- 
alry, and  the  Cossacks  as  representative  light  cavalry. 
Medium  cavalry  is,  as  the  name  implies,  a  mean  in  weight 
and  employment  between  the  other  two>;  of  this  class  of 
cavalry  the  Prussian  Uhlans  may  be  regarded  as  the  best 
type.  Of  a  total  of  ninety-three  regiments  of  cavalry  in 
the  German  Army,  fourteen  are  heavy,  fifty  -  three  are 
medium,  and  twenty-six  light. 

The  classifications  of  cavalry,  as  given  above,  were 
once  plainly  marked,  but  they  are  now  rapidly  merging 
into  each  other.  The  distinction  of  heavy,  medium,  and 
light  is  still  observed,  and  the  distinctive  appellations  of 
cuirassiers,  dragoons,  etc.,  are  still  maintained;  but  all 
troopers  are  now  armed  with  the  carbine,  and  trained  to 
a  more  or  less  efficient  dismounted  fire  action,  thus  acquir- 
ing the  essential  characteristics  of  dragoons.  In  addition 
to  this,  a  great  portion  of  the  cavalry  in  European  armies 
is  armed  with  the  lance,  thus  sharing  with  the  lancers 
the  arm  which  formerly  distinguished  the  latter.  All  are 
armed  with  the  saber. 

The  dragoon  is  essentially  the  cavalryman  of  the  pres- 
ent day,  and  the  American  cavalryman  of  1864-5  is  the 
type  to  which  all  European  mounted  troops  are  more  or 
less  reluctantly,  or  perhaps  more  or  less  unconsciously,  ap- 
proaching. A  cavalry  is  now  demanded  which  can  seize 
the  transient  opportunities  of  charging  with  the  saber, 
can  fight  sturdily  on  foot,  and  can  operate  independently. 
All  this  the  American  cavalry  could  do,  and  did  do,  in  the 
War  of  Secession.  Probably  no  troops  in  the  world  have 
been  so  persistently — it  might  seem  willfully — misunder- 
stood by  foreign  critics  as  our  cavalry  of  1861-65.  This  is 
largely  due,  no  doubt,  to  the  fact  that  European  critics 
have  quite  generally  failed  to  note  the  difference  between 


50  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

the  mounted  partisans  of  Morgan  or  Mosby  and  the  cavalry 
of  Sheridan  or  Stuart.  The  cavalry  was  trained  to  the  use 
of  the  saber,  and  used  it  whenever  opportunity  offered. 
When  such  opportunity  did  not  offer,  it  fought  efficiently 
on  foot  instead  of  calling  upon  the  infantry  for  assistance. 
These  troops  were  true  dragoons,  and  were  not  mounted 
infantry  or  "so-called  cavalry,'7  as  European  critics  are 
fond  of  calling  them,  unless  mounted  infantry  or  "so-called 
cavalry"  be  armed  with  the  saber  and  taught  to  use  it  in 
preference  to  any  other  weapon. 

Arms. — The  arms  of  the  trooper  are  the  saber,  the  mag- 
azine carbine,  and  the  revolver.  To  these  the  Europeans 
generally  add  the  lance  and  discard  the  revolver  except 
for  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers.  The  use  of  the 
lance  in  the  British  cavalry  is  now  limited  to  ceremonies, 
and  the  continental  powers  appear  to  be  approaching  rap- 
idly the  conclusion  that  the  lance  as  a  weapon  has  become 
obsolete.  However,  the  lance  still  has  its  advocates,  who 
claim  that  its  moral  influence  increases  the  bravery  of  the 
troops  armed  with  it,  and  decreases  that  of  their  oppo- 
nents if  not  similarly  armec1;  that  in  the  shock  of  cavalry 
against  cavalry  the  longer  weapon  will  have  the  advan- 
tage; and  that  infantry  lying  down  to  receive  a  cavalry 
charge  could  be  reached  with  the  lance,  while  they  could 
scarcely  be  harmed  with  the  saber.  It  is  grantel  by  those 
who  favor  the  lance  that  after  the  first  moment  of  the 
shock  that  weapon  is  comparatively  worthless,  and  that  the 
saber  must  be  used  in  the  resulting  mellay.  It  is  accord 
ingly  recommended  that  the  lance  be  given  to  the  first  rank 
and  the  saber  to  the  second.  The  opponents  of  the  lance 
claim  that  it  is  impossible,  in  an  ordinary  term  of  service, 
to  make  the  trooper  expert  with  both  lance  and  carbine, 
and  that  the  latter  is  the  more  important  arm;  that  the 
lance  is  inferior  to  the  saber  in  the  mellay;  that  it  is  a 
serious  incumbrance  in  a  wrooded  country;  and  that  it  is 
a  tell-tale  nuisance  on  scouting  duty,  often  disclosing  the 
presence  of  the  cavalry,  and  being  of  no  compensating  ad- 
vantage. The  lance  is  abcut  nine  feet  long,  and  the  staff 
is  either  of  bamboo  or  steel. 

The  relative  merits  of  the  saber  and  the  revolver  have 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  51 

been  discussed,  with  much  ability  by  American  officers, 
without,  however,  determining  military  opinion  on  the  mat- 
ter even  in  our  own  cavalry  force.  It  is  claimed  for  the 
revolver  that  its  reach  exceeds  that  of  the  saber;  that  it 
can  injure  the  enemy  materially  just  before  the  shock,  in 
this  respect  being  even  better  than  the  lance;  that  the 
shock — the  horse  being  the  weapon — is  the  same  whether 
the  revolver  or  the  saber  be  used;  and  that  the  use  of  the 
revolver  in  the  mellay  would  be  very  effective.  On  thfe 
other  hand,  it  is  claimed  that  an  expert  swordsman  can  be 
made  in  less  time  than  a  really  expert  "shot"  with  the 
revolver;  that  only  men  very  skillful  in  the  use  of  the  re- 
volver could  avoid  injuring  each  other  as  much  as  the  en- 
emy in  the  mellay;  that  the  officers  cannot  lead  the  charge, 
but  must  be  in,  or  behind,  the  line;  that  the  line  invariably 
"checks  up"  as  the  fire  is  delivered,  thus  lessening  the 
force  of  the  shock;  that  the  saber  is  "always  loaded," 
while  the  revolver,  once  emptied,  leaves  the  trooper  tem- 
porarily defenseless;  and,  finally,  that  there  have  been  sev- 
eral instances  of  the  successful  use  of  the  saber  against 
the  revolver,  not  the  reverse. 

So  long  as  shock  action  constitutes  one  of  the  uses 
of  cavalry  on  the  battle-field  the  saber  must  be  carried  as 
a  weapon  by  mounted  troops;  and  if  the  cavalry  would 
not  be  reduced  to  a  condition  of  dependence  upon  the  in- 
fantry, and  relegated  to  the  role  of  a  purely  auxiliary 
arm,  it  must  be  armed  also  with  the  carbine.  In  the  United 
States  Army  it  has  been  deemed  best  to  supplement  these 
arms  with  the  revolver;  in  Europe  it  is  thought  advisable 
to  reinforce  them  with  the  lance.  In  any  case,  the  saber 
and  the  carbine  are  the  indispensable  arms  of  the  cavalry. 

Pace  of  Cavalry. — At  a  walk,  cavalry  covers  4  miles  an 
hour,  or  117  yards  a  minute. 

The  maneuvering  trot  is  at  the  rate  of  8  mile®  an  hour, 
or  235  yards  a  minute.  At  "slow  trot,"  the  rate  is  from  6 
to  6J  miles  an  hour,  or  about  180  ycrds  a  minute. 

At  an  alternate  trot  and  walk  the  pace  of  cavalry  is 
6  miles  an  how,  or  176  yards  a  minute.  Including  rests, 
the  average  marching  rate  of  cavalry  is  5  males  an  hour. 

The  maneuvering  gallop  is  at  the  rate  of  12  miles  an 
hour,  or  352  yards  a  minute. 


52  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

Alternately  galloping  and  trotting,  the  pace  is  10  miles 
an  hour,  or  293  yards  a  minute. 

The  full,  or  extended,  gallop  is  at  the  rate  of  16  miles 
an  hour,  or  470  yards  a  minute. 

Powers  and  Limitations  of  Cavalry. — Cavalry  constitutes 
a  force  which  can  be  rapidly  transferred  to  any  point  where 
it  may  be  needed;  which  can  take  advantage  of  fleeting 
opportunities  that  would  vanish  before  infantry  could 
strike;  which  can  be  used  in  reconnaissance  to  a  degree 
that  would  be  impossible  for  foot  troops;  which  can  often 
hold  in  check  a  hostile  force  by  its  mere  presence  and  man- 
ifest readiness  for  delivering  a  quick  blow;  and  without 
which  a  vigorous  pursuit  of  a  defeated  enemy  would  be 
almost  impossible.  Its  disadvantages  are  that  it  is  an  ex- 
pensive arm  to  equip  and  maintain,  costing,  as  it  does, 
three  times  as  much  as  the  same  number  of  infantry;  that 
it  requires  long  training  to  become  efficient;  and  that  its 
use  on  the  field  of  battle  is  more  rare  than  that  of  the 
other  two  arms. 

Mounted  Infantry.  —  Influenced  by  conservatism  and 
corps  prejudice,  the  European  cavalry  has  submitted  re- 
luctantly to  the  adoption  of  the  carbine  as  an  essential 
part  of  its  armament;  but,  appreciating  the  necessity  of 
fire  action  to  enable  mounted  troops  to  act  independently 
and  with  vigor,  some  writers  (mostly  English)  have  advo- 
cated the  employment  of  mounted  infantry,  attached  to 
the  cavalry  after  the  manner  of  horse  artillery.  One  of 
the  ablest  English  advocates  of  mounted  infantry*  says: 
"The  r61e  of  mounted  infantry  may  be  summarized  as, 
mainly,  offensive.  When  an  enemy  has  occupied  villages, 
buildings,  coppices,  defiles,  or  bridges,  which  cannot  be 
turned,  when  nothing  can  be  effected  by  the  mounted  action 
of  cavalry,  mounted  infantry  may  be  usefully  employed. 
With  horses  or  ponies,  linked  or  held  in  some  secure  or 
sheltered  spot,  the  infantry  soldier,  with  his  magazine  rifle 
and  careful  training  in  musketry,  is  able  to  deal  with  an 
enemy's  infantry  in  a  manner  which  the  cavalry,  armed 
with  the  carbine,  and  equipped  for  mounted  service  only, 

*Major  B.  T.  H.  Hutton,  D.  A.  A.  G.  King's  Royal  Rifles. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  53 

could  not  hope  to  attempt.  Again,  upon  the  field  of  battle, 
mounted  infantry  thrown  forward  with  the  dash  and  spirit 
of  initiative  in  action  characteristic  of  British  troops, 
should  be  able  to  seize  and  hold  important  points  of  van- 
tage, and  by  their  fighting  power  should  be  able  to  deny 
them  to  the  enemy's  infantry."  There  is  nothing  in  this 
summary  of  mounted  infantry  duties  that  has  not  been  suc- 
cessfully accomplished  by  American  cavalry,  and  that,  too, 
without  sacrificing  any  of  its  distinctive  cavalry  character- 
istics. American  cavalrymen  are  not  prepared  to  subscribe 
to  Hohenlohe's  dictum,  that  cavalry  cannot  conduct  an 
efficient  dismounted  offensive,  except  against  infantry 
which  is  numerically  weak  or  morally  worthless — such  as 
armed  crowds,  franc-tireurs,  etc.  In  the  United  States 
Army  there  would  seem  to  be  ordinarily  no  place  for 
mounted  infantry;  for  it  could  do  nothing  that  our  cavalry 
cannot,  while  the  latter  can  do  much  that  would  be  im- 
possible with  mounted  infantry.  In  case  of  a  numerical 
deficiency  of  cavalry,  mounted  infantry  might  be  impro- 
vised by  mounting  certain  infantry  organizations.  Such 
improvisation  of  mounted  infantry  will  often  be  profit- 
able in  operations  against  a  savage  foe  or  partisan  troops, 
but  will  rarely  be  advantageous  in  a  campaign  against 
regularly  organized  and  trained  forces. 

ARTILLERY. 

Classification. — Artillery  is  primarily  divided  into  siege, 
heavy  field,  light  field,  horse,  and  mountain  batteries. 

Siege  artillery  embraces  all  the  heavy  guns  which  may 
be  employed  in  siege  operations.  In  all  recent  wars  it  has 
been  the  custom  to  use  large  naval  guns  or  any  other  heavy 
ordnance  which  was  available  or  could  be  procured  from  the 
home  depots,  in  addition  to  the  mobile  siege  batteries  at- 
tached to  the  army  in  the  field.  The  mobile  siege  batteries 
in  the  United  States  Army  are  equipped  with  a  4.7-inch  gun, 
firing  a  60-pound  projectile,  and  a  6-inch  siege  howitzer,  fir- 
ing a  120-pound  projectile. 

Heavy  field  artillery  includes  all  the  heavy  mobile 
batteries  employed  upon  the  battle-field.  Prior  to  1899 
batteries  of  position  were  employed  in  defending  important 


54  OEGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

points  on  the  field  of  battle,  or  used  in  action  in  any  man- 
ner where  their  destructive  power  could  be  independent  of 
the  quality  of  considerable  mobility.  Such  batteries  wer& 
generally  composed  of  siege  guns  or  other  heavy  ordnance 
which  might  be  available.  Foot  batteries  armed  with 
heavy  guns  were  added  to  the  armies  of  several  of  the 
European  powers.  Experience  in  Manchuria  shows  the 
importance  in  battle  of  heavy  guns.  The  same  thing  wa» 
forcibly  demonstrated  in  South  Africa,  where  one  or  two 
heavy  Boer  guns  sometimes  prevented  the  British  field 
guns  from  accomplishing  anything  at  all.  This  heavy  ar- 
tillery is  capable  of  rapid  movement  only  for  short  dis- 
tances and  short  periods  of  time,  but  must  be  sufficiently 
mobile  to  be  brought  into  action  in  time  to  be  employed 
against  the  enemy's  light  artillery  before  the  latter  can 
approach  within  effective  range.  It  is  also  of  great  value 
against  hostile  intrenchments  which  resist  guns  of  lighter 
caliber.  The  3.8-inch  field  gun,  firing  a  30-pound  projectile, 
and  the  4.7-inch  field  howitzer,  firing  a  60-pound  projectile, 
have  been  adopted  for  use  in  the  United  States  Army,  and 
are  intended  for  use  under  conditions  where  the  lighter  pro- 
jectile of  the  ordinary  field  artillery  would  prove  inadequate. 

Light  field  artillery  constitutes  the  bulk  of  an  airmy's 
artillery  in  the  field.  In  the  United  iStates  service  the 
caliber  of  this  gun  is  3  inches,  firing  a  15-pound  projectile. 
The  mobile  artillery  of  an  army  should  contain  a  certain 
number  of  howitzers  for  searching  out  trenches,  protected 
positions,  etc.,  against  which  their  high-angle  fire  is  more 
effective  than  the  direct  fire  of  guns.  This  class  of  artil- 
lery has  the  other  advantage,  that  for  the  same  weight  of 
gun,  carriage,  and  limber  a  projectile  of  double  the  weight 
of  that  of  a  rifle  can  be  used.  To  this  end,  a  3.8-inch  field 
howitzer,  firing  a  30-pound  projectile,  but  giving  the  same 
weight  behind  the  horses  as  the  3-inch  gun,  has  been 
designed. 

Horse  artillery  is  especially  designed  for  service  with 
cavalry.  Mobility  is  its  essential  characteristic.  To  this 
end,  each  cannoneer  is  mounted  upon  horseback.  In  the 
United  States  service  the  horse  batteries  are,  as  a  rule, 
equipped  with  the  same  gun  as  the  light  field  artillery,  but 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  55 

as  it  was  questioned  as  to  whether  a  gun  of  such  weight 
would  be  sufficiently  mobile  under  all  conditions,  a  lighter 
gun  with  2.38-inch  calibre  and  firing  a  7.5-pound  projectile 
has  been  designed  by  the  Ordnance  Department  for  issue 
to  some  of  the  horse  batteries.  This  latter  gun  is  consid- 
ered the  smallest  caliber  that  can  effectively  employ  shrap- 
nel. Its  lightness  makes  it  a  valuable  part  of  the  mobile 
artillery  system. 

Mountain  artillery  is  in  a  class  by  itself.  The  gun 
and  carriage  are  arranged  for  either  wheel  or  pack  trans- 
portation. The  mountain  batteries  are  intended  for  use  in 
mountainous  regions,  or  in  sections  where  the  roads  are 
bad  and  the  traction  difficult.  Formerly  the  majority  of 
mountain  guns  in  our  Army  were  of  75  mm.  caliber  and  of 
foreign  manufacture,  but  it  has  now  been  practically  de- 
cided to  increase  the  caliber  to  3  inches,  thus  permitting 
them  to  use  the  field  artillery  projectile,  thereby  decreas- 
ing the  difficulties  of  manufacture  and  issue  of  ammunition. 
Previous  difficulties  in  packing  the  ammunition  for  these 
guns,  due  to  the  different  weights  of  projectiles  and  the 
special  carriers  that  were  required,  have  now  been  obvi- 
ated by  arranging  the  original  shipping-boxes,  in  which 
the  projectiles  are  packed  at  the  place  of  manufacture,  so 
that  these  boxes  can  be  hung  directly  to  the  new  form  of 
pack-saddle.  The  utility  and  rate  of  fire  is  also  to  be  im- 
proved materially  by  increasing  the  maximum  elevation  at 
which  the  gun  can  be  fired  to  45  degrees,  and  increasing 
the  length  of  recoil  of  the  gun  on  the  carriage,  thereby 
making  the  latter  more  stable,  and  enabling  the  adoption 
of  improved  sights,  permitting  the  use  of  both  direct  and" 
indirect  fire. 

Arms. — The  gun  is  the  special  arm  of  the  artillery;  bat 
the  cannoneers  are  provided  with  arms  for  the  perform- 
ance of  guard  duty,  and  for  their  individual  defense  in 
hand-to-hand  conflict.  The  sergeants  are  all  armed  with 
the  saber  and  revolver;  all  the  other  men  are  provided  with 
the  revolver.  Although  supplied  with  individual  weapons, 
the  cannoneers  must  be  impressed  with  the  fact  that  the 
gun  is  their  proper  weapon  and  main  defense,  to  be  used 
until  the  very  last  moment.  Hohenlohe,  indeed,  would  pro- 


56  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

vide  them  with  no  other  arm  were  battle  alone  considered; 
but  he  regards  the  individual  weapon  as  necessary  for  the 
protection  of  the  soldier  against  hostile  inhabitants  of  the 
country  in  which  the  battery  may  be  serving.* 

Pace  of  Artillery. — The  pace  of  field  and  horse  artillery 
is  the  same  as  that  of  cavalry.  For  field  batteries  the  trot 
is  the  pace  of  maneuver,  the  gallop  being  used  only  in  case 
of  great  emergency.  In  horse  artillery  the  gallop  may  be 
used  whenever  the  circumstances  are  such  that  it  would 
be  required  of  cavalry. 

On  the  march  the  walk  is  the  habitual  pace  of  field 
batteries,  but  in  rapid  marches  the  slow  trot  alternates 
with  the  walk.  In  urgent  cases  the  batteries  may  be  re- 
quired to  trot  four  or  five  miles  without  breaking  the  gait. 

Powers  and  Limitations  of  Artillery. — Artillery  is  a  pow- 
erful arm,  and  every  advance  in  the  science  of  warfare 
adds  to  its  potency.  It  is  the  only  arm  that  can  destroy 
material  obstacles  at  a  distance;  and  if  not  opposed  by  hos- 
tile guns,  it  could  greatly  injure,  and  perhaps  destroy,  the 
other  arms  of  the  enemy  before  they  could  deliver  effective 
blows  in  return.  It  is,  moreover,  independent,  to  a  great 
degree,  of  the  personal  factor  which  enters  so  largely  into 
the  action  of  the  other  arms.  The  piece  properly  laid,  its 
accuracy  is  not  affected  by  the  nervousness  which  might 
destroy  the  aim  of  the  infantry  soldier;  there  is  no  human 
muscle  to  be  bruised  and  disabled  by  recoil ;  and  the  greater 
distance  at  which  it  habitually  engages  the  enemy  renders 
it  free  from  much  of  the  excitement  which  generally  pro- 
vents  the  perfectly  cool  handling  of  the  other  arms  at  the 
time  of  their  most  decisive  action. 

On  the  oth^r  hand,  artillery  is  incapable  of  independ- 
ent action;**  it  is  limited  to  fire  action;  it  is  effective  only 
when  at  a  halt  in  battery;  it  is  expensive  and  difficult  to 

""'Letters  on  Artillery,"  Walford's  translation,  pp.   233-4. 

**"We  find  mentioned  in  many  writings  an  outspoken  desire 
to  argue,  and  to  prove  practically,  that  artillery  is  an  independ- 
ent arm.  For  my  part,  I  can  find  nothing  intelligible  in  these 
words.  I  should  like  very  much  to  know  how  an  army  corps  would 
act  independently  if  it  were  composed  of  artillery  alone." — Hohen- 
lohe,  "Letters  on  Artillery,"  p.  156. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  57 

train;  it  is  bulky  and  occupies  great  space  on  the  march; 
it  can  be  injured  disastrously  in  materiel  as  well  as  in  per- 
sonnel; and  its  effective  action  is  largely  dependent  on  the 
state  of  the  ground  and  weather. 

Range. — Equipped  as  it  is  with  telescopic  sights,  and 
having  an  unobstructed  field  of  fire,  modern  field  artillery 
can  produce  results  at  a  range  of  more  than  four  miles-, 
but,  owing  to  the  obstructed  view  of  most  battle-fields,  and 
the  limits  of  human  vision,  the  extreme  range  at  which 
field  guns  would  ordinarily  be  used  may  be  taken  at  6,000 
yards.  From  this  distance  to  the  enemy's  position  the 
ranges  may  be  classified  as  follows: 

Light  Artillery.  Heavy  Artillery. 

Distant Over  4,500  yards.          Over  6,000  yards. 

Serious 4,500  to  3,500  yards.     6,000  to  5,000  yards. 

Effective 3,500  to  2,000  yards.     4,000  to  2,500  yards. 

Decisive Under  2,000  yards.       Under  2,500  yards. 

Kinds  of  Fire. — Artillery  fire  is  classified  as  to  its  tra- 
jectory as  direct,  indirect,  curved,  and  high-angle  fire. 

Direct  fire  is  delivered  at  objects  which  can  be  seen 
from  the  gun  in  battery,  laid  at  moderate  angles  of 
elevation. 

Indirect  fire  is  delivered  over  an  intervening  obstacle, 
the  gun  and  object  being  mutually  invisible,  but  both  bat- 
tery and  target  being  visible  from  an  observing  station 
from  which  the  fire  is  directed. 

Curved  fire  is  delivered  at  angles  not  exceeding  15  de- 
grees, with  guns  with  reduced  charges,  and  with  howitzers 
with  service  charges  at  long  ranges,  and  with  reduced 
charges  at  short  ranges. 

High-angle  fire  is  the  fire  at  angles  exceeding  15  de- 
grees, with  howitzers  with  reduced  charges  and  mortars 
with  service  charges. 

The  gun  is  designed  especially  for  direct  fire;  the  how- 
itzer for  curved  fire;  and  the  mortar  for  high  angle  fire; 
all  may  be  used  for  indirect  fire. 

Artillery  fire  is  classified  as  to  its  direction  as  frontal, 
oblique,  enfilade,  reverse,  and  cross  fire. 

Frontal  fire  is  that  in  which  the  line  of  fire  is  perpen- 
dicular to  the  enemy's  front. 


58  ORGANIZATION  A^TD  TACTICS. 

Ollique  fire  is  that  in  which  the  line  of  fire  is  oblique  t* 
the  enemy's  front. 

Enfilade  fire  is  from  guns  placed  on  the  prolongation 
of  the  enemy's  line.  In  this  case,  the  line  of  fire  is  coin- 
cident with  the  enemy's  front,  which  it  sweeps.  When  fire 
is  used  to  sweep  along  the  front  of  a  defensive  line,  and 
thus  enfilade  the  assailants  as  they  approach  the  position, 
it  is  known  as  fiariking  fire. 

Reverse  fire  is  directed  upon  the  rear  instead  of  the 
front  of  the  enemy.  Enfilade  and  reverse  fire  are  very  de- 
moralizing to  an  enemy,  owing  to  the  impossibility  of  his 
replying  without  first  effecting  a  change  of  front. 

Cross  fire  is  that  in  which  the  projectiles  from  guns 
in  different  positions  cross  each  other's  path  on,  or  in  front 
of,  the  enemy's  line.  This  fire  is  only  less  demoralizing 
than  enfilade  or  reverse  fire,  and  the  power  of  the  artil- 
lery for  its  employment  increases  with  the  range  of  the 
guns. 

Projectiles. — Artillery  projectiles  are  classified  as  shell 
and  shrapnel.  Canister,  which  was  formerly  used  and  con- 
sisted of  a  tin  cylinder  filled  with  bullets  held  in  place  by 
filling  the  interstices  with  sawdust,  clay,  or  sand,  is  now 
obsolete.  Its  effect  is  now  accomplished  by  the  use  of  the 
ordinary  shrapnel  with  its  fuse  cut  at  zero. 

Shell. — The  shell  now  used  is  a  "hollow  cast-iron  or 
steel  cylinder  with  an  ogival  head,"  filled  with  gun  cotton 
or  other  high  explosive.  It  may  be  characterized  as  a  fly- 
ing mine,  the  chief  object  of  which  is  to  destroy  material 
objects  at  a  distance. 

Shrapnel. — Shrapnel  consists  of  a  strong  cylindrical 
steel  case,  open  at  the  forward  end.  In  this  are  packed 
300  steel-jacketed  balls,  and  a  point  section,  containing  the 
time  fuse,  is  screwed  on.  A  central  channel  connects  the 
fuse  with  the  powder  charge,  which  is  in  the  base.  The 
weight  of  the  bullets  is  53  per  cent  of  the  entire  weight 
of  the  projectile.  The  new  projectile  has  a  base  bursting 
charge,  while  the  old  one  had  a  head  charge  which  de- 
creased the  velocity  of  the  bullets  on  burst  while  causing 
them  to  scatter  more.  The  weakest  cross-section  is  at  the 
line  of  attachment  of  the  point  section.  Hence,  upon  ex- 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  59 

plosion  of  the  charge,  the  head  is  blown  off,  the  case  usu- 
ally remaining  intact,  thus  acting  like  a  short  shot-gun, 
throwing  the  contents  to  the  front  with  an  added  velocity. 
Fuses. — Shell  and  shrapnel  are  exploded  by  means  of 
fuses,  of  which  there  are  three  classes,  as  follows: 

1.  Time  fuses,  ignited  by  the  flame  or  shock  of  the 
discharge,  and  so  arranged  that  the  ignition  will  be  com- 
municated to  the  bursting  charge  in  a  certain  number  of 
seconds,  determined  beforehand. 

2.  Percussion  fuses,  by  means  of  which  the  bursting 
charge  is  ignited  by  the  shock  of  impact. 

3.  Combination   fuses,   possessing   the   properties   of 
the  other  two.    This  class  of  fuses  is  now  in  general  use. 

The  fuse  now  issued  is  a  great  improvement  over  the 
old  one,  in  that  it  is  set  for  time,  not  by  punching,  but  by 
turning  a  disk  about  an  axis  coinciding  with  that  of  the 
projectile.  After  an  old  fuse  was  once  punched,  it  could  not 
afterwards  be  used  at  a  longer  range,  while  the  new  one 
may  be  set  and  reset  repeatedly.  Thus,  a  battery  may, 
if  desired,  go  into  action  with  its  fuses  set  at  zero,  ready 
to  use  its  maximum  canister  effect  at  a  moment's  notice; 
and  still  leset  fuses  as  desired  at  any  range. 

Use  of  Different  Projectiles. — SheM  is  used  with  the  per- 
cussion fuse  to  destroy  parapets,  buildings,  palisades,  ab- 
atis, etc.,  or  to  set  fire  to  houses  and  villages.  With  the 
time  fuse,  it  is  used  against  troops  behind  intrenchments 
by  bursting  the  shells  directly  overhead. 

Shrapnel  is  used  against  troops,  in  all  formations,  m 
the  open  or  behind  slight  cover.  It  is  preeminently  the 
projectile  to  use  against  flesh  and  blood,  just  as  the  shell 
is  the  one  par  excellence  to  use  against  material  obstacles. 
Shrapnel  is  effective  at  all  ranges.  At  a  range  of  6,500 
yards  each  bullet  has  a  resultant  velocity  of  950  foot  sec- 
onds, or,  roughly  speaking,  the  same  effect  as  a  shot  fired 
from  the  service  revolver. 

Shrapnel  should  be  burst  in  the  air  with  a  time  fuse. 
The  explosion  should  take  place  in  front  of  the  line  of  hos- 
tile troops,  as,  the  motion  of  the  projectile  being  imparted 
to  the  falling  bullets,  they  would  otherwise  pass  beyond 


60  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

their  object;  and,  moreover,  at  a  high  angle  of  fall  the 
bullets  strike  so  that  ricochet  is  impossible. 

Shrapnel,  known  then  as  spherical  case  shot,  was  used 
very  effectively  in  the  War  of  Secession,  notably  at  Mal- 
vern  Hill  and  Gettysburg.  The  projectile  of  those  days 
was  used  with  the  twelve-pounder  Napoleon  gun,  and  was 
immeasurably  inferior  to  that  now  in  use.  It  is  becoming 
more  and  more  prominent  as  the  great  artillery  projectile, 
even  having  replaced  the  shell  in  ranging. 

Field  Mortars. — The  use  of  the  field  mortar  is  still 
purely  theoretical,  and  the  organization  of  the  mortar  bat- 
tery is  as  yet  undecided.  Such  batteries  would  be  largely 
batteries  of  position  and  their  use  confined  to  siege  opera- 
tions. If  organized,  they  would  be  undoubtedly  separate 
from  other  field  batteries. 

Rapid-firing  Guns. — Kapid-firing  guns  embrace  all  single- 
barreled  guns  using  fixed  ammunition,*  and  having  a 
breech  mechanism  working  by  levers  so  arranged  as  to 
enable  several  shots  per  minute  to  be  fired.  All  modern 
field  guns  come  under  this  classification.  Among  the  best 
known  and  most  efficient  rapid-firing  guns  are  the  Hotcli- 
kiss,  Driggs-Schroeder,  Nordenfelt,  Krupp,  and  Canet.  The 
smaller  calibers  use  shell  only;  the  larger,  both  shell  and 
shrapnel. 

Machine  Guns. — There  are  two  general  types  of  machine 
guns,  of  which  the  Gatling  and  Colt  may  be  taken  as  rep- 
resentatives, they  being  the  guns  now  in  use  in  our  service. 
In  the  Gatling  gun  a  group  of  rifle  barrels,  from  six  to 
ten,  is  assembled  about  a  central  shaft,  to  which  all  are 
parallel.  These  are  loaded  and  fired  in  continuous  suc- 
cession, or  by  volleys,  by  the  action  of  suitable  machinery 
at  the  breech,  the  power  being  applied  by  crank  and  gear- 
ing. Fixed  ammunition  is  used,  the  empty  cartridge  shell 
being  automatically  ejected. 

In  the  Colt  gun  there  is  only  one  barrel.  By  means 
of  a  small  cylinder  containing  a  piston  and  connected  to 
the  barrel  by  a  vent,  a  portion  of  the  powder  gas  is  util- 

*Ammunition  in  which  the  projectile,  charge,  and  primer  are 
combined  so  that  only  one  operation  is  necessary  in  loading. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  61 

ized  to  operate  automatically  the  breech  mechanism.  Some 
guns  of  the  single-barrel  type  are  operated  by  recoil,  and 
others  by  both  gas  pressure  and  recoil.  Of  the  latter  type, 
the  Vickers-Maxim  is  a  notable  example.  The  single-bar- 
rel gun  is  rapidly  superseding  the  older  revolving  type  of 
machine  gun.  The  rate  of  fire  of  the  Gatling  gun  is  800 
shots  or  more  per  minute;  of  the  Colt,  480  rounds  per 
minute. 

Distinction  should  be  made  between  the  small  gun 
using  infantry  ammunition  and  the  so-called  "machine  gun 
of  caliber"  large  enough  to  fire  an  explosive  projectile. 
The  British  "pompom"  is  an  example  of  the  latter  class. 

Most  European  armies  have  separate  machine  gun 
companies  of  from  six  to  eight  guns,  which  are,  as  a  rule, 
attached  to  regiments  of  infantry  or  to  the  cavalry  di- 
visions. They  are  not  considered  as  a  part  of  the  field 
artillery.  In  the  United  States  Army  no  system  has  been 
developed  for  the  employment  of  machine  guns.  Experi- 
mentally, machine  guns  have  been  attached  to  some  reg- 
iments of  infantry  at  the  rate  of  one  gun  to  each  bat- 
talion, the  gun  being  operated  by  a  detachment  under  com- 
mand of  an  officer,  and  arranged  for  either  pack  or  wheel 
transportation. 

Machine  guns  should  not  be  pitted  against  field  artil- 
lery, which  by  superior  range  and  weight  of  metal  could 
annihilate  them. 

Owing  to  the  great  mobility  and  the  substitute  for  in- 
.  fantry  fire  which  they  offer,  machine  guns  will  be  of  value 
with  cavalry,  especially  on  raids  and  other  independent 
action.  On  the  defensive,  they  will  always  be  valuable  in 
holding  advanced  posts,  in  flanking  the  front  of  a  defens- 
ive position,  etc.  On  the  offensive,  their  use  is  more  doubt- 
ful; they  may  be  of  considerable  value  with  an  advance 
guard;  out  in  the  general  course  of  the  attack  the  part 
played  by  them  will  probably  be  small.  They  can  not  ac- 
company the  infantry  in  the  decisive  stages  of  the  fight, 
and  at  longer  ranges  they  could  not  well  oppose  the  artil- 
lery that  would  be  brought  to  bear  upon  them.  The  ma- 
chine £rm  is  undoubtedly  a  powerful  weapon  in  the  defense 
of  positions,  but  its  offensive  value  is  probably  very  small. 

— 6— 


62  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

Cover  for  Guns. — The  destructive  effect  of  both  infantry 
and  artillery  fire  often  renders  cover  for  field  guns  a  mat- 
ter of  necessity.  This  cover  may  be  either  natural  or  arti- 
ficial. Natural  cover  consists  of  any  feature  of  the  ground 
which  will  intercept  or  turn  aside  the  enemy's  projectiles, 
or  which,  by  partly  or  entirely  concealing  the  pieces,  will 
cause  the  enemy  to  make  an  erroneous  estimate  of  the 
range.  Artificial  cover  consists  of  ordinary  intrenchinents, 
gun-pits,  or  portable  shields. 

The  main  objection  to  gun-pits  are  the  conspicuous 
targets  they  present;  the  restrictions  they  place  on  the 
free  movement  and  full  employment  of  the  guns;  their  lim- 
ited application  to  the  offensive.  They  would  seldom  be 
constructed  except  in  the  open  or  where  no  other  possible 
cover  would  be  available. 

For  the  protection  of  the  personnel  of  the  guns  against 
sma^-arms  and  shrapnel  bullets,  a  stee!  shield  .2  inches 
thick  is  provided  with  the  modern  field  gun.  This  shield 
consists  of  three  parts — apron,  main  and  top  shield,  which 
fold  together  when  the  piece  is  limbered.  Each  shield  is 
tested  by  firing  against  it  with  the  service  rifle  at  a  range 
of  100  yards.  On  the  defensive,  artificial  cover  can  easily 
be  provided  for  field  guns;  on  the  offensive,  the  skillful  use 
of  natural  cover  and  the  effective  handling  of  the  piece 
must  constitute  the  elements  of  safetv  for  the  artilleryman 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  G3 


CHAPTER  IV. 

INFANTRY   IN  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE. 

"All  great  wars  will,  as  heretofore,  depend  chiefly  on  the  in- 
fantry."— Sherman. 

THE  OFFENSIVE. 

General  Theory  of  the  Attack. — The  object  of  the  attack 
is  the  forcible  expulsion  of  the  enemy  from  the  position 
in  which  he  strives  to  maintain  himself.  Fire  action  being 
unable  to  accomplish  this  end  alone,  and  the  shock  being 
a  necessary  supplement,  it  follows  that  a  successful  attack 
implies  primarily  an  ability  to  reach  the  defender's  posi- 
tion. The  improvements  in  the  range  and  destructive  ef- 
fect of  firearms  subject  the  attacker  to  a  more  severe  fire 
and  one  of  longer  duration  than  was  formerly  the  case; 
and,  in  this  respect,  the  defense  has,  of  late  years,  gained 
enormously  in  comparison  with  the  offensive.  The  old 
shoulder-to-shoulder  line  of  battle,  or  the  columns  formerly 
,used,  are  no  longer  possible  attack  formations.  They  would 
be  shot  to  pieces  before  they  could  reach  the  hostile  posi- 
tion, and  their  shattered  fragments  would  be  unable  either 
to  give  a  forceful  shock  to  the  enemy,  or  to  resist  his 
counter-stroke. 

The  object  of  the  attack  formation  must,  then,  be  to 
arrange  and  move  the  troops  so  as  to  escape  destructive 
losses,  and  reach  the  enemy's  position  with  a  force  supe- 
rior (or  at  least  equal)  to  that  of  the  defender.  To  this  end 
it  must  be  such  as: 

1.  To  enable  the  troops  to  make  the  most  telling  use 
of  the  rifle,  and  thus  diminish  the  effect  of  the  enemy's 
fire  by  subjecting  him  to  heavy  loss  in  return. 

2.  To  present  the  least  favorable  target  to  the  enemy, 
and  profit  by  the  sheltering  features  of  the  ground. 

3.  To  admit  of  celerity  of  movement,  and  thus  min- 
imize the  time  of  exposure  to  hostile  fire. 

4.  To  be  able  to  deliver  a  heavy  shock  at  the  end  of 
the  fire  action. 


64  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

Experience  in  many  wars  has  shown  that  a  line  com- 
posed of  skirmishers  at  considerable  intervals  best  fulfills 
the  first  two  conditions.  But  an  entire  battalion  formed 
in  this  manner  would  present  a  front  of  such  extent  as  to 
be  quite  beyond  the  control  of  its  commander.  Moreover, 
it  would  offer  but  weak  resistance  to  a  counter-stroke,  its 
flanks  would  be  without  protection,  and  its  losses  could 
not  be  replaced.  A  second  battalion  following  in  support 
might  obviate  these  objections,  except  the  first;  but  a  re- 
inforcement of  the  firing  line,  for  the  purpose  of  replacing 
losses,  would  cause  at  once  an  intermingling  of  troops  of 
different  organizations,  and  a  further  objection  would  lie 
in  the  fact  that  the  demanding  and  furnishing  of  reinforce- 
ments for  the  firing  line  would  rest  with  two  different  bat- 
talion commanders.  We  may  conclude,  then,  that  the  fir- 
ing line  should  be  supported  by  troops  belonging  to  the 
same  battalion. 

It  being  the  intention  to  throw  the  whole  battalion  up- 
on the  hostile  position  in  the  final  shock,  and,  in  fact,  lo 
utilize  its  entire  firing  power  at  close  ranges,  the  front  of 
the  firing  line  must  approximate  the  front  rf  the  battalion 
in  close  order;  and  when  several  battalions  are  acting  to- 
gether this  front  is  generally  increased  by  half  the  inter- 
vals between  the  battalion  and  those  on  either  side.  The 
extreme  fighting  front  of  the  battalion  in  a  regiment  should 
not  exceed  one  and  one-half  times  the  front  of  the  battal- 
ion in  close  order.  The  maximum  front  of  any  firing  lino 
will  be  regulated  by  the  necessity  of  supervision  and  con- 
trol by  the  battalion  commander.  The  minimum  front  will 
depend  upon  the  requirement  that  each  man  should  have 
space  enough  to  enable  him  to  use  his  rifle  with  the  great- 
est effect. 

As  soon  as  the  engagement  fairly  commences,  the 
losses  begin,  and  must  be  quickly  replaced;  and  as  the 
line  draws  nearer  to  the  enemy  the  number  of  rifles  en- 
gaged must  be  continually  increased,  so  that  the  fire  may 
steadily  grow  in  intensity  as  the  range  becomes  more 
deadly.  A  portion  of  the  battalion  must,  therefore,  follow 
as  a  support,  at  such  a  distance  and  in  such  a  formation 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  65 

that  it  can  readily  reinforce  the  firing  line  without  incur- 
ring in  the  meantime  heavy  losses  itself. 

The  thin  firing  line  attracts  and  holds  the  attention 
of  the  enemy,  and  it  formerly  screened,  to  a  great  degree, 
with  a  curtain  of  smoke,  the  support  from  the  view  of  the 
opposing  infantry.  For  some  time  after  the  introduction  of 
smokeless  powder,  it  afforded  considerable  protection  to 
the  support;  for  it  is  a  well-known  fac+  that  soldiers  in 
battle  instinctively  and  invariably  fire  at  those  who  are 
shooting  at  them.  It  followed,  therefore,  that  only  those 
bullets  which  passed  through  the  intervals  in  the  firing 
line,  or  over  the  heads  or  through  the  bodies  of  the  soldiers 
composing  it — in  other  words,  accidental  shots — struck  the 
men  in  the  support.  It  was  thus  possible  for  close-order 
formations  to  live  in  the  line  of  supports,  when  they  could 
not  hope  to  exist  in  the  firing  line. 

The  experiences  of  the  last  two  wars  have  demon- 
strated, however,  that  with  the  flat  trajectory  of  modern 
rifles,  troops  in  support  will  lose  more  heavily  than  those 
in  the  advanced  lines  if  compact  formations  are  employed, 
unless  they  are  protected  by  accidents  of  the  terrain  and 
intrenched.  The  dispersed  formation  for  the  support  must 
therefore  be  adopted.  The  distance  of  this  supporting  line 
from  the  one  in  advance  is  influenced  by  the  nature  of  the 
terrain  and  of  the  enemy's  rifle  fire.  If  cover  can  be  ob- 
tained, the  supports  should  be  as  close  as  possible  to  the 
firing  line.  If  the  small-arm  employed  by  the  enemy  has 
a  high  trajectory,  the  angle  of  fall  of  the  bullet  will  be 
great,  and  the  supporting  line  may  approach  comparative- 
ly close  to  the  skirmishers;  but,  with  the  flat  trajectory  of 
most  modern  military  rifles,  the  supports  must  be  held 
further  back,  in  order  that  they  may  not  become  butts,  as 
it  were,  for  the  living  targets  in  the  advanced  skirmish  line. 

As  the  assailants  approach  the  hostile  position,  the 
supporting  line  draw^  more  closely  to  the  firing  line,  ow- 
ing to  its  almost  continuous  advance,  while  the  firing  line 
halts  and  fires.  This  distance  steadily  decreases,  the  sup- 
port being  constantly  pushed  forward  into  the  firing  line 
until  it  is  entirely  absorbed  by  it. 

As  the  firing  line  becomes  thoroughly  committed  to 


66  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

the  fight,  all  movements  on  its  part  save  a  direct  advance 
or  retreat  become  more  and  more  impracticable;  and  it 
thus  happens  that  its  flanks  are  peculiarly  exposed  to 
counter-attacks,  and  that  this  danger  increases  as  the  sup- 
port is  absorbed.  There  must,  consequently,  be  another 
force  in  hand,  available  for  use  on  either  flank  or  at  any 
part  of  the  line  that  may  be  pierced  by  a  counter-thrust 
of  the  enemy.  This  force  is  known  as  the  reserve,  and  is 
generally  equal  in  strength  to  the  firing  line  and  the  sup- 
port combined.  For  reasons  similar  to  those  given  in  the 
case  of  the  support,  the  reserve  deploys  on  the  same 
ground  as  the  firing  line,  thus  enabling  it  to  replace  the 
support  as  the  latter  is  absorbed  in  the  firing  line.  As 
the  firing  line  comes  within  close  range  of  the  enemy,  the 
fire  becomes  so  severe  as  to  render  further  advance  im- 
possible until  a  renewed  onward  impulse  is  given  by  re- 
inforcement from  the  reserve;  the  reinforcement  being 
made  either  by  fractions  or  simultaneously.  The  fire  now 
being  at  the  most  effective  range,  it  is,  moreover,  desirable 
to  have  in  the  firing  line  every  rifle  that  can  be  used.  The 
union  of  the  reserve  with  the  firing  line  raises  the  fire  to 
such  a  furious  intensity,  and  the  losses  become  so  heavy, 
that  the  strain  can  not  be  borne  many  minutes  before  either 
the  assailants  or  the  defenders  must  give  way.  In  order 
that  the  attacking  force  may  be  strengthened  physically 
and  morally  by  reinforcement  at  this  critical  juncture, 
there  must  be  a  second  line  at  hand  to  rush  forward  and 
carry  the  firing  line  with  it  in  a  charge  on  the  hostile  po- 
sition. That  this  reinforcement  may  reach  the  firing  line 
in  time,  it  should  never  at  this  phase  of  the  action  be  more 
than  600  yards  in  its  rear,  and,  indeed,  the  distance  is  usu- 
ally much  less. 

Sometimes  the  reserve  is  sufficient  to  carry  forward  the 
firing  line  to  the  final  assault,  but  a  second  line  is  gen- 
erally necessary;  and,  in  order  that  the  troops  may  not,  in 
the  disorder  of  victory,  be  easily  thrust  out  of  the  cap- 
tured position  by  a  counter-charge  of  hostile  reserves,  a 
third  line,  well  in  hand,  in  close  order,  is  necessary  to  oc- 
cupy the  position  and  hold  it  while  the  troops  of  the  other 
lines  are  re-forming.  We  thus  find  the  attacking  force 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  07 

divided  primarily  into  a  firing  line,  a  support,  and  a  reserve; 
the  first  two  together  forming  the  fighting  line,  and  the 
fighting  line  and  reserve  together  forming  the  first  line. 
This  is  generally  supported  by  a  second  line,  and  the  two  arc 
often  supported  by  a  third  line.  ' 

It  must  not  be  understood  by  the  term  "firing  line" 
that  the  most  advanced  line  is  the  only  one  which  actually 
delivers  fire.  On  the  contrary,  although  the  front  line  will 
do  most  of  the  firing,  others  in  rear  will  also  bear  their 
share  of  it.  On  ordinary  terrain,  lines  in  rear  may  from 
time  to  time  be  better  placed  to  fire  upon  the  enemy's  po- 
sition than  those  preceding  them,  and  advantage  should 
be  taken  of  this.  It  will  indeed  be  sometimes  the  case  that 
several  successive  lines  will  be  firing  simultaneously  when- 
they  can  safely  fire  over  the  heads  or  past  the  flanks  of 
preceding  lines. 

The  above  is  merely  a  brief  outline  of  the  general 
principles  of  the  attack.  Each  of  the  component  parts  of 
the  attack  formation  must  now  be  considered  separately 
and  in  detail. 

THE  FIRING  LINE. 

Measures  for  Its  Control. — The  functions  of  the  skir- 
mishers have  been  greatly  changed  by  the  evolution  of 
tactics  in  the  last  few  years.  Formerly  used  merely  to 
feel  and  develop  the  enemy,  or  to  cover  the  deployment  of 
troops  in  their  own  rear,  they  have  become  the  most  im- 
portant element  in  modern  tactics,  and  now  not  only  be- 
gin the  action,  but  fight  it  out  to  the  end. 

This  change  in  the  method  of  employing  skirmishers 
has  added  greatly  to  the  difficulty  of  command;  for  a  firing 
line  in  extended  order  is,  from  its  very  nature,  more  diffi- 
cult to  control  than  the  same  number  of  men  in  the  old 
close-order  formation.  Each  soldier  is  necessarily  left  more 
to  his  individual  impulses  than  ever  before;  and  the  great- 
est care  is  now  necessary  to  prevent  the  men  from  getting 
completely  out  of  hanc1  and  wasting  ammunition  in  a  wild 
and  ineffective  fire.  The  most  important  measures  for  se- 
curing the  control  of  the  men  are  a  subdivision  of  the  com- 
pany into  small  squads  or  groups,  the  most  stringent  dia- 


68  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

cipline,  and  careful  instruction  in  that  branch  of  military 
training  known  as  "fire  discipline."  The  squad  is  held  to- 
gether in  close  order  until  compelled  to  deploy  as  skir- 
mishers either  for  its  own  protection  or  in  order  to  increase 
the  effect  of  its  fire.  It  should  be  small  enough  to  enable 
its  leader  to  exercise  superintendence  over  it  in  any  forma- 
tion. In  an  extended  line,  in  the  turmoil  of  battle,  the 
squad  leaders  are  often  left  quite  to  their  own  resources; 
and  the  position  of  a  non-commissioned  officer,  like  that  of 
an  officer,  has  become  much  more  important  than  it  was 
formerly.  Good  subalterns  and  non-commissioned  officers 
are,  in  fact,  one  of  the  first  requisites  for  an  efficient  firing 
line;  and  one  of  the  ablest  military  writers  of  the  age* 
declares  that  only  an  army  that  possesses  a  thoroughly  ex- 
perienced, intelligent,  and  brave  corps  of  subaltern  offi- 
cers, all  trained  for  independent  action,  can  be  successful 
on  the  offensive. 

As  the  men  in  extended  order  in  battle  often  get  be- 
yond the  control  of  their  own  officers;  as  they  are  mingled 
during  successive  reinforcements  with  men  of  other  com- 
mands, and  consequently  find  themselves  under  the  imme- 
diate orders  of  officers  of  different  organizations — it  is  nec- 
essary that  their  discipline  should  be  such  as  to  insure 
prompt  obedience  to  any  officer  of  their  own  army,  and 
that  each  should  be  instructed,  when  separated  from  his 
own  squad  or  company,  to  place  himself  at  once  in  another, 
and  obey  its  leader  with  the  same  loyalty  that  should  char- 
acterize his  service  under  the  commanders  of  his  own 
proper  organization.  Whenever  necessary,  new  squads 
should  be  formed  of  such  men  as  are  separated  from  their 
own  commands.  No  unwounded  men  should  be  allowed  to 
drift  to  the  rear,  but  should  be  picked  up  by,  and  incorpo- 
rated with,  the  organizations  following. 

Fire  Discipline. — By  "fire  discipline"  is  meant  the  "un- 
hesitating habit,  developed  in  the  men  by  instruction  and 
training,  of  commencing,  or  ceasing,  or  relaxing  the  fire,  or 
of  concentrating  it  upon  a  defined  object,  all  in  obedience 
to  the  will  of  the  commander."**  In  addition  to  being  care 

*Von  der  Goltz. 
**Mayne. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  69 

fully  trained  in  rifle-firing,  the  soldier  should  be  impressed 
with  the  importance  of  the  following  rules: 

1.  Never  fire  except  when  ordered,  and  then  only  the 
number  of  cartridges  indicated. 

2.  .  Never  fire   after   the   command   or   signal   "Cease 
firing." 

3.  Never  fire  except  at  the  named  objective. 

4.  Never  fail  to  adjust  the  sight  at  the  range  named. 

5.  Always  aim  at  the  feet  of  the  enemy. 

The  observance  of  these  simple  rules  in  action  is  a  mat- 
ter of  the  greatest  difficulty.  In  the  excitement  of  battle 
the  men  become  so  absorbed  in  the  act  of  firing  that  they 
perform  the  motions  automatically  rather  than  intelligent- 
ly, and  seem  to  be  actuated  by  a  desire  to  shoot  rapidly 
rather  than  with  effect.  Of  about  27,000  muskets  picked  up 
on  the  battle-field  of  Gettysburg,  at  least  24,000  were 
loaded.  About  half  contained  two  charges,  one-fourth  hell 
from  three  to  ten  charges,  and  one  musket  contained  twen- 
ty-three cartridges.  Yet  the  troops  in  this  battle  were  sea- 
soned soldiers  of  exceptional  experience  in  war.  The  Aus- 
trian rifles  left  on  the  field  of  Koniggratz  were  found  in 
a  similar  condition.  The  introduction  of  the  breech-loader 
has  changed  the  kind  of  indications  of  this  absence  of  mind 
on  the  firing  line,  withoat  in  the  least  modifying  their 
emphasis.  It  was  observed  in  the  Franco-German  War 
that  as  the  Germans  drew  close  to  the  French  position 
their  casualties  diminished;  partly,  no  doubt,  because  of 
the  effect  of  the  German  fire  at  short  range,  but  largely 
because  of  the  neglect  of  the  French  soldiers  to  lower  their 
sights.  At  Majuba  Hill  many  of  the  British  soldiers  had 
their  sights  at  800  yards  when  the  Boers  were  closing  up- 
on them;  and  at  St.  Privat  a  sergeant  of  the  Guards  seems 
to  have  quite  immortalized  himself  by  the  simple  action 
of  personally  causing  the  men  near  him  to  reduce  their 
sights  to  proper  range  as  they  advanced."-"  Hohenlohe  says 
that  it  is  even  a  proof  of  a  certain  standard  of  training  in 
infantry  if  in  a  hot  fight  the  men  put  their  rifles  to  their 

"This  incident  gained  for  Sergeant  Schultz  special  commenda- 
tion in  Ltidinghausen's  "History  of  the  Second  Regiment  of  Foot 
Guards,"  and  has  been  frequently  commented  upon. 


70  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

shoulders  before  firing.  At  Koniggratz  he  found  himself 
within  twenty  or  thirty  paces  of  a  half-battalion  of  Aus- 
trian infantry,  who  in  their  demoralization  (they  had  just 
been  thrust  out  of  the  village  of  Chlum)  held  their  rifles 
almost  vertically,  and  sent  a  storm  of  bullets  into  the  air, 
without,  of  course,  hitting  anything.  General  Walker,  in 
his  "History  of  the  Second  Army  Corps,"  describing  the 
attack  of  the  Confederates  late  in  the  Jay,  on  the  intrench- 
ments  on  the  Brock  Koad,  in  the  battle  of  the  Wilderness, 
says:  "The  attack  was  a  real  one,  but  was  not  made  with 
great  spirit;  nor,  it  must  be  confessed,  was  the  response 
from  our  side  as  hearty  as  it  was  wont  to  be.  The  enemy's 
line  advanced  to  within  about  one  hundred  yards,  and  then 
halted  and  commenced  firing,  to  which  our  troops  replied, 
with  noise  enough,  but  keeping  too  much  down  behind  the 
log  intrenchments  and  thus  discharging  their  muskets  up- 
ward.'7 These  troops  had  been  fighting  nearly  all  day 
with  great  gallantry,  and  were  worn  out  with  "the  excite- 
ment and  the  strain,  the  labors  and  the  losses  of  the  morn- 
ing." From  these  instances  (which  might  Ve  supported  by 
many  others)  it  is  evident  that  only  the  strictest  fire  disci- 
pline and  the  utmost  vigilance  on  the  part  of  the  officers 
and  non-commissioned  officers  can  secure  an  accurate  fire 
in  the  heat  of  action. 

Long-Range  Fire. — The  time  of  beginning  the  firing  will 
depend  upon  many  circumstances  of  terrain,  supply  of  am- 
munition, morale  of  the  troops,  and  the  target  offered  by 
the  enemy.  Long-distance  firing  is  generally  to  be  depre- 
cated, as  it  might  lead  to  an  exhaustion  of  ammunition 
before  reaching  the  most  effective  ranges.  It  must  be  re- 
membered that  the  consumption  of  ammunition  is  great, 
even  with  experienced  soldiers  habituated  to  the  best  of 
fire  discipline.  With  raw  troops  it  is  enormous.  Another 
objection  lies  in  the  fact  that  unless  the  enemy  offered  an 
exceptionally  good  target,  the  fire  would,  by  its  lack  of 
effect,  encourage  rather  than  demoralize  him. 

The  condition  of  the  troops  is  a  matter  that  cannot 
be  left  out  of  consideration  in  deciding  whether  firing  13 
to  be  used  at  long  range.  If  the  enemy  be  in  a  position 
to  use  long-range  fire,  and  his  shots  take  effect,  the  troops 
will  speedily  become  demoralized  if  they  be  not  allowed  to 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  71 

return  the  fire.  Even  though  they  should  not  be  able  ta 
do  any  appreciable  damage  to  the  enemy  by  their  return 
fire,  they  could  (in  the  homely  but  expressive  phrase  of  the 
British)  at  least  "shoot  up  their  own  pluck."  Long-range 
fire  may  thus  be  forced  upon  the  assailant;  but  it  should 
be  carefully  regulated  and  not  continue  longer  than  con- 
siderations of  morale  demand. 

When  used,  it  will  generally  be  with  counted  car- 
tridges. Thus  if  ammunition  be  plentiful,  severe  losses  may 
be  indicted  upon  the  enemy,  especially  if  his  troops  be  in 
heavy  masses.  Special  bodies  of  infantry  may  be  detailed, 
either  alone  or  in  conjunction  with  the  artillery,  to  silence 
the  enemy's  guns,  and  thus  prepare  the  way  for  the  in- 
fantry attack.  But  this  is  really  imposing  upon  the  in- 
fantry an  artillery  function — "using  a  mallet  for  a  ham- 
mer"— and  should  be  considered  justifiable  only  when  a 
deficiency  in  artillery  renders  such  employment  of  infantry 
a  matter  of  imperative  necessity.  As  a  rule,  infantry 
should  not  be  called  upon  to  replace  artillery  in  opposing 
hostile  guns  at  long  range;  for  the  consumption  of  ammu- 
nition will  be  enormous  and  the  result  doubtful  at  best. 

Time  of  Opening  Fire.  —  The  attacking  force  should 
approach  as  near  the  enemy's  position  as  possible  without 
firing.  It  is  expecting  too  much  of  human  nature  to  sup- 
pose that  infantry  can  be  urged  through  a  storm  of  rifle 
bullets  without  replying  to  it;  but  at  the  longer  ranges  it 
must  obtain  protection  from  it?  own  artillery.  The  fact  of 
attacking  presupposes  a  superiority  of  force  on  the  part 
of  the  assailants;  and  a  superiority  of  artillery  is  essential 
in  the  preparation  for  the  assault.  The  hostile  artillery 
n-ust  either  be  silenced,  or  kept  so  busy  by  the  batteries 
of  the  offensive  that  it  cannot  turn  its  attention  to  the 
attacking  infantry.  A  superior  force  of  artillery  should 
be  able  to  d^  this,  and  at  the  same  time  turn  such  a  heavy 
fire  upon  the  opposing  infantry  as  to  keep  it  under  cover 
and  impair  the  effectiveness  of  its  fire,  until  the  fire  of  the 
batteries  is  necessarily  suspended  in  order  to  avoid  firing 
on  their  own  advancing  infantry.*  If  possible,  the  attack- 

*So  dependent  upon  each  other  are  the  several  arms  that  it 
is  impossible  to  consider  the  tactics  of  one  without  reference  to- 


72  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

ing  infantry  should  advance  to  about  800  yards  of  the  en- 
emy before  firing,  as  it  is  at  this  range  that  its  own  fire 
becomes  very  effective.  It  is  rarely,  however,  that  the  in- 
fantry can  approach  nearer  than  1,000  or  1,200  yards  in 
the  open  without  the  necessity  for  firing  becoming  imper- 
ative. It  should  be  able  to  reach  the  latter  limit  if  its 
morale  is  good  and  its  supporting  artillery  is  strong  and 
skillfully  handled,  unless  the  terrain  is  such  as  to  give  the 
enemy  exceptional  advantages  for  long-range  fire. 

Volley  Firing. — This  is  generally  limited  to  the  fire  of 
position  in  the  attack.  Selected  bodies  of  troops  in  the 
supports  and  reserves  fire  over  the  heads  of  men  in  the 
firing  line  when  the  latter  is  on  ground  sufficiently  lower 
than  that  occupied  by  the  selected  bodies  to  allow  such 
fire  to  be  used.  The  use  of  volley  firing  by  the  firing  line 
in  the  attack  until  the  shorter  ranges  shall  have  been 
reached  is  still  advocated  by  some  tacticians,  on  the 
grounds  that  the  men  are  more  easily  kept  in  hand,  the 
expenditure  of  ammunition  is  more  easily  regulated,  the 
objective  of  the  fire  can  be  altered  at  any  moment,  the 
changes  in  elevation  can  be  made  at  any  time,  and  it  has 
a  more  demoralizing  effect  upon  the  enemy  than  a  fire  at 
will;  for  the  fall  of  a  number  of  men  at  the  same  instant 
makes  a  more  powerful  impression  than  the  same,  or  even 
a  greater,  number  falling  separately.  Against  this  it  is 
urged  that  the  leader  ordering  the  volleys  cannot  be  sure 
that  each  man  has  finished  aiming,  and  the  quick,  sharp 
command  to  fire  is  calculated  to  cause  an  impulsive  pull 
and  derange  the  aim.  The  fact  that  independent  fire  al- 
lows more  shots  to  be  fired  in  a  given  time  may  or  may  not 
be  an  advantage.  At  very  close  ranges,  in  critical  moments 
of  the  fight,  it  is  an  advantage;  at  other  times  it  is  quite 
the  reverse,  as  it  would  lead  to  an  inordinate  consumption 
of  ammunition  without  any  compensating  gain. 

Volley  firing  is,  however,  possible  only  when  the  men 
are  cool  enough  to  comprehend  and  obey  orders;  for  vol- 

the  use  of  the  others.  All  claims  of  the  "independence"  of  one 
arm  or  another  are  based  simply  upon  tactical  ignorance  or  a  per- 
verted and  pernicious  sort  of  esprit  de  corps. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  73 

leys,  to  be  effective,  must  be  well  delivered.  Ill-directed, 
"ragged"  volleys  encourage  rather  than  demoralize  the 
enemy,  and  a  few  nervous,  excitable  men  may  ruin  the  vol- 
ley of  a  squad,  a  section,  or  even  a  battalion.  As  soon  as 
the  immediate  commander  of  the  body  firing  volleys  ob- 
serves that  the  men  are  becoming  "rattled,"  he  should  at 
once  order  a  fire  with  counted  cartridges,  thus  giving  the 
force  of  an  order  to  a  mode  of  action  that  cannot  be  pre- 
vented. At  close  ranges  volleys  will  generally  be  found 
impossible.  Indeed,  Captain  May  declares  that  in  tlie 
whole  course  of  the  Austro-Prussian  War  volleys  were  un- 
known; and  Boguslawski  says  that,  in  the  Franco-German 
War,  the  few  cases  in  which  volleys  by  the  Germans  could 
be  well  authenticated  were  when  the  French  were  sur- 
prised. The  only  thing  that  can  be  recommended  is  to  use 
volleys  whenever  bodies  of  the  enemy  can  be  surprised  in 
mass  formation  or  otherwise  taken  at  a  disadvantage. 

Individual  Fire. — Individual  fire  is  of  three  classes: 
fire  with  counted  cartridges,  fire  at  will,  and  rapid  fire. 

If  good  results  are  to  be  obtained  from  individual  fire, 
the  discipline  must  be  such  that  the  men  will  fire  only  the 
indicated  number  of  cartridges,  or  will,  if  the  number  be 
not  indicated,  cease  firing  at  once  upon  hearing  the  signal. 

Fire  with  Counted  Cartridges. — This  is  used  principally 
in  the  attack  from  the  time  of  opening  fire  until  mid  range* 
is  reached.  More  than  three  counted  cartridges  are  rarely 
used  without  intermission;  this  is  to  steady  the  men  and 
prevent  waste  of  ammunition. 

Fire  at  Will. — Fire  at  will  is  employed  in  the  attack 
from  the  beginning  of  mid  range  to  the  place  selected  for 
the  delivering  of  the  assault.  Pauses  in  the  fire  are  val- 
uable, as  they  enable  wild  fire  to  be  checked  atnd  tend  to 
economize  ammunition. 

Rapid  Fire. — This  will,  if  possible,  be  postponed  until 
the  decisive  moment  of  the  action,  just  before  the  final  as- 
sault. At  this  point  the  bayonet  should  be  fixed,  the  rear 
sight  laid  down,  the  magazine  used,  and  as  intense  a  fire 

*  Infantry  Drill  Regulations,  U.  S.  Army,  1904,  classifies  dis- 
tances of  from  300  to  600  yards  as  mid  range. 


74  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

.as  possible  directed  straight  to  the  front.  At  this  critical 
moment  fire  discipline  will  probably  disappear,  but  offi- 
cers and  non-commissioned  officers  should  make  every  ef- 
fort to  cause  the  men  to  lay  down  their  sights  and  fire 
straight  to  the  front,  and  prevent  them  from  blazing  away 
in  the  air. 

Cover. — At  all  ranges,  protection  from  the  enemy's  fire 
must  be  sought  in  the  use  of  natural  or  artificial  cover.  In 
the  attack  of  any  position,  it  will  be  necessary  for  the 
firing  line  to  intrench  as  it  advances  unless  natural  cover 
exists.  These  intrenchments  will  be  utilized  by  succeed- 
ing lines,  and  if  necessity  demands,  may  be  deepened  by 
them.  Trees,  ditches^  shallow  depressions,  and  other  feat- 
ures of  the  terrain  afford  shelter  for  the  skirmishers;  and 
if  no  natural  cover  be  at  hand,  they  may  gain  considerable 
protection  by  lying  down.  The  cover  chosen  must,  in  ev- 
ery case,  be  such  that  the  men  sheltered  by  it  can  see  the 
enemy  and  have  an  effective  fire  upon  him.  No  amount 
of  protection  afforded  by  the  cover  can  compensate  for  the 
least  impairment  of  the  efficiency  of  the  hre  of  the  men 
sheltered  by  it.  If  shelter  alone  were  considered,  the  men 
might  as  well  be  left  off  the  battle-field  altogether.  An- 
other important  consideration  is,  that  the  cover  must  not, 
in  any  way,  interfere  with  progress  to  the  front  nor  ob- 
struct a  retreat  from  the  position. 

It  is  not  only  necessary  that  the  E  en  should  be  in- 
structed in  taking  advantage  of  all  cover  that  may  be  avail- 
able, but  they  should  also  be  taught  to  leave  it  at  a  word 
of  command.  "When  a  regiment  is  deployed  as  skirmish- 
ers," says  General  Sherman,  "and  crosses  an  open  field  or 
woods,  under  heavy  fire,  if  each  man  runs  forward  from 
tree  to  tree,  or  stump  to  stump,  and  yet  preserves  a  good 
general  alignment,  it  gives  great  confidence  to  the  men 
themselves,  Tor  they  always  keep  their  eyes  well  to  the 
right  and  left,  and  watch  their  comrades;  but  when  some 
few  hold  back,  stick  too  close  or  too  long  to  a  comfortable 
log,  it  often  stops  the  line  and  defeats  the  whole  object/' 
Boguslawski,  in  describing  the  action  of  the  German  in- 
fantry in  1870-71,  says:  "The  attacks  were  generally  made 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  75 

with  great  determination  when  once  in  progress,  for 
against  the  enormous  effect  of  infantry  fire,  the  greatest 
difficulty  does  not  consist  in  charging  home,  but  in  leav- 
ing cover  to  begin  the  attack."  This  tendency  on  the  part 
of  the  men  to  hug  cover  must  be  recognized  and  provided 
for.  When  the  men  show  reluctance  to  leave  their  shel- 
ter, and  are  deaf  to  the  commands  and  insensible  to  the 
example  of  their  officers,  a  reinforcement  coming  up  with 
a  cheer  will  often  carry  the  line  forward  from  its  cover 
and  a  considerable  distance  beyond.  The  successive  rein- 
forcements of  the  firing  line  should,  therefore,  be  regu- 
lated, as  far  as  possible,  with  a  view  to  this  forward 
impulsion. 

Rushes. — The  advance  should  be  continued  without  in- 
terruption, as  the  moral  effect  of  a  steady,  unhesitating, 
unswerving  advance  is  very  great,  and  so  long  as  the  on- 
ward movement  is  uninterrupted  there  is  no  trouble  in 
regard  to  getting  men  to  leave  cover.  During  the  early 
stages  of  the  advance,  running  should  be  carefully  avoided, 
as  it  would  tend  to  wind  the  men  and  interfere  with  the 
efficiency  of  their  fire.  But  upon  arriving  within  from 
700  to  900  yards  of  the  enemy's  position,  a  fire  of 
such  intensity  is  encountered  that  the  question  of  pass- 
ing over  the  intervening  epace  assumes  a  new  phase. 
It  is  desirable  to  traverse  this  distance  as  quickly  as  pos- 
sible; but  to  do  so,  even  at  double  time,  would  require 
several  minutes,  during  which  time  the  attacking  infantry 
would  be  exposed  to  an  unimpeded  fire  from  the  rifles  of 
the  enemy,  and  probably  swept  out  of  existence.  Even 
if  the  men  should  succeed  in  reaching  the  hostile  position, 
they  would  be  winded  and  altogether  unfit  for  a  hand-to- 
hand  struggle.  Such  a  long  charge  would,  in  fact,  be  justi- 
fiable only  when  it  was  evident  that  the  enemy  had  al- 
ready begun  to  abandon  his  position  and  that  the  charge 
would  merely  accelerate  his  flight.  A  zone  will  finally 
be  reached  which  can  only  be  crosseC  by  a  succession  of 
short  advances.  The  methods  of  the  Japanese  in  the  re- 
cent Manchurian  campaign  are  worthy  of  note.  In  some 
instances  their  further  advance  was  made  by  individual 
skirmishers  rushing  forward  to  cover,  there  intrenching, 


76  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

if  necessary,  and  opening  fire.  Here  they  remained  until 
sufficiently  reinforced  to  conduct  another  similar  advance. 
In  other  instances  the  advance  was  conducted  by  an 
irregular  line  of  squads  or  sections  at  considerable  in- 
tervals, each  group  advancing  in  column  of  files  to  cov- 
er, where  they  would  remain  until  sufficiently  reinforced 
for  a  further  advance.  The  former  idea  of  regular  ad- 
vances or  rushes  by  alternate  sections  of  the  firing  line 
has  to  a  great  extent  disappeared.  The  distance  of  the 
rush  is  largely  regulated  by  the  effectiveness  of  the  en- 
emy's fire  and  the  nature  of  the  ground.  Generally  some 
sheltering  feature  of  the  terrain  is  selected  as  the  object- 
ive of  the  rush.  It  seems  certain  that  whenever  it  is  pos- 
sible, the  rush  rhould  be  supported  by  fire  action. 

Whenever  rushing  by  alternate  sections  of  the  line  is 
deemed  advisable,  the  fractions  of  the  line  advancing 
should  be  large;  for  if  the  subdivisions  be  too  small,  the 
front  of  fire  will  be  too  restricted,  and  there  will  be  great 
danger  of  the  troops  in  front  receiving  accidental  shots 
from  those  in  rear.  This  must  be  especially  guarded 
against,  for  the  effect  of  stray  shots  from  their  own 
friends  in  rear  is  peculiarly  demoralizing.  If  the  rush 
be  made  by  alternate  fractions,  and  these  fractions  be 
small,  the  distance  covered  by  each  forward  bound  should 
be  small,  as  the  angle  of  free  fire  for  the  portions  in  rear 
will  be  reduced  according  to  their  distance  from  the  frac- 
tions in  front.  As  a  rule,  the  firing  line  of  an  attacking 
force  (unless  very  large)  should  not  be  divided  into  more 
than  two  echelons  for  alternate  rushes. 

In  order  that  the  fire  may  proceed  uninterruptedly 
during  the  rushes,  it  would  seem  that  the  best  method 
would  generally  be  to  rdvarce  the  right  echelon  first,  and 
then  bring  the  left  up  to  the  game  line.  Owing  to  the 
manner  in  which  men  kneeling  or  lying  down  hold  their 
pieces,  the  chance  of  stray  shots  from  the  rear  echelon 
striking  the  one  in  advance  would  be  reduced  to  a  min- 
imum, if  the  left  echelon  were  in  rear;  for  the  accidental 
shots  would  be  pretty  sure  to  go  to  the  left.  The  left 
echelon  could,  then,  fire  during  the  forward  rush  of  the 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  77 

right,  and  the  latter  could,  of  course,  cover  with  its  fire 
the  advance  of  the  left  fraction  of  the  line. 

An  advance  by  rushes  should  not  be  begun  until  cir- 
cumstances render  it  necessary;  for  when  this  method  of 
advance  has  been  adopted,  it  is  generally  impossible  to 
stop  it  and  change  the  form  of  attack. 

The  advance  by  rapid  rushes  is  not  the  only  means 
of  approaching  the  enemy's  position,  for  in  the  late  Ariglo- 
Boer  War  and  in  the  Russo-Japanese  War  the  lines  often 
advanced  by  creeping. 

Composition  of  the  Firing  Line. — In  the  successive  re- 
inforcements of  the  firing  line,  men  of  different  organiza- 
tions inevitably  get  mixed  together.  There  is,  apparent- 
ly, no  help  for  this;  but  it  should  be  delayed  as  long  as 
possible  and  the  intermingling  reduced  to  a  minimum. 
This  may  best  be  done  either  by  having  the  firing  line  and 
supports  taken  from  the  same  company,  or  by  having  en- 
tire companies  in  the  firing  line  and  supporting  them  with 
companies  of  their  own  battalions.  It  is  desirable  that 
the  firing  line  and  supports  should  never  belong  to  differ- 
ent battalions.  Generally,  in  opening  the  fight,  not  more 
than  one-fourth  of  the  men  should  be  in  the  firing  line. 
The  most  effective  handling  of  the  rifle  is  obtained  when 
the  skirmish  line  consists  of  one  man  to  each  yard  of  front. 

Great  care  should  be  taken  to  give  the  proper  direc- 
tion to  the  firing  line  when  it  first  moves  out  to  the  at- 
tack; for  a  change  of  direction  of  the  line  under  a  heavy 
fire  is  always  difficult  and  often  impossible.  A  change 
of  front  to  the  extent  of  a  half  wheel,  or  one-eighth  of  a 
circle,  is  sometimes  practicable  before  the  line  becomes 
seriously  engaged;  obliquing  may  be  depended  upon  to 
gain  slight  distances  to  either  flank;  but  once  actively 
employed,  changes  of  direction,  movements  by  the  flank, 
or,  in  fact,  any  movement  except  straight  ahead  or  direct 
to  the  rear,  are  impossible. 

The  firing  line  is  essentially  the  fighting  part  of  the 
army;  and  the  other  portions  of  the  infantry  are  merely 
to  repair  its  losses,  protect  its  flanks,  and  reinforce  it  to 
the  density  necessary  for  conducting  the  combat.  It  is, 
as  a  rule,  opposed  to  a  similar  line  on  the  side  of  the 

—  7— 


78  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.- 

enemy;  for  all  recent  wars  have  shown  that  masses  are 
helpless  when  opposed  to  an  extended  line.  Ic  should  be 
able  to  repulse  front  attacks,  and  ordinarily  should  have 
no  fear  of  cavalry,  unless  surprised  and  taken  in  flank 
by  it.  In  the  Franco-German  War  most  of  the  attacks 
of  the  French  cavalry  were  repulsed  by  the  German  skir- 
mishers with  no  other  change  of  formation  than  a  slight 
diminution  of  intervals. 

Scouts. — Almost  invariably,  the  ground  over  which  an 
attack  is  made  is  broken,  ard  contains  features  that  may 
either  afford  shelter  for  the  assailants  or  constitute  ob- 
stacles to  their  advance.  Scouts  should,  therefore,  be  sent 
out  to  the  front  to  make  a  rapid  reconnaissance  of  the 
ground  and  signal  information  relative  to  it  to  the  troops 
in  rear.  The  scouts  should  foe  skilled  in  judging  ground, 
should  be  sharpshooters,  and  in  addition  to  reconnoiter- 
ing  the  terrain  and  the  enemy's  prsition,  should  be  charged 
with  the  duty  of  driving  back  the  hostile  scouts  and  pick- 
ing off  their  leaders.  They  take  advantage  of  the  ground 
to  conceal  themselves  as  much  as  possible,  and  are  espe- 
cially careful  to  find  good  cover  for  the  troops  in  rear 
and  to  discover  the  enemy.  Even  on  open  ground  they 
are  useful;  on  broken  and  diversified  ground  they  are 
indispensable. 

The  scouts,  in  number  depending  upon  the  nature  of 
the  ground  and  the  duties  required  of  them,  are  generally 
sent  out  as  soon  as  the  command  arrives  within  the  zone 
of  artillery  fire.  Several  scouts,  under  a  non-commissioned 
officer,  are  usually  sent  out  from  each  company,  advanc- 
ing at  a  rapid  pace  and  generally  preceding  the  skirmish- 
ers by  about  300  yards.  The  movements  of  the  line  of 
scouts  are  regulated  by  the  officers  accompanying  it,  one 
officer. for  the  scouts  from  each  battalion.  Their  move- 
ments may  be  controlled  by  whistle  signals,  and  they  must 
be  halted  to  await  the  firing  line,  or  be  recalled  to  it,  be- 
fore fire  is  opened.  They  are  usually  united  with  the  fir- 
ing line  by  the  time  it  arrives  within  900  or  1,000  yards 
of  the  hostile  position. 

The  French  regulations  require  their  scouts  to  pre- 
cede the  firing  line  by  about  500  yards. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  79 

THE  SUPPORT. 

Object  of  the  Support. — The  object  of  the  support  is 
generally  two-fold.  If  the  firing  line  supported  by  it  is 
at  the  flank  of  the  general  line,  or  if  gaps  or  intervals, 
through  which  the  enemy  might  penetrate,  exist  in  the 
line,  the  support  is  charged  with  the  duty  of  protecting 
the  firing  line  from  flank  attacks  by  the  enemy,  and  flank 
scouts  should  be  constantly  employed.  This  duty  is,  how- 
ever, generally  a  secondary  object,  and  it  devolves  upon 
the  reserve  as  soon  as  the  support  begins  to  merge  into 
the  firing  line.  The  paramount  function  of  the  support 
is  to  reinforce  the  firing  line. 

Some  European  armies  have  no  supports,  but  use  re- 
serves only. 

Strength  of  the  Support. — The  strength  of  the  support 
depends  mainly  upon  the  degree  of  cover  afforded  by  the 
ground  over  which  the  attack  is  to  be  made.  On  open 
ground,  where  the  firing  line  will  probably  suffer  heav- 
ily, the  support  should  be  relatively  stronger  than  on 
ground  affording  such  shelter  as  to  make  it  reasonably 
certain  that  the  former  will  be  able  to  approach  near  the 
hostile  position  before  encountering  much  loss.  At  the 
beginning  of  the  attack  the  strength  of  the  support  should 
be  at  least  one-half  that  of  the  firing  line,  and  it  is  gen- 
erally equal  to  it. 

Distance  from  the  Firing  Line. — At  the  beginning  of  the 
attack  the  distance  of  the  support  from  the  firing  line 
should  be  such  that  fire  directed  at  the  latter  would  not 
reach  the  former.  One  kind  of  German  shrapnel  has 
beaten  ground  275  yards  deep;  diaphragm  shrapnel  has 
beaten  ground  500  yards  deep.  The  distance  is  by  no 
means  invariable,  however,  but  changes  according  to  the 
circumstances  of  terrain  and  fire.  It  should  be  greater 
on  open  ground  than  when  cover  enables  the  support  to 
advance  closely  without  loss;  and,  for  reasons  already 
stated,  it  should  be  greater  when  the  trajectory  of  the 
enemy's  rifle  is  flat  than  when  it  is  high.  It  also  depends 
upon  the  important  consideration  that  the  support  most 
be  near  enough  to  reinforce  the  firing  line  promptly,  and 
far  enough  back  to  avoid  heavy  loss.  If  the  support  be 


80  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

so  closa  as  to  suffer  heavily,  the  men  will  invariably  rush 
forward  and  join  the  firing  line;  for  all  men  object  to  be- 
ing shot  at  without  a  chance  of  firing  in  return.  If  the 
support  be  too  far  away,  the  firing  line  will  suffer  for 
want  of  timely  succor,  and  the  reinforcements  will  en- 
counter needless  loss  in  traversing  too  long  a  distance 
— especially  when  both  firing  line  and  support  are  under 
shelter  and  the  shace  between  them  is  open.  The  distance 
diminishes,  of  course,  from,  the  maximum  prescribed  for 
the  earlier  stages  of  the  attack  to  the  minimum  reached 
in  the  complete  union  of  the  support  with  the  firing  line. 
Formation  of  the  Support. — The  formation  of  the  sup- 
port varies  with  the  nature  of  the  ground  and  the  phases 
of  the  action.  The  use  of  columns  is  generally  practicable 
only  in  the  earlier  stages  of  the  fight;  and  even  then  they 
must  be  small  in  order  that  they  may  profit  by  the  shelter 
afforded  by  the  terrain,  and  not  offer  a  good  target  to 
the  enemy's  artillery.  If  no  cover  exists,  a  line  formation 
becomes  imperative. 

Small  columns,  a  line  in  close  order,  or  a  line  of  sec- 
tions can  generally  be  used  by  the  support  until  the  fir- 
ing line  approaches  near  enough  to  the  enemy  to  open 
fire,  at  which  time  it  will  generally  be  necessary  to  ex- 
tend the  support  into  a  line  of  squads  or  skirmishers.  The 
support  is  generally  absorbed  by  the  firing  line  by  the  time 
the  latter  is  within  decisive  ranges.  Before  reaching  this 
point  it  will  be  necessary  for  the  support  to  deploy  as 
ekirmishers;  but  as  a  rule  the  reinforcement  will  be 
made  by  squads  in  extended  order.  Each  extension  should 
be  made  only  when  it  becomes  necessary,  in  order  to 
avoid  losses  or  facilitate  the  reinforcement  of  the  firing 
line.  It  may  often  occur  that  one  part  of  the  line  is  ex- 
posed, and  another  sheltered  by  the  nature  of  the  ter- 
rain. In  such  a  case,  while  the  exposed  part  is  extended, 
it  may  be  possible  to  retain  the  latter  in  small  columns 
until  the  attack  is  well  advanced.  Small  columns  may 
also  often  be  employed  in  the  support  in  night  attacks, 
or  when  the  ground  favors  a  surprise  of  the  enemy.  The 
fact  that  they  cannot  often  be  used  should  not  cause  them 
to  be  neglected  when  they  can  be  employed.  In  nothing 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  81 

is  the  skill  of  the  tactician  more  evident  than  in  the  choice 
of  the  time  of  deployment  or  the  change  from  close  to  ex- 
tended order.  To  act  too  soon,  in  this  respect,  is  to  aban- 
don the  control  which  close  order  gives  and  incur  the  risk 
of  the  men  getting  out  of  hand;  while  delayed  action  re- 
sults often  in  ruinous  losses  and  invites  defeat. 

Reinforcement  of  the  Firing  Line.  —  In  reinforcing  the 
firing  line  from  the  support  it  is  desirable  that,  as  far  as 
possible,  men  of  the  same  group  be  kept  together,  and  it 
is  accordingly  best  to  reinforce  by  sending  squads  for- 
ward rather  than  individual  men.  The  firing  line  is  rare- 
ly of  uniform  density.  Bits  of  cover  here  and  there  at- 
tract groups  of  men,  and  the  skirmishers  instinctively- 
spread  out  to  each  side  of  dangerous  ground  which  is  well 
beaten  by  a  rain  of  falling  bullets.  Gaps  are  often  thua 
made  in  the  line,  and  it  is  into  these  that  groups  from 
the  support  should  be  inserted.  But  this  method  of  rein- 
forcing is  not  always  practicable,  and  though  it  is  desir- 
able to  keep  men  of  the  same  group  together,  there  is 
often  nothing  to  be  done  but  to  send  them  forward  to  find 
places  where  best  they  can;  for  once  under  a  heavy  fire, 
the  skirmishers  cannot  move  to  a  flank  nor  diminish  their 
intervals.*  Moreover,  the  evils  of  mixing  men  of  differ- 
ent commands  in  the  firing  line  has  probably  been  much 
exaggerated.  If  the  troops  be  well  disciplined,  they  will 
obey  orders  from  any  officer  under  whose  command  they 
happen  to  fall;  and  the  officers  most  conspicuous  in  the 
fore-front  of  battle  are  those  natural  leaders  whose  in- 
fluence over  men  is  largely  independent  of  official  position 
or  personal  acquaintance.  There  is  no  denying  the  fact 
that  the  morale  of  most  men  is  better  when  they  -are  wii;h 
their  own  comrades  than  when  they  are  among  strangers; 
but  military  history  is  full  of  instances  of  gallant  and 
successful  attacks  made  by  men  of  various  commands 
mingled  together.  The  force  which  carried  the  great  Rus- 
sian battery  at  the  Alma  consisted  of  a  mixture  of  troops  , 

*"Could  such  a  movement  to  the  flank  be  possible,  if  the  fight 
were  so  hot  as  to  necessitate  the  advance  of  reinforcements?  Would 
not  these  skirmishers,  who  all  stand  up  and  move  together  to  a 
flank,  be  certainly  sacrificed  to  the  enemy's  bullets?"— Hohenlohe. 


82  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

from  many  regiments.  The  troops  which,  under  Hancock, 
made  the  brilliant  assault  at  "the  Bloody  Angle"  were  dis- 
ordered, and  men  of  different  regiments,  brigades,  and 
divisions  were  mingled  together.  In  the  attack  on  the 
village  of  Froschweiler,  in  the  battle  of  Worth,  soldiers 
of  almost  every  regiment  of  the  5th  and  llth  German 
corps  were  crowded  together  in  a  general  mass;  and  at 
Tel-el-Kebir,  in  1882,  though  the  Highland  Brigade  was 
formed  for  attack  in  line,  two  deep,  within  300  yards  of 
the  Egyptian  position,  it  carried  the  intrenchments  in  a 
crowd  of  men  of  different  battalions,  in  which  all  tactical 
formation  had  disappeared. 

The  choice  of  the  time  of  reinforcing  is  a  matter  of 
the  greatest  importance.  If  the  reinforcement  be  delayed 
too  long,  the  men  will  rush  forward  singly  and  in  small 
groups,  and  the  support  will,  without  orders,  melt  away 
into  the  firing  line.  On  the  other  hand,  the  reinforcement 
should  be  delayed  as  long  as  practicable,  as  its  moral  ef- 
fect on  the  firing  line  is  much  greater  in  the  later  than  in 
the  earlier  stages  of  the  fight. 

When  the  support  is  halted,  it  must  seek  cover. 

THE  RESERVE. 

The  Objects  of  the  Reserve. — The  objects  of  the  reserve 
are  similar  to  those  of  the  support;  namely,  to  guard  the 
flanks  and  reinforce  the  firing  line.  It  is,  in  fact,  but  a 
continuation  of  the  support — "a  second  drop  to  fall  upon 
the  same  spot  as  the  first." 

Formation  of  the  Reserve. — In  order  that  it  may  fulfill 
its  first  object,  the  reserve  should,  as  a  rule,  be  held  well 
in  hand  in  rear  of  the  center  or  of  the  most  exposed  flank; 
though  circumstances  of  terrain,  or  the  exposure  of  both 
flanks,  may  sometimes  render  it  advisable  to  divide  the 
reserve  into  two  parts.  The  assailant  should,  however, 
while  carefully  guarding  his  flanks,  seek  more  to  protect 
his  flanks  and  rear  by  occupying  the  enemy  completely 
with  the  vigor  of  his  front  attack  than  by  detaching  de- 
fensive bodies  to  the  flank.  As  long  as  possible,  the  re- 
serve should  be  held  in  column;  but  as  soon  as  it  comes 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  83 

within  effective  range  of  artillery  fire,  its  extension  be- 
comes necessary;  for  the  reserve  is,  even  more  than  the 
support,  a  target  for  the  hostile  guns. 

The  Distance  of  the  Reserve  from  the  Bodies  in  Front. — 
In  the  beginning  of  the  attack  the  distance  of  the  reserve 
from  the  firing  line  varies  from  600  to  1,000  yards.  In  our 
Drill  Regulations  the  former  distance  is  adopted,  the  re- 
serve being  300  yards  in  rear  of  the  support.  As  the  at- 
tacking force  approaches  the  enemy's  position,  and  the 
support  becomes  merged  with  the  firing  line,  the  distance 
of  the  reserve  from  the  support  is,  of  course,  diminished; 
for  the  halts  for  firing  check  the  progress  of  the  troops  in 
front,  while  the  reserve  must  continue  its  advance  uninter- 
ruptedly. The  advance,  in  fact,  from  the  time  the  attack 
formation  is  adopted,  should  be  continued  with  energy  and 
without  interruption;  for  an  advance  once  checked  and 
brought  to  a  standstill  is  almost  sure  to  fail. 

The  distance  of  the  reserve  from  the  firing  line  must 
always  be  less  than  the  distance  of  the  latter  from  the 
enemy.  Otherwise,  the  enemy  might,  by  a  sudden  attack, 
overwhelm  the  firing  line  before  it  could  be  reinforced  by 
the  reserve.  As  the  crisis  of  the  attack  approaches,  the 
reserve  must  be  close  to  the  firing  line,  in  order  that  it 
may  reinforce  it  promptly. 

Reinforcement  ly  the  Reserve. — The  reinforcement  of  the 
firing  line  from  the  reserve  is  rarely  effected  by  throwing 
the  latter  bodily  into  the  former;  but,  on  the  contrary, 
when  the  firing  line  is  within  about  600  yards  from  the 
enemy  it  is  generally  fed  steadily  from  the  reserve,  a  por- 
tion of  which  is,  however,  held  in  hand  for  reinforcing  just 
before  the  final  assault.  Great  care  must  be  taken  to  re- 
inforce at  the  right  moment.  "It  is  very  difficult  in  this 
matter,"  says  Boguslawski,  "to  do>  the  right  thing,  and  to 
avoid  falling  into  the  error  of  letting  the  infantry  which 
is  already  engaged  expend  itself,  and  at  the  same  time 
not  to  commit  the  other  fault  of  giving  ear  to  every  call 
for  assistance,  and  of  engaging  the  reserve  prematurely 
in  the  raging  fight,  when  the  commander  naturally  loses, 
to  a  great  extent,  his  hold  over  them."  The  words  of  Gen- 
eral Skobeleff  on  the  same  subject  are  interesting.  "There 


84  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

are,"  he  says,  "in  every  command  a  small  percentage  of 
cowards,  who  will  slink  away  at  the  first  opportunity,  a 
certain  number  of  men  of  rash  bravery  who  will  go  too 
far  forward  and  get  killed,  and  the  great  majority  of  men 
of  ordinary  courage,  but  liable  to  waver  as  the  fight  gets 
hot.  The  reserves  must  be  sent  in  at  the  moment  when 
the  reasonably  brave  men  have  been  long  enough  engaged 
and  met  with  enough  resistance  to  begin  to  feel  nervous, 
but  before  they  have  begun  to  retreat."* 

Strength  of  the  Reserve. — Before  it  .begins  reinforcing, 
the  reserve  is  generally  equal  in  strength  to  the  firing  line 
and  support  combined.  It  may  in  some  cases  be  advisable 
to  give  it  a  smaller  proportionate  strength,  but,  as  a  rule, 
it  is  equal  to  all  in  front  of  it;  and  at  the  opening  of  the 
fight  it  should  never  be  less  than  one-fourth  of  the  entire 
first  line. 

THE  SECOND  LINE. 

Object  of  the  Second  Line. — The  reserve  is  generally  in- 
sufficient to  give  the  firing  line  the  impetus  necessary  to 
carry  it  to  the  enemy's  position.  It  is  usually  absorbed  in 
the  firing  line  at  the  crisis  of  the  fight,  and  its  entire  en- 
ergy taken  up  in  fire  action.  Whenever  stubborn  resist- 
ance seems  likely  to  be  encountered,  a  second  line  must 
accordingly  be  provided  for  shock  action;  and  it  must 
carry  the  first**  line  with  it  in  the  final  assault;  for  the 
passage  of  lines  in  action  may  now  be  regarded  as  prac- 
tically impossible.  In  addition  to  its  function  of  giving 
the  first  line  the  physical  and  moral  reinforcement  neces- 
sary to  carry  it  to  the  enemy's  position,  the  second  line 
is  charged  with  the  duty  of  guarding  the  flanks  of  the  first, 
with  reinforcing  or  extending  that  line  when  necessary, 
and  with  renewing  the  fight  in  case  of  the  repulse  of  the 
first  line. 


*Greene's  "Russian  Campaigns  in  Turkey,"  p.  450.  Though 
Skobeleff  had  reference,  in  the  above  remarks,  to  the  divisional  re- 
serves, the  words  are  no  less  true  when  applied  to  the  reserve  of  a 
battalion. 

**It  must  be  remembered  that  the  first  line  consists  of  the  fir- 
tog  line,  the  support,  and  the  reserve. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  85 

Strength  of  Second  Line. — The  strength  of  the  second 
line  varies  from  one-third  of  that  of  the  first  to  an  equal- 
ity with  it.  No  invariable  rule  can  be  given.  It  may  even 
be  necessary,  in  some  cases,  to  have  the  second  line  strong- 
er than  the  first;  but,  as  a  rule,  if  the  lines  are  not  equal, 
the  greater  strength  should  be  put  in  the  first. 

Distance  from  First  Line. — At  the  beginning  of  the  at- 
tack the  second  line  is  generally  about  600  yards  in  rear 
of  the  first,  the  distance  steadily  diminishing  as  the  hos- 
tile position  is  approached. 

Command. — The  second  line  should  be  under  the  com- 
mand of  the  officer  who  has  charge  of  the  first;  so  that  the 
same  mind  that  directs  the  attack  may  control  the  rein- 
forcement at  the  critical  moment. 

THE  THIRD  LINE. 

Object  of  the  Third  Line. — The  final  assault  must,  of 
course,  result  either  in  success  or  failure.  In  the  former 
case,  the  troops,  excited  by  the  charge  and  disorganized 
by  the  intermingling  of  different  tactical  units,  are  in  no 
condition  to  sustain  a  counter-charge  by  the  enemy's 
reserve®,  and,  unless  promptly  supported,  they  may  be 
driven  from  the  position  they  have  gained  before  order 
can  be  restored.  Our  own  history  furnishes  many  exam- 
ples of  a  position  gallantly  won,  and  then  lost  for  want 
of  timely  support  of  the  attacking  troops.  In  the  Wilder- 
ness, Jenkins'  Confederate  brigade,  which  had  penetrated 
the  Union  position,  was  driven  out  by  a  charge  by  Car- 
roll's brigade,  which  had  been  held  in  reserve.  At  Frank- 
lin, the  Confederates  were,  in  the  very  moment  of  success, 
defeated  and  thrust  out  of  the  Union  works  by  a  charge 
by  Opdycke's  brigade.  At  Spottsylvania,  Upton's  fine  as- 
sault failed  of  permanent  results  because  unsupported. 
Many  other  instances  might  be  cited  from  the  same  war. 

It  is  necessary,  therefore,  to  have  in  hand  a  body  af 
formed  troops  with  which  to  meet  the  enemy's  counter- 
attacks, to  hold  the  captured  position,  or  to  conduct  a 
pursuit.  The  attack  must  not  be  regarded  as  completed 
until  the  enemy  has  been  pushed  entirely  out  of  the  po 


86  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

sition,  and  deprived  of  the  power  of  making  a  counter- 
attack. Under  cover  of  the  third  line,  the  troops  of  the 
first  and  second  lines  are  re-formed  as  quickly  as  possible. 
In  case  of  the  repulse  of  the  attack,  a  body  of  formed  troops 
is  likewise  necessary  to  cover  the  retreat  of  the  attack- 
ing troops  shattered  and  demoralized  by  defeat. 

The  duties  of  securing  a  captured  position  or  cover- 
ing a  retreat  may  be  performed  by  the  second  line  unless 
it  has  been  merged  with  the  first  line  in  the  course  of  the 
fight.  As  such  will  generally  be  the  case,  a  third  line  is 
usually  necessary.  Bearing  in  mind  that  the  object  of 
the  second  line  is  to  reinforce  for  the  final  assault,  for 
which  the  reserves  of  the  first  line  may,  perhaps,  be  suffi- 
cient, while  that  of  the  third  is  to  clinch  a  victory  or  neu- 
tralize a  defeat,  we  can  appreciate  Von  Scherff's  quaint 
statement  that,  while  a  second  line  of  battle  is  necessary 
only  under  certain  conditions,  a  third  line  can  never  well 
be  dispensed  with. 

The  third  line  is  sometimes  termed  the  "maneuvering 
line,"  and  has  more  independence  of  action  than  the  sec- 
ond. The  troops  for  flank  attacks  are  generally  taken 
from  the  third  line,  which  is  also  charged  with  the  repulse 
of  flank  attacks  made  by  the  enemy.  When  counter- 
attacks are  necessary,  they  are  usually  carried  out  by  the 
third  line,  which  is  also  sometimes  employed  in  fortifying 
a  line  of  defense  in  rear,  by  means  of  which  it  may,  in  case 
of  the  repulse  of  the  attack,  check  the  enemy,  and  from 
which  it  may  renew  the  assault. 

Command. — The  third  line  is  not  necessarily  under  the 
command  of  the  officer  commanding  the  first  two,  as  it  is 
charged  with  quite  different  functions.  It  is  generally 
under  the  immediate  control  of  the  commanding  officer  of 
the  entire  force  composing  the  three  lines. 

Distance  from  Second  Line. — The  distance  of  the  third 
line  from  the  second  is,  at  the  beginning  of  the  attack, 
1,000  yards. 

Strength. — The  third  line  is  generally  larger  than  the 
second,  and  is  often  equal  in  strength  to  the  first.  In  a 
regimental  formation  for  attack  the  first,  second,  and 
third  lines  may  each  consist  of  a  battalion. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  87 

THE  REGIMENT  OF  INFANTRY  IN  ATTACK,* 

The  regiment  may  be  formed  in  two  or  three  lines, 
according  to  the  nature  of  the  attack  and  the  front  to  be 
occupied.  The  maximum  front  should  not  exceed  that  of 
the  regiment  formed  in  one  line  in  close  order,  increased 
by  half  the  interval  between  it  and  the  adjacent  regiment. 
The  minimum  front  is  that  of  a  battalion  in  line  in  close 
order.  If  formed  in  two  lines,  the  first  line  consists  of  two 
battalions,  and  the  second  line  of  one.  If  formed  in  three 
lines,  each  consists  of  a  battalion. 

In  the  former  case  the  distance  between  the  first  and 
second  lines  is  about  600  yards;  in  the  latter,  the  first  and 
second  lines  are  separated  by  about  600  yards,  and  the 
second  and  third  lines  by  about  1,000  yards.  The  forma- 
tion in  three  lines  is  the  one  adopted  when  a  powerful  at- 
tack is  intended,  and  will  accordingly  be  the  one  here  con- 
sidered. This  is  a  favorite  formation  with  the  Germans 
and  French,  and  is  the  one  almost  invariably  used  by  the 
latter  when  the  regiment  is  acting  alone. 

Just  before  entering  the  first  zone  of  artillery  fire, 
the  regiment  (being  in  route  formation)  is  formed  into 
column  of  battalions.  The  colonel  directs  the  major  com- 
manding the  first  battalion  to  form  for  attack,  and  indi- 
cates the  direction  and  object  of  the  assault.  The  major 
at  once  designates  the  second  and  third  companies  to  form 
the  firing  line,  and  the  first  and  fourth  companies  for  the 
support  and  reserve  respectively,  names  the  officer  to 
command  the  battalion  scouts,  and  orders  the  formation 
for  attack  to  be  taken.  The  companies  designated  for 
the  firing  line  each  send  forward  a  few  scouts  under  a  non- 
commissioned officer,  who  reports  to  the  officer  named 
by  the  battalion  commander  to  direct  the  scouting.  When 

*The  method  of  attack  by  company  and  battalion,  either  alone 
or  as  a  part  of  a  larger  body,  is  given  in  detail  in  the  Infantry 
Drill  Regulations,  with  which  all  officers  are  presumed  to  be  famil- 
iar; and  a  description  here  of  the  company  or  battalion  in  attack 
would  be  merely  a  matter  of  supererogation.  To  make  a  special 
armliration  of  the  foregoing  principles,  it  is  thought  best,  therefore, 
to  take  the  case  of  a  larger  body  than  those  considered  in  detail 
in  the  drill-book. 


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the  line  of  scouts  has  advanced  sufficiently,  the  two  com- 
panies of  the  firing  line  deploy  into  line  of  squads,  and 
follow  the  scouts  at  a  distance  of  about  300  yards. 

The  further  deployment  of  the  firing  line  from  a  line 
of  groups  to  skirmishers  will  probably  be  compelled  by 
the  enemy's  fire  at  some  point  between  1,900  and  1,200 
yards  from  the  hostile  position.  The  company  in  support 
follows  the  firing  line  when  the  latter  has  gained  a  dis- 
tance of  about  300  yards,  and  the  reserve  follows  the  sup- 
port at  the  same  distance.  The  support  and  reserve  are 
so  disposed  as  to  protect  the  flanks  of  the  firing  line. 
Both  the  support  and  the  reserve  deploy  on  the  same 
ground  as  the  firing  line.  The  second  line  in  suitable  form- 
ation follows  the  reserve  of  the  first  line  at  a  distance  of 
about  600  yards,  and  the  third  in  similar  formation  fol- 
lows the  second  line  at  a  distance  of  about  1,000  yards. 
(See  Fig.  1.) 

At  about  1,200  to  1,000  yards  from  the  hostile  posi- 
tion the  firing  line  halts  and  opens  fire  on  the  enemy,  fir- 
ing by  platoons  or  companies  with  counted  cartridges. 
(See  Fig.  2.)  When  the  firing  line  has  approached  within 
about  900  yards  of  the  enemy,  the  support  deploys  into 


92  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

line  of  skirmishers.  (See  Fig.  3.)  The  scouts  are  usu- 
ally absorbed  by  the  firing  line  about  this  time.  The  fir- 
ing line  continues  its  advance,  the  skirmishers  gradually 
closing  in  toward  the  center.  The  reserve  deploys  as  skir- 
mishers when  about  1,200  yards  from  the  hostile  position. 
When  about  600  yards  from  the  enemy,  the  support  is 
placed  on  a  flank,  or  in  an  interval  of  the  firing  line.  (See 
Fig.  4.)  The  reserve  then  follows  as  a  support,  and  is 
placed  in  the  line  by  deployed  squads  between  600  and 
200  yards,  or  reinforces  as  a  unit  at  about  200  yards,  tak- 
ing part  in  the  rapid  fire. 

To  advance  by  alternate  portions  of  the  line,  the  ma- 
jor designates  the  companies  to  move  forward  and  those 
to  open  fire.  Each  captain  gives  the  commands  necessary 
for  his  own  company  to  advance,  halt,  and  open  fire  inde- 
pendently of  the  other  companies  The  advance  by  alter- 
nate portions  of  the  line,  once  taken  up,  is  continued  until 
the  major  directs  the  company  in  rear  to  halt  on  the  line 
with  the  leading  companies. 

When  the  first  line  is  about  200  yards  from  the  en- 
emy's position,  it  kneels  or  lies  down  and  opens  rapid 
fire.  The  best  fire  is  generally  obtained  from  the  line 
lying  down;  but  it  is  easier  to  get  the  line  forward  from 
a  kneeling  position.  As  soon  as  the  rapid  fire  has  begun, 
the  second  line,  which,  upon  arriving  within  1,200  yards 
of  the  enemy's  position,  has  deployed  into  line  of  skir- 
mishers, fixes  bayonets  and  moves  forward  at  double  time. 
At  a  signal  from  the  colonel,  given  as  the  two  lines  unite 
(see  Fig.  5),  the  trumpets  sound  the  charge,  and  the  men 
rush  forward  with  a  hurrah,  upon  the  enemy's  position. 
The  third  line  hastens  forward,  occupies  the  captured  po- 
sition, pursues  or  fires  upon  the  retreating  enemy,  or 
defends  the  position  from  a  counter-charge  by  the  enemy's 
reserves.  The  battalions  of  the  first  and  second  lines  are 
now  quickly  assembled. 

It  must  not  be  understood  that  the  advance  of  the 
attacking  infantry  against  the  hostile  position  is  made 
with  the  rapidity  that  might  be  presumed  from  reading 
the  above  description.  On  the  other  hand,  the  different 
phases  of  the  attack  may  last  hours  or  even  days.  The 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  ^3 

firing  line  will  make  its  advance  as  nearly  continuous  as 
the  conditions  will  permit,  but  at  every  halt  it  will  be 
necessary  for  some  portions  of  the  line  to  intrench  and 
pour  in  a  fire  upon  the  enemy  while  some  other  portion 
of  the  line  will  advance  by  creeping,  by  rushes,  or  by  in- 
dividual skirmishers  to  a  point  further  to  the  front,  there 
to  intrench  and  open  fire  while  the  rest  of  the  line  works 
forward  to  this  position  or  to  one  still  more  advanced.  At 
every  stage  of  the  action  until  the  position  is  reached 
from  which  it  is  intended  to  make  the  final  assault,  some 
portion  of  the  skirmish  line  should  »be  advancing  toward 
the  enemy.  This  position  reached,  it  will  undoubtedly  be 
necessary  for  the  first  line,  now  fully  deployed  and  en- 
gaged in  delivering  its  most  telling  fire  to  intrench  un- 
less adequate  natural  cover  should  exist.  The  advance  of 
the  second  line  will  continue  as  rapidly  as  possible,  but 
cannot  be  made  continuous.  The  fire  of  the  first  line  up- 
on the  enemy's  trenches,  however,  will  make  the  losses  of 
the  second  line  much  less  than  those  of  the  first  line  dur- 
ing its  advance  to  this  position.  But  the  last  rush  of  the 
second  line  to  the  point  where  it  joins  the  first  should  be 
made  with  sufficient  impetus  to  carry  the  latter  forward 
to  the  enemy's  position,  in  the  final  assault. 

The  formation  and  methods  described  above  must  be 
regarded  merely  as  an  illustration  of  general  principles. 
It  is  not  only  impossible  to  prescribe  a  method  which 
would  suit  every  case,  but  it  would  probably  be  difficult 
to  find  any  given  method  that  would  answer,  without  mod- 
ification, more  than  one  case  in  fifty.  The  nature  of  the 
terrain,  the  strength,  morale,  and  arms  of  the  enemy,  and 
many  other  considerations  will  regulate  the  distances  be- 
tween the  different  echelons,  the  formation  of  each  part 
of  the  attacking  force,  and  the  number  of  lines  employed. 
The  regiment  should  be  formed  in  two  lines  when  the  ex- 
tent of  front  is  too  great  to  be  covered  by  the  three-line 
formation,  and  the  first  line  seems  sufficient  to  carry  the 
enemy's  position.  In  such  a  case  the  functions  belonging 
usually  to  the  third  line  would  devolve  upon  the  second. 
Such  a  formation  would  be  especially  applicable  to  an  at- 
tack upon  a  position  which  could  be  overlapped,  thus  ren- 


94  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

dering  possible  a  combination  of  front  and  flank  attack; 
for  in  such  a  case  the  front  attack  would  not  meet  with 
such  stubborn  resistance  as  when  dependent  only  upon 
its  own  direct  efforts. 

The  extension  of  the  various  portions  of  the  attack- 
ing force  in  the  case  chosen  above  for  illustration  indi 
cates  that  the  regiment  is  under  a  heavy  fire  of  both  artil- 
lery and  infantry.  It  cannot  be  too  often  repeated,  nor 
too  strongly  emphasized,  that  columns  should  be  retained 
until  the  last  practicable  moment.  Thus,  if  possible,  the 
battalion  in  the  third  line  would  be  kept  in  close  column 
until  the  very  moment  of  occupying  the  enemy's  position. 
The  same  may  be  said  of  the  battalion  in  the  second  line, 
until  it  becomes  necessary  to  deploy  for  the  final  assault. 
Similarly,  the  companies  forming  the  reserve  in  the  first 
line  should  be  kept  in  column,  or  in  line  in  close  order, 
until  extension  becomes  imperative  for  reinforcement  or 
the  avoidance  of  heavy  losses.  In  the  illustration  given, 
the  second  and  third  lines  are  both  represented  as  in 
rear  of  the  center  of  the  first.  This  would  often  be  the 
case;  but  they  might  both  be  in  rear  of  one  flank,  or  one 
in  rear  of  the  right  and  one  in  rear  of  the  left  flank.  It 
is  also  to  be  noted  that,  owing  to  the  increased  range  of 
infantry  rifles,  the  distances  between  echelons  as  given 
above  are  all  too  small  rather  than  the  reverse;  and  that 
the  advance  by  rushes  will  probably  begin  at  a  greater 
distance  than  600  yards.  It  is  probable  that  the  rapid  fire 
will  begin  at  a  greater  distance  than  200  yards;  that  the 
firing  line  will  be  quickly  increased  to  a  density  equal  to 
that  of  a  single  rank  in  close  order,  to  obtain  the  fullest 
effect  from  the  new  life;  that  the  support  will  necessarily 
be  held  so  far  back  as  to  constitute  with  the  reserve  a 
single  body;  and  that,  owing  to  the  increased  distance 
from  the  firing  line  to  the  first  body  in  its  rear,  the  rein- 
forcements must  invariably  be  made  at  double  time,  or,  if 
over  very  open  ground,  at  a  run. 

THE  BRIGADE  OF  INFANTRY  IN  ATTACK. 

The  brigade  may  be  formed  in  one,  two,  or  three  lines. 
In  the  first  case,  the  fighting  line  consists  of  two  battal- 
ions of  each  regiment,  the  third  battalion  of  each  being 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  95 

held  as  a  regimental  reserve.  This  formation  practically 
gives  a  strong  fighting  line,  a  weak  second  line,  and  no 
third.  Its  adoption  implies  an  expectation  that  the  fight- 
ing line  will  be  sufficient  to  carry  the  position,  the  regi- 
mental reserves  performing  the  functions  usually  pertain- 
ing to  a  third  line.  In  this  formation,  a  third  line  may  be 
composed  of  troops  belonging  to  another  brigade. 

When  the  brigade  is  formed  in  two  lines,  two  regi- 
ments are  in  the  first  line  and  one  in  the  second.  The 
regiments  in  the  first  line  are  each  formed  with  two  bat- 
talions in  the  fighting  line  and  one  as  a  regimental  re- 
serve. The  rear  regiment  may  be  held  in  column  of  masses, 
line  of  masses,  in  line  of  platoon  columns,  in  battle  forma- 
tion, in  line,  or  any  formation  that  may  be  best  suited 
to  the  nature  of  the  terrain  or  the  circumstances  of  the 
action.  Its  distance  from  the  first  line  is  about  600  yards. 
This  formation  really  gives  us  three  lines;  the  first  con- 
sisting of  four  battalions,  the  second  line  (regimental  re- 
serves) of  two  battalions,  and  the  third  line  (the  rear  reg- 
iment) of  three  battalions. 

The  best  formation  for  a  strong  attack  is  undoubtedly 
the  formation  of  regiments  side  by  side,  each  in  three  lines. 
This  enables  a  separate  objective  to  be  assigned  to  each 
regiment,  and  limits  the  intermingling  of  troops  to  men 
of  different  battalions  of  the  same  regiment.  This  forma- 
tion gives  three  battalions  to  each  line. 

In  an  unpremeditated  engagement  (for  instance,  one 
brought  on  unexpectedly  by  an  advance  guard)  prompt 
formation  is  generally  the  paramount  consideration.  In 
this  case  the  leading  regiments  may  be  ordered  on  the 
fighting  line,  without  regimental  reserves,  a  battalion  from 
the  rear  regiment  being  assigned  as  a  reserve  to  each. 
This  formation  places  six  battalions  in  the  first  line,  two 
in  the  second  line,  and  one  in  the  third.  In  this  case, 
the  intermingling  of  men  of  different  regiments  is  certain; 
the  immediate  reserve  of  each  regiment  is  not  under  its 
own  regimental  commander;  and  the  colonel  of  the  third 
regiment  is  practically  deprived  of  his  command.  The 
need  of  prompt  formation  for  attack  must  be  great  to  over- 
come these  grave  objections.  If  reconnaissance  has  been 


96  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

properly  performed,  there  is  no  excuse  for  this  formation. 
Its  adoption  implies  that  the  force  has  been  surprised  and 
compelled  to  assume  a  faulty  formation. 

The  question  of  infantry  tactics,  pure  and  simple,  ends 
with  the  brigade.  The  tactical  handling  of  larger  bodies 
belongs  to  the  subject  of  combined  tactics. 

GENERAL  RULES. 

The  following  general  rules  should  always  be  observed 
in  conducting  an  attack: 

1.  Do  not  have  a  heavy  firing  line  before  you  come 
within  effective  rifle  range  of  the  enemy;  then  employ  in 
that  line  as  many  men  as  can  use  their  rifles  with  the  best 
effect. 

2.  Regulate  the  fire  from  the  beginning  so  that  it  may 
steadily  increase  in  power  up  to  the  stage  just  preced- 
ing the  final  charge,  when  it  should  reach  its  maximum 
intensity. 

3.  Guard  carefully  against  an  exhaustion  of  ammu- 
nition. 

4.  Avoid  a  premature  reinforcement  of  the  firing  line, 
in  order  that  you  may  have  men  at  hand  to  sustain  it  when 
the  moral  effect  of  reinforcement  is  greatest. 

5.  Endeavor  to  prevent  your  men  from  being  influ- 
enced by  any  panic  or  demoralization  that  may  seize  upon 
troops  supported  by  them. 

6.  Keep  all  your  troops,  except  the  firing  line,  in  col- 
umn, until  considerations  of  fire  action,  or  protection  from 
the  enemy's  fire,  demand  deployment. 

7.  Always  endeavor  to  hold  in  reserve  a  small  body 
of  formed  troops  for  the  moment  when   your   attacking 
force  is  disordered  by  its  own  success  or  driven  back  in 
defeat;  but  do  not  keep  large  bodies  out  of  action  for  this 
purpose. 

SUMMARY. 

The  attack  consists  of  three  distinct  phases;  namely: 
1.  The  preparation,  which  consists  of  the  recon- 
naissance of  the  terrain  and  the  hostile  posi- 
tion, and  the  use  of  artillery  and  long-range 
infantry  fire  to  shake  the  enemy  and  prepare 
the  way  for  the  assault. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  97 

2.  The  decisive  action,  which  begins  with  the  ar- 

rival of  the  infantry  at  effective  ranges,  and 
ends  with  the  final  charge  on  the  enemy's 
position. 

3.  The  completion,  which  includes  the  occupation 

of  the  position  by  a  formed  body  of  troops 
(generally  of  the  third  line)  and  the  re-forma- 
tion of  the  victorious  troops  disordered  by  the 
assault.  In  case  the  assault  fails,  the  third 
phase  consists  of  the  withdrawal  of  the  at 
tacking  troops. 

It  must  be  observed  that  there  is  no  unanimity  of 
opinion  among  the  great  military  powers  as  to  the  details 
of  infantry  attack.  The  German  and  French  formations 
have  been  developed  from  their  experiences  in  the  great 
Franco-Geirman  War  of  1870  as  modified  by  their  observa- 
tions since  that  date,  and  have  not  yet  been  put  to  the 
practical  test  to  which  the  British  ideas  existing  prior  to 
1899  were  subjected.  The  English  ideas  are  based  large- 
ly on  their  experiences  in  the  Boer  War,  when  they  were 
compelled  to  oppose  a  peculiar  foe  on  an  unusual  terrain. 
The  real  value  to  be  assigned  to  the  experiences  of  this 
war  is  largely  problematical. 

The  wonderful  success  of  the  Japanese  methods  of 
attack  may  to  a  considerable  extent  be  due  to  the  ad- 
vantage possessed  by  them  of  being  able  to  apply  the  les- 
sons learned  by  them  in  the  war  against  China  on  the 
same  terrain  where  these  experiences  were  gained. 

FLANK  ATTACKS. 

With  the  increased  range  and  power  of  firearms  front 
attacks  have  become  more  and  more  difficult  and  costly. 
So  true  is  this  that,  unless  the  assailant  has  a  great  su- 
periority in  numbers  or  morale,  a  front  attack  is  almost 
sure  to  fail.  In  a  direct  front  attack  of  the  Prussian  5th 
Corps  at  Worth,  although  the  defenders  were  in  greatly 
inferior  numbers,  the  10th  Division  lost  a  third  of  its 
men,  killed  and  wounded,  and  the  attack  was  finally  suc- 
cessful only  when  the  llth  Corps  assailed  the  position  on 


98  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

the  flank.  Spicheren  and  St.  Privat  also  furnish  striking 
instances  of  bloody  front  attacks  and  successful  assaults 
upon  the  flank  by  the  victorious  Germans. 

With  a  flank  attack  the  case  is  different.  If  the  at- 
tack be  a  surprise,  the  moral  effect  of  the  flank  tire  is  very 
great,  and  a  small  force  may  drive  a  much  larger  one  from 
a  position  impregnable  to  assaults  from  the  front.  At  St. 
Privat  the  sudden  flank  fire  of  a  single  German  company 
caused  nine  French  battalions  to  fall  back  from  a  position 
which  they  had  held  securely  against  a  heavy  fire  from 
the  front. 

A  combination  of  front  and  flank  attacks  is  necessary; 
for  if  a  front  attack  alone  be  made,  it  is  likely  to  fail, 
while  if  a  flank  attack  alone  be  depended  upon,  the  en- 
emy can  meet  it  by  a  change  of  front.  A  front  attack  is, 
therefore,  necessary  to  hold  the  enemy,  and  it  must  be 
energetically  pushed,  in  order  that  he  may  not  oppose  it 
with  a  small  portion  of  his  force  and  throw  his  weight 
against  the  flank  attack.  This  combination  of  front  and 
flank  attacks  was  a  marked  feature  of  all  the  battles  of 
the  Franco-German  War;  and,  indeed,  there  is  no  tactical 
combination  that  promises  greater  success;  for  it  en- 
closes the  enemy  between  two  convergent  fires,  and  causes 
a  divergence  of  his  efforts,  while  the  attacking  force  works 
concentrically  and  in  harmony. 

The  Germans  generally  made  their  flank  attacks  with 
only  a  small  portion  of  their  force;  but  the  size  of  the 
turning  force  must  be  much  larger  in  future,  for  the  gen- 
eral use  of  intrenchments  on  the  defensive,  and  the  in- 
crease in  the  range  and  power  of  firearms,  render  it  much 
easier  to  check  a  front  attack,  and  consequently  leave 
more  troops  available  to  guard  the  flanks.  In  all  its  tacti- 
cal details,  a  flank  attack  is  the  same  as  one  directed 
against  the  hostile  front;  for  the  enemy  will,  under  almost 
all  circumstances,  make  more  or  less  of  a  change  of  front, 
and  the  assault  upon  the  flank  will  thus  become  locally  a 
front  attack. 

A  fla'nk  attack  may  be  made  either  by  extending  the 
front  so  as  to  overlap  the  enemy's  line  on  one  flank,  and 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  99 

then  wheeling  it  upon  the  flank  to  be  attacked,  or  by  mak- 
ing a  turning  movement. 

A  turning  movement  is  made  by  detaching  a  force  to 
make  a  detour  and  fall  upon  the  enemy's  flank.  In  order 
that  it  may  be  successful,  it  must  be  made  out  of  the  sight 
and  beyond  the  range  of  the  enemy.  Otherwise  he  can 
make  dispositions  for  meeting  it,  and  may  even  be  able  to 
turn  the  tables  by  taking  the  turning  force  itself  in  flank. 
An  attempt  to  turn  a  flank  by  making  a  flank  march  in 
sight  and  under  fire  of  the  enemy  is  sure  to  fail.  Flank 
attacks  attempted  with  the  line  of  infantry  already  de- 
ployed are  rarely  successful,  and  cause  a  dangerous  ex- 
tension of  the  troops. 

It  is  not  often  possible  before  the  battle  begins  to 
concentrate  the  troops  before  the  flank  which  is  to  be  at- 
tacked. This  must  generally  be  done  after  the  enemy's 
attention  is  taken  up  with  the  front  attack.  The  more 
earnestly  the  latter  is  pressed,  the  more  likelihood  there 
is  of  absorbing  the  enemy's  attention  with  it.  If  it  cannot 
be  pushed  home  successfully,  the  assailants  must  intrench 
within  effective  range,  and  thus  hold  the  enemy  until  the 
turning  force  strikes  him,  the  flank  attack  being  thus  the 
real  one,  and  the  other  a  feint.  It  may  even  happen  that 
the  enemy's  attention  will  be  so  taken  up  with  the  attack 
upon  his  flank  that  the  front  attack  can,  after  all,  give 
the  decisive  blow.  This  was  actually  the  case  at  the  bat- 
tle of  Spicheren. 

The  distance  to  be  passed  over  by  the  turning  foroe 
increases,  of  course,  with  the  range  of  modern  weap- 
ons; and  the  difficulty  of  making  a  successful  turning 
movement  is,  consequently,  much  greater  than  it  was  for- 
merly. The  turning  force  now  necessarily  gets  beyond  the 
control  of  the  commander  of  the  main  body,  and  the  dif- 
ficulty of  making  the  front  and  flank  attacks  simultane- 
ously is  thus  greatly  heightened.  If  the  front  attack  be 
made  too  soon,  it  is  likely  to  be  repulsed.  If  it  be  made 
too  late,  the  turning  force  will  probably  be  shattered  in 
its  unaided  conflict  with  the  enemy.  The  commander 
should  endeavor  to  maintain  prompt  communication  with 
the  turning  force  by  means  of  the  field  telegraph  or  tele* 


100  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

phone,  or,  if  he  be  unprovided  with  field  signal  communi- 
cations, by  stationing  himself  on  the  flank  nearest  that 
force,  and  having  mounted  staff  officers  so  stationed 
that  they  may  notify  him  when  the  turning  column  has 
reached  a  certain  point.  He  must  then  judge  the  time  of 
attack  so  that  the  enemy  will  be  strongly  engaged  in  front 
at  the  moment  when  the  turning  force  strikes  the  hostile 
flank.  Attempts  to  concert  attacks  by  means  of  some  pre- 
arranged sound  signal  generally  fail  miserably. 

It  must  not  be  supposed  that  the  flanks  of  the  ene- 
my's general  line  are  the  sole  objects  of  flank  attacks. 
Such  attacks  should  also  be  made  upon  advanced  posts, 
woods,  or  any  part  of  a  position  which  extends  to  the 
front  of  the  general  line  and  is  not  strongly  defended  in 
flank. 

THE  DEFENSIVE. 

The  object  of  the  force  on  the  defensive  is  to  shatter 
the  assailant  with  its  fire,  and  inflict  upon  him  such  losses 
that  he  will  either  be  unable  to  reach  the  position  at  all, 
or  will  attain  it  in  such  a  crippled  condition  that  he  may 
be  easily  overthrown  by  a  counter-attack.  An  effective 
fire  upon  the  assailant  and  shelter  from  the  fire  of  the 
enemy  are,  therefore,  essential  in  a  good  defense.  These 
conditions  are  best  fulfilled  by  utilizing  natural,  and  con- 
structing artificial,  cover,  and  having  a  firing  line  of  such 
density  as  to  admit  of  the  most  effective  use  of  the  rifle 
by  each  man. 

Formerly  the  fire  was  delivered  by  two  or  more  ranks 
in  close  order;  but  the  firing  was  then  effective  only  at 
short  ranges,  and  volume  rather  than  great  accuracy  of 
fire  being  required,  the  men  could  all  use  their  muskets 
with  effect.  But  with  the  arms  of  precision  now  in  use, 
accurate  shooting  is  the  first  consideration  at  the  longer 
ranges,  and  it  is  only  at  close  quarters  that  mass  firing 
can  be  effectively  employed.*  Experience  having  demon- 
strated that  the  most  effective  fire  is  obtained  from  a 
single  rank  consisting  of  about  one  man  to  a  yard,  that 

*Except,  of  course,  when  volleys  can  be  fired  at  long  range  at 
masses  of  troops,  a  camp,  or  some  other  large  target 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.     'J'J  ioi 

should  ordinarily  be  the  density  of  the  firing  line.  From 
the  time  the  enemy  arrives  within  effective  range,  the  fir- 
ing must  be  maintained  at  its  maximum  effect,  and  troops 
must,  therefore,  be  at  hand  to  replace  the  losses  in  the 
firing  line  and  prevent  its  fire  from  slackening.  A  sup- 
port similar  to  that  used  in  the  attack  is  consequently 
necessary;  but  as  it  is  stationary  and  under  cover,  its  dis- 
tance from  the  firing  line  is  usually  much  less  than  in  the 
case  of  the  assailant. 

The  general  characteristics  of  the  defense  are  the 
same  as  those  of  the  attack.  As  the  assailant  draws  near 
and  the  losses  of  the  defenders  increase,  the  support  is 
gradually  fed  into  the  firing  line,  and  is  usually  absorbed 
about  the  same  time  as  the  support  of  the  attacking  force. 
Similarly,  as  soon  as  the  distance  between  the  contend- 
ing forces  admits  of  short-range  fire,  the  reserve  (either 
wholly  or  in  part)  is  pushed  forward  into  the  firing  line 
to  meet  the  increased  fire  of  the  assailants  with  a  corre- 
sponding intensification  of  fire.  If  the  fire  of  the  defend- 
ers is  the  more  effective,  the  assailants  will  be  driven  back. 
If  the  reverse  is  the  case,  the  first  line  of  the  defenders 
will  be  so  shattered  and  demoralized  as  to  be  unable,  with- 
out prompt  assistance,  to  oppose  the  shock  of  the  enemy. 
A  second  line,  consisting  of  troops  well  in  hand,  is,  there- 
fore, necessary  for  the  physical  and  moral  reinforcement 
of  the  first  line  at  this  juncture,  and  to  meet  the  assail- 
ants in  counter-shock  with  the  bayonet. 

A  purely  defensive  action  rarely  results  in  success; 
nor  should  it  ever  be  assumed,  except  by  a  commander 
whose  troops  are  so  raw  or  so  demoralized  that  they  can- 
not be  trusted  to  fight  well  in  the  open.  A  counter-stroke 
is  an  essential  part  of  a  good  defensive  plan;  without  it 
an  enemy  may  be  balked,  but  not  defeated.  In  order  that 
the  counter-stroke  may  be  promptly  delivered  at  the  right 
time  and  place,  a  body  of  troops  must  be  held  in  hand  at 
the  most  favorable  point,  for  offensive  purposes.  In  the 
event  of  defeat,  it  covers  the  retreat  of  the  rest  of  the 
force.  The  body  thus  held  in  hand  constitutes  the  third 
line.  The  component  parts  of  the  defense  formation  are, 


102  ORGANIZATION   AND   TACTICS. 

therefore,  the  same  throughout  as  those  of  the  attack 
Each  part  will  now  be  considered  more  in  detail. 

THE  FIRING  LINE. 

Preliminary  Dispositions. — The  effect  of  the  attack  de- 
pends so  greatly  upon  the  correctness  of  the  assailant's 
dispositions,  and  these  in  turn  depend  so  largely  upon  his 
knowledge  of  the  position  of  the  defender,  that  the  latter 
should  endeavor  to  conceal  the  disposition  of  his  forces 
until  compelled  by  the  exigencies  of  battle  to  disclos0 
them.  For  this  reason,  the  firing  line  should  not  at  once 
be  placed  in  full  force  upon  the  selected  position,  which 
should  rather  be  held  by  a  thin  line  of  scouts,  the  firing 
line  proper  being  held  back,  under  shelter  of  some  feat- 
ures of  the  terrain,  urtil  it  can  be  effectively  used.  It 
must  be  remembered,  however,  that  a  weak  defense  in  the 
beginning  is  a  great  mistake,  and  the  position  must  be 
fully  occupied  as  soon  as  the  troops  can  be  effectively  used. 
How  soon  this  will  be  will  depend  upon  the  terrain,  the 
nature  of  the  attacks,  and  the  target  offered  by  the  enemy's 
troops.  Usually,  the  firing  line  is  moved  into  position  by 
the  time  the  enemy  has  arrived  within  2,000  or  2,500  yards. 
For  the  protection  of  the  artillery,  infantry  may  some- 
times have  to  be  pushed  forward  at  the  outset;  but  it  is 
generally  possible  to  keep  the  first  line  practically  out  of 
fire  until  the  enemy's  infantry  develops  the  attack. 

The  line  will  not,  ordinarily,  be  of  uniform  strength. 
At  the  probable  points  of  attack  there  should  be  as  many 
men  as  can  use  their  rifles  with  effect,  while  at  points 
where  obstacles  break  up  and  hinder  the  attack  the  force 
may  be  much  smaller.  As  casualties  occur,  the  men  of 
each  company  close  in  on  the  center,  the  reinforcements 
from  the  support  being  placed  on  either  flank.  Owing  to 
the  firing  line  being  stationary,  this  is  inore  practicable 
than  in  the  case  of  the  attack. 

Long-Pange  Fire. — When  the  enemy  has  arrived  within 
2,500  to  2,000  yards  of  the  position,  long-range  volleys  by 
company  or  platoon  may  be  opened  upon  him  if  a  favorable 
target  be  presented.  Long-range  fire  is  generally  more 
effectively  used  by  the  defenders  than  by  the  assailants* 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  103- 

as  the  ranges  are  more  accurately  known,  the  distance 
to  certain  fixed  objects  in  front  of  the  position  being 
easily  ascertained  beforehand.  Moreover,  the  greater  fa- 
cility of  supplying  ammunition  to  the  stationary  troops 
renders  it  practicable  to  expend  an  amount  of  cartridges 
in  long-range  fire  that  would  be  difficult  or  impossible  in 
the  attack.  If  ammunition  be  plentiful,  heavy  losses  may 
be  inflicted  upon  the  assailant  at  very  great  ranges.  The 
terrible  losses  sustained  by  the  Prussian  Guard  at  St. 
Privat  were  mostly  inflicted  at  a  range  of  2,000  to  800 
yards;  and  it  is  stated,  on  the  authority  of  General  Tod- 
leben,  that  at  Plevna  the  number  of  Turkish  bullets  that 
fell  among  the  Russians  at  a  distance  of  2,000  yards  was 
such  that  divisions  which  at  the  outset  numbered  10,000 
or  12,000  men  were  speedily  reduced  to  4,000  or  5,000.  It 
is  well  known  that  the  Russian  attacks  were  frequently 
stopped  by  the  Turkish  long-range  fire,  the  chief  charac- 
teristics of  which  were  the  employment  of  two  firing  lines 
(one  above  and  firing  over  the  other)  and  in  enormous  con- 
sumption of  ammunition,  the  Turks  expending  in  some  bat- 
tles from  200  to  500  rounds  per  man.  It  may  be  said  that. 
in  the  instances  mentioned,  the  attacks  were  unskillfully 
made  by  the  Germans  and  the  Russians;  but,  on  the  other 
hand,  it  may  be  asserted  with  equal  truth  that  long-range- 
fire  was  unskillfully  employed  by  the  French  and  the 
Turks.  In  future  wars,  better  tactical  dispositions  wiil 
doubtless  be  met  with  more  effective  long-range  fire.  If 
the  target  presented  by  the  enemy  be  good,  if  the  supply 
of  ammunition  be  abundant,  and  the  troops  be  kept  well 
in  hand,  it  may  be  safely  said  that  the  defender  should 
not  fail  to  employ  long-range  fire  to  the  fullest  extent. 

Tht  Objective  of  the  Fire. — The  firing  line  will  probably 
devote  its  entire  attention  to  the  nearest  groups  and  eche- 
lons of  the  enemy  without  any  special  caution  to  that  ef- 
fect; but  it  is  well  that,  on  the  defensive,  it  should  be  di- 
rected habitually  to  do  so,  as  the  enemy's  troops  should 
l?e  impressed  with  the  idea  that  their  own  firing  line  is 
the  most  dangerous  place  in  which  they  can  put  them- 
selves. When  the  enemy's  advanced  troops  are  well 
mauled  by  our  own  firing  1'ne,  his  troops  farther  in  the 


104  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

rear  may  be  safely  left  to  the  fire  of  the  artillery  and  spe- 
cial bodies  of  infantry.  In  the  instructions  issued  by  Gen- 
eral Skobeleff  to  his  troops  in  the  campaign  against  the 
Tekke  Turkomans,  he  said:  "It  is  not  really  the  mass  of 
individuals  present  on  the  ground  that  decides  the  vic- 
tory, but  the  progress  which,  thanks  to  different  circum- 
stances, a  few  brave  men  may  make  advancing  in  isolated 
groups.  Consequently,  every  attention  must  be  paid  to 
the  appearance  of  groups  of  this  nature,  and  the  full 
power  of  your  fire  must  be  directed  upon  them  by  means 
of  volleys;  for  if  you  neglect  to  inflict  great  losses  on 
them,  these  groups  will  increase  in  size  in  a  wonderful 
way  and  decide  the  affair  in  their  favor.  I  counsel  the 
leaders  of  all  fractions  to  keep  a  watchful  eye  on  these 
advanced  groups;  there  is  no  doubt  that  in  annihilating 
them,  we  destroy,  in  the  germ,  all  the  initiative  force  of 
the  rest  of  the  mass."  Skobeleff  doubtless  had  also  in 
view  his  experience  at  Plevna.  In  his  attack  on  the  Turk- 
ish redoubts  on  the  Lovtcha  Road,  he  found,  when  he 
reached  the  enemy's  position  that  there  were  no  troops 
behind  his  line  of  skirmishers,  his  reserves  having  melted 
away  under  .the  storm  of  bullets  rained  down  by  the  Turk- 
ish unaimed  fire;  but,  the  position  once  reached,  those  who 
remained  in  the  skirmish  line  were  sufficient  to  drive  out 
the  Turks. 

If  possible,  the  fire  of  several  groups  should  be  con- 
centrated on  some  group  of  the  enemy  which  seems  to  be 
making  special  progress.  From  the  very  beginning  of  the 
action,  all  hostile  scouts  should  be  fired  upon  as  soon  as 
they  show  themselves,  sharpshooters  being  detailed  for 
that  purpose. 

The  use  of  smokeless  powder  has  rendered  the  sup- 
ports and  reserves  more  plainly  visible  than  was  formerly 
the  case,  and  they  can  now  be  the  objective  of  the  fire 
of  the  artillery,  and  often  also  of  bodies  of  infantry  posted 
as  a  second  firing  line  and  firing  over  the  heads  of  the  first. 
Such  second  firing  line  may  often  be  formed  of  the  re- 
serve of  the  first.  It  is,  of  course,  necessary  that  the  slope 
of  the  ground  should  be  such  as  to  enable  the  second  line 
to  be  posted  above  the  first ;  and  it  should  use  volleys  only. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  105 

When  the  enemy  is  advancing  by  alternate  rushes,  the 
portion  of  his  force  exposed  in  the  forward  rush  should 
be  the  objective  of  the  fire.  If  the  men  are  under  suffi- 
cient control,  volleys  should  be  used  in  this  case,  so  that 
each  rifle  may  be  turned  upon  the  enemy  as  he  rises. 

THE  SUPPORT. 

The  general  nature  and  objects  of  the  support  are  the 
same  on  the  defensive  as  in  the  attack;  but  until  it  is 
absorbed  in  the  firing  line  it  is  held  intrenched  and  un- 
der such  shelter  as  the  ground  may  afford.  The  position 
of  the  support  is  so  dependent  upon  the  terrain  that  its 
distance  from  the  firing  line  cannot  be  definitely  pre- 
scribed; but,  as  a  rule,  it  should  be  as  near  as  possible 
without  undue  exposure,  and  its  distance  would  not  usu- 
ally exceed  75  or  100  yards.  The  reinforcement  of  the  fir- 
ing line  is  made  as  the  circumstances  of  the  action  de- 
mand. When  the  enemy  arrives  within  1,200  yards — the 
point  at  which  he  may  be  expected  to  open  fire — all  impor- 
tant points  of  the  position  should  be  fully  manned,  and  this 
will  probably  call  for  the  first  reinforcements  from  the 
support.  When  the  assailant  arrives  within  about  600 
yards  of  the  position,  the  support  will  generally  be  entire- 
ly absorbed.  The  strength  of  the  support  relatively  to 
the  firing  line  will  often  be  the  same  as  in  the  attack; 
though,  not  being  exposed  to  so  much  danger  as  the  as- 
sailant, who  advances  uncovered  over  ground  generally 
swept  with  a  heavy  fire,  the  defender  can  from  the  first 
give  more  density  to  the  firing  line  than  would  be  pru- 
dent in  the  attack,  keeping  only  a  small  echelon  in  rear 
as  a  support.  The  support,  either  wholly  or  in  part,  may, 
indeed,  often  be  placed  in  the  firing  line  at  the  beginning 
of  the  fight,  in  order  to  secure  superiority  of  fire  and  a 
front  at  least  equal  to  that  of  the  attack. 

THE  RESERVE. 

The  reserve  should  always  be  intrenched,  and  is  usu- 
ally located  at  a  distance  of  about  300  yards  from  the  sup- 
port, centrally  located,  and  under  sheltering  features  of 
the  terrain.  The  requirement  of  central  location  should 


106  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

be  sacrificed,  if  necessary,  to  the  more  important  consid- 
eration of  shelter;  for  if  the  reserve  be  exposed  to  a  se- 
vere fire,  it  will  probably  push  forward  and  cause  a  pre- 
mature reinforcement  of  the  firing  line.  The  distance  from 
the  support,  like  that  of  the  support  from  the  firing  line, 
varies  according  to  the  terrain,  but  will,  in  general  terms, 
be  as  short  as  may  be  consistent  with  the  two  require- 
ments of  shelter  and  prompt  reinforcement  of  every  part 
of  the  line.  The  relative  strength  of  the  reserve  is  usu- 
ally the  same  as  in  the  attack;  but,  like  the  support,  its 
strength  varies,  and  if  the  firing  line  be  very  strongly 
posted  and  well  sheltered,  the  reserve  may  be  weak. 
When  the  enemy  reinforces  with  his  reserve,  the  increased 
strength  of  his  firing  line  must  be  met  by  the  defender 
with  a  corresponding  reinforcement  from  the  reserve. 
Part  of  the  reserve  may  be  held  in  hand  to  assist  in  the 
counter-attack,  but,  except  in  the  case  of  purely  local 
counter-strokes,  this  duty  generally  falls  on  troops  of 
the  second  or  third  lines. 

THE  SECOND  LINE. 

The  functions  of  the  second  line  are,  to  support  the 
more  exposed  portions  of  the  first  line,  which  it  reinforces 
to  meet  the  enemy's  shock;  to  aid  in  local  counter-attacks, 
and  to  provide  for  the  protection  of  the  flanks.  It  is  gen- 
erally centrally  located,  or  posted  behind  the  points  most 
likely  to  be  penetrated  by  the  enemy.  It  should  always  be 
sheltered  from  the  enemy's  fire,  and  its  distance  from  the 
first  line  will  accordingly  depend  upon  the  terrain.  This 
distance  should  not  ordinarily  exceed  600  yards,  and  will 
generally  be  considerably  less.  When  the  enemy  makes 
his  charge  on  the  position,  the  second  line  fixes  bayonets 
and  charges  to  meet  him.  As  the  assailant  makes  his 
charge  from  a  distance  of  about  200  yards,  the  second  line 
should  not  be  at  a  greater  distance  from  the  firing  line 
at  the  crisis  of  the  fight,  in  order  that  the  latter  may  re- 
ceive immediate  assistance  when  it  is  struck  by  the  en- 
emy. The  second  line  should,  therefore,  be  moved  forward 
as  the  attack  reaches  its  final  stage  and  it  becomes  evi- 
dent where  the  enemy's  shock  will  fall. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  107 

THE  THIRD  LINE. 

Counter- Attacks. — As  in  the  case  of  the  attacking  force, 
the  third  line  is  essentially  the  maneuvering  line,  and  its 
chief  function  is  to  clinch  the  advantage  gained  by  the  fire 
of  the  defenders  by  a  vigorous  assumption  of  the  offensive, 
or  to  assist  the  firing  line  in  the  final  stages  of  the  fight, 
by  combining  a  flank  attack  with  the  heavy  fire  which  the 
enemy  receives  in  front.  Local  counter-attacks  may  be 
made  by  the  reserves  of  the  first  line,  to  recover  lost 
ground  or  gain  some  local  advantage;  but  decisive  counter- 
attacks can  be  made  only  by  large  bodies  of  troops.  They 
may  be  made  either  just  before  or  just  after  the  enemy 
charges  upon  the  position.  In  the  former  case,  they  are 
made  upon  the  enemy's  flank  by  the  third  line  maneuvered 
to  a  suitable  position  for  that  purpose.  In  the  latter  case, 
if  the  enemy  be  repulsed,  the  counter-attack  is  made  in 
the  same  manner.  If,  however,  he  penetrate  the  position, 
they  are  made  by  the  second  line,  assisted  by  the  third, 
if  the  latter  be  in  a  position  to  do  so.  If  the  enemy  be 
well  punished  by  the  fire  in  front,  a  counter-attack  upon 
his  flank  just  before  he  undertakes  the  charge  is,  by  all 
means,  the  best;  for  a  flank  attack  is  generally  more  de- 
cisive than  a  frontal  one,  its  direction  is  such  that  it  does 
not  mask  the  fire  from  the  position,  and  the  time  of  its 
delivery  is  such  that  the  enemy  is  not  inspirited  by  suc- 
cess, as  he  is  when  he  has  penetrated  the  position.  A 
counter-attack  is  rarely  made  by  the  first  line,  whose  chief 
duty  is  to  pelt  the  enemy  relentlessly  with  its  fire  in  re- 
treat as  well  as  when  he  is  advancing.  There  are,  how- 
ever, noted  instances  of  counter-charges  by  the  first  line. 
At  Waterloo  the  Foot  Guards,  under  Wellington's  own 
orders,  after  pouring  a  heavy  fire  into  the  French,  made  a 
successful  local  counter-charge,  and  the  counfer-charge  of 
the  53d,  71st,  and  95th  British  regiments  against  the  left 
column  of  the  Imperial  Guard  was  the  most  decisive  tacti- 
cal movement  of  the  day.  At  Gettysburg,  as  Pickett's  col- 
umn penetrated  the  Union  position,  it  was  struck  in  flank 
by  the  brigades  of  Stannard,  Harrow,  and  Hall,  the  troops 
composing  which  (both  in  first  and  second  line)  wheeled 


108  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

toward  the  assailing  column,  which  was  opposed  in  front 
by  Webb's  brigade. 

The  Main  Reserve. — The  third  line  constitutes  the  main 
reserve,  and  should  be  used  to  make  or  repel  flank  attacks, 
instead  of  being  merely  held  in  hand  to  cover  a  retreat. 
It  should,  consequently,  be  stationed  near  the  point  where 
the  counter-attack  is  to  be  made,  and  this  would  gener- 
ally place  it  near  a  flank.  The  larger  the  body  of  troops 
on  the  defensive,  the  nearer  the  flank  should  the  main  re- 
serve be,  in  order  that  it  might  promptly  reach  the  posi- 
tion from  which  the  assault  is  to  be  made. 

This  line  forms  no  exception  to  the  general  rule  that 
troops  in  reserve  should  be  intrenched. 

Guarding  the  Flanks. — The  costly  nature  of  a  frontal 
attack  has  already  been  commented  upon,  and  it  may  be 
said  generally  that  the  assailant  will  shun  the  front,  if 
there  be  a  reasonable  opportunity  of  making  a  flank  at- 
tack. "The  flanks  are  the  Achilles'  heel  of  the  defender," 
and  they  must  be  carefully  protected.  This  duty  falls  up- 
on the  third  line,  or  main  reserve,  as  the  troops  on  the 
attacked  flank  can  rarely  execute  a  change  of  front  to  meet 
the  assailant,  unless  the  flank  attack  is  made  so  open- 
ly and  unskillfully  that  it  can  be  deliberately  prepared 
for  by  the  defender.  The  instances  of  flank  attacks,  both 
successful  and  unsuccessful,  afforded  by  military  history 
are  legion,  but  the  same  lesson  is  taught  by  all;  namely, 
the  line  taken  in  flank  can  rarely  be  saved  by  its  own 
efforts,  and  if  there  be  no  reserve  at  hand,  disaster  is 
almost  certain.  When  Stonewall  Jackson  struck  the 
right  flank  of  the  Eleventh  Corps  at  Chancellors  ville,  only 
Bushbeck's  Brigade,  which  stood  at  the  extreme  left  of 
the  corps,  was  able  to  offer  any  resistance  worth  consid- 
ering, and  it  was  not  until  fresh  troops  were  brought  up 
from  the  Third  Corps  that  the  Confederate  advance  was 
definitely  checked. 

Strength  of  the  Three  Lines. — No  rule  can  be  given  for 

even  the  approximate  strength  of  the  three  lines.     The 

second  line  will  usually  be  considerably  weaker  than  the 

first,    and    will    generally    be    so    distributed    as    to    support 

the  most  exposed   parts   of   the   position.      The    strength   of 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  109 

the  third  line  will  depend  entirely  upon  the  plan  of  the 
commander  of  the  defensive  force.  If  his  plan  contem- 
plate only  the  assistance  of  the  firing  line  with  partial 
counter-strokes,  the  third  line  will  be  small.  If,  however, 
it  be  his  intention  to  assume  the  offensive  vigorously  as 
soon  as  the  assailant  has  suffered  severely  from  fire,  the 
third  line  must  be  large.  It  is  as  impossible  to  prescribe 
the  formation  of  the  third  line  as  it  is  to  specify  its  rel- 
ative size.  It  is  kept  will  in  hand,  and  concealed  from 
observation  and  fire  by  features  of  the  terrain.  In  the 
case  of  a  regiment,  the  first  line  might,  perhaps,  consist 
of  six  companies;  the  second,  of  four;  and  the  third,  of  two. 
If  a  purely  defensive  action  were  contemplated,  the  first 
line  might  consist  of  two  battalions;  the  second,  of  one; 
the  third  being  entirely  omitted.  If  a  vigorous  counter- 
offensive  were  intended,  the  first  line  might  consist  of 
six  companies;  the  second,  of  two;  and  the  third,  of  a 
battalion.  No  rule  can  be  given,  however,  and  the  com- 
mander must  dispose  his  force  according  to  the  demands 
of  circumstances. 

THE  SELECTION  AND  OCCUPATION  OF  THE  POSITION. 

In  discussing  the  question  of  the  defensive,  two  cases 
must  be  considered:  1.  The  deliberate  occupation  of  a 
position  with  a  view  to  awaiting  the  enemy's  attack; 
2.  The  occupation  of  a  position  when  the  enemy  is  en- 
countered, and,  in  the  course  of  reinforcing  the  advance 
guard,  the  defensive  is  assumed  either  by  choice  or  from 
necessity. 

The  requirements  of  a  good  defensive  position  are 
considered  in  detail  in  the  chapter  on  "The  Three  Arms 
Combined."  It  will  be  sufficient  here  to  state  that  the 
first,  and  by  far  the  most  important,  requisite  of  an  in- 
fantry position  is  a  clear  field  of  fire  to  the  front  and 
flanks  for  a  distance  equal  to  the  effective  range  of  the 
rifle.  Next  in  importance  is  the  question  of  cover,  such 
as  sunken  roads,  railroad  embankments  and  cuts,  ditches, 
gravel-pits,  stone-quarries,  etc.,  for  the  fighting  line,  and 
the  reverse  slopes  of  hills  for  the  shelter  of  the  reserves.* 

*Each  of  these  features  has  been  used  to  advantage  in  battle 
At  Fredericksburg,  2,500  men  of  McLaw's  division  were  posted  In 


110  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

Reverse  slopes  in  themselves  constitute  no  protection 
from  modern  artillery  fire.  It  may  here  b^  stated  that, 
as  a  general  rule,  all  troops  on  the  defensive  must  intrench, 
unless  protected  ~by  adequate  natural  cover.  An  especially  de- 
sirable position  is  one  on  open  ground  sloping  gently 
toward  the  enemy  in  such  a  manner  as  to  give  a  free 
sweep  of  fire  to  the  front.  If  this  position  be,  moreover, 
on  the  side  of  a  valley  such  that  the  enemy  must,  in  at- 
tacking, move  down  a  slope,  and  thus  expose  his  differ- 
ent echelons  simultaneously  to  the  fire  of  the  defenders, 
the  position  will  be  particularly  advantageous.  A  posi- 
tion on  a  steep  hillside  is  not  desirable;  for,  while  it  would 
doubtless  add  to  the  fatigue  of  the  assailant  to  climb  the 
hill,  the  fire  of  the  defenders  would  not  be  so  effective  as 
it  would  be  on  a  gentle  slope  or  level  ground. 

If  the  position  be  on  a  hill,  the  firing  line  should  be 
posted  along  the  "military  crest,"  which  is  the  ridge  from 
which  all  the  ground  in  front  can  be  clearly  swept  by  fire. 
The  military  crest  may  coincide  with  the  actual  crest,  but 
is  usually  somewhat  below  it.*  If  dependent  upon  natural 
cover,  the  firing  line  should  be  posted  just  behind  the 

a  sunken  road,  lying  at  the  base  of  Marye's  Heights,  the  side  of 
the  road  toward  the  assailants  having  a  stone  retaining-wall  breast 
high.  Six  successive  charges  of  the  United  States  troops,  made 
with  the  greatest  gallantry,  were  hopelessly  shattered  against  this 
position,  with  enormous  loss. 

At  the  battle  of  Essling,  Lannes,  posting  his  infantry  in  a  shal- 
low draining-ditch  which  extended  between  the  villages  of  Aspern 
and  Essling,  successfully  resisted  the  determined  attacks  of  greatly 
superior  forces  of  Austrians. 

At  the  second  battle  of  Bull  Run,  Stonewall  Jackson  took  up  a 
position  behind  an  old  railroad  embankment  which  extended  along 
his  entire  front,  and  was  thus  able  to  repulse  the  Union  attacks,  and 
hold  his  ground  until  the  arrival  of  Longstreet  placed  matters  on  a 
more  equal  footing. 

At  Gravelotte,  Gen.  Frossard  so  utilized  a  number  of  shallow 
stone-quarries  (connected  with  slight  intrenchments)  as  shelter  for 
his  men,  that  his  corps  not  only  held  its  position  against  the  German 
attacks,  but  did  so  with  comparatively  insignificant  loss. 

At  Waterloo,  the  reverse  slope  of  the  ridge  was  used  by  Welling- 
ton to  screen  his  second  line  from  observation  and  to  a  considerable 
degree  from  fire. 

*For  a  description  of  the  military  crest,  see  Beach's  "Manual 
of  Military  Field  Engineering,"  p.  99. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  Ill 

military  crest,  the  support  being  far  enough  in  rear  to  be 
concealed,  but  near  enough  to  reinforce  the  firing  line 
quickly.  The  reserve  should  be  farther  in  rear;  on  th<j 
reverse  slope  of  the  hill,  if  not  too  distant.  If  intrenched, 
the  firing  line  should  be  just  below  the  crest,  the  support 
being  moved  up  to  the  line  that  would  otherwise  be  occu- 
pied by  the  firing  line,  and  being  also  sheltered  with  in- 
trenchments.  If  it  can  be  avoided,  troops  should  never 
be  posted  exactly  at  the  crest,  as  they  would,  while  out- 
lined against  the  sky,  present  a  peculiarly  good  target 
to  the  enemy's  fire. 

The  position  must  be  suited  in  extent  to  the  size  of 
the  force  by  which  it  is  to  be  occupied,  and  everything  pos- 
sible should  be  done  to  strengthen  it.  Entanglements  and 
other  obstacles  should  be  constructed  in  front  of  it,  all 
objects  that  would  shelter  the  enemy  or  conceal  him  from 
view  should  be  removed  or  demolished,  the  range  of  every 
prominent  object  in  the  line  of  the  enemy's  advance  should 
be  ascertained  and  carefully  noted,  and,  above  all,  in- 
trenchments  should  be  constructed.* 

In  the  second  case,  these  deliberate  preparations  are 
impossible.  The  advance  guard  encounters  the  advance 
guard  of  the  enemy,  and  the  troops  in  rear  are  moved  in- 
to position  as  the  ground  may  favor  or  the  exigencies  of 
the  fight  demand.  As  each  regiment  moves  to  its  position, 
the  colonel  designates  the  battalions  or  companies  for  the 
different  lines,  and  causes  a  reconnaissance  to  be  made, 
scouts  being  sent  forward  by  the  captain  of  each  company 
in  the  fighting  line.  The  scouts  connect  with  those  of  ad- 
jacent companies,  seek  to  discover  the  enemy's  position 
and  movements,  and  endeavor  to  keep  back  his  scouts  and 
patrols.  Each  captain  indicates  to  each  subdivision  of  his 
company  the  position  it  is  to'  occupy,  and  the  steps  it  is 
to  take  in  preparing  cover,  in  accordance  with  general  in- 
structions from  the  battalion  commander;  and  during  the 
first  phases  of  the  fight  he  endeavors  to  find  the  range  of 
all  conspicuous  objects  in  the  line  of  the  enemy's  advance. 

*Further  on  the  subject  of  occupying  and  strengthening  a 
position,  see  the  chapter  on  "The  Three  Arms  Combined." 


112  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

The  colonel  assures  himself  that  each  battalion  and  com- 
pany is  in  the  best  possible  position  in  regard  to  cover 
and  effective  fire. 

THE  USE  OF  HASTY  INTRENCHMENTS  BY  INFANTRY. 

The  growth  of  the  art  of  intrenching  has  been  alluded 
to  in  a  former  chapter;  and  so  great  has  become  its  im- 
portance under  the  conditions  of  modern  rifle-firing  that 
no  army  now  contemplates  the  occupation  of  a  defens- 
ive position  without  resorting  to  the  powerful  aid  of 
intrenchments. 

Great  as  the  use  of  intrenchments  will  be  in  future, 
they  must  not  be  invariably  relied  upon.  The  morale  ol 
the  men  will  inevitably  suffer  if  they  be  allowed  to  in- 
trench at  every  step  and  under  all  circumstances,  and  in- 
trenchments may  thus  prove  a  curse  rather  than  a  blessing. 
General  Sherman  says:  "The  habit  of  intrenching  cer- 
tainly does  have  the  effect  of  making  new  troops  timid. 
When  a  line  of  battle  is  once  covered  by  a  good  parapet, 
made  by  the  engineers  or  by  the  labor  of  the  men  them- 
selves, it  does  require  an  effort  to  make  them  leave  it  in 
the  face  of  danger;  but  when  the  enemy  is  intrenched,  it 
becomes  absolutely  necessary  to  permit  each  brigade  and 
division  of  the  troops  immediately  opposed  to  throw  up  a 
corresponding  trench  for  their  own  protection  in  case  of 
a  sudden  sally.  We  invariably  did  this  in  all  our  recent 
campaigns,  and  it  had  no  ill  effect,  though  sometimes  our 
troops  were  a  little  too  slow  in  leaving  their  well-covered 
lines  to  assail  the  enemy  in  position  or  on  retreat.  .  .  . 
.  .  .  .  On  the  'defensive'  there  is  no  doubt  of  the  pro- 
priety of  fortifying;  but  in  the  assailing  army  the  general 
must  watch  closely  to  see  that  his  men  do  not  neglect  an 
opportunity  to  drop  his  precautionary  defenses,  and  act 
promptly  on  the  'offensive'  at  every  chance."*  The  skill 

*"Memoirs,"  Vol.  II.,  p.  396.  General  Sherman's  opponent  Gen- 
eral Hood,  bears  similar  testimony  as  to  the  demoralizing  influence 
of  intrenchments  on  soldiers  habitually  using  them.  Speaking  of 
the  condition  of  his  troops  in  the  invasion  of  Tennessee,  he  says: 
"The  discovery  that  the  army,  after  a  forward  march  of  one  hundred 
and  eighty  miles,  was  still,  seemingly,  unwilling  to  accept  battle  un- 
less under  the  protection  of  breastworks,  caused  me  to  experience 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  113 

of  a  commander  will  largely  consist  in  knowing  when  to 
use  and  when  to  dispense  with  intrenchments. 

RELATIVE  ADVANTAGES  OF  THE  OFFENSIVE  AND  DEFENSIVE. 

The  Defensive. — The  commander  acting  on  the  defen- 
sive chooses  his  own  ground,  and  may  select  a  position 
which  will  afford  him  shelter  and  compel  the  assailant  to 
cross  open  ground  swept  with  a  heavy  fire.  The  position 
can  also  be  fortified,  the  range  of  different  objects  in  the 
line  of  the  enemy's  advance  can  be  ascertained,  and  the 
supply  of  ammunition  can  be  easily  made.  Moreover,  the 
troops  being  stationary,  fire  discipline  is  more  easily  main- 
tained than  in  the  case  of  the  assailant,  whose  troops  are 
moving  and  more  or  less  di:  ordered  by  the  inequalities  of 
the  ground.  The  assailant  is  firing  at  a  target  which  is 
at  least  partially  covered,  while  the  mark  presented  to  the 
fire  of  the  defenders  is  unsheltered,  except  by  chance 
features  of  the  terrain.  The  assailants,  especially  at  the 
shorter  ranges,  are  panting  and  breathless  when  they  fire, 
while  the  defenders,  remaining  quiet,  can  take  more  accu- 
rate aim. 

The  Offensive. — The  commander  acting  on  the  offensive 
can  choose  his  own  line  of  action.  He  has  from  the  first 
a  definite  plan,  and  can  make  feigned  attacks  against  dif- 
ferent parts  of  the  enemy's  position,  while  massing  a  pre- 
ponderating force  against  a  single  point.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  defender,  in  the  dark  as  to  his  adversary's  de- 
signs and  uncertain  as  to  the  point  of  attack,  must  dissem- 
inate his  force  so  as  to  be  strong  at  every  point  where  a 
heavy  assault  may  fall. 

The  offensive  implies  numerical  or  moral  superiority, 
or  both,  and  is  an  indication  of  confidence  on  the  part  >f 
the  commander  which  tends  to  raise  the  morale  of  the 
troops.  This  is  heightened  by  the  forward  impulsion,  and 
the  turmoil  and  excitement  of  the  attack;  and  the  assail- 

grave  concern.  In  my  inmost  heart  I  questioned  whether  or  not  I 
would  ever  succeed  in  eradicating  this  evil." — "Advance  and  Re- 
treat," quoted  in  "Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War,"  Vol.  IT., 
p.  432. 


114  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

ants  are  comparatively  unaffected  by  the  sight  of  their 
own  dead  and  wounded,  whom  they  leave  behind,  while 
the  defenders'  killed  encumber  the  position.  The  morale 
of  the  defenders  is  further  shaken  by  the  spectacle  of  an 
unflinching  advance  which  their  fire  does  not  stop.  Fi- 
nally, though  the  line  of  defense  be  chosen  with  care  and 
prepared  with  skill,  though  its  general  features  be  ad- 
mirable and  it  seem  almost  perfect,  there  may  yet  be  a 
weak  point  through  which  the  enemy  may  penetrate,  and 
thus,  by  taking  the  rest  of  the  line  in  flank,  cause  the  aban- 
donment of  the  entire  position.  The  defender  gains  a 
victory  only  when  he  succeeds  at  all  points;  but  the  as- 
sailant wins  when  he  is  successful  at  a  single  part  of 
the  line.* 

WITHDRAWAL  FROM  ACTION. 

In  case  of  failure  to  carry  the  position,  the  with- 
drawal of  the  attacking  troops  is  a  matter  of  much  diffi- 
culty, which  increases  in  proportion  to  the  extent  to 
which  the  attack  has  been  carried,  and  the  energy  and 
earnestness  with  which  it  has  been  conducted. 

In  case  the  support  has  not  yet  reinforced  the  firing 
line,  the  latter  should  fall  back  upon  it,  forming  on  its 
flanks  or  in  the  intervals,  so  as  to  form  entire  companies. 
The  subdivisions  of  the  support  open  fire  as  soon  as  their 
front  is  uncovered,  and  the  re-formed  companies  then  with- 
draw by  alternate  platoons,  the  retiring  platoon  being 
covered  by  the  fire  of  the  other.  In  case  the  enemy  shows 
no  disposition  to  attack  vigorously,  the  reserve  retires 
without  waiting  for  the  firing  line  and  support.  Other- 
wise, the  united  support  and  firing  line  fall  back  upon 
the  reserve,  thus  forming  battalion,  and  the  withdrawal 
is  conducted  by  alternate  companies  or  half-battalions. 

If  the  support  has  reinforced  the  firing  line,  but  the 
reserve  still  remains  intact,  the  latter  may  be  disposed 
near  one  of  the  flanks,  in  such  a  position  as  to  hold  the 
enemy  in  check  while  the  firing  line  re-forms  in  its  rear. 
The  reserve  is  next  withdrawn  to  the  rear  of  the  firing 

*Further  on  this  subject,  see  the  chapter  on  "The  Three  Arms 
Combined." 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  115 

line,  under  cover  of  the  fire  of  the  latter,  and  the  two 
lines  thus  withdraw  alternately. 

This  methodical  withdrawal  from  action  can  be  possi- 
ble only  in  the  earlier  stages  of  the  attack,  when  the  as- 
sailants have  not  yet  suffered  severely  and  have  not  been 
disordered  by  successive  reinforcements  from  the  echelons 
in  rear;  but  later,  especially  when  the  first  line  has  been 
entirely  absorbed  in  the  firing  line,  and  the  fight  has 
reached  the  intensity  of  a  modern  infantry  combat  at  short 
range,  an  orderly  withdrawal  may  be  regarded  as  alto- 
gether out  of  the  question.  With  their  energy  exhausted 
by  the  attack,  with  their  courage  expended  in  a  bloody 
struggle  which  they  have  been  unable  to  maintain,  and 
with  the  enemy's  fire  pelting  them  in  the  back  as  they 
withdraw,  nothing  more  can  be  expected  of  the  men  than 
that  they  will  rally  when  they  reach  shelter.  The  third 
line  (and  the  second  also,  if  not  committed  to  the  assault) 
may  move  to  a  flank,  and  take  up  a  position  whence  it 
can  take  the  enemy  in  flank  in  case  of  pursuit,  or  open 
with  volleys  or  rapid  fire  on  the  hostile  position,  and  thus 
diminish  the  effect  of  the  enemy's  fire.  When  the  attack 
is  repulsed  at  close  range,  the  defender  should  not,  as  a 
rule,  make  a  direct  pursuit  from  his  position,  as  he  can, 
with  the  weapons  now  in  use,  do  vastly  more  damage  to 
the  retreating  force  by  continuing  his  fire  from  the  posi- 
tion. The  retreating  men  no  longer  keep  down  the  de- 
fenders' fire  with  their  own,  they  can  no  longer  profit  by 
the  sheltering  features  of  the  ground,  and  they  generally 
present  a  target  consisting  of  a  confused  mass  of  demor- 
alized and  helpless  humanity.  When  the  assailants  reach 
a  point  from  which  they  can  make  no  further  progress, 
they  should,  therefore,  ibtrench  and  remain  where  they 
are;  for  no  losses  incurred  in  intrenching  under  a  hot  fire 
can  equal  those  that  would  result  from  a,  retreat  across 
a  fire-swept  zone.  If  matters  do  not  change  for  the  bet- 
ter with  the  assailants,  they  may,  by  waiting  until  night, 
be  able  to  withdraw  in  comparative  safety  under  cover  of 
the  darkness.* 

*Describing  the  unsuccessful  assault  of  Davis'  division  against 
the  Confederate  position  at  Kenesaw  Mountain,  General  Cox  says: 


110  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

i 

The  withdrawal  of  the  defender  is  in  every  way  sim 
ilar  to  that  of  the  assailant.  In  retreating  he  encounters 
the  same  destructive  losses,  and  it  is  always  better  for 
him  to  wait  and  receive  the  enemy's  shock  with  the  bay- 
onet than  to  retreat  just  before  the  assailant  reaches  the 
position.  Under  the  conditions  of  modern  infantry  fire, 
retreat  generally  means  annihilation,  and  a  body  of  in- 
fantry once  committed  to  an  energetic  attack  or  defense 
should  be  fully  impressed  with  the  fact  that  its  safety 
lies  only  in  victory. 

THE  SUPPLY  OF  AMMUNITION  ON  THE  FIELD. 

The  supply  of  ammunition  on  the  field  of  battle  is  a 
matter  of  vital  importance;  for  infantry  without  ammuni- 
tion is  a  Samson  shorn  of  his  strength. 

There  is,  as  yet,  no  form  of  ammunition  wagon  or  cart 
prescribed  f^r  the  United  States  Army,  other  than  the 
escort  wagon. 

The  following  general  rules  are  recognized,  as  they 
are  based  upon  the  experience  of  armies  in  which  much 
attention  has  been  bestowed  upon  the  subject. 

An  acting  ordnance  officer  or  reliable  sergeant  is  iu 
charge  of  the  battalion  ammunition  wagons  when  they 
march  in  rear  of  the  regiment.  One  wagon  is  attached 
to  each  battalion  and  accompanies  it.  The  small-arms 
ammunition  columns  should  always  be  pushed  as  far  to 
the  front  as  may  be  practicable  without  undue  exposure. 
As  soon  as  the  battalion  wagon  has  been  emptied  of  its 

"Both  brigades  had  a  heavy  list  of  casualties  among  field  and  com- 
pany officers  as  well  as  private  soldiers.  They  reached  the  trench 
in  front  of  their  objective  point,  but  the  narrow  front  of  the  column 
now  stood  revealed  to  the  enemy,  who  were  able  to  concentrate  upon 
them  also  a  storm  of  rifle  balls  and  canister  which  made  farther 
advance  impossible.  Lying  upon  the  ground  within  the  range  of 
musket-fire  from  the  works,  they  covered  themselves  as  they  could, 
and  finally,  by  General  Thomas'  consent,  intrenched  themselves  un- 
der a  terrible  fire,  the  open  ground  over  which  they  must  retreat 
making  it  safer  to  stay  than  to  return.  The  cover  they  were  able  to 
make  enabled  them  to  hold  on  till  night,  and  then  their  works  were 
so  strengthened  that  they  were  permanently  held,  though  for  several 
days  and  nights  the  troops  could  rest  only  by  sleeping  on  their  arms." 
—"Atlanta"  (Scribner's  Series),  p.  125. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  117 

ammunition,  it  should  be  sent  back  to  the  ammunition 
column  and  :'ts  place  taken  by  a  full  wagon  without  delay. 
Just  before  going  into  action,  each  man  should  be 
supplied  with  one  or  more  packages  of  ammunition  in  ad- 
dition to  that  which  he  has  been  carrying  on  his  person 
— enough,  in  fact,  to  fill  all  his  belts  and  pockets — and 
advantage  should  be  taken  of  every  pause  in  the  attack 
and  every  lull  in  the  enemy's  fire  to  replenish  the  belts 
of  the  men.  No  man  should  be  allowed  to  leave  the  ranks 
for  the  purpose  of  going  after  cartridges;  but  a  non-com- 
missioned officer  and  two  or  three  men  should  be  detailed 
from  eacL  company  to  distribute  ammunition,  each  of 
the  company  ammunition-carriers  being  provided  with  a 
leather  haversack  to  hold  the  ammunition.  One  of  the 
carriers  should  be  charged  with  the  duty  of  collecting  and 
distributirg  the  cartridges  of  the  killed  and  wounded. 

ACTION  OF  INFANTRY  AGAINST  CAVALRY. 

Good  intact  infantry,  with  plenty  of  ammunition, 
should,  unless  taken  completely  by  surprise,  have  no  fear 
of  cavalry.  If  in  battle  formation  when  attacked  by  cav- 
alry, the  firing  line,  if  equal  in  density  to  a  single-rank 
line  in  close  order,  should  merely  halt  and  open  fire.  If 
in  a  skirmish  line  with  small  intervals,  it  should  rally  by 
squads.  If  in  a  thin  skirmish  line,  it  would  be  better 
for  the  men  to  remain  in  their  places  or  simply  group  to- 
gether by  files.  Other  troops  form  line  if  they  happen  to 
be  in  column,  the  support  being  placed  in  a  position  to 
guard  the  flanks  of  the  firing  line.  The  cavalry  will  in- 
variably penetrate  through  the  intervals  in  the  firing  line, 
rather  than  run  against  the  skirmishers  or  rallied  squads, 
which  should  face  about  and  continue  their  fire  upon  the 
cavalry  after  it  passes  through,  unless  they  have  to  en- 
counter succeeding  echelons  of  charging  horsemen.  The 
chance  of  hitting  a  surging  rrowd  of  troopers  will  be  much 
greater  than  any  risk  of  injuring  their  own  comrades  In 
rear,  and  in  the  meHay  it  is  no  time  for  men  to  stand 
Idle.  When  the  cavalry  has  been  repulsed,  the  fire  should 
be  continued  until  the  retreating  horsemen  are  out  of 
range.  If  attacked  in  flank,  the  bodies  constituting  the 


118  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

support  and  reserve  should  form  front  toward  the  threat- 
ened flank,  and  the  firing  line  should  rally  by  groups  or 
sections.  If,  in  any  case,  the  cavalry  attack  in  several 
echelons,  the  fire  must  not  be  directed  upon  a  fraction  al- 
ready repulsed,  but  upon  the  leading  echelon  which  con- 
tinues the  charge. 

If  in  line  when  attacked  in  front  by  cavalry,  no 
change  in  the  formation  of  the  infantry  should  be  neces- 
sary. As  soon  as  the  hostile  cavalry  shows  itself,  it 
should  be  kept  at  a  distance  by  fire,  preferably  by  volleys. 
Even  though  the  cavalry  be  repulsed  with  heavy  loss,  the 
infantry  must  be  regarded  as  worsted  when  it  has  been  so 
injured  and  demoralized  by  the  cavalry  charge  as  to  be 
compelled  to  suspend  its  advance.  The  German  infantry 
is  taught  that  it  should  be  able  to  advance  on  open  ground 
against  cavalry,  unless  the  latter  be  aided  by  superior 
infantry  or  artillery  fire,  or  be  so  superior  in  numbers 
that  it  can  attack  at  the  same  time  in  several  different 
directions.  The  cavalry  must  be  conceded  to  have  gained 
a  great  advantage  if  it  can  compel  the  infantry  to  halt 
or  take  up  a  formation  unfavorable  to  the  greatest  devel- 
opment of  its  fire. 

When  the  infantry  is  short  of  ammunition,  when  its 
morale  is  shaken  by  heavy  losses,  or  when  it  is  retreat- 
ing over  open  ground,  it  will  generally  be  advisable  to 
rally  by  platoons  to  receive  the  charging  cavalry. 

There  is,  however,  nothing  radically  new  in  the  rela 
tions  of  cavalry  and  infantry,  and  it  would  be  absurd  to 
attempt  to  rule  cavalry  off  the  battle-field,  o,r  to  suppose 
that  it  can  never  again  work  serious  injury,  or  perhaps 
absolute  ruin,  to  infantry  in  action.  It  should  be  con- 
stantly borne  in  mind  that  the  superiority  of  the  infantry 
demands  that  it  should  be  good,  unshaken,  well  supplied  with 
ammunition,  and  not  taken  ly  surprise.  The  first  duties  of 
an  infantry  commander  opposed  to  cavalry  are,  therefore, 
to  exercise  the  utmost  vigilance  in  watching  the  enemy, 
and  to  guard  with  extreme  care  against  an  exhaustion  of 
ammunition. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 


CHAPTER   V. 

CAVALRY  IN  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE. 

"No  army  can  enter  the  lists  with  a  fair  chance  of  success,, 
unless  it  has  a  cavalry  that  can  both  ride  and  fight." — Wilson. 

The  characteristics  of  cavalry  have  already  been  gen- 
erally considered;  the  tactical  handling  of  this  arm  will 
now  be  more  particularly  discussed. 

The  cavalryman,  trusting  to  shock  action  on  the  battle- 
field, has  played  a  conspicuous  part  in  the  history  of  war 
for  many  generations;  his  exploits  have  decided  the  issue 
of  many  a  doubtful  combat.  On  occasion  he  has  exerted 
a  supreme  influence  over  the  course  of  the  action  from  its 
commencement  to  its  close,  but  the  era  for  operations  of 
this  kind  has  passed.  Opportunities  will  often  present 
themselves  in  engagements  of  the  future  for  charges  by 
mounted  troops  wielding  the  saber.  The  true  r61e  of  the 
horseman  of  to-day  is,  however,  very  different  from  that 
of  even  a  few  years  ago. 

Although  it  is  probable  that  the  trocper  will  employ 
his  firearms  more  frequently  than  either  saber  or  lance, 
it  must  not  be  concluded  that  the  use  of  these  weapons 
has  disappeared  from  the  battle-field.  Occasions  for  their 
employment  will  seldom  arise  in  the  course  of  future 
campaagns,  but  when  they  do  o-cciur,  cavalry  will  have 
opportunities  which  could  never  be  grasped  by  any  other 
arm. 

The  difference  between  mounted  infantry  and  cavalry 
proper  does  not  arise  from  the  fact  that  the  personnel  of 
the  former  is  drawn  from  infantry  regiments,  but  that  it 
is  able  to  fight  only  on  foot.  Mounted  troops  who  for  want 
of  some  suitable  weapon  are  incapable  of  injuring  their 
opponents  unless  they  dismount,  will  frequently  miss  op- 
portunities of  performing  very  effective  service.  For  cam- 
paigns between  great  modern  armies,  the  trooper  must  b& 
a  genuine  horseman  who  can  wield  his  saber  confidently 
from  the  saddle,  but  who  is  no  less  ready  to  use  his  car- 


120  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

bine,  dismounted,  when  circumstances  do  not  admit  of  the 
former  action. 

The  true  function  of  the  cavalryman  of  to-day  lies  in 
independent  action.  This  does  not  by  any  means  preclude 
the  actual  charge,  but  shock  tactics  must  be  the  exception 
under  conditions  as  they  now  exist,  and  are  very  unlikely 
to  be  employed  on  a  scale  of  much  importance  in  the  future. 

THE  CHARGE  IN  LINE. 

Formation. — The  charge  in  line  is  made  in  close  order, 
boot-to-boot,  the  forward  movement  increasing  in  rapidity 
until  it  finally  terminates  in  a  shock  delivered  at  full 
speed.  The  effect  of  the  shock  depends  upon  the  cohesion, 
weight,  and  speed  of  the  charging  force;  in  the  mellay 
which  follows,  the  result  depends  upon  the  weapons  of 
the  trooper,  and  his  skill  in  their  use. 

Whether  victorious  or  unsuccessful,  cavalry  is  invaria- 
bly disordered  by  the  shock  and  succeeding  mellay.  In 
email  bodies  the  disorder  is  of  sLort  duratk  -,  but  in 
large  masses  it  lasts  a  long  time,  the  confusion  of  broken 
ranks  being  increased  by  wounded  and  riderless  horses, 
as  well  as  by  troopers  who  have  lost  their  weapons  or 
become  separated  from  their  tactical  units.  If,  then,  cav- 
alry were  to  charge  in  a  single  line,  it  might,  while  dis- 
ordered by  its  own  succers,  be  easily  overthrown  by  even 
a  small  body  of  hostile  cavalry  attacking  in  close  forma- 
tion and  well  in  hand.  To  guard  against  a  counter-charge, 
a  support  is,  therefore,  necessary;  and  as  the  flanks  are 
dangerously  weak  points  in  cavalry,  the  support  must  be 
so  placed  that  it  can  readily  attack  the  flank  of  the  enemy 
or  protect  that  of  its  own  attacking  line.  It  should,  there- 
fore, be  echeloned  on  the  flank  which  is  more  exposed  to 
the  enemy's  attack,  or  from  which  it  can  better  operate 
against  the  flank  of  the  hostile  cavalry;  though,  in  the 
case  of  a  large  force,  a  portion  of  the  support  may  be 
placed,  with  wide  intervals,  in  rear  of  the  attacking  line,  or 
echeloned  on  the  less  exposed  flank.  As  a  rule,  however, 
the  support  should  not  be  immediately  in  rear  of  the  at- 
tacking line  (and  never  except  with  wide  intervals),  lest, 
in  case  of  the  defeat  of  the  latter,  it  be  thrown  into  con- 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  121 

fusion  or  ridden  over  by  the  retreating  troopers,  who  al- 
most invariably  break  straight  to  the  rear.  Either  to 
assail  or  defend  a  flank,  the  support  is  almost  sure  to  be 
drawn  into  the  mellay,  and  a  reserve  must,  consequently, 
be  at  hand  to  decide  the  victory,  to  ward  off  an  attack 
upon  the  first  line  while  disordered  by  the  charge,  to  pur- 
sue the  enemy,  or  to  cover  the  retreat.  The  reserve  is  usu- 
ally echeloned  on  the  opposite  flank  from  the  support. 
When  this  flank  is  covered  by  other  troops  or  by  natural 
obstacles,  the  reserve  should  ordinarily  be  on  the  same 
flank  as  the  support,  and  echeloned  on  the  outer  flank  of 
the  latter.  In  general  terms,  the  support  and  reserve  should 
be  so  disposed  that  the  attacking  line  may  be  relieved 
from  all  anxiety  in  regard  to  its  flanks,  and  devote  its 
whole  attention  to  the  enemy  in  its  front.  In  a  cavalry 
combat,  that  force  which  can  bring  into  action  the  last 
formed  reserve  is  almost  sure  to  be  victorious.  At  Wag- 
ram,  Grouchy  drove  back  Rosenberg's  cavalry  with  great 
slaughter;  but  Hohenlohe's  cuirassiers  fell  upon  the  dis- 
ordered French  horse,  and  would  have  swept  it  from  the 
field,  had  not  Montbrun  brought  up  a  fresh  cavalry  force 
and  defeated  Hohenlohe  in  turn. 

In  a  small  force  the  duties  of  support  and  reserve  are 
combined  in  a  single  body,  part  of  the  support  being  kept 
unbroken  and  held  well  in  hand  when  the  rest  is  launched 
into  the  fight;  but  in  general  an  attacking  force  of  cavalry 
consists  of  an  attacking  line,  a  support,  and  a  reserve.  The 
attacking  line  must  be  strong,  for  if  it  fails,  the  rest  can 
generally  do  no  more  than  prevent  a  complete  reverse;  but 
if  too  much  of  the  force  be  placed  in  the  attacking  line, 
the  lack  of  a  proper  support  and  reserve  may  cause  it  to 
be  defeated  while  in  disorder.  As  a  rule,  the  attacking 
line  should  consist  of  about  one-half  of  the  strength  of 
the  entire  force,  the  support  varying  from  one-fourth  to 
one-third,  and  the  reserve  accordingly  from  one-fourth  to 
one-sixth.  Troops  and,  if  possible,  squadrons  should  be 
preserved  intact  in  each  line;  though  one  or  more  platoons 
of  a  flank  troop  may  be  echeloned  on  its  outer  flank,  and 
in  small  bodies  the  reserve  and  support  may  both  be  taken 
from  the  same  troop. 


122  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

The  distances  between  the  lines,  or  echelons,  vary 
with  the  size  of  the  attacking  force.  In  the  case  of  a  troop, 
the  distance  from  the  attacking  line  to  the  support  is  about 
80  yards,  and  from  the  support  to  the  reserve  not  more 
than  150  yards.  In  the  case  of  a  brigade  or  division,  the 
former  distance  is  about  275  yards,  and  the  latter  from  150 
to  200  yards.  If  the  flank  of  the  attacking  line  be  seri- 
ously threatened,  the  support  may  close  to  not  less  than 
100  yards.  The  inner  flank  of  the  support  should  be  from 
50  to  75  yards  beyond  the  outer  (or  exposed)  flank  of  the 
attacking  line;  and  the  reserve  should  be  similarly  placed 
in  relation  to  the  inner  (or  protected)  flank  of  the  same 
line.  (See  Figure  6.) 

Even  though  the  attack  be  made  in  line,  small  col- 
umns are  the  proper  formation  for  maneuvering  cavalry. 
They  possess  greater  mobility  and  flexibility  than  the  line, 
present  a  smaller  target  to  artillery  fire,  and  admit  of  the 
easy  passage  of  obstacles  and  the  utilization  of  shelter- 
ing features  of  the  terrain.  In  moving  forward  to  the  at- 
tack, the  attacking  line  should  be  formed  either  in  line 
of  troops  in  columns  of  fours  at  full  interval,  or  in  line 
of  platoon  columns.  The  deployment  into  line  must  be 
made  at  the  right  moment;  if  delayed  too  long,  the  attack- 
ing body  may  be  itself  attacked  before  it  is  in  proper 
formation;  if  it  be  made  too  soon,  there  is  less  chance  of 
surprise  and  greater  exposure  to  loss,  and  changes  of 
direction  in  line,  which  always  impair  the  cohesion  of  the 
attacking  body  and  weaken  the  force  of  the  shock,  may 
become  necessary.  The  support  should  also  be  in  line  of 
small  columns  at  deploying  intervals,  and  its  movements 
should  conform  to  those  of  the  attacking  line.  The  reserve 
is  similarly  formed.  If,  in  issuing  from  a  defile,  forming 
on  right  or  left  into  line,  or  changing  front,  time  does  not 
admit  of  completing  the  formation,  each  troop  or  squad- 
ron may  be  advanced  to  the  attack  as  soon  as  it  is  formed. 

In  most  armies,  each  part  of  the  charging  force  is 
formed  in  two  ranks.  In  our  service  the  charge  is  made 
in  single  rank.  There  is  a  decided  lack  of  unanimity  in 
the  views  of  the  best  authorities  on  this  subject.  The  ad- 
vocates of  the  single-rank  formation  claim  that  the  rear 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 


123 


rank  generally  merges  into  the -front  rank  in  the  course 
of  the  charge,  thus  producing  a  charge  in  single  rank;  that 
where  this  merging  does  not  take  place,  the  rear  rank  is 
useless;  and  that  casualties  are  increased,  and  the  rear 
rank  thrown  into  confusion,  by  the  disabled  men  and  horses 
in  the  front  rank  being  run  over.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is 
claimed  that  a  line  invariably  loosens  out  in  the  charge, 
and  that  a  charge  boot-to-boot  is  impossible  unless  there 
are  men  in  a  rear  rank  to  push  forward  into  the  vacant 
spaces  created  in  the  first.  It  is  often  practicable  to  de- 
liver the  charge  in  a  line  of  platoon  columns  in  single 


NORTMAL 


FORMATION 


ATTACK 
Or     A 

BRIGADE     OF     CAVALRY. 


•Sa 

tt 
(A  SQUADRONS) 


1 


1 


Support 
(I  REOJMENT) 


12  SQUADRONS) 


124  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

rank;  the  distance  between  successive  ranks  in  this  case 
being  much  greater  than  in  a  line  in  double  rank,  and  most 
of  the  objections  to  a  line  in  that  formation  being  obviated. 

Pace  and  Conduct  of  the  Attack. — In  moving  to  the  attack, 
a  slow  trot  is  taken  and  continued  until  the  zone  of  effect- 
ive artillery  fire  is  entered,  when  the  trot  is  increased  to 
its  full  rate  of  speed  and  maintained  until  within  point- 
blank  range  of  the  enemy's  small-arms — generally  about 
600  yards  from  the  hostile  position.  The  columns  then 
deploy  into  line  and  take  the  gallop,  gradually  increasing 
in  speed  until  within  from  75  to  50  yards  of  the  enemy, 
when  the  charge  is  sounded  and  the  line  rushes  forward 
at  full  speed,  but  without  losing  its  cohesion,  the  men 
yelling  and  the  trumpets  sounding. 

In  former  times  the  charge  did  not  extend  over  more 
than  800  yards,  including  the  trot  and  gallop;  but,  owing 
to  the  long-range  guns  and  rifles  of  the  present,  large 
bodies  of  cavalry  cannot  often  be  held  in  hand,  without 
great  exposure,  at  a  less  distance  than  4,000  yards  from 
the  enemy.  With  small  bodies  the  distance  may,  of  course, 
often  be  much  less;  but  the  distance  is  generally  so  great 
that  it  is  now  conceded  that  cavalry,  to  be  worthy  of  the 
name,  must  even  be  able  to  pass  over  four  or  four  and  a 
half  miles  at  the  more  rapid  paces  (trot  and  gallop),  and 
then  have  enough  energy  left  to  make  a  charge  and  carry 
it  through. 

On  open  ground  the  rapid  advance  must  naturally  be- 
gin at  a  greater  distance  than  when  sheltering  features 
of  terrain  protect  the  cavalry  from  the  enemy's  fire. 
Against  formed  cavalry  the  trot  should  be  continued  to 
within  a  few  hundred  yards,  in  order  that  the  cohesion 
of  the  line  and  the  simultaneity  of  the  shock  may  not  be 
destroyed  by  a  long  gallop.  The  gallop,  in  fact,  should  not, 
as  a  rule,  begin  sooner  than  may  be  necessary  to  give  a 
proper  impetus  to  the  charge;  for  a  long  galiop  distresses 
the  horses,  and  when  they  are  blown  and  exhausted,  the 
cavalry  is  at  the  mercy  o^  the  enemy.  In  Ponsonby's  fa- 
mous attack  with  the  Union  Brigade  at  Waterloo,  he 
charged  with  great  gallantry  through  and  through  the  col- 
umns of  French  infantry  (which  had  recoiled  from  the  at- 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  125 

tack  on  Wellington's  left),  reached  the  great  battery  in  the 
French  position,  and  was  sabering  cannoneers  and  horses, 
when,  just  as  the  force  of  the  charge  was  completely  spent, 
he  was  struck  by  the  French  lancers  and  cuirassiers.  The 
exhausted  cavalry  was  completely  and  easily  overthrown, 
the  French  horsemen  making  mere  sport  of  overtaking 
and  dispatching  the  retreating  British  troopers. 

When  the  attacking  line  charges,  the  support  takes 
the  full  gallop;  and  when  at  proper  distance,  it  charges 
against  the  flank  or  an  intact  organization  of  the  enemy. 
It  may  often  be  expedient  to  detach  the  support,  either 
entirely  or  in  part,  early  in  the  attack,  to  make  a  distinct 
but  simultaneous  charge  upon  the  enemy's  flank  in  con- 
nection with  the  main  attack.  Under  the  cover  of  dust  or 
smoke,  this  may  be  of  the  nature  of  a  surprise;  and  even 
if  plainly  seen,  it  may  deceive  the  enemy  as  to  the  direc- 
tion from  which  to  expect  the  main  attack,  and  it  will,  at 
least,  compel  him  to  divide  his  force  to  make  dispositions 
to  protect  his  flank.  The  reserve  is  not  habitually  thrown 
into  action  except  to  meet  an  unexpected  flank  attack,  OP 
take  advantage  of  an  opening  to  strike  the  enemy  on  the 
flank.  In  a  large  force — such  as  a  brigade  or  division— 
the  reserve  takes  advantage  of  natural  obstacles  to  screen 
itself  from  the  view  and  fire  of  the  enemy;  but  it  must  not 
lose  sight  of  the  attacking  line  or  of  the  commander,  nor 
must  it  get  so  far  to  the  rear  that  it  cannot  respond  quick- 
ly to  his  orders.  This  should  not,  however,  be  understood 
as  depriving  the  reserve  commander  of  all  initiative;  and 
the  mere  absence  of  orders  should  never  excuse  him  for 
failing  to  tako  advantage  of  an  opportunity  of  striking  the 
enemy  on  the  flank,  or  of  delivering  any  other  decisive 
blow.  If  in  column,  the  reserve  forms  line  of  columns  at 
deploying  intervals  when  the  attacking  line  charges,  and 
it  assumes  the  functions  of  the  support  when  the  latter 
charges. 

In  the  charge  the  officers  lead,  except  when  the  re-' 
volver  is  used,  in  which  case  they  take  their  positions 
on  the  flanks  or  in  the  rank,  opposite  their  habitual  places. 
Every  unoccupied  detachment  of  cavalry  near  the  charging 
body  should  form  a  part  of  the  reserve  without  orders  to 


126  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

do  so,  unless  it  has  been  stationed  at  a  certain  point  for 
some  particular  object.  Even  then  the  commander  of  the 
detachment  must  decide  as  to  which  is  his  paramount  duty 
in  the  case,  and  must  be  prepared  to  accept  the  conse- 
quences of  any  error  of  judgment  on  his  part.  An  error 
inspired  by  zeal  anl  bravery  is  generally  easily  pardoned.* 

In  all  cases,  and  especially  when  infantry  is  the  object 
of  the  attack,  the  enemy  should  be  shaken  by  artillery  fire 
(generally  from  horse  batteries),  which  should  be  continued 
until  the  charging  cavalry  masks  the  front  of  the  guns.** 

When  the  charge  is  successful,  the  enemy  is  pursued 
by  the  troopers  engaged  in  the  mellay,  until  the  pursuit  can 
be  taken  up  by  the  support  and  reserve,  when  the  first  line 
rallies  and  acts  as  a  support  to  the  pursuing  force.  From 
the  moment  the  enemy  breaks,  no  time  should  be  allowed 
him  to  rally,  but  he  should  be  driven  either  entirely  off  the 
field  or  under  shelter  of  his  infantry.  In  the  case  of  an 
unsuccessful  charge,  the  attacking  line  should  so  withdraw 
as  to  avoid  collision  with  the  support  and  reserve,  which 
should  both  attack  the  pui  suing  force  in  flank.  The  at- 
tacking line  then  rallies,  and  comes  up  to  act  as  a  support 
to  its  former  support  and  reserve. 

Influence  of  the  Terrain. — The  influence  of  the  terrain 
is  greater  upon  the  action  of  cavalry  than  upon  that  of 
infantry.  The  Germans  train  their  cavalry  to  charge  with 
unbroken  ranks  over  ditches,  low  walls,  and  broken  ground; 
bin  such  riding  is  possible  only  with  cavalry  horses  that  are 
acknowledged  to  be  the  most  carefully  trained  in  the  world. 
Plowed  ground,  heavy  sand,  and  wet  and  swampy  soil  will 
retard,  and  in  isome  cases  check,  the  charge  of  cavalry.  It 
is  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  open,  level  ground  is  the 

*In  the  great  cavalry  battle  at  Gettysburg,  Captain  Miller,  of 
the  Third  Pennsylvania  Cavalry,  seeing  an  opportunity  to  strike 
Wade  Hampton's  column  in  flank  as  it  was  charged  in  front  by 
Custer,  turned  to  his  first  lieutenant  with  the  remark:  "I  have  been 
ordered  to  hold  this  position,  but  if  you  will  back  me  up  in  case  I 
am  court-martialed  for  disobedience,  I  will  order  a  charge."  The 
charge  was  opportune  and  effective,  and  no  mention  of  a  court- 
martial  was  ever  made.  Miller's  conduct  on  this  occasion  is  in 
striking  contrast  with  that  of  Cardigan  at  Balaklava. 

**See  Chapter  VI. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  127 

best  for  cavalry  action;  for  on  such  ground  surprise  is  im 
possible,  and  the  fire  of  infantry  and  artillery  has  an  un- 
broken sweep.  Undulating  ground,  if  not  broken  by  woods 
inclosures,  or  other  obstacles,  is  the  best,  as  it  affords  very 
considerable  shelter  without  impeding  the  force  of  the 
attack.  A  charge  may  be  made  down  a  slope  of  less  than 
five,  or  up  a  hill  of  not  more  than  ten  degrees.  A  combi- 
nation of  open  and  inclosed  ground  is  favorable  for  a  cav- 
alry attack,  provided  that  passages  exist  by  which  the 
columns  may  go  from  one  clear  space  to  another,  and  open 
ground  suitable  for  the  charge  exists  immediately  in  fron* 
of  the  place  of  collision.  The  worst  possible  ground  is 
that  which  impedes  the  progress  of  the  cavalry  without 
affording  shelter  from  the  enemy's  fire — such  as  the  ground 
over  which  Michel's  cuirassiers  charged  at  Worth,  where 
"rows  of  trees  cut  down  close  to  the  ground,  and  deep 
ditches,  impeded  the  movement  of  large  bodies  in  close 
formation,  whilst  the  infantry  had  a  perfectly  open  range 
over  the  gentle  slopes  of  the  otherwise  exposed  heights."* 

The  extent  of  the  ground  will  have  a  great  influence 
on  the  formation  of  the  attacking  cavalry.  For  a  charge 
in  line,  there  should  be  room  enough  laterally  for  deploy- 
ment and  for  flank  attack;  failing  this  condition,  the  charge 
must  be  made  in  a  different  formation.  In  any  case,  there 
should  be  room  enough  to  the  front  to  enable  full  headway 
to  be  gained  for  the  charge,  and  for  the  mellay  and  rally; 
and  to  the  rear  there  should  be  no  insurmountable  obstacle 
on  which  the  cavalry,  in  case  of  reverse,  might  be  forced 
back. 

Ground  Scouts  and  Combat  Patrols. — A  knowledge  of  the 
ground  is  imperatively  necessary  for  the  cavalry  leader 
for  a  charge  made  over  unknown  ground  frequently  results 
in  serious  disaster  independently  of  the  efforts  of  the  enem* 
The  FJ  ussian  Fourth  Hussars,  at  Koniggratz,  charging  over 
unknown  ground,  came,  while  in  full  gallop,  upon  a  gully 
which  had  been  concealed  from  view  by  the  high  standing 
grain,  and  nearly  all  were  precipitated  headlong  therein, 
the  charge  thus  coming  to  a  disastrous  end. 

*German  "Official  Account." 


128  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

To  avoid  such  accidents,  ground  scouts  should  be  sent 
forward  to  reconnoiter  the  ground.  These  men,  who  should 
be  selected  for  their  intelligence,  daring,  and  power  of 
quick  observation,  move  at  a  considerable  distance  to  the 
front,  and  communicate  by  signal  with  the  commander. 
The  duty  is  an  extremely  hazardous  one,  but  the  occasion 
generally  demands  it,  and  even  if  all  the  scouts  should 
be  killed  or  wounded,  the  loss  would  be  justified  by  the 
preservation  of  the  command  from  disaster.  When  the 
charge  begins,  the  scouts  clear  away  from  the  front  at  a 
run,  and  take  position  on  the  flanks.  In  the  United  States 
it  will  be  found  necessary  to  equip  the  ground  scouts  with 
nippers  with  which  to  cut  wire  fences.  Combat  patrols, 
consisting  of  two  or  three  men  each,  should  be  sent  out 
to  the  flanks  to  give  timely  notice  of  threatened  attacks 
by  the  enemy.  The  men  composing  these  patrols  should 
have  the  same  qualifications  as  the  ground  scouts.  When- 
ever a  body  of  cavalry  halts  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy, 
it  should  send  out  ground  scouts  and  combat  patrols  at 
once. 

Flank  Attacks. — Of  cavalry  charges  it  may  be  said  with- 
out material  error,  that  only  flank  attacks  give  decisive 
results.  Indeed,  as  Von  Schmidt  declares,  ten  men  on  a 
flank  are  worth  more  than  a  hundred  in  front;  and  all  cav- 
alry movements  in  the  charge  should  aim  to  strike  a  hos- 
tile flank  either  directly  or  in  conjunction  with  the  firont 
attack. 

The  flank  attack  may  be  made  either  by  a  portion  of 
the  line  overlapping  that  of  the  enemy  and  wheeling  in- 
ward, or  by  a  detached  force  making  a  direct  attack  upon 
the  hostile  flank.  The  former  method  is  dangerous  when 
the  force  does  not  exceed  that  of  the  enemy;  for  in  order 
to  overlap  with  one  flank,  the  other  must  be  similarly  ex- 
posed to  the  enemy.  The  second  method  generally  pro- 
ducesi  the  most  decisive  results,  but  it  can  be  effected  only 
by  surprise.  This,  however,  is  not  always  difficult,  as  by 
utilizing  the  various  features  of  the  terrain  it  is  often 
possible  to  get  within  a  comparatively  short  distance  of 
the  opposing  force  without  being  seen;  and  this  is  espe- 
cially the  case  when  the  attention  of  the  hostile  troops 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  129 

is  taken  up  with  a  tyody  of  menacing  cavalry  in  its  front. 
Opportunities  for  direct  attacks  upon  a  flank  are  often 
presented  by  a  body  of  cavalry  engaged  in  an  attack.  At 
Gettysburg,  a  charging  column  of  Confederate  cavalry, 
consisting  of  the  brigades  of  Fitzhugh  Lee,  Hampton,  and 
Chambliss,  while  opposed  in  front  by  Custer  with  only  a 
single  regiment,  was  assailed  in  flank  by  several  regiments 
of  Union  cavalry,  and  driven  back. 

A  charge  on  the  enemy's  flank  in  conjunction  with  a 
front  attack  is  more  effective  just  after  the  clash  of  the 
two  opposing  lines  than  when  simultaneous  with  it.  The 
two  lines  rebound  from  the  shock,  horses  frequently  be- 
ing turned  "end  over  end"  and  crushing  their  riders  under- 
neath them,  and  the  opponents  then  interlock  in  a  mellay 
which  often  lasts  only  one  or  two  minutes,  and  rarely  con* 
tinues  more  than  five  or  ten.  If  the  flank  attack  can 
strike  just  at  the  moment  of  the  rebound  from  the  colli- 
sion in  front,  it  may  ride  down  the  disordered  line,  and 
sweep  it  off  the  field  before  it  has  a  chance  to  recover 
from  the  first  shock. 

Time  for  Attack. — In  a  cavalry  charge  the  first  consid- 
eration is  that  the  attack  should  be  opportune.  A  timely 
attack  in  a  poor  or  disordered  formation  and  over  unfa- 
vorable ground  is  worth  more  than  the  most  perfectly 
prepared  and  conducted  charge  made  either  prematurely 
or  after  the  "golden  moment"  has  passed.  If  the  attack 
be  made  too  soon,  the  enemy  will  be  found  unshaken  and 
unsurprised;  if  made  too  late,  the  confusion,  bad  position, 
or  other  unfavorable  circumstance  of  the  enemy  will  be 
found  remedied,  and  the  opportunity  will  be  lost.  By  a 
charge  in  the  nick  of  time,  Kellerman,  with  only  four  squad- 
rons, saved  the  day  for  the  French  at  Marengo.  Marmont, 
who  was  an  eye-witness  of  the  attack,  says  that  a  differ- 
ence of  three  minutes  sooner  or  later  would  probably  have 
rendered  the  charge  useless. 

It  is  necessary,  therefore,  that  a  cavalry  leader  should 
be  a  man  of  keen  observation,  quick  decision,  and  such 
resolution  that  he  will  never  shrink  from  taking  the  ini- 
tiative when  the  fleeting  opportunity  for  a  successful 
charge  presents  itself.  Good  cavalry  leaders  are  the  rar- 
est of  all  military  men. 


130  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

THE  CHARGE  IN  COLUMN  AND  AS  FORAGERS. 

When  not  made  in  line  with  support  and  reserve  in 
echelon,  the  charge  should  be  made  in  a  column  of  sub- 
divisions, the  distance  between  which  should  be  such  as 
to  admit  of  each  rendering  timely  support  to  the  one  in 
front,  without  being  so  close  as  to  be  compromised  in  its 
defeat.  Until  the  time  of  deploying  for  the  charge,  the 
rear  subdivisions  should  be  in  small  columns,  so  as  to 
leave  openings  for  the  first  line  in  case  of  defeat.  The 
subdivisions  charge  successively,  the  leading  unit,  if  re- 
pulsed or  broken  by  the  shock,  endeavoring  to  clear  the 
flanks  of  the  column  and  form  in  rear.  The  charge  in 
column  of  subdivisions  may  be  made  in  column  of  platoons, 
column  of  troops,  column  of  squadrons,  or  in  a  line  of  such 
columns.  A  charge  in  column  of  subdivisions  gives  a  suc- 
cession of  shocks  falling  in  the  same  place,  and  is  prefer- 
able to  the  attack  in  line,  unless  the  latter  offers  an  op- 
portunity for  an  attack  on  the  hostile  flank,  either  direct 
or  in  conjunction  with  a  front  attack. 

It  is  of  vital  importance  that  the  subdivisions  be  not 
too  close.  At  the  battle  of  Sohr  (September  30,  1745),  fifty 
Austrian  squadrons  were  formed  in  three  lines,  with  dis- 
tances of  only  twenty  yards.  The  Prussian  cavalry,  charg- 
ing them  squarely  in  front,  threw  the  first  line  in  con- 
fusion upon  the  second,  and  the  combined  lines  upon  the 
third,  and  swept  the  whole  mass  in  disordered  rout  from 
the  field. 

The  charge  in  column  of  subdivisions  was  frequently 
used  in  the  War  of  Secession,  the  most  celebrated  instance 
of  its  use  being  at  Gettysburg,  where  the  brigades  of 
Hampton  and  Lee,  charging  in  close  column  of  squadrons, 
were  met  by  Ouster  in  the  same  formation.  On  this  occa- 
sion the  especial  weakness  of  a  charge  in  this  formation 
— the  exposure  of  the  flanks — was  also  manifested.  It  is 
with  a  heavy  and  dense  column  of  cavalry  as  with  a  sim- 
ilar column  of  infantry.  It  cannot  be  actuated  by  a  single 
impulse,  and  every  trooper  added  to  increase  its  mass 
adds  to  the  number  of  individual  wills  it  contains,  and 
the  number  of  individual  impulses  of  self-preservation  to- 
be  overcome.  Its  progress  depends  mainly  on  the  courage 
and  skill  of  the  few  men  in  front,  who  cannot  easily  be^ 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  131 

pushed  on  by  those  in  rear  without  incurring  disorder, 
while  the  fall  of  a  single  trooper  in  the  column  is  likely 
to  throw  into  confusion  all  in  rear.  If  the  column  were  a 
solid  body  influenced  by  a  single  mind,  its  force  would  be 
in  proportion  ta  its  mass,  but  under  actual  conditions, 
none  but  small  columns  can,  as  a  rule,  be  used. 

Nevertheless,  charges  have  b2en  made  successfully  in 
column  of  fours,  even  by  forces  as  large  as  a  regiment; 
and  the  nature  of  the  terrain  may  often  be  such  as  to 
present  the  alternative  of  using  cavalry  in  this  formation 
or  not  using  it  at  all.  At  Boonsboro,  Md,,  in  1862,  Colonel 
W.  H.  F.  Lee,  in  commani  of  the  Confederate  rear  guard, 
charged  with  the  Ninth  Virginia  Cavalry  in  column  of  fours, 
through  the  streets  of  the  village,  where  no  other  forma- 
tion was  possible,  and  succeeded  in  his  object  of  checking 
the  Union  pursuit.  In  this  charge,  a  considerable  interval 
was  left  between  the  squadrons,  and  each,  as  it  was  broken 
by  the  shock  of  the  charge,  returned  to  the  rear  and  re- 
formed, the  attack  thus  taking  the  form  of  a  series  of 
shocks.  A  similar  charge  was  made  by  the  Third  Virginia 
Cavalry  at  the  battle  of  Kelly's  Ford,  in  1863.  Many  other 
similar  instances  in  the  same  war  might  be  noted. 

In  charging  in  column  of  fours,  each  four  takes  the 
extended  gallop  when  the  one  next  preceding  has  gained 
the  distance  of  one  horse's  length.  The  charge  may  be 
made  in  double  column  of  fours,  when  the  ground  does  not 
admit  of  a  charge  on  a  wide  front,  and  the  front  of  a 
single  four  seems  inadequate.  In  such  a  case,  the  saber 
and  revolver  might  be  combined,  the  men  on  the  left  flank 
of  the  column  using  the  latter  weapon,  as  the  left  is  the 
weak  side  of  a  swordsman.* 

The  charge  as  foragers  may  be  made  from  either  close- 
order  or  extended-order  line,  the  trcopcrs  always  using  the 
revolver,  unless  otherwise  ordered,  and  charging  in  couples 
with  intervals  of  about  six  yards.  A  reserve  consisting 
of  not  less  than  one-fourth  of  the  command  should  be  kept 
in  hand  in  close  order.  This  method  of  charging  is  adapted 

"The  formation  in  double  column  of  fours  is  prescribed  in  the 
Drill  Regulations  only  for  a  squadron  or  a  larger  body.  Its  use  as  a 
charging  formation  is  recommended  above  only  under  the  peculiar 
conditions  mentioned. 


132  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

to  wooded  and  broken  ground,  and  is  also  employed  to 
lessen  the  target  presented  to  infantry  or  artillery  fire, 
to  annoy  and  occupy  the  enemy  for  the  purpose  of  gain- 
ing time  for  the  deployment  of  troops  in  rear,  or  in  pur- 
suit of  a  defeated  enemy.  If  the  enemy's  cavalry  turn  and 
break  without  awaiting  the  shock,  the  charge  may  be 
checked  and  a  rapid  pursuit  be  made  by  foragers,  the  rest 
of  the  command  following  in  close  order. 

CAVALRY  AGAINST  CAVALRY. 

While  the  use  of  cavalry  against  the  other  arms  on 
the  battle-field  will  not  be  so  great  as  it  was  formerly,  the 
number  of  cavalry  battles  will  doubtless  be  much  greater. 
The  success  of  a  campaign  depending  upon  proper  screen- 
ing and  reconnoitering  duty,  and  this  in  turn  depending 
upon  the  superiority  of  the  cavalry  over  that  of  the  en- 
emy, each  army  will  strive  at  the  outset  to  overthrow  the 
mounted  force  of  its  opponent.  The  constant  attempts 
to  break  through  the  screen  of  the  enemy,  and  to 
thwart  him  in  similar  attempts,  will  lead  to  continual 
encounters  between  the  screening  troops,  until  finally, 
when  the  armies  arrive  within  the  presence  of  each  other, 
the  cavalry  of  each  will  uncover  the  front,  and  withdraw 
to  positions  on  the  flanks.  From  these  positions,  the  cav- 
alry, accompanied  by  horse  artillery,  will  endeavor  to  gain 
the  flanks,  or  even  the  rear,  of  the  enemy,  for  the  purpose 
of  creating  a  diversion;  and  it  will  aid  and  support  every 
attempt  to  attack  the  enemy's  flank,  and  use  every  endear 
or  to  prevent  similar  attacks  in  return.  This  will  often 
lead  to  such  great  cavalry  combats  as  those  on  the  flanks 
at  Gettysburg  and  Mars-la-Tour. 

Again,  it  being  the  duty  of  the  cavalry  of  a  defeated 
army  to  cover  the  retreat,  and  of  that  of  the  victor  to  con- 
duct the  pursuit,  almost  every  great  battle  will  close  with 
an  engagement  of  cavalry. 

An  attack  made  with  vigor  and  audacity  by  a  small 
force  of  cavalry  against  a  large  one  may  often  be  the 
means  of  gaining  time  and  averting  a  disaster.* 

*Reports  of  Captain  James  E.  Harrison,  Fifth  United  States 
Cavalry,  and  General  W.  H.  F.  Lee,  C.  S.  A.,  in  "Official  Records  of 
Union  and  Confederate  Armies,"  Vol.  XXXIX. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  133 

The  best  opportunities  for  a  cavalry  attack  upon  the 
enemy's  cavalry  are  when  the  latter  is  issuing  from  a  defile 
and  presents  a  narrow  front;  when  it  can  be  surprised  in 
a  column  formation;  when  it  can  be  taken  in  flank  while 
charging  another  body;  when  it  is  exhausted;  while  it  is 
changing  formation,  or  when  it  is  on  ground  unfavorable 
to  its  deployment.  In  the  latter  case,  the  ground,  while 
unfavorable  to  the  deployment  of  the  enemy,  must,  of 
course,  offer  no  obstacle  to  that  of  the  attacking  cavalry, 
and  it  must  not  afford  shelter  behind  which  a  portion  of 
the  enemy's  cavalry  could  be  placed  for  effective  dis- 
mounted fire  action.  For  instance,  the  enemy  may  be 
emerging  from  a  wood  into  an  open  plain  on  which  the 
attacking  cavalry  can  readily  deploy,  while  the  enemy's 
deployment  is  still  obstructed  by  the  wood;  but  a  charge 
upon  him  might  subject  the  attacking  troops  to  a  destruct- 
ive fire  from  a  part  of  his  force  dismounted  and  sheltered 
by  the  timber. 

It  is  evident  that  the  combats  of  cavalry  with  cavalry 
will  generally  be  fought  by  the  cavalry  divisions.  The 
divisional  cavalry  will  habitually  be  used  in  conjunction 
with  the  other  troops  of  the  division,  and  will  rarely  be 
engaged  in  a  pure  cavalry  fight,  except  when  united  with 
the  cavalry  divisions  in  screening  duty,  in  the  pursuit,  or 
in  covering  the  retreat,  or  when  employed  in  defending  the 
divisional  artillery  from  an  attack  by  the  enemy's  cavalry. 

CAVALRY  AGAINST  INFANTRY. 

Cavalry  may  be  used  with  effect  against  infantry  un- 
der the  following  circumstances: 

I.    When  the  Infantry  is  broken  by  the  fire  of  the  op- 
posing infantry  or  artillery. 

II.    When  the   infantry  is  engaged   with  opposing  in- 
fantry. 

III.  To  compel  the  infantry  to  take  up  such  a  formation 

as  to  present  a  good  target  to  the  fire  of  the 
opposing  infantry  or  artillery. 

IV.  To  check  an  attack  of  the  enemy's  infantry  and 

gain  time  for  the  arrival  of  reinforcements. 


34  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

V.     When  infantry  is  exhausted  by  a  prolonged  contest 

with  infantry. 

VI.     When  infantry  is  disordered  in  retreat. 
VII.     In  covering  a  retreat. 
VIII.     To    cut    through    a    surrounding    force    of    hostile 

infantry. 

IX.     When  the  infantry  is  demoralized,  of  poor  qual- 
ity, is  out  of  ammunition,  or  can  be  taken  by 
surprise. 
X.    When  the  infantry  is  mounted. 

Infantry  is  fitted  neither  by  training  nor  armament 
for  mounted  combat,  and  is  consequently  at  a  great  disad- 
vantage until  dismounted.  The  act  of  dismounting  takes 
some  seconds,  and  for  a  battalion  or  regiment  to  transform 
itself  from  a  body  of  horsemen  to  a  force  on  foot,  with  their 
horses  held  securely  under  cover  in  the  rear,  requires  an 
appreciable  space  of  time. 

ForrriiMon  for  Attack. — Infantry  in  masses  or  in  line 
in  close  order  should  be  attacked  in  line  of  columns  or  in 
successive  lines  at  about  100  yards  distance,  the  lines  as 
nearly  equal  as  practicable,  successive  waves  of  cavalry 
being  necessary  to  prevent  the  infantry  from  re-forming 
when  the  charge  has  passed  over  it.  When  the  infantry 
is  in  extended  order,  it  should  be  charged  by  foragers,  sup- 
ported by  about  half  of  the  force  in  close  order;  the  latter 
to  advance  in  reinforcement,  or  form  a  rallying-point  in 
case  of  repulse. 

In  charging  infantry,  cavalry  should  take  the  shortest 
line,  but  should  endeavor,  from  the  first,  so  to  shape  its 
course  as  to  strike  the  infantry  in  flank.  In  attacking  the 
infantry  in  front,  the  cavalry  should  endeavor  to  approach 
from  the  right  of  the  infantry,  as  the  oblique  fire  of  the 
latter  is  less  effective  towards  its  right  than  towards  its 
left.  It  is  also  an  advantage,  in  attacking  infantry,  to 
charge  up  a  slight  slope,  as  the  bullets  are  in  such  a  case 
likely  to  pass  over  the  heads  of  the  advancing  troops.  In 
attacking  infantry,  it  is  necessary  that  the  gallop  should  be 
taken  much  sooner  than  in  attacking  cavalry,  as  it  is  of 
the  utmost  importance  to  Diminish  the  time  of  exposure 
to  the  hostile  fire. 

In   attacking  infantry,   the   cavalry  must  be   careful 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  135 

not  to  mask  the  fire  of  its  own  infantry  and  artillery;  other- 
wise the  charge  might,  under  some  circumstances,  be  of 
positive  benefit  to  the  enemy. 

The  Use  of  Cavalry  against  Infantry  Not  a  Thing  of  the 
Past. — There  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  cavalry  will  not 
frequently  be  used  against  infantry  in  the  wars  of  the  near 
future.  Those  critics  who  would  rule  cavalry  off  the  bat- 
tle-field because  of  the  disasters  of  the  French  horse  in 
charging  intact  infantry  at  Worth  and  Sedan,  should  re- 
member that  the  same  era  that  saw  the  Mamelukes  anni- 
hilated by  the  French  infantry  at  the  Pyramids,  and  Blii- 
cher's  cavalry  wrecked  against  Davout's  squares  at  Auer- 
stadt,  witnessed  the  decisive  charges  at  Marengo,  Auster- 
litz,  and  Borodino.  Granting,  as  we  must,  that  front  at- 
tacks of  cavalry  against  good,  intact  infantry  are  out  of 
the  question,  there  are,  nevertheless,  numerous  cases  in 
which  cavalry  can  be  profitably  used  against  infantry.  The 
employment  of  cavalry  in  these  jaces  will  certainly  often 
subject  it  to  great  loss,  but  it  is  '-very where  acknowledged 
that  under  the  conditions  of  the  modern  battle-field,  infantry 
must  incur  enormous  losses  in  attack,  and  there  is  no  rea- 
son why  infantry  should  be  expected  to  face  death  more 
cheerfully  than  cavalry  should.  Infantry  can  profit  by  the 
shelter  of  the  terrain,  and  so  (in  a  lesser  degree)  can  cav- 
alry. Infantry  does  not  present  so  good  a  target  as  cav- 
alry; neither  does  it  pass  over  the  ground  so  rapidly.  The 
physical  effect  produced  by  the  fire  of  attacking  infantry 
is  lacking  in  the  case  of  cavalry;  but  the  moral  effect  of 
a  cavalry  charge  is  greater  than  that  of  an  infantry  attack. 
Cavalry  still  has  a  gireat  future  before  it  on  the  battle- 
field; but  it  must  have  clear-headed,  quick-witted,  and  fear- 
less leaders,  and  it  r.ust  be  good  cavalry,  not  merely  brave 
men  on  horseback. 

CAVALRY  AGAINST  ARTILLERY. 

Artillery  should  not  ordinarily  feao*  a  front  attack  of 
cavalry.  Nevertheless,  opportunities  will  occur  in  battle 
in  which  artillery  may  be  attacked  by  cavalry  with  every 
prospect  of  success. 

I.    When  in  the  course  of  the  battle  the  artillery  stands 
alone  unsupported  by  other  arms. 


136  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

II.     When  the  artillery  can  be  surprised,  especially  while 
limbering  up  or  in  the  act  of  unlimbering. 

In  this  case  the  artillery  is  manifestly  practically 
helpless,  if  not  supported  by  the  other  arms. 

Formation  for  Attack. — In  attacking  a  battery,  the  cav- 
alry is  divided  into  two  or  three  parts.  The  attacking  line 
charges  as  foragers,  divides  near  the  center  as  it  advances, 
and  assaults  the  battery  on  each  flank,  attacking  the  can- 
noneers and  the  battery  escort.  The  support  advances 
to  secure  the  battery.  The  reserve  follows  in  close  order, 
and  is  held  in  hand  to  repel  a  counter-charge  should  one 
be  made.  If  the  escort  consists  of  cavalry,  the  attack  on 
the  guns  must  be  made  in  extended  order,  but  the  escort 
must  be  attacked  by  a  force  in  close  order.  If  the  battery 
be  in  position,  the  cavalry  should  always  endeavor  to 
strike  it  in  flank  or  rear.  Generally  a  troop  or  squadron 
will  be  sufficient  for  the  attack  of  a  single  battery.  In 
any  case,  the  defeat  of  the  support  is  necessary  to  complete 
the  capture  of  the  battery.  At  Brandy  Station  (June  9, 
1863),  the  Sixth  U.  S.  Cavalry  and  the  Sixth  Pennsylvania 
Cavalry  charged  upon  the  Confederate  artillery.  "Never," 
says  Major  McClellan,  "rode  troopers  more  gallantly  than 
did  those  steady  regulars,  as  under  a  fire  of  shell  and  shrap- 
nel, and  finally  of  canister,  they  dashed  up  to  the  very 
muzzle,  then  through  and  beyond  our  guns,  passing  be- 
tween Hampton's  left  and  Jones'  right.  Here  they  were 
simultaneously  attacked  from  both  flanks,  and  the  sur- 
vivors driven  back."* 

Measures  to  Be  Taken  on  Capturing  a  Battery. — Cavalry 
may  attack  a  battery,  either  with  the  object  of  capturing 
it,  for  the  purpose  of  disabling  it,  or  with  a  view  to  caus- 
ing it  so  much  annoyance  as  to  compel  it  to  change  its  posi- 
tion. The  cavalry,  once  in  possession  of  a  battery,  should 
endeavor  to  carry  it  off.  If  this  be  impossible,  the  guns 
should  be  disabled,1**  and  the  horses  and  limbers  carried  off 

*MoClellan's  "Campaigns  of  Stuart's  Cavalry,"  p.  268. 

**"To  disable  a  field  gun,  open  the  breech-block  and  then  break 
with  a  heavy  hammer;  or  load  the  piece,  close  the  breech  without 
locking  it,  and  fire  the  piece;  or  place  two  or  three  blank  cartridges 
in  the  gun,  close  and  lock  the  breech-block,  ram  from  the  muzzle  a 
ball  of  clay  or  sod,  then  unlock  the  breech-block  and  fire;  or  fire  a 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  137 

if  practicable;  if  this  cannot  be  done,  the  horses  should 
be  killed  and  the  traces  cut.  When  a  gun  is  limbered  up 
and  retreating,  an  attempt  should  be  made  to  shoot  one 
or  more  of  the  horses  of  the  team,  preferably  the  wheelers. 

DEFENSIVE  USE  OF  SHOCK  ACTION. 

Shock  action;  from  its  very  nature,  belongs  to  the 
offensive;  but  it  may  be  used  in  counter-charge  as  a  part 
of  a  general  defensive  plan.  The  flanks  of  the  infantry  and 
artillery  must  be  protected  from  surprise  by  the  enemy's 
cavalry,  which  should  be  taken  in  flank  or  vigorously  as 
sailed  in  front  when  it  attempts  to  strike.  In  such  a  case, 
the  advantage  of  position  is  with  the  cavalry  of  the  de- 
fensive, as  the  place  where  it  is  to  be  used  can  be  known 
beforehand,  and  it  can  often  be  stationed  in  a  position 
affording  shelter,  concealment,  and  proximity  to  the  point 
of  acti  n. 

Divisional  cavalry  may  sometimes  be  used  defensively 
with  effect  at  the  crisis  of  the  fight,  to  delay  the  opposing 
infantry,  or  even  to  check  it  altogether;  this  being  a  case 
of  the  use  of  cavalry  against  exhausted  infantry.  The 
best  time  for  a  counter-charge  by  the  divisional  cavalry  is, 
however,  at  the  moment  when  the  enemy  has  penetrated 
the  position,  as  the  effect  of  the  infantry  fire  of  the  de- 
fender is  then  kept  up  until  the  last  moment,  and  the 
counter-charge  strikes  the  enemy  at  the  instant  of  his 
greatest  disorder. 

The  local  defense  of  cavalry  is  possible  only  with  fire 
action. 

DISMOUNTED  ACTION. 

Cavalry  in  active  operations  has  two  well-defined  roles: 
that  of  detached  or  independent  action  and  that  in  con- 
junction with  other  arms.  In  the  performance  of  either 
of  these  duties,  dismounted  fire  action  plays  an  important 
part.  In  the  United  States  service,  the  trooper  is  now 
armed  with  the  same  rifle  as  the  infantryman,  except  that 

shotted  gun  with  its  muzzle  against  the  chase  of  another.  Guns  of 
the  Krupp  system  may  be  temporarily  disabled  by  carrying  off  the 
breech-block  or  breaking  the  handle  of  the  breech-block." — U.  8.  Cav- 
alry Drill  Regulations. 


138  OBGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

he  is  unprovided  with  a  bayonet.  Making  the  necessary 
deductions  for  horse-holders,  a  force  of  cavalry  should  be 
able  to  perform  as  efficient  service  with  the  rifle  as  infant- 
ry. Owing  to  his  greater  mobility,  the  trooper  should  be 
able  to  move  quickly  to  any  portion  of  the  field  and  thus 
improve  opportunities  for  firing  upon  the  enemy,  which 
the  slower-moving  foot  toldier  would  be  unable  to  grasp. 
Thus  dismounted  fire  action  will  be  successfully  em- 
ployed by  cavalry  for  the  following  purposes: 

I.  To  drive  away  or  capture  small  bodies  of  infantry 
or  partisan  troops,  who  endeavor  to  check  the 
progress  of  raiding  or  reconnoitering  cavalry. 
II.  To  force  a  defile  whicL  blocks  an  advance,  and  thus 
avoid  a  delay;  oir,  to  seize  and  hold  localities  un- 
til the  arrival  of  infantry. 

III.  To  reinforce  infantry  in  emergencies. 

IV.  To  fill  a  gap  in  the  line  of  battle. 

Formerly  the  compact  order  in  which  infantry  maneu- 
vered facilitated  control  by  commanders  and  rendered  gaps 
in  a  line  of  battle  rare;  dispersion,  however,  is  the  order 
of  fighting  of  the  present  day,  and  under  such  conditions 
involuntary  breaches  in  the  general  front  are  liable  to 
occur,  and  to  fill  these,  mounted  troops  kept  in  reserve 
will  prove  most  serviceable. 

Similarly,  cavalry  may  occupy  a  position  for  the  pur- 
pose of  relieving  infantry,  and  causing  the  enemy  to  be- 
lieve that  the  position  is  still  held  in  force. 

V.     In  an  inclosed,  wooded,  or  broken  country,  where 

mounted  action  is  impracticable. 
VI.    In  covering  a  retreat. 
VII.     When  exhausted  or  defeated  cavalry  is  called  upon 

to  resist  a  charge  of  fresh  cavalry. 
VIII.     In  conjunction  with  cavalry  mounted. 
IX.     In  turning  movements,  when  opportunities  are  pre- 
sented for  opening  enfilade  fire  on  the  enemy's 
lines. 

There  will  be  many  occasions  when  the  enemy  is  held 
in  front  by  infantry,  on  which  a  force  of  cavalry  on  ac- 
count of  its  mobility  could  make  a  rapid  turning  movement 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  139 

and  enfilade  the  enemy's  line  before  he  can  make  disposi- 
tions to  meet  it. 

X.    Whenever  cavalry,  through  force  of  circumstances,  is 
deprived  of  the  power  of  using  mounted  action. 

Increased  Value  of  Dismounted  Action. — The  increased 
value  of  dismounted  fire  action  is  due  solely  to  the  in- 
creased range  of  fire-arms.  With  the  old  muzzle-loading, 
smooth-bore  weapons  it  would  have  been  almost  impossible 
for  cavalry  to  do  any  effective  work  on  foot,  and  then 
mount  and  withdraw.  Dismounted  fire  action  was  accord- 
ingly limited  to  a  very  few  objects,  such  as  forcing  a  pas- 
sage or  defile  against  inferior  numbers  of  foot  troops,  or 
in  defending  some  similar  position  to  the  last  extremity. 
Cavalry  can  now,  however,  dismount  and  subject  the  en- 
emy to  a  destructive  fire,  and  still  have  time,  if  pressed 
by  superior  numbers,  to  mount  and  withdraw  in  safety. 

Formation. — To  prepare  for  dismounted  action,  the  cav- 
alry is  always  formed  in  column  of  fours,  or  in  line  of  col- 
umns of  fours,  usually  one  man  of  each  four  holding  the 
horses,  and  the  rest  of  the  command  forming  for  action  to 
the  right,  left,  right-front,  or  left-front  of  the  column.  A 
mounted  reserve  is  retained  for  such  mounted  action  as 
circumstances  may  require.  It  may  be  charged  with  the 
protection  of  the  led  horses,  or  the  latter  may  be  intrusted 
to  a  designated  detachment  or  detachments. 

The  proportion  of  men  dismounted  is  generally  three- 
fourths  of  the  whole  command,  excepting  the  mounted  re- 
serve, but  depends  upon  the  degree  of  danger  to  which  the 
horses  are  exposed,  and  the  amount  of  mobility  required  of 
them,  as  well  as  the  amount  of  fire  action  required  of  the 
dismounted  line.  It  may  be  necessary  to  keep  as  many  as 
half  of  the  men  mounted;  and  on  the  other  hand,  when  a 
strong  firing  line  is  imperatively  necessary  and  the  horses 
are  well  sheltered  and  likely  to  remain  stationary,  all  the 
horses  of  a  platoon  may  be  linked  together  in  a  circle,  and 
left  to  the  care  of  a  single  horse-holder,  almost  the  entire 
force  being  thus  made  available  for  action.  The  horse- 
holders  usually  remain  mounted;  but  when  charged  with 
the  care  of  many  horses,  or  in  order  to  obtain  shelter,  they 
may  be  allowed  to  dismount.  The  horses  should  never  be 


140  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

exposed  to  direct  fire  if  it  can  possibly  be  avoided;  but  they 
should  be  kept  as  near  the  line  as  considerations  of  pro- 
tection permit,  and  they  should  not  be  moved  unless  a  ma- 
terial change  is  made  in  the  position  of  the  dismounted 
men.  The  horses  should  be  kept  under  cover  in  rear  of 
their  respective  subdivisions,  and  it  is  very  important  that 
they  should  be  brought  up  to  the  line  (or  remain  standing) 
in  the  same  formation  that  they  were  in  when  the  troop- 
ers dismounted;  otherwise  there  will  be  confusion  and  de- 
lay at  a  time  when  haste  is  urgent. 

The  dismounted  men  are  maneuvered  and  fought  in 
essentially  the  same  manner  as  infantry,  the  first  line 
consisting  of  skirmishers,  support,  and  reserve.  The  latter 
is  in  addition  to  the  mounted  reserve.  When  the  squadron 
is  in  action  as  a  part  of  the  regiment,  there  is  no  mounted 
squadron  reserve,  except  such  mounted  guard  as  may  be 
necessary  for  the  led  horses. 

In  partisan  or  Indian  warfare,  or  in  guarding  convoys, 
especially  in  a  broken  or  wooded  country,  mounted  skir- 
mishers may  dismount  and  retain  their  horses  on  the  lino. 
A  more  effective  fire  can  thus  be  obtained  than  would  be 
possible  in  mounted  firing.  This  method  of  dismounted 
action  is  only  for  the  purpose  of  fighting  a  delaying  action, 
or  for  repulsing  an  annoying  but  insignificant  enemy;  real 
work  must  be  done  either  by  regularly  dismounting  to  fight 
on  foot,  or  by  making  a  mounted  charge. 

Offensive  Action. — As  a  rule,  the  cavalry  approaches  as 
near  as  possible  to  the  enemy  before  dismounting.  It 
should  at  least  be  able  to  remain  mounted  until  it  encoun- 
ters artillery  fire.  The  dismounted  force  should  put  a» 
many  carbines  as  practicable  in  the  firing  line  from  the 
first,  and  should  close  with  the  enemy  as  quickly  as  pos- 
sible. When  the  hostile  position  is  carried,  the  dismounted 
men  should  at  first  merely  hold  it,  the  mounted  reserve 
pursuing,  and  the  led  horses  being  brought  up  to  the  posi- 
tion. The  attacking  force  is  then  assembled  as  soon  as 
possible,  and  may  either  mount  and  follow  the  mounted 
reserve  in  pursuit,  or  prepare  to  defend  the  position  from 
counter-attack.  Whenever  a  sufficient  number  of  mounted 
men  can  be  spared,  an  attempt  may  be  made,  in  eonjunc- 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  141 

tion  with  the  dismounted  attack,  by  the  mounted  reserve 
against  the  enemy's  flank  or  rear. 

Even  when  the  attack  is  to  be  made  on  foot,  ground 
scouts  and  combat  patrols  (mounted  if  practicable)  should 
always  be  sent  out,  for  the  change  from  dismounted  to 
mounted  action  is  one  for  which  the  cavalry  should  always 
be  prepared.  The  ground  scouts  should  be  drawn  in  when 
the  fight  begins,  the  patrols  remaining  on  the  flanks. 

Defensive  Action. — When  dismounted  cavalry  is  acting 
on  the  defensive,  the  whole  of  the  reserve  should,  as  soon 
as  the  enemy's  attack  is  developed,  be  put  in  the  firing  line, 
unless  there  be  danger  to  the  position  at  other  points.  If 
attacked  by  a  superior  force,  the  defenders  should  discon- 
tinue the  action  in  time  to  mount  and  retire  to  another 
position,  unless  ordered  to  hold  on  at  all  hazards.  In  de- 
fending a  bridge,  street,  or  defile,  the  dismounted  cavalry 
should  construct  barricades,  and,  as  a  general  rule,  cav- 
alry should  intrench  whenever  it  is  on  a  pure  defensive. 

If  opposed  to  mounted  cavalry  (as  mentioned  above), 
the  cavalry  o-n  the  defensive  should  endeavor  to  subject  it 
to  an  annihilating  magazine  fire  at  short  range,  a  reserve 
being  kept  mounted.  If  the  assailants  are  thrown  into  con 
fusion  by  the  fire,  oir  if  they  attempt  to  dismount,  an  op- 
portunity may  be  offered  to  the  reserve  to  charge  them,  or 
to  attack  their  led  horses. 

As  a  rule,  cavalry  should  avoid  engaging  in  a  dis- 
mounted fight  with  infantry;  but  should  an  emergency  de- 
mand such  action,  it  should  endeavor  to  add  to  its  shooting 
power  by  its  superior  mobility.  Cavalry  may  often,  by 
celerity  of  movement  and  skill  in  utilizing  concealing  feat- 
ures of  the  terrain,  be  able  to  strike  the  flank  of  a  march- 
ing column  of  infantry,  which  it  can  annoy  and  throw  into 
disorder  with  its  fire,  gradually  withdrawing  from  the 
firing  line  as  the  infantry  becomes  engaged,  and  mounting 
and  retreating  before  it  can  receive  heavy  loss  in  return. 

Dismounted  fire  action  adds  immeasurably  to  the  inde- 
pendence and  fighting  power  of  cavalry,  and  is  an  indis- 
pensable part  of  the  functions  of  that  arm. 
—it— 


142  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

MOUNTED  FIRE  ACTION. 

Mounted  fire  action  with  the  carbine  is  here  consid 
ered.  The  pistol  may  be  used  in  shock  action  in  place  of 
the  saber. 

Mounted  fire  action  may  be  used  as  follows: 
I.     As  a  means  of  temporary  resistance  by  small  scouting 
parties,  or  by  the  point  and  flankers  of  an  advance 
guard. 

II.     In  the  pursuit  of  a  beaten  enemy,  when  a  mounted 
charge  is  impracticable. 

III.  In  covering  a  retreat  when  the  pursuit  is  so  active 

and  so  'strong  as  to  make  it  unsafe  to  dismount 
and  inexpedient  to  charge.* 

IV.  When  the  opposing  cavalry  is  charging  over  heavy 

and  unfavorable  ground. 

Mounted  fire  action  may  be  used  by  cavalry  in  close 
order,  but  the  habitual  formation  for  this  mode  of  fight- 
ing is  in  extended  order,  the  skirmishers  being  deployed 
with  intervals  of  four  yards. 

Mounted  fire  action  is  the  least  effective  use  of  cav- 
alry, and  it  may  be  well  to  repeat  that  it  should  never  be 
osed  when  either  shock  action  or  dismounted  fire  action  is 
practicable. 

CAVALRY  RAIDS. 

The  subject  of  raids  belongs  really  to  the  strategic 
service  of  cavalry;  but  this  duty  is  so  important  and  so 
intimately  connected  with  the  vaiious  tactical  uses  of  cav- 
alry that  it  may  well  be  considered  in  connection  with 
tactics. 

Cavalry  raids  may  be  undertaken  for  one  or  more  of 
the  following  objects: 

I.  To  threaten  or  destroy  the  communications  of  the  en- 
emy, thus  compelling  him  to  weaken  himself  for 
their  protection,  or  £elay  his  advance. 

The  operations  of  Morgan  and  Forrest  against  the  com- 
munications 3f  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  after  the  bat- 
tle of  Murfreesboro,  and  Forrest's  threatening  movements 

*See  the  subject  "Mounted  Fire  Action,"  in  Chapter  III. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  143 

toward  Sherman's  communications  in  1864,  exemplify  this 
use  of  cavalry  raids. 

II.  To  check  an  invading  army  by  operations  against  its 

communications  and  the  capture  of  its  immediate 

base  of  supplies. 

The  combined  operations  of  Forrest  and  Van  Dorn 
against  Grant  in  Mississippi  in  December,  1862,  consti- 
tute, perhaps,  the  most  successful  and  profitable  raid  ever 
undertaken.  The  region  in  which  the  armies  were  operat- 
ing was  exhausted,  and  the  destruction  of  the  depot  and 
the  railroad  by  which  further  supplies  could  be  accumu- 
lated compelled  Grant  to  abandon  his  movement  against 
Vicksburg  and  fall  back  upon  Memphis. 

III.  To  make  a  diversion  in  favor  of  the  main  army  by 

drawing  off  troops  in  pursuit  of  the  raiding  force. 

After  the  battle  of  Antietam  (September  17,  1862), 
Lee's  army,  diminished  in  numbers  and  suffering  from  its 
disastrous  check,  had  crossed  into  Virginia,  and  it  was  of 
great  importance  that  it  should  have  time  for  recupera- 
tion before  again  confronting  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 
Stuart,  with  a  select  force  of  1,800  cavalry,  recrossed  the 
Potomac,  and,  in  a  raid  of  three  days,  passed  completely 
around  McClellan's  army,  captured  Chambersburg,  de- 
stroyed a  vast  quantity  of  public  property,  seized  1,200 
horses,  and  captured  280  prisoners. 

"Not  the  least  important  of  the  results  of  this  expedi- 
tion," says  Stuart's  biographer,  "was  its  effect  on  the  phys- 
ical and  moral  condition  of  the  Federal  cavalry.  As  to  its 
physical  results,  General  McClellan  sufficiently  describes 
them  when  he  says  in  his  report,  that  it  was  necessary  for 
him  to  use  all  of  his  cavalry  against  Stuart,  and  that  'this 
exhausting  service  completely  broke  down  nearly  all  of 
our  cavalry  horses  and  rendered  a  remount  absolutely  in- 
dispensable before  we  could  advance  on  the  enemy.'  On 
the  6th  of  October,  General  McClellan  had  received  posi- 
tive ordeirs  'to  cross  the  river  and  attack  the  enemy.'  He 
was  unable  to  execute  these  orders  until  the  last  days  of 
that  month."* 


""'Campaigns  of  Stuart's  Cavalry.' 


144  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

IV.  To  gain  information. 

In  June,  1862,  McClellan's  army  was  on  the  Chicka- 
hominy  awaiting  reinforcements.  Lee,  contemplating  an 
offensive  movement,  sent  Stuart  "to  make  a  scout  move- 
ment to  the  rear  of  the  enemy,"  the  object  being  mainlj 
"to  gain  intelligence  of  his  operations,  communications, 
etc.,"*  with  incidental  instructions  to  capture  trains,  de- 
stroy supplies,  etc.  Beginning  his  raid  on  the  12th  of  June, 
Stuart  reported  to  General  Lee  on  the  16th,  having  made 
a  circuit  around  McClellan,  in  the  course  of  which  he  cap- 
tured a  few  prisoners  and  destroyed  a  considerable  quan- 
tity of  United  States  property. 

"The  greatest  results,  however,  were  those  which  fol- 
lowed from  the  information  obtained  by  Stuart.  All  doubt 
as  to  the  location  of  the  Federal  army  was  solved,  and 
the  possibility  was  demonstrated  of  those  movements 
which,  on  the  27th  of  June,  culminated  in  the  defeat  of 
the  Federal  right  wing  at  Cold  Harbor."** 

V.  To  cause  alarm  in  the  enemy's  country,  and  thus  de- 

stroy confidence  in  the  enemy's  commanding  gen- 
eral, or  create  a  sentiment  unfavorable  to  the  pros- 
ecution of  the  war. 

The  greatest  result  of  Stuart's  Chickahominy  raid  was, 
however,  a  moral  one.  It  caused  a  great  commotion  and 
excitement  throughout  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and 
shook  the  confidence  of  the  North  in  McClellan.*** 

The  raid  of  Morgan  into  the  Northern  States,  in  the 
summer  of  1863,  had  the  effect  of  keeping  employed  for 
a  number  of  weeks  a  force  of  United  States  troops  many 
times  larger  than  his  own  command,  and  thus  deprived 
Rosecrans  of  reinforcements  that  would  have  sufficed  to 
turn  Chickamauga  into  a  Union  victory. 

VI.  To   interfere   with   the   mobilization   and   concentra- 

tion of  the  enemy's  forces  at  the  beginning  of  a 
campaign. 
Raids  for  this  purpose  should  be  made  by  small  forces, 

*Official  instructions  of  Lee  to  Stuart. 
**"Campai2ns  of  Stuart's  Cavalry." 

***See  "The  Civil  War  in  America,"  by  the  Comte  de  Paris 
(American  edition),  Vol.  II.,  page  83. 


ORGANIZATHm    AND   TACTICS.  145 

as  thsir  object  will  generally  be  the  destruction  of  a  bridge, 
viaduct,  tunnel,  or  lock,  and  celerity  will  be  of  paramount 
importance,  in  order  that  the  raiding  force  may  escape  the 
large  bodies  of  troops  concentrating  in  the  theater.  This 
kind  of  raids  may  often  be  made  by  mere  expeditionary 
patrols. 

VII.  To  devastat0  the  enemy's  country  and  destroy  his 

resources. 

The  best  illustration  of  such  an  operation  is  the  great 
raid  of  Wilson  in  the  spring  of  1865.  A  raiding  force  em- 
ployed for  this  purpose  should  be  large — in  fact,  an  army 
of  cavalry  able  to  fight  a  battle,  and  resembling  an  ordi- 
nary raiding  column  only  in  its  independence  of  a  base  or 
depots  of  supply. 

VIII.  To  effect  the  release  of  prisoners. 

In  February,  1864,  Kilpatrick  moved  against  Richmond 
with  a  raiding  force,  consisting  of  4,000  cavalry  and  a  bat- 
tery of  artillery,  for  the  purpose  of  making  a  dash  upon 
the  Confederate  capital  and  releasing  the  Union  prisoners 
confined  there.  He  reached  the  outskirts  of  Richmond,  but 
was  unable  to  effect  his  object.  One  of  the  objects  of 
Stoneman's  unsuccessful  raid  in  Georgia,  in  1864,  was 
the  release  of  Union  prisoners  confined  at  Macon  and 
Andersonville. 

When  raids  are  undertaken  for  this  purpose,  it  is  nec- 
essary to  avoid  embarrassing  the  raiding  column  with  a 
mass  of  unarmed  prisoners  on  foot.  The  raid  will  be  un- 
successful unless  the  prisoners  can  be  quickly  conducted 
to  some  point  of  safety  near  at  hand,  or  can  be  provided 
with  arms,  and  thus  form  a  reinforcement  sufficient  to 
enable  the  raiding  force  to  repulse  any  attack  that  is  likely 
to  be  made  upon  it. 

A  review  of  the  raids  undertaken  by  the  cavalry  of 
both  the  opposing  armies  in  the  recent  campaign  in  Man- 
churia shows  that  they  were  generally  unsuccessful. 

When  Raids  Are  Practicable. — Raids  are  rarely  practica- 
ble in  the  enemy's  country.  In  the  War  of  Secession  the 
only  raids  on  Northern  soil  were  Stuart's  Chambersburg 
raid,  which  was  of  only  three  days'  duration,  and  Morgan's 
great  raid,  which  resulted  in  his  own  defeat  and  capture. 


146  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.      . 

It  being  necessary  to  obtain  information  in  order  to  elude 
the  hostile  forces  pursuing  or  endeavoring  to  head  the  raid- 
ing column,  it  follows  that  in  a  hostile  country  a  raiding 
force  is  operating  in  the  dark  while  its  adversaries  have 
every  advantage.  In  Tennessee  and  Kentucky,  Morgan 
was  always  well  informed  of  every  movement  of  the  United 
States  forces;  but  after  he  crossed  the  Ohio  Kiver  he  found 
it  "utterly  impossible,  moving  as  rapidly  as  he  was  forced 
to  do,  and  in  the  midst  of  a  strange  and  hostile  population, 
to  get  positive  information  regarding  any  matter."* 

The  raiding  columns  of  United  States  cavalry  in  the 
South  met  with  an  advantage  not  often  found  in  an  en- 
emy's country;  for  while  the  white  population  was  intensely 
hostile,  the  slaves  were,  as  a  rule,  more  than  willing  to 
give  information,  and  act  as  guides  or  spies.  This  limita- 
tion of  raids  to  a  friendly  country  is  all  the  more  certain 
when  the  belligerent  nations  speak  different  languages. 
Raids  of  French  cavalry  against  the  communications  of  a 
German  army  invading  France  should  be  perfectly  feasible; 
but  if  the  French  were  invading  Germany,  they  would 
doubtless  find  raiding  exceedingly  difficult.  The  objection 
of  some  European  authorities**  to  making  raids  in  a  thick- 
ly populated  region  may  be  dismissed  at  once  with  the 
remark  that  cavalry  that  cannot  overcome  the  resistance 
of  home  guards,  Franc-tireurs,  or  armed  peasants  is  not.  fit' 
for  raiding,  however  valuable  it  may  be  on  the  field  of 
battle. 

The  allurements  of  adventure  offered  by  a  raid  furnish 
a  temptation  to  every  true  cavalry  leader,  but  it  is  a  temp- 
tation that  should  be  resisted  unless  the  object  justifies  the 
raid;  for  aside  from  the  peril  of  capture  (which  may  be 
evaded  by  courage  and  skill)  there  exists  the  danger  of  the 
demoralization  of  the  command  by  a  spirit  of  depredation, 
or  of  its  being  for  some  time  rendered  unserviceable  by  the 
fatigues  and  exhaustion  of  raiding  duty.  Above  all  is  the 
risk  of  being  absent  from  the  army  when  a  decisive  battle 
occurs.  Many  of  the  raids  in  the  War  of  Secession,  being 

*Duke. 

**Notably  Von  der  Goltz  and  Hohenlohe. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  147 

undertaken  without  an  adequate  object,  or  not  conducted 
with  skill,  terminated  in  disaster. 

In  Stuart's  Chambersburg  raid,  his  entire  command 
marched  eighty  miles  in  twenty-seven  hours.  In  Morgan's 
great  raid,  his  command  averaged  for  some  days  twenty- 
one  hours  a  day  in  the  saddle,  and  on  one  occasion  marched 
ninety  miles  in  thirty-five  hours.  "The  men  in  our  ranks," 
says  General  Duke,  "were  worn  down  and  demoralized  with 
the  tremendous  fatigue,  which  no  man  can  realize  or  form 
the  faintest  conception  of  until  he  has  experienced  it.  It 
is  as  different  from  the  fatigue  of  an  ordinary  long  march, 
followed  by  some  rest,  as  the  pain  given  by  an  hour's  de- 
privation of  water  is  unlike  the  burning,  rabid  thirst  of 
fever."  In  General  Wilson's  raid  against  the  railroad  junc- 
tion at  Burkesville,  Va.,  in  June,  1864,  with  his  own  and 
Kautz's  cavalry  divisions,  the  command  marched  over  300 
miles  and  destroyed  sixty  miles  of  railroad  in  ten  days.* 
General  Kautz  says  that  for  nine  days  and  nights  his  men 
were  in  the  saddle  or  destroying  railroads,  and  were  so 
tired  that  every  exertion  of  the  officers  was  necessary  to 
krer  them  awake  even  under  the  enemy's  fire.  Many  were 
captured  asleep  on  the  road.** 

The  object  must  be  an  important  one  to  justify  such 
demoralizing  fatigue  and  the  consequent  necessary  rest  for 
•recuperation.  Van  Dorn's  raid  upon  Holly  Springs  had 
an  object  worth  any  sacrifice;  for  it  decided  a  campaign, 
anc1  a  great  battle  could  have  done  no  more.  Even  if  his 
si-ccess  had  been  gained  with  the  loss  of  every  trooper  in 
his  command,  the  raid  would  have  been  worth  its  cost.  OB 
the  other  hand,  Stuart's  third  raid  around  the  Army  jf 
the  Potomac,  though  successfully  effected,  was  a  positive 

"This  raid  severed  Lee's  communications  with,  the  South  for 
six  weeks,  and  would  have  compelled  the  evacuation  of  Richmond 
and  Petersburg  had  the  infantry  done  its  share  of  the  work  properly. 
Grant's  use  of  cavalry  during  this  part  of  the  year  was  defective.  It 
should  have  been  kept  united,  and  used  together;  first  against  the 
railroads  north,  and  second  against  those  south  of  Richmond.  As  it 
was,  Sheridan  was  baffled  on  his  Trevilian  raid,  while  Wilson,  al- 
though entirely  successful,  was  compelled  to  beat  a  hasty  retreat. 
United  they  could  have  defeated  any  force  the  Confederates  could 
have  sent  against  them. 

"""Official  Report,  July  4,  1864. 


14b  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

misfortune  t  the  Confederates;  for  it  caused  his  absence 
from  Lee's  army  on  the  first  day  of  the  battle  of  Gettys- 
burg, when  his  cavalry  would  have  been  of  incalculable 
value.  In  a  similar  manner,  an  ill-timed  raid  of  Forres*:, 
in  compliance  with  Hood's  orders,  "to  drain  the  country 
of  persons  liable  to  military  service,  animals  suitable  for 
army  purposes,  and  subsistence  supplies,"  caused  his  ab- 
sence from  the  battle  of  Nashville,  and  doubtless  contrib- 
uted materially  to  the  defeat  of  the  Confederate  army. 

Jomposition  and  Preparation  of  a  Raiding  Force. — A 
raiding  force  should  be  composed  of  well-mounted,  well- 
disciplined,  self-reliant  troops,  sufficiently  toughened  by 
service  to  be  able  to  endure  the  greatest  hardships.  It 
should  consist  of  complete  organizations,  instead  of  de- 
tachments from  different  ones,  and  should  usually  vary  in 
numbers  from  1,000  to  3,000  men.  When  quick  work,  re- 
quiring absolute  secrecy,  is  the  object,  the  force  employed 
may  be  very  small;  when,  on  the  other  hand,  the  expedition 
is  for  the  purpose  of  devastating  a  region  and  destroying 
the  enemy's  resources,  the  force  must  be  large.*  As  the 
force  should  be  strong  enough  to  brush  away  the  hostile 
bodies  met  in  its  path,  and  small  enough  for  mobility,  the 
resistance  likely  to  be  encountered  should  be  carefully  con 
sidered,  and  the  strength  of  the  raiding  column  regulated 
accordingly. 

As  a  rule,  infantry  should  form  no  part  of  a  raiding 
column.  If  a  deficiency  in  cavalry  render  the  employment 
of  infantry  necessary,  the  latter  should  be  mounted.  Artil- 
lery may  often  be  used  with  great  advantage  on  raids,  but 
it  should  consist  of  mountain  or  horse  batteries.  While 
no  fixed  proportion  can  be  prescribed  for  the  number  of  guns 
to  the  total  strength  if  the  raiding  column,  it  should  be 
the  leaist  consistent  with  the  objects  of  the  expedition. 

*Morgan's  first  raid  into  Kentucky  was  made  with  900  men; 
his  great  raid  with  2,400.  Stuart's  raiding  columns  varied  in  strength 
from  1,500  to  2,000  men;  his  great  Chambersburg  raid  being  made 
with  1,800.  Grierson's  raiding  column  numbered  1,800  men.  Wilson's 
command,  including  Kautz's,  in  the  Burkesville  raid,  consisted  of  a 
force  of  5,500.  Wilson  made  his  great  raid  through  Alabama  and 
Georgia  with  13,000  men;  and  Sheridan  had  10,000  troopers  under 
his  command  in  his  raid  against  the  James  River  Canal. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  149 

A  raiding  force  should  always  count  upon  living  upou 
the  country;  but,  to  meet  emergencies,  a  reserve  of  sup- 
plies for  a  few  days  should  invariably  be  carried  along. 
The  commander  of  the  raiding  force  should  compute  as 
accurately  as  possible  the  number  of  days  for  which  he 
should  be  compelled  to  provide  his  command  with  supplies 
in  the  event  of  the  enemy's  resistance,  or  other  emerg- 
ency, preventing  his  foraging,  and  should  carry  half  ra- 
tions and  half  forage  for  such  number  of  days.  These 
supplies  should  be  carried  by  a  train  of  pack-mules;  for  a 
wagon  train  with  a  raiding  column  may  be  characterized 
as  an  unmitigated  nuisance.  A  single  pack-mule  will  carry 
one  day's  half  rations  for  160  men,  or  one  day's  ualf  forage 
(grain)  for  thirty-five  horses.  Each  trooper  might  be  re- 
quired to  carry  as  much  as  five  days'  full  rations  on  his 
own  horse,  and  he  should  invariably  be  required  to  carry 
200  rounds  of  carbine  ammunition  and  an  extra  pair  of 
horse-shoes.  Pioneer  tools  and  explosives,  for  use  in  tin* 
destruction  of  railroads,  bridges,  tunnels,  etc.,  should  be 
provided  and  carried  in  the  pack-train. 

The  objective  of  the  raid  should  be  definitely  deter- 
mined, and  the  commander  should  know  beforehand  just 
how  he  is  to  attain  it.  It  is  always  well  to  have  an  alter- 
native objective,  so  that  in  case  it  should  be  impossible 
to  attain  the  principal  object,  the  accompF.shment  of  the 
second  will  prevent  the  raid  fro1  :  being  altogether  fruit- 
less, and  will  even  give  it  the  appearance  of  success — a 
matter  of  no  small  importance  in  its  effect  upon  the  enemy 
and  upon  the  morale  of  the  raiding  troops.  Everything 
possible  should  be  done  to  obtain  a  clear  knowledge  of  the 
region  through  which  the  raid  is  to  be  made,  and  to  gain 
information  while  in  it.  It  was  the  custom  of  Morgan  to 
send  scouts  and  spies  into  the  region  in  which  he  intended 
to  operate,  where  they  remained,  familiarizing  themselves 
with  everything  pertaining  to  its  roads,  bridges,  resources, 
and  the  location  of  hostile  troops,  until  the  raiding  column 
arrived,  when  they  were  at  once  ready  to  act  as  guides. 
For  manifest  reasons,  this  plan  would  not  work  well  in  a 
hostile  country,  where  it  would  probably  be  necessary  to 
impress  guides  at  all  hazards. 


150  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

Conduct  of  the  Raid. — But  little  can  be  prescribed  for 
the  conduct  of  a  raid,  as  each  expedition  will  present 
its  own  peculiar  circumstances  to  which  the  operations 
must  conform.  Except  in  the  case  of  a  very  large  raiding 
force,  it  is  generally  advisable  to  march  m  a  single  column, 
in  order  that  the  force  may  be  kept  well  in  hand;  for  in 
moving  with  the  rapidity  required  in  raids,  the  junction 
of  parallel  columns  in  critical  emergencies  could  not  be 
counted  upon  with  any  degree  of  confidence.  The  main 
command  should  be  in  constant  readiness  foi  action.  In- 
dividual scouts  and  small  patrols  should  be  kept  well  out 
to  the  front  and  flanks,  and  small  parties  (not  exceeding 
in  the  aggregate  more  than  one-third  of  the  command) 
should  be  sent  out  to  forage  and  seize  horses,  to  replace 
those  which  may  become  exhausted  and  broken  aown.  Re- 
ceipts should  be  given  for  all  forage,  provisions,  and  horses 
taken,  and  no  family  should  be  left  in  want.  The  receipts 
given  enable  the  people  to  present  to  their  own  govern- 
ment claims  for  remuneration,  and  should  also  protect 
them  from  further  requisitions,  except  in  cases  of  impera- 
tive necessity.  A  tendency  to  plunder  is  likely  to  spring 
up  in  a  raiding  column,  even  if  composed  of  the  best  of 
troops;*  and  it  should  be  promptly  and  sternTy  repressed, 
not  only  from  motives  of  humanity,  but  to  prevent  the 
demoralization  of  the  command. 

If  circumstances  render  a  detachment  necessary  for 
any  purpose,  its  commander  should  be  clearly  instructed, 
not  only  in  regard  to  the  object  he  is  to  accomplish,  but 
also  what  he  should  do  in  case  it  becomes  impossible  to 
rejoin  the  main  column.  Detachments  should  not  be  made 
without  some  important  object;  for  the  commander  must 
always  regard  as  very  possible  the  definite  separation  of 
the  detachment  from  his  command. 

For  the  leader  of  a  raiding  force,   secrecy,   celerity, 

*General  Kautz,  in  his  official  report  of  his  raid  of  May  5  to 
17,  1864,  says:  "The  fighting  qualities  of  the  men  I  have  never  seen 
excelled,  and  in  this  respect  I  can  congratulate  the  whole  command 
without  distinction.  I  have,  however,  to  deplore  a  disposition  to 
pillage  and  plunder  on  the  part  of  some  of  the  men,  and  a  want  of 
proper  officering  on  the  part  of  some  of  the  officers  to  check  this 
tendency." 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  151 

and  resolution  should  be  the  motto;  for  his  command,  dis- 
cipline and  endurance  are  the  two  essential  qualities. 

DESTRUCTION  OF  COMMUNICATIONS. 

The  principal  destructive  efforts  of  a  raiding  force  wiU 
be  directed  against  railroads,  bridges,  tunnels,  locks,  and 
ordinary  roads. 

Bridges. — To  destroy  a  bridge,  a  charge  of  gun-cotton 
should  be  exploded  in  the  haunches  of  an  area,  or,  if  time 
does  not  admit  of  this,  in  the  crown  of  the  arch.  Iron 
girder  bridges  can  be  most  easily  destroyed  by  placing  the 
charges  under  the  supports. 

Bridges  of  the  truss  variety  are  most  easily  destroyed 
by  attacking  the  lower  chord  of  through  bridges,  and  the 
upper  chord  of  deck  bridges. 

Railroads. — The  following  manner  of  destroying  a  rail- 
road is  based  on  the  method  employed  in  the  War  of  Seces- 
sion. The  men  are  divided  into  sections,  several  hundred 
men  in  each.  The  £rst  section  is  distributed  along  the 
track,  one  man  at  each  tie,  and,  at  a  given  signal,  the  en- 
tire piece  of  track  thus  manned  is  raised  to  a  vertical  posi- 
tion. At  a  second  signal,  the  track  is  thrown  over  so  that 
the  rails  are  underneath  and  the  ties  on  top.  Each  man 
next  loosens  his  tie  from  the  rail,  and  the  section  moves  on 
to  another  portion  of  the  track.  The  second  section  now 
takes  its  place  at  the  portion  already  torn  up,  collects  the 
ties  in  piles  of  about  thirty  each,  and  places  the  rails  on  the 
top  of  the  piles,  the  center  of  the  rail  over  the  center  of  the 
pile.  Fire  is  then  set  to  the  piles,  and  the  second  section 
follows  the  first.  The  third  section  now  comes  up,  takes  the 
place  of  the  second,  and,  when  the  rails  are  sufficiently  heat- 
ed, removes  them,  two  men  to  each  rail,  with  "railroad 
hooks"  or  pinchers,  and  bends  them  around  trees  or  posts, 
at  the  same  time  twisting  them.  The  third  section  now  fol- 
lows the  second,  which,  continuing  the  work  of  the  first, 
has  by  this  time  another  lot  of  rails  ready,  and  the  work  is 
thus  carried  on  to  completion.  When  the  road  is  well  bal- 
lasted, preliminary  work  with  pick  and  shovel  will,  of  course, 
be  necessary. 

The  rolling  stock  should  be  burned,  blown  up,  or  run 


152  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

at  full  speed  to  a  broken  bridge  and  precipitated  into  the 
river.  When  haste  is  urgent,  rails  may  be  broken,  here  and 
there,  by  exploding  gun-cotton  against  them,  or  by  remov- 
ing the  outside  rail  on  a  curve.  This  would,  however,  be 
only  a  temporary  impairment  of  the  road,  worthy  of  an  ex- 
peditionary patrol,  but  not  of  a  raiding  column. 

Tunnels. — An  effectual  way  of  blocking  a  railroad — at 
least  temporarily — is  by  blowing  in  a  tunnel.  The  tunnel 
should  be  blown  in  at  several  places  simultaneously;  or,  be- 
ginning at  the  center,  it  should  be  blasted  at  different  points 
to  the  end. 

Telegraph. — A  line  of  telegraph  may  be  destroyed  by 
cutting  down  the  poles,  cutting  the  wires,  and  breaking  the 
insulators.  It  may  be  temporarily  disabled  by  winding 
together  the  wires  (first  scraped  clean)  with  fine  wires. 

Locks. — The  gates  of  a  lock  can  easily  be  destroyed 
with  gun-cotton.  If  time  permits,  the  lock  can  be  more 
permanently  damaged  by  blowing  in  the  walls  at  the  sides. 

Ordinary  Roads. — Ordinary  roads  can  be  blocked  by 
felling  trees  across  them,  or  by  blowing  up  the  road-bed.* 

SUMMARY. 

The  tactics  of  cavalry  is  more  varied  than  that  of  any 
other  arm.  It  embraces  shock  action  in  line  and  in  column; 
fire  action  mounted  and  on  foot;  a  combination  of  fire  and 
shock  action  either  mounted  or  dismounted;  and  the  sim- 
ultaneous use  of  fire  action  dismounted  and  shock  action 
mounted  by  different  parts  of  the  same  command.  The 
arms,  training,  and  tactical  formations  of  modern  cavalry 
adapt  it  to  use  on  varied  ground,  and  in  every  phase  of  the 
battle,  and  sustain  General  Kilpatrick's  apothegm,  that 
"cavalry  can  fight  anywhere  except  at  sea." 

*For  detailed  instructions  in  regard  to  hasty  demolitions,  etc., 
see  the  "Manual  of  Military  Field  Engineering." — Major  William  D. 
Beach,  10th  Cavalry. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  153 


CHAPTER  VI. 

ARTILLERY  IN  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE. 

"The  artillery  is  the  indispensable  companion  of  the  infantry. 
It  makes  room  for  the  latter  where  it  is  not  able  to  force  its  way 
single-handed.  It  prepares  the  way  for  the  battle,  shields  the  foot 
soldiery  from  unnecessary  losses,  when  the  best  forces  would  be 
wrecked  by  too  great  impediments,  and  provides  it  with  covering  and 
defense  when  it  is  compelled  to  retire." — Von  tier  Goltz. 

General  Theory  of  the  Employment  of  Artillery  in  Attack. — 
To  appreciate  fully  the  part  played  by  artillery  in  attack, 
let  us  first  suppose  an  assault  made  by  an  army  composed 
exclusively  of  infantry  upon  a  position  defended  by  infantry 
and  guns.  Long  before  the  attacking  force  reaches  a  posi- 
tion where  it  can  use  its  rifles  with  effect,  it  is  opened  upon 
by  the  hostile  guns,  and  the  shrapnel  dropping  in  the  midst 
of  the  columns  compels  a  deployment  before  the  require- 
ments of  fire  action  demand  such  a  movement,  and  while 
considerations  of  mobility  make  the  retention  of  columns 
desirable.  The  advancing  troops  suffer  from  a  fire  which 
they  cannot  return;  an  instinctive  impulse  of  self-defense 
causes  them  to  open  fire  at  long  range;  the  enemy  is  en- 
couraged by  the  ineffective  volleys  or  wild  individual  fire  of 
the  assailants,  and  by  the  time  the  latter  arrive  within 
effective  rifle  range  of  the  position,  they  are  so  shattered 
by  the  fire  of  the  artillery,  so  out-of-hand  by  the  long  ad- 
vance in  deployed  order,  and  so  demoralized  in  fir°  discipline, 
that  they  fall  an  easy  prey  to  the  defender's  infantry,  even 
if  they  be  not  checked  by  the  artillery  fire  alone.  Artillery 
is,  then,  primarily  necessary  to  oppose  the  guns  of  the 
defense,  in  order  that  the  infantry  may  take  up,  at  compara- 
tive leisure  and  in  comparative  safety,  a  suitable  formation 
for  attack.  Afterwards,  to  protect  the  infantry  from  a  fire 
which  it  cannot  effectively  return,  the  artillery  must  open 
such  a  cannonade  upon  the  defender's  batteries  as  to  cause 
them  in  self-defense  to  turn  their  attention  from  the  foot 
troops  to  the  assailant's  guns.  This  causes  a  duel  between 


154  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

the  opposing  batteries,  which  is  generally  carried  on  at 
ranges  varying  from  5,000  to  3,000  yards,  and  continued 
until  the  guns  of  the  defender  are  silenced  or  the  assailing 
batteries  find  themselves  unable  to  continue  the  contest. 
In  the  former  case,  the  infantry  advances  as  soon  as  the 
defender's  guns  are  silenced. 

Even  when  the  assailant's  artillery  has  demonstrated 
its  superiority  over  that  of  the  defender,  a  permanent  silenc- 
ing of  the  latter  can  hardly  be  hoped  for;  and,  indeed,  the 
cessation  of  fire  may  be  due  merely  to  a  husbanding  of 
ammunition  for  the  more  decisive  stages  of  the  fight.  The 
infantry  must,  therefore,  still  expect  in  its  advance  to  en- 
counter the  fire  of  hostile  guns;  and  to  prepare  the  way 
for  the  attacking  troops,  the  artillery  must  still  be  pre- 
pared to  crush  with  a  superior  fire  every  hostile  battery 
which  opens  upon  the  attacking  infantry.  But  the  infantry 
of  the  assailants,  even  if  the  fire  of  the  defender's  guns  be 
entirely  diverted  from  it,  is  still  subjected  to  the  fire  of 
the  hostile  infantry,  which,  in  a  stationary  position,  pro- 
tected by  intrenchments,  and  firing  at  known  ranges,  can 
paralyze  the  advance  of  its  opponent  by  the  superior  effect- 
iveness of  its  fire.  It  is  necessary,  then,  that  the  artillery 
should  turn  its  attention  to  the  infantry  of  the  defenders, 
which  it  must  endeavor  to  overwhelm  with  such  a  storm  of 
shrapnel  as  to  shake  its  morale,  impair  the  accuracy  of  its 
fire,  and  neutralize  the  advantage  which  it  would  otherwise 
have  over  the  infantry  of  the  attack.  The  latter  may  thus 
be  enabled  to  approach  within  effective  rifle  range  before 
opening  fire. 

After  the  infantry  is  well  committed  to  the  assault,  the 
artillery  must  continue  to  lend  its  aid  to  the  attacking 
troops,  part  (when  the  nature  of  the  terrain  renders  it  prac- 
ticable) continuing  to  fire  upon  the  enemy  over  the  heads  of 
the  advancing  infantry,  ancl  part  pushing  ahead  with  the 
latter  and  engaging  the  enemy  at  short  range,  without,  how- 
ever, exposing  itself  to  effective  rifle  fire.  Thus  the  blows 
which  the  defender's  guns  would  deliver  upon  the  attacking 
infantry  are  warded  off,  as  it  were,  by  the  assailant's  artil- 
lery; the  rain  of  bullets  showered  upon  the  defender  is  in- 
tensified by  a  storm  of  shrapnel;  and  the  morale  of  the  ad- 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  155 

vancing  infantry  is  strengthened  by  the  support  of  its  "indis- 
pensable companion." 

If  the  attack  be  repulsed,  the  lines  of  f.rtillery  furnish 
a  solid  support  upon  which  the  infantry  can  rally.  If  the 
attack  be  successful,  the  batteries  are  quickly  rushed  for- 
ward to  the  captured  position,  in  order  that  they  may  check 
with  their  fire  the  attempts  of  the  enemy  to  recover  the  lost 
ground. 

Starting  with  this  epitome  of  the  part  played  by  the 
artillery  in  the  attack,  we  may  proceed  to  a  more  extended 
consideration  of  the  offensive  tactics  of  that  arm. 

THE  TACTICS  OF  FIELD  ARTILLERY.* 

There  is  sometimes  an  impression  among  officers  who 
have  not  had  occasion  to  consider  the  matter  particularly, 
that  artillery  is  a  purely  technical  arm,  and  has  little  use 
for  tactics  in  the  broader  sense.  It  seems  at  first  sight 
that  it  has  only  to  move  forward  in  some  sort  of  decent 
order — which  is  a  matter  merely  of  Drill  Regulations — and 
then  take  up  a  suitable  position  and  open  fire — both  cf 
which  duties  require  a  knowledge  more  technical  thai} 
tactical. 

This  impression  has  perhaps  been  strengthened  by  mis- 
interpretation of  two  well-known  quotations  from  Hohen- 
lohe's  "Letters  on  Artillery."  The  first  is:  "Judging  from 
my  own  experiences  in  war — and  you  will  own  that  in 

*REVISEES'  NOTE. — No  attempt  has  been  made  to  revise  the 
chapter  relating  to  Artillery  in  Attack  and  Defense  at  this  time.  It 
is  believed  that  the  principles  enunciated  by  Colonel  Wagner  con- 
cerning the  use  of  artillery  are  unchanged,  and  that  they  have  been 
modified  in  their  application  alone.  Up  to  the  present,  the  Artil- 
lery Board  of  the  United  States  Army  has  not  reached  final  con- 
clusions, regarding  Drill  Regulations,  tactical  or  technical  hand- 
ling of  the  new  field  artillery.  Data  as  to  the  use  of  artillery  in 
the  recent  campaign  in  Manchuria  are  not  yet  complete.  Under 
these  circumstances,  it  has  been  thought  best  to  substitute  for  the 
remainder  of  the  chapter  on  "Artillery  in  Attack  and  Defense,"  a 
lecture  prepared  from  all  the  data  available  at  present,  by  Captain 
Oliver  L.  Spaulding,  Jr.,  Artillery  Corps,  U.  S.  Army,  under  the 
title  "The  Tactics  of  Field  Artillery,"  for  use  in  the  Infantry  and 
Cavalry  School  and  Staff  College,  as  a  substitute  for  the  chapter 
on  the  same  subject  in  "Organization  and  Tactics."  It  is  intended 
to  further  revise  this  chapter  whenever  the  War  Department  shall 
have  issued  something  authoritative  on  the  subject. 


156  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

matters  connected  with  artillery  they  are  fairly  numerous 
— the  only  movements  which  are  of  use  in  the  field  are, 
the  advance  in  column  of  route,  deployments,  and  the  ad- 
vance in  line."  The  second  is:  "The  artillery  must  in  the 
first  place,  hit;  in  the  second  place,  hit;  in  the  third  place, 
kit" 

These  two  sentences,  by  themselves,  would  seem  to 
suppoirt  the  idea  in  question;  but  of  course  they  do  not 
when  taken  with  their  context.  True,  the  movements  re- 
quired of  artillery  on  the  battle-field  are  simple,  and  the 
guns  are  worse  than  useless  if  there  be  a  lack  of  the  tech- 
nical knowledge  necessary  to  establish  them  in  position 
and  range  them  properly;  but  tactical  knowledge  in  the 
broader  sense  is  required  to  control  all  these  technical 
operations.  Not  only  must  all  be  skillfully  combined  to 
accomplish  the  required  tactical  purpose,  but  the  manner 
of  combination  must  be  adapted  to  the  corresponding  op- 
erations of  other  troops;  for  artillery  is  an  auxiliary  arm, 
and  its  business  is  to  assist  and  support  its  infantry. 

Thus  there  arises  a  complete  system  of  artillery  tac- 
tics, consisting  of  the  principles  by  which  a  commander 
should  be  guided  in  making  these  combinations  of  technical 
operations. 

The  guns  themselves  must  be  moved  and  fought,  a& 
Hohenlohe  points  out.  This  is  the  technical  foundation, 
and  this  duty  falls  in  the  main  upon  the  battery  command- 
ers. As  we  follow  up  the  chain  of  command,  to  the  chief 
of  artTlery  and  the  commander-in-chief,  the  technical  du- 
ties grow  less  and  less,  and  the  tactical  duties  greater 
and  greater. 

Naturally  enough,  such  a  tactical  system  is  deeply 
affected  by  changes  in  technical  methods,  and  these  meth- 
ods must  always  adapt  themselves  to  the  materiel  with 
which  they  have  to  deal. 

Now,  artillery  materiel  has  been  greatly  changed  in  the 
last  few  years,  and  the  methods  of  handling  it  have  changed 
with  it.  The  question  naturally  arises,  whether  the  whole 
system  of  artillary  tactics  has  not  thereby  been  overturned, 
necessitating  the  development  of  an  entirely  new  one;  and 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  157 

many  students  of  ^lie  subject  are  inclined  to  answer  in  the 
affirmative.  { 

But  this  view  seems  a  trifle  one-sided.  It  takes  ac- 
count only  of  the  changed  tool,  not  of  the  unchanged  pur- 
pose, which  is  to  help  the  infantry  to  win  battles. 

The  means  by  which  artillery  gives  this  help  is  always 
fire  action.  The  methods  of  developing  the  fire  are  now- 
adays widely  different  from  those  of  a  few  years  ago,  and 
its  power  is  much  increased;  but  the  nature  of  the  fire  it- 
self is  the  same.  Prima  facie,  then,  ought  we  not  to  ex- 
pect to  find  the  old  system  of  tactics  modified,  rather  than 
revolutionized? 

A  great  deal  of  study  is  naturally  being  given  the 
question  now,  when  the  re-armament  with  rapid-fire  guns 
is  approaching  completion  throughout  the  world;  and,  as 
usual,  there  are  extremists  on  both  sides — ultra-conserva- 
tives and  ultra-radicals.  But  it  is  believed  that  in  the  final 
solution  of  the  problem,  the  old  broad  principles  will  be 
found  to  remain,  the  details  being  modified  to  conform  to 
the  altered  conditions.  Study  of  the  Japanese  Regulations, 
under  which  such  excellent  work  has  been  done  in  the  late 
war,  supports  this  belief. 

Since  artillery  always  fights  in  line,  and  at  a  halt,  the 
choice  of  positon  becomes  of  paramount  importance.  The 
convenience  with  which  indirect  fire  may  now  be  employed 
makes  it  much  easier  to  put  up  with  a  poor  position  than 
formerly,  and  renders  it  possible  to  use  guns  with  some 
effect  from  almost  anywhere  within  range  of  the  target; 
but  most  of  the  old  rules  for  choice  of  a  position  still  hold 
good,  and  the  best  position  will  be  the  one  which  most 
nearly  satisfies  the  requirements  of  those  rules.  The  fol- 
lowing are  the  principal  things  to  be  sought: 

1.  Good  cover;  a  ridge,  behind  which  guns  may  be 
placed  out  of  sight,  is  usually  sought;  but  trees,  bushes, 
or  high  standing  grain,  completely  concealing  the  battery, 
are  also  good. 

2.  Clear,  open  gro>und  to  the  front  and  flanks,  giving 
the  greatest  possible  range  and  the  broadest  possible  field 
of  fire. 

—12— 


158  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

3.  Good  stations  for  the  observation  of  fire. 

4.  Good  aiming  points,  in  case  of  indirect  laying. 

5.  A  front  generally  perpendicular  to  the  line  of  fire. 

6.  Sufficient  space  to  allow  the  deployment  of  all  the 
batteries  that  it  is  desired  to  use. 

7.  Firm  soil,  to  resist  the  weair  and  tear  of  the  firing. 

8.  Easy  access  from  the  rear,  convenience  of  moving 
to  the  front,  and  good  lateral  communication — all  under 
cover. 

The  relative  importance  of  these  desiderata  depends 
upon  circumstances — upon  the  purpose  in  view,  the  nature 
and  extent  of  the  target,  and  the  disposition  of  friendly 
troops. 

The  most  careful  reconnaissance  possible  should  be 
made  before  deciding  upon  a  position.  Dismounted  as  well 
as  mounted  examination  of  the  ground  should  be  made; 
and  observation  from  the  direction  of  the  enemy  is  very 
desirable. 

Such  reconnaissance  is  easily  made  in  the  case  of  de- 
liberate occupation  of  a  defensive  position.  But  on  the 
march  the  matter  is  not  so  simple,  for  such  work  takes 
time.  If  the  advance  guard  meets  with  serious  opposition, 
and  it  is  necessary  to  bring  up  artillery  to  its  assistance, 
the  artillery  commander  will  not  be  able  to  do  very  much 
before  his  guns  are  ready  to  come  into  action. 

In  order  to  facilitate  this  reconnaissance,  as  well  as 
to  assist  in  locating  positions  of  the  enemy,  it  is  advisable 
to  have  an  artillery  officer,  under  the  immediate  orders  of 
the  artillery  commander,  march  with  the  leading  elements 
of  the  advance  guard.  His  special  duty  is  to  look  for  places 
favorable  to  the  action  of  artillery. 

On  reaching  such  a  position,  the  officer  halts  and 
makes  a  careful  study  of  the  ground.  He  notes  its  ad- 
vantages and  disadvantages;  estimates  the  number  of  bat- 
teries which  could  be  used  with  convenience;  notes  desir- 
able locations  for  observation  stations;  selects  and  deter- 
mines distances  to  convenient  aiming-points;  locates  any 
important  features  shown  on  the  map;  picks  out  the  places 
where  an  enemy  might  probably  appear;  and,  in  fact,  con- 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  159 

ducts  as  complete  a  reconnaissance  as  time  will  permit  at. 
each  position  as  he  reaches  it. 

Several  good  men  should  accompany  him,  as  scouts 
and  orderlies;  by  means  of  these  men,  he  keeps  in  commu- 
nication with  the  artillery  commander,  sending  back  such 
memoranda  as  seem  of  especial  importance. 

Thus,  when  the  batteries  do  have  to  come  into  action, 
the  commander  will  find  his  reconnaissance  well  under 
way,  and  the  officer,  who  will  meet  him  upon  the  position, 
will  be  prepared  to  help  him  complete  't  in  the  shortest 
possible  time. 

If  possible,  positions  should  be  occupied  unseen  by 
the  enemy.  Battles  nowadays  are  likely  to  last  several 
days,  and  take  on  something  of  the  character  of  siege  op- 
erations; so  that  positions  may  often  be  occupied  under 
cover  of  darkness.  The  guns  may  then  remain  silent  and 
concealed  until  the  time  comes  for  their  use,  when  they 
may  enjoy  the  advantage  of  acting  by  surprise. 

Changes  of  position  are  undesirable;  the  guns  are 
useless  and  vulnerable  while  in  motion,  and  time  is  lost 
in  ranging  at  each  new  position.  Hence  changes  should 
not  be  made  when  it  can  be  avoided;  as  will  be  seen  later, 
however,  some  few  changes  during  the  course  of  the  action 
will  ordinarily  be  necessary. 

The  fire  of  all  the  guns  is  under  the  general  super- 
vision of  the  artillery  commander;  but  the  methods  of 
carrying  out  his  orders  are  left  to  the  subordinate  com- 
manders. Fire  should  not  be  opened  without  his  order; 
and  no  subordinate  should  fire  upon  a  target  other  than 
that  designated  by  Mm,  unless  in  an  emergency,  or  at  some 
critical  moment;  in  such  case  the  subordinate  should  at 
once  report  his  action  to  his  immediate  superior. 

As  to  the  objective  of  the  fire,  the  rule  of  our  old  Drill 
Regulations  holds  good:  "As  a  general  rule,  the  fire  of  ar- 
tillery is  directed  against  that  arm  of  the  enemy  which 
at  the  time  is  predominant,  or  which  is  capable  of  inflict- 
ing the  greatest  losis  on  the  infantry  or  cavalry  which  the 
artillery  is  'Supporting." 

In  treating  tactical  subjects,  it  is  customary  to  con- 


160  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

aider  offensive  and  defensive  action  separately.  The  line 
thus  drawn  is  to  some  extent  an  arbitrary  one,  for  offense 
and  defense  shade  into  each  other  almost  imperceptibly. 
But  the  form  cf  battle  assumed  as  typical — that  in  which 
one  army  occupies  a  purely  defensive  position  and  the 
other  attacks  it — does  furnish  an  opportunity  to  discuss 
methods,  which  may  afterward  be  modified  and  applied  to 
conditions  as  found. 

Following  this  custom,  let  us  trace  the  course  of  the 
artillery  in  such  a  battle,  first  from  the  standpoint  of  the 
attack,  then  from  that  of  the  defense. 

A  determined  attack  upon  a  prepared  position  must 
be  preceded  by  a  long  period  of  reconnaissance,  the  attack- 
ing force  gradually  feeling  out  the  position,  and  locating 
the  weak  points. 

This  is  a  more  difficult  matter  now  than  ever  before, 
since  it  must  be  managed  from  a  greater  distance.  The 
defense  will  undoubtedly  have  numerous  small  detachments 
in  front  of  its  main  position,  some  of  them  provided  with 
artillery,  to  mislead  and  delay  the  attack.  Each  detach- 
ment will  have  to  be  looked  after  separately,  and  the  re- 
sult will  be  a  series  of  minor  actions,  largely  fought  by 
the  artillery — for  the  detachments  will  not  wait  for  their 
opponents  to  come  to  close  quarters.  The  issue  of  each 
such  small  attack  will  not  be  doubtful;  but  each  one  must 
be  begun  with  much  the  same  caution  as  a  general  engage- 
ment, for  it  will  never  be  certain  beforehand  just,  when  and 
where  the  main  position  will  be  reached. 

For  this  reason  all,  or  at  least  most,  of  these  pre- 
liminary attacks  will  have  to  be  preceded  by  the  assem- 
bling of  a  formidable  number  of  guns,  all  of  which  will  be 
prepared  to  come  into  action  at  once  upon  the  hostile  bat- 
teries as  soon  as  located.  Care  must  be  taken  not  to 
bring  them  under  a  decisive  fire,  either  artillery  or  infantry, 
or  they  will  suffer  a  loss  totally  o<ut  of  proportion  to  the 
results  to  be  obtained.  Opportunities  for  enfilade  fire  will 
be  frequent  in  this  kind  of  work,  and  must  not  be  waste-1. 

The  guns  may  also,  in  this  stage,  have  occasion  to  fire 
upon  the  enemy's  infantry.  The  attacking  infantry  will  be 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  161 

constantly  working  forward,  and  occupying  successive  po- 
sitions, which  can,  if  necessary,  be  defended  against  coun- 
ter-attacks. If  these  positions  be  occupied  or  commanded 
by  the  enemy,  the  artillery  must  aid  the  infantry  to  get 
possession  of  them. 

Finally,  perhaps  after  days  of  skirmishing,  the  recon- 
naissance period  will  approach  an  end.  The  enemy's  heavy 
guns  will  begin  to-  be  felt,  and  the  attacker's  corresponding 
arm  will  seek  positions  from  which  to  reply.  The  fire  of 
the  opposing  field  guns  will  grow  stronger,  and  the  front 
covered  by  them  broader.  It  will  be  found  no  longer  pos- 
sible to  continue  the  tactics  of  flanking  out  oir  driving  in 
separate  detachments,  and  gradually  the  main  defensive 
position  will  outline  itself,  and  the  weak  points  become 
apparent. 

It  is  to  be  supposed  that  the  attacker  is  the  stronger 
in  artillery;  this  is  indicated  in  the  assumption  of  the  of- 
fensive. Throughout  the  combat,  it  is  for  him  to  utilize 
this  superiority  by  always  having  the  preponderance  at 
each  point  of  contact. 

So  now,  as  in  the  reconnaissance  period,  he  concen- 
trates his  guns.  This  does  not,  of  course,  mean  that  every- 
thing he  has  is  drawn  up  in  one  grand  line,  but  simply 
that  the  different  units  are  so  placed  that  each  one  can 
bring  its  fire  effectively  upon  the  designated  target.  The 
guns  themselves  may  be  widely  separated;  but  they  are  all 
held  in  the  hand  of  the  commander,  moire  firmly  than  ever 
before,  by  means  of  the  field  telephone. 

How  far  the  physical  separation  of  the  guns  may  go, 
without  impairing  their  tactical  concentration,  depends 
upon  the  terrain  and  upon  the  circumstances  of  each  par- 
ticular case.  In  a  small  force,  say  a  single  division,  bat- 
teries may  have  to  stand  alone;  but  they  should  never  be 
divided,  and  if  it  is  at  all  possible,  battalions  should  be 
kept  together.  In  Manch/usria,  the  favorite  unit  was  the 
regiment. 

The  battery  commander  will  usually  have  his  hands 
full  with  the  technical  direction  of  the  fire  of  his  battery. 
The  tactical  application  of  it  belongs  to  the  higher  com- 


162  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

manders.  If, -then,  the  battery  be  isolated,  a  double  duty 
falls  upon  the  captain,  and,  in  proportion  as  he  devotes  at 
tention  to  one,  he  must  neglect  the  other. 

Nevertheless  it  is  true,  as  just  remarked,  that  con- 
centration of  gums  does  not  mean  the  formation  of  a  con- 
tinuous line;  it  mears  the  control,  by  one  commander,  over 
many  units,  and  the  careful  distribution  by  that  com- 
mander, to  the  units,  of  particular  targets  or  fields  of  fire; 
it  means  unity  of  action. 

The  phase  of  the  combat  now  opening  is  the  artillery 
duel.  It  is  important  for  the  attacker  to  cripple  the  en- 
emy's artillery,  his  long-range  arm,  as  much  as  possible 
before  bringing  his  infantry  into  action.  Referring  to  the 
general  rule  already  given  for  the  objective  of  artillery 
fire,  we  find  these  conditions:  it  has  become  necessary  for 
the  infantry  to  advance;  at  the  outset  it  is  the  artillery 
of  the  enemy  that  is  most  dangerous  to  it;  therefore  that 
artillery  becomes  the  target  for  the  attacking  guns. 

It  is  thus  desirable  for  the  attacker  to  seek  a  general 
artillery  engagement.  For  this  purpose,  he  should  deploy 
as  many  guns  as  can  be  used,  from  the  outset,  so  as  to 
avoid  any  risk  of  letting  the  defender  enjoy  even  a  tem- 
porary superiority.  Enough  batteries  to  cover  the  enemy's 
whole  line  with  an  effective  fire  should  be  placed  in  posi- 
tion, ready  for  instant  use.  Each  unit  in  this  mass  should 
have  its  own  field  of  fire  allotted  to  it,  and  have  orders 
to  reply  to  any  battery  which  may  be  discovered  within 
that  field.  All  being  ready,  fire  is  opened  upon  such  bat- 
teries as  have  been  located,  and  an  attempt  is  made  to 
force  the  defender  to  disclose  his  whole  artillery  position. 

To  get  decisive  results,  a  concentration  of  fire  is  nec- 
essary; and  this  concentration  the  attacker  should  usually 
be  able  to  make.  Keeping  the  enemy  actively  engaged,  as 
just  indicated,  he  will  employ  all  his  available  remaining 
guns  upon  a  single  hostile  unit,  and  silence  it.  The  con- 
centration will  then  be  made  upon  another  unit,  that  al- 
ready silenced  being  left  to  the  batteries  assigned  to  ob- 
serve that  particular  part  of  the  field. 

Formerly,  this  duel  was  a  very  distinct  phase  of  the 


ORGANIZATION   AND   TACTICS.  163 

battle,  and  no  infantry  ventured  within  range  of  the  en- 
emy's guns  until  a  decided  superiority  was  established  over 
them.  But  now  artillery  range  is  so  long  that  infantry 
must  come  within  it,  even  while  the  duel  is  at  its  height, 
if  it  is  to  .reap  any  advantage  from  the  icannonade  during 
its  advance. 

The  artillery  duel,  then,  shades  gradually  into  the 
next  phase,  which  is  the  preparation  of  the  infantry  attacfc. 

It  may,  in  fact,  prove  impossible  to  draw  the  defender 
into  the  artillery  duel.  If  be  chooses  to  keep  his  guns  si- 
lent and  concealed,  the  attacker  has  no  choice  but  to  send 
his  infantry  forward  regardless  of  them.  While  this  arm 
is  seeking  to  gain  a  lodgment  within  striking  distance  of 
the  position,  the  defender's  artillery  will  be  forced  to  open 
fire  upon  it;  his  position  being  thus  disclosed,  his  fire  may 
be  answered  in  kind. 

But  however  this  may  be,  when  the  infantry  advances 
to  the  attack  a  new  duty  imposes  itself  upon  the  artillery. 
It  has  now  to  prepare  the  approach  to  the  particular  point 
selected  for  attack. 

It  must  direct  as  severe  a  fire  as  possible  upon  that 
point.  But  at  the  same  time  it  cannot  neglect  the  hostile 
guns  placed  elsewhere,  or  the  advantage  gained  by  its 
previous  work  will  be  lost.  The  duel  will  have  been  fought 
at  long  ranges — probably  at  least  3,000  yards,  perhaps 
4,000  or  even  5,000.  The  war  in  Manchuria  furnishes  in- 
stances of  artillery  fighting,  and  very  effective  fighting, 
too,  at  7,000  yards.  At  such  ranges  the  possibility  of  put- 
ting permanently  out  of  action  the  opposing  batteries,  con- 
cealed from  view  and  having  their  personnel  protected  by 
shields,  will  be  remote.  They  may  be  silenced,  or  forced 
to  slacken  their  fire,  but  if  left  to  themselves,  they  would 
soon  be  able  to  resume  it. 

A  division  of  the  artillery  force  thus  becomes  neces- 
sary. Certain  batteries,  including  usually  the  heavy  guns, 
are  assigned  to  keep  down  the  enemy's  artillery  fire,  while 
the  remainder  devote  themselves  to  preparing  the  infantry 
attack. 

Those  told  off  to  the  former  duty  will  continue   to 


164  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

act  very  much  as  in  the  duel  period,  except  that,  the  oppos- 
ing fire  having  slackened,  each  battery  can  take  care  of  a 
larger  sector.  When  the  enemy  perceives  what  is  being 
done,  he  will  probably  intensify  his  fire  again  as  much  as 
possible,  and  a  second  'contest  similar  to  the  duel  will  take 
place.  For  this  reason,  care  must  be  taken  not  to  draw 
off  too  many  batteries,  and  those  that  remain  will  have 
to  exert  themselves  to  the  utmost.  Rapid  volley  fire  will 
be  opened  instantly  upon  any  hostile  battery  that  renews 
its  fire. 

The  positions  of  the  batteries  constituting  the  target 
will  by  this  time  be  well  known,  and  such  fire  can  be  made 
effective  immediately.  If  those  batteries  change  position, 
their  fire,  when  re-opened,  will  not  be  dangerous  at  first, 
so  time  will  be  available  for  ranging  on  them.  It  will  be 
difficult  for  them  to  act  by  surprise  in  their  new  positions, 
for  each  part  of  the  defender's  line  will  be  under  close 
observation  by  some  battery  told  off  for  that  particular 
purpose,  and  they  will  be  very  quickly  detected. 

The  batteries  intended  to  prepare  the  infantry  assault 
gradually  withdraw  from  the  duel,  as  they  can  be  spared, 
and  prepare  to  concentrate  their  fire  upon  the  point  se- 
lected. All  possible  preparations  are  made  for  opening 
fire,  and  ranges  determined  as  accurately  as  possible,  so 
that  the  fire,  when  begun,  may  be  effective  from  the  first. 

All  then  open  simultaneously,  and  keep  the  defend- 
er's fire  down  over  the  whole  front  of  the  attack  by  a  con- 
tinuous fire. 

It  has  just  been  said  that  the  heavy  guns  will  nat- 
urally be  found  among  the  batteries  observing  the  enemy's 
artillery  positions.  But  use  for  them  may  be  found  at 
times  among  the  preparation  batteries.  It  will  be  found 
necessary  or  desirable  to  destroy  material  obstacles  in 
the  way  of  the  attacking  infantry,  and  if  these  are  seri- 
ous, the  greater  shell  power  of  the  heavy  guns  will  be 
pressed  into  service. 

While  all  this  is  going  on,  the  infantry  is  pushing  in, 
and  making  its  final  dispositions  foir  the  decisive  attack; 
and  when  the  preparations  are  completed,  the  assault  is 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  165 

launched.  The  duty  of  the  artillery  now  changes  from 
preparation  to  support. 

The  support  of  the  attack  consists  of  two  things: 
the  first  is,  keeping  down  the  fire,  both  artillery  and  in- 
fantry, from  that  part  of  the  line  against  which  the  as- 
sault is  directed;  the  second,  guarding  the  flanks  of  the 
attacking  force. 

For  the  second  purpose,  certain  batteries  are  desig- 
nated, either  from  those  that  have  been  assisting  in  the 
preparation,  or  from  those  that  have  been  taking  care  of 
the  enemy's  artijJery.  The  flanks  of  an  attacking  force 
are  very  vulnerable,  and  the  enemy  will  undoubtedly  try 
to  take  advantage  of  this,  either  by  counter-attacks  di- 
rected against  them,  or  by  fire  action  from  favorable 
points  outside  of  the  threatened  section. 

In  order  to  give  the  necessary  protection,  the  bat- 
teries assigned  to  this  duty  act  much  in  the  manner  of 
those  which  maintained  the  artHlery  duel  after  the  prep- 
aration of  the  attack  had  begun;  that  is,  each  battery  is 
assigned  its  field  of  fire,  and  makes  its  preparations  to 
act  instantly  and  vigorously  against  any  part  of  it,  noting 
ranges  to  prominent  places,  seating  its  aiming-points, 
and  keeping  a  vigilant  watch  of  everything  within  its 
sector. 

The  guns  which  are  told  off  to  keep  down  the  fire  In 
front  maintain  a  vigorous  fire  over  the  heads  of  the  a.l- 
vancing  infantry  until  the  latest  possible  moment  before 
contact;  they  then  slightly  increase  their  elevation  and 
lengthen  their  fuses,  and  sweep  the  ground  just  in  rear 
of  the  enemy's  firing  line,  preventing  reinforcement  or 
withdrawal  of  it. 

Just  when  the  fire  should  be  thus  diverted  from  the 
firing  line  is  a  delicate  question.  As  fuse®,  laying  appa- 
ratus, and  observing  instruments  aire  improved,  this  mo- 
ment may  be  postponed;  but  even  so,  the  answer  is  no 
mere  matter  of  calculating  the  danger  space  and  ceasing  the 
fire  when  the  troops  reach  the  near  edge  of  it.  The  moral 
effect  upon  the  infantry  has  to  be  considered;  troops  can 
not  be  expected  to  advance  with  confidence  very  close  to 


166  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

the  real  danger  line.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  fire  ceases 
too  soon,  the  defenders  will  be  able  to  redouble  the  in- 
tensity of  their  fire.  Many  infantry  officers  say  that  they 
prefer  to  take  some  chances  of  getting  a  few  shells  among 
them  from  the  rear,  rather  than  dispense  prematurely 
with  the  support  of  the  artillery. 

It  has  been  laid  down  as  a  general  rule  that  the  fire 
must  cease  when  the  infantry  comes  within  500  yards  of 
the  target.  But  if  this  rule  be  followed,  the  artillery 
might  almost  as  well  not  support  the  attack  at  all.  A 
German  officer,  who  observed  the  war  in  South  Africa 
from  the  Boer  side,  holds  that  this  distance  must  be  re- 
duced to  100  yards. 

If,  as  *s  probable,  the  approach  to  the  position  is  up 
a  slope,  or  if  the  guns  themselves  occupy  an  elevated 
position,  the  fire  may  be  safely  continued  longer  than  on 
level  ground.  And  even  when  the  guns  have  to  increase 
their  elevation,  the  howitzers,  owing  to  the  steep  angle 
of  fall  of  their  trajectory,  may  continue  to  fire  almost  up 
to  the  moment  of  the  last  rush.  This,  it  will  be  noted, 
is  one  of  the  most  valuable  uses  of  howitzers,  and  they 
should  always  be  represented  among  the  batteries  as- 
signed to  this  duty. 

Some  of  the  supporting  batteries  will  go  in  with  the 
infantry  to  close  range,  perhaps  1,000  yards  or  less.  Sev- 
eral reasons  will  compel  this.  For  one  thing,  the  proper 
protection  of  the  flanks  may  very  likely  prove  impossible 
except  from  close  range;  if,  for  example,  the  enemy  should 
be  able  to  place  a  few  flanking  guns  behind  some  ob- 
stacle, in  such  a  manner  that  they  could  not  be  reached 
by  frontal  fire,  they  could  cause  great  loss  and  confusion 
in  the  attacking  force  if  no  artillery  were  present  to  reply 
to  them. 

Another  reason  is  the  desirabilitv  of  affording  moral 
support  to  the  infantry  during  the  advance,  through  the 
presence  of  its  "indispensable  companion."  The  French, 
especially,  attach  great  importance  to  this  feature,  and 
regard  it  as  essential,  "that  the  infantry  should  feel  the 
constant  and  immediate  support  of  the  accompanying  bat- 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  167 

teries,  and  that  these  should  reach  the  conquered  posi- 
tion at  the  same  time  as  the  infantry." 

It  is  said  that  the  shields  now  attached  to  the  guns 
render  it  possible  to  serve  them  under  fire  from  closer 
ranges  than  formerly,  in  spite  of  the  increased  power  of 
that  fire;  and  that  consequently  the  batteries  should  not 
hesitate  to  go  in,  more  particularly  as  they,  together  with 
the  infantry,  will  be  under  the  powerful  protection  of  the 
guns  which  remain  behind,  firing  over  their  heads. 

All  this  is  quite  true,  as  far  as  it  goes,  but  it  does 
not  touchj  the  real  objection  to  this  procedure  of  sending 
in  the  guns.  The  professed  object  is  moral  support;  but 
if  the  guns  make  long  stops  to  fire,  and  in  so  doing  util- 
ize the  protection  of  their  shields,  they  will  soon  lose 
touch  with  the  infantry.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  they  make 
several  changes  of  position,  advancing  step  by  step  with 
the  infantry,  they  will,  at  each  halt,  waste  at  least  a 
short  time  in  ranging;  moreover,  during  these  movements, 
they  will  lose  so  many  horses  that  they  will  soon  be  per- 
manently stopped.  In  either  case,  the  moral  support 
vanishes. 

There  is  something  in  the  idea  of  moral  support,  but 
it  ought  not  to  be  emphasized  too  much.  Batteries  must 
be  sent  in  to  close  range,  for  this  and  other  reasons,  but 
it  should  be  done  with  judgment,  and  after  due  consider- 
ation whether  the  conditions  require  it — not  as  a  matter 
of  course.  The  guns  ca;n  not  remain  immediately  with 
ihe  infantry  in  any  case,  if  they  are  to  do  any  firing;  and 
it  would  seem  that  their  fire  ought  to  have  much  the  same 
moral  effect  upon  their  own  infantry,  whether  delivered 
from  a  position  500  oir  2,000  yards  in  rear  of  it.  And  if 
it  is  a  mere  matter  of  fire  effect  against  troops  in  position, 
a  range  of  3,000  yards  is  as  good  as  1,000 — better,  in  fact, 
for  the  greater  angle  of  fall  of  the  projectiles  enables 
them  to  search  cover  better. 

Such  an  advance  ait  this  stage  can  not  be  made  off- 
hand. It  being  decided  that  it  should  be  made,  the  ground 
over  whicth  it  is  to  pass  will  have  to  be  thoroughly,  al- 
though rapidly,  studied,  positions  and  the  routes  to  them 
selected,  and  every  possible  means  taken  for  security. 


168  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

The  number  of  batteries  to  be  sent  should  also  be  con- 
sidered, in  view  of  the  terrain  and  of  the  object  of  the 
movement. 

In  executing  the  advance,  batteries  should  move  suc- 
cessively, so  as  not  to  cause  a  complete  cessation  of  fire 
at  an}^  time.  Each  part  of  the  line  should  advance  under 
the  protection  of  the  fire  of  some  other  part. 

if  the  attack  succeeds,  and  the  enemy  is  driven  from 
his  position,  the  victor  has  first  to  occupy  and  hold  the 
captured  ground,  and  then  to  make  the  most  of  his  ad- 
vantage by  a  vigorous  pursuit.  At  this  time,  as  an  Eng- 
lish writer  (Captain  H.  T.  Russell,  R.  F.  A.)  says:  "Units 
will  be  inextricably  mixed,  prominent  officers  conspicuous 
by  their  absence,  and  this  is  the  time  when  the  com- 
mander of  individuality  and  resource,  who  does  not  shirk 
responsibility,  can  make  his  mark  and  perhaps  help  to 
make  history." 

The  first  thing  to  be  done  is  to  complete  the  enemy's 
rout — prevent  a  counter-attack,  and  make  as  difficult  as 
possible  the  formation  of  a  rear  guard. 

Artillery  will  be  pushed  into  the  position  as  swiftly 
as  possible,  to  support  the  infantry  now  in  the  act  of 
occupying  it.  This  is  an  instance  where  subordinate  ar- 
tillery commanders,  occupying  advanced  positions,  should 
move  without  waiting  for  orders,  and  come  up  at  once. 

The  batteries  farther  to  the  rear  come  up  more  delib- 
erately, first  seeing  that  the  ones  ahead  have  made  good 
their  foothold  in  the  captured  position,  and  supporting 
them  in  the  event  of  a  counter-attack.  Meanwhile  the 
cavalry  and  horse  artillery  are  working  around  the  flanks, 
and  preparing  to  begin  the  pursuit 

These  arms  naturally  take  the  largest  -share  of  the 
work  of  pursuit.  The  field  batteries  assist  in  so  far  as 
they  are  ab'e,  firing  upon  any  bodies  of  the  enemy  that 
seem  inclined  to  make  a  stand;  but  without  express  or- 
ders they  should  not  go  fair  beyond  the  captured  position; 
they  should  rather  remain  there  until  the  successful  in- 
fantry has  recovered  from  the  disorder  brought  about  by 
its  own  victory.  The  assistance  of  th'e  guns  may  be 
needed  during  that  process. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  169 

In  the  pursuit,  artillery  should  not  waste  time  on 
small  oir  broken  bodies,  but  should  devote  its  attention 
to  the  main  force.  It  should  leave  the  capture  of  pris- 
oners to  other  troops;  it  has  no  men  to  send  back  with 
them,  if  taken. 

If  the  attack  is  repulsed,  the  responsibility  for  cov- 
eiing  the  withdrawal  and  checking  pursuit  rests  upon 
the  artillery,  and  primarily  upon  the  batteries  which  are 
most  advanced. 

From  the  above  description  it  will  be  noted  that 
several  changes  of  position  will  have  to  be  made  during 
the  course  of  the  action.  These  positions  wil1  be,  in  gen- 
eral: (1)  the  reconnoitering  position,  (2)  the  duel  position, 
(3)  the  supporting  position. 

This  classification  of  positions  must  not,  however,  be 
taken  too  literally,  as  a  "sealed  pattern"  order  of  attack. 
Under  some  of  these  heads  several  changes  of  position 
in  one  action  may  be  included;  some  of  them  may  be 
omitted  entirely,  or  rather  one  position  may  be  made  to 
serve  for  several  purposes;  some  batteries  may  have  oc- 
casion to  occupy  all  these  positions  in  succession,  others 
will  make  fewer  changes. 

It  has  been  remarked  above  that  changes  of  position 
are  always  undesirable;  and  this  is  especially  true  in  the 
attack,  since  changes  cannot  be  so  readily  made  under 
cover  as  in  the  defense.  The  difficulty  increases  as  the 
range  shortens,  and  in  the  later  changes  little  or  no  pro- 
tection can  be  found. 

Changes  should  be  made  by  echelon,  part  of  the  bat- 
teries moving  under  cover  of  the  fire  of  the  rest.  If,  as 
is  usual,  the  old  position  is  on  the  reverse  slope  of  a  hill, 
the  best  plan  is  to  limber  to  the  rear,  first  running  the 
guns  back  by  hand  if  direct  fire  is  being  used;  a  more  or 
less  covered  line  of  advance  to  the  new  position  may 
then  be  found,  and  the  necessity  of  crossing  the  crest  of 
the  hill,  on  the  sky  line,  avoided. 

There  is  a  tendency  to  consider  the  tactical  defensive 
as  the  gainer  by  modern  improvements  in  weapons.  This 
may  be  so  to  some  extent,  but  too  much  reliance  should 


170  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

not  be  placed  upon  such  a  theory.    To  quote  from  Meckel: 

"During  a  long  period  of  peace,  there  is  generally  a 
tendency  to  forget  the  lessons  of  war;  to  exaggerate  the 
results  of  improvements  in  firearms  and  the  importance 
of  formations;  and  to  attribute  a  certain  superiority  to 
the  defensive.  In  reality,  no  one  form  of  battle  is  superior 
to  another.  Their  relative  values  depend  entirely  upon 
the  terrain  and  upon  circumstances." 

The  battles  in  Manchuria  would  appear  to  support 
this  idea.  The  defense  has  indeed  grown  stronger  in  the 
earlier  stages  of  the  battle,  but  when  it  conies  to  the  de- 
cisive point,  improved  weapons  really  prove  of  greater 
value  to  the  attacker. 

The  first  step  in  battle  is  the  establishment  of  con- 
tact. Each  party  seeks  to  gain  information  as  to  the 
force  and  dispositions  of  the  other;  but  obviously  the  as- 
sailant is  the  more  urgently  in  need  of  information.  Con- 
tact can  be  gained  only  by  fighting,  and  the  defense  here 
enjoys  the  great  advantage  of  seeing  without  being  seen, 
and  of  having  his  position  carefully  prepared  beforehand. 
Later  in  the  fight,  these  advantages  gradually  diminish. 

The  one  advantage  that  in  the  nature  of  things  al- 
ways belongs  to  the  defense  is,  that  he  can,  in  the  form 
of  battle  selected  as  typical,  reconnoiter,  choose,  prepare, 
and  occupy  his  position  at  leisure. 

The  general  characteristics  desirable  in  an  artillery 
position  have  already  been  noted.  In  defense,  places  must 
be  found  from  which  the  guns,  without  in  any  degree  im- 
peding the  infantry,  may  command  all  available  positions 
and  cover  in  front,  both  to  protect  advanced  positions 
held  by  friends,  and  to  prevent  strong  points  being  seized 
by  the  enemy.  Provision  must  also  be  made  for  flanking 
fire,  which  may  become  highly  important  in  the  later 
stages  of  the  infantry  attack;  here  care  is  necessary,  lest 
the  flanking  positions  be  themselves  flanked. 

Every  artillery  commander,  of  whatever  grade,  should 
carefully  reconnoiter  the  ground  assigned  him.  Not  only 
the  position  to  be  immediately  occupied  must  be  examined, 
but  several  positions,  having  regard  to  the  probable  ne- 


ORGANIZATION    AND    TACTICS.  171 

cas'sity  of  changing  position  during  the  engagement — for 
even  in  defense  the  artillery  must  make  some  changes,  al- 
though better  off  than  the  attack.  When  the  infantry 
assault  begins,  a  new  position  will  probably  have  to  be 
taken  up  to  meet  it;  and  circumstances  may  compel  other 
alterations  in  dispositions. 

It  would  seem  superfluous  to  say  that  artillery  will 
often  have  to  provide  for  its  own  security,  by  sending 
scouts  to  reconnoiter  the  ground  beyond  its  immediate 
position;  but  there  is  no  lack  of  instances  where  this  pre- 
caution has  been  neglected,  and  batteries  surprised  by 
other  troops  that  have  worked  up,  concealed  by  some  ap- 
parently insignificant  fold  of  the  ground.  But  barring 
such  surprise,  artillery  need  not  fear  any  frontal  attack. 
It  is  vulnerable  in  the  flanks  only. 

Corresponding  to  the  advantage  which  the  defense 
possesses  in  taking  position  at  leisure,  is  the  disadvan- 
tage that  he  must  be  prepared  to  meet  all  possible  attacks 
of  the  enemy.  This  constrains  the  defending  artillery  to 
scatter  its  force  more,  to  cover  dangerous  places  in  the 
line.  But  the  whole  for  e  must  not  be  scattered  in  this 
way,  or  every  part  of  the  line  will  be  weak.  The  most 
important  points  are  occ/upied,  and  the  remainder  of  the 
artillery  held  back  until  needed. 

Fire  control  is  simpler  in  defense  than  in  attack,  ow- 
ing to  the  greater  permanence  of  the  positions.  The  field 
telephone  may  be  used  to  an  even  greater  extent.  Reg- 
ular range-finding  systems  may  be  established  in  the 
more  important  positions;  a  measured  base  line,  angle- 
measuring  instruments  at  the  ends,  and  telepLonic  com- 
munication are  the  essentials  of  the  system. 

As  remairked  above,  the  first  troops  of  the  defense 
to  engage  the  enemy  will  be  small  covering  detachments 
in  front.  The  use  of  these  is  twofold.  In  the  first  place, 
they  force  the  enemy  to  deploy  and  show  his  strength, 
giving  valuable  information  to  the  defender  in  time  for 
him  to  profit  by  it.  .Secondly,  they  annoy  him,  causing 
him  to  make  constant,  useless  and  costly  attacks,  and 
gradually  undermining  the  morale  of  his  troops. 


172  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

Such  detachments  should  act  in  much  the  same  man- 
ner as  a  rear  guard;  they  should  make  a  show  of  ener- 
getic resistance,  but  not  allow  themselves  to  be  drawn  in- 
to a  serious  engagement. 

This  being  so,  they  should  be  strong  in  artillery,  the 
long-range  arm  par  excellence,  and  have  only  enough  of 
the  other  arms  to  protect  the  artillery;  one  or  two  bat- 
teries, a  battalion  of  infantry,  and  enough  cavalry  for 
patrols  and  messengers,  would  be  a  typical  make-up. 

Horse  artillery  accompanied  by  cavalry  is  eminently 
suited  for  this  work,  but  unless  an  army  were  exception- 
ally strong  in  these  arms  they  would  be  of  more  use  on 
the  flanks.  Here  detachments  so  constituted  may  per- 
form a  double  .service;  they  may  do  all  that  is  outlined 
above,  and  also  attempt  to  lead  the  enemy  in  a  false  di- 
rection. This  is  one  of  the  few  cases  where  dividing  a 
battery  may  be  good  tactics.  Swift  and  energetic,  rather 
than  powerful  action  is  required;  sharp  attacks,  from  many 
points,  in  quick  succession,  may  keep  the  enemy  in  doubt 
as  to  the  force  in  his  front. 

All  advanced  parties  will  of  course  withdraw  before 
any  serious  attack  is  developed,  but  skirmishers  should 
be  kept  a  few  hundred  yards  ahead  of  the  artillery  posi- 
tions, ,so  that  the  artillery  need  not  be  distracted  from 
its  proper  work  to  watch  for  local  attacks  upon  its  own 
lines. 

By  reason  of  their  long  range,  heavy  guns  will  be  abl  • 
to  assist,  from  their  main  positions,  in  the  later  stages 
of  the  preliminary  operations.  These  are  usually  placed 
near  the  flanks,  both  in  order  to  deal  with  enveloping 
movements,  and  to  cross  their  fire  upon  a  frontal  attack. 
They  should  be  well  dispersed,  even  batteries  being  some- 
times divided.  Their  positions  are  more  permanent  than 
those  of  any  other  guns,  and  the  telephonic  communica- 
tion may  be  more  elaborated;  and  the  high  power  of  the 
guns  permits  their  use  with  good  effect,  singly. 

Unless  a  purely  passive  defense  is  contemplated,  it 
is  not  advisable  to  open  fire  at  very  long  range  from  the 
field  guns  in  the  main  position.  It  is  desirable  to  koep  the 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  173 

enemy  in  doubt  as  to  the  location  of  the  batteries  until 
he  has  come  to  fairly  close  quarters.  No  definite  rule  can 
be  given  as  to  the  proper  range,  in  yards,  to  be  used;  but 
perhaps  it  might  be  said  that  fire  ought  not  to  be  opened, 
if  it  can  well  be  avoided,  at  ranges  over  3,500  or  4,000 
yards. 

Each  battery  should  have  its  own  sector  of  fire  as- 
signed as  soon  as  the  advanced  detachments  begin  to  find 
the  enemy,  and  should  remain  in  observation  of  all  tar- 
gets appearing  in  it,  until  some  one  of  them  comes  to  easy 
range,  or  until  effective  fire  is  opened  from  some  battery 
within  the  sector.  Enough  batteries  should  be  in  observa- 
tion to  cover  thoroughly  with  fire  all  probable  lines  of 
advance  of  the  enemy;  not  more,  as  this  would  result  only 
in  disclosing  more  than  is  necessary  of  the  position.  The 
remaining  guns  constitute  a  temporary  reserve,  to  be 
held  limbered,  ready  foir  use  as  the  enemy's  plans  become 
clearer. 

This  does  not  mean  that  there  should  be  any  hesita- 
tion in  bringing  batteries  into  action  as  soon  as  there  id 
any  need  for  them,  whether  they  be  in  observation  or  lim- 
bered up.  All  are  gradually  sent  into  the  firing  line; 
there  is  no  .real  reserve,  as  that  term  is  understood  in 
the  other  armts. 

Usually  this  process  will  result  in  a  general  engage- 
ment with  the  attacking  guns — the  artillery  duel.  In 
this,  the  defense,  although  probably  the  weaker,  may  have 
a  very  good  cbance  of  success.  The  method  of  opening  fire 
gradually  end  progressively,  from  concealed  positions,  may 
lead  the  enemy  to  underrate  the  force  opposed  to  him, 
and  to  send  his  batteries  into  action  before  enough  have 
been  collected.  In  such  a  case,  the  defense  might  enjoy, 
temporarily,  an  absolute  superiority,  and  beat  the  at- 
tacker in  detail.  In  any  case,  he  has  the  advantage  of  *. 
carefully  chosen  position,  occupied  at  leisure,  and  should 
be  first  in  getting  the  range.  If  he  can  handle  the  en- 
emy's artiPery  severely  enough,  the  chances  are  that  no 
infantry  attack  will  be  made. 

It  may  often  be  to  the  defender's  advantage,  espe- 

—13- 


174  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

dally  if  he  believes  himself  to  be  greatly  inferior  in  artil- 
lery, to  decline  the  duel,  and  save  his  strength  for  the 
infantry  attack.  With  long-range  guns  and  concealed  po 
eitions,  he  may  well  succeed  in  holding  the  enemy  at  arm's 
length,  never  letting  him  get  enough  information  about 
the  position  for  a  general  engaigement. »  The  attacker  may 
then,  perhaps,  conceal  his  own  guns  and  play  a  waiting 
gume — concentrate  upon  each  battery  as  it  is  discovered, 
and  finally  force  the  defense  to  open  fire  al1  along  the  line 
to  avoid  being  curt  up  in  detail. 

If  this  fails,  or  if  he  has  not  the  time  for  it,  he  will, 
as  we  have  already  feen,  have  to  send  in  his  infantry. 
In  the  typical  case,  however,  there  would  be  an  artillery 
duel,  in  some  form  or  other,  and  the  probable  result  would 
be  that  the  defense  wou]d  ultimately  have  to  slacken  or 
cease  fire. 

Unless  the  defense  breaks  off  the  duel  prematurely, 
in  order  to  induce  the  enemy  to  make  a  premature  assault, 
the  infantry  will  be  getting  under  way  before  the  duel  ap- 
proaches an  end.  The  defense  »can  not  permit  hostile  in- 
fantry to  maneuver  unmolested  under  his  guns,  and  so 
must  assign  certain  batteries  to  fire  upon  it;  he  will  use 
as  few  guns  as  possible  for  this  purpose,  however,  for  the 
enemy's  artillery  is  still  has  most  important  target. 

If  the  attack  gains  the  upper  hand  in  the  duel,  the 
defense  must  prepare  to  resist  a  determined  infantry  at- 
tack. It  may  or  may  not  be  necessary  to  move  the  bat- 
teries to  avoid  further  loss  in  the  mean  time;  but  the 
artillery  commanders  now  employ  themselves  in  perfect- 
ing their  dispositions  for  the  next  phase  of  the  fight.  Bat- 
teries are  withdrawn  from  Darts  of  the  line  where  they 
are  not  likely  to  be  needed,  and  a  new  mobile  reserve 
formed,  to  be  used  as  before. 

The  artillery  has  hitherto  been  the  leader  in  the  bat- 
tle. As  the  attack  progresses,  it  begins  to  come  into 
action  again:  not  now  as  the  sole,  or  even  the  predomi- 
nant arm,  for  it  has  shown  itself  unable  to  prevent  an 
assault;  but  solely  to  assist  the  infantry  in  repelling  that 
assault. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  175 

This  being  the  task  in  hand,  the  advancing  infantry 
wi' 1  be  the  principal  target;  but  it  is  not  yet  time  to  leave 
the  hostile  artillery  entirely  out  of  account.  This  is  now 
turning  a  greater  or  less  number  of  guns  upon  the  point 
selected  for  the  attack,  'and  the  defender  should  try  to 
determine  which  are  the  batteries  .so  directing  their  fire, 
and  use  some  of  his  own  guns  against  them. 

The  guns  that  have  withdrawn  from  the  artillery 
duel  ought  not  to  reopen  their  fijre  prematurely.  Their 
target  is  to  be  the  advancing  infantry,  and  their  object 
is  to  assist  in  repulsing  its  attack.  If  now  they  open  too 
soon,  the  hostile  artillery,  not  being  yet  compelled  to  pro- 
tect its  own  troops  from  rifle  fire,  will  be  able  to  return 
with  its  whole  power  to  the  guns  of  the  defense,  and  crush 
them.  Both  the  artillery  and  infantry  of  the  attack  can 
then  unite  upon  the  unsupported  infantry.  There  will 
have  been  two  successive  efforts  at  defense,  each  by  only 
a  part  of  the  force,  and  each  will  have  been  overcome 
separately. 

For  these  reason/s,  the  artillery  should  hold  its  fire 
until  the  attacking  troops  come  to  rifle  range.  The  guns 
of  the  attack  will  then  be  forced  to  divide  their  attention 
between  the  infantry  and  artillery,  while  at  the  same 
time  the  defender's  fire  is  doubled  in  intensity. 

It  will  be  a  delicate  matter  to  come  into  action  again, 
and  much  will  depend  upon  the  care  which  has  been  be- 
stowed upon  the  preliminary  reconnaissance.  New  posi- 
tions will  have  to  be  used.  The  old  covered  emplacements 
will  not  usually  command  the  ground  over  which  the  in- 
fantry attack  is  made,  and  the  guns  will  have  to  move 
up,  using  direct  fire  and  little  or  no  concealment.  Prob- 
ably by  this  time  the  old  emplacements  will  have  been 
closely  located  by  the  enemy,  so  that  the  advantage  of 
retaining  them  is  minimized. 

Besides,  by  coming  into  action  in  a  new  position,  the 
element  of  surprise  is  introduced'.  A  cannonade  from  an 
unsuspected  quarter,  especially  if  a  cross  fire  can  be 
brought  to  bear,  should  have  a  stopping  power  entirely 
disproportionate  to  its  volumne. 


176  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

As  the  direction  of  the  attack  becomes  clearer,  more 
and  more  guns  should  open,  until,  by  the  time  it  has  fully 
developed,  all  aire  in  action.  And,  as  the  decisive  moment 
approaches,  every  gun  should  fire  upon  the  infantry  alone, 
neglecting  the  hostile  guns. 

Each  gun  is,  as  the  phrase  goes,  "its  own  reserve." 
That  is  to  say,  its  maximum  rate  of  fire  is  seldom  used, 
and  a  battery  can  at  almost  any  time  double  its  rapiditj. 
But  at  the  crisis  of  the  attack,  this  reserve,  with  all 
others,  is  thrown  in. 

If  the  attack  is  repulsed,  the  defender  will  usually 
try  to  take  the  offensive  in  his  turn,  and  the  guns  will 
act  as  already  indicated  for  pursuit. 

If  the  attack  is  successful,  a  counter-attack  will  be 
attempted.  In  this,  the  artillery  has,  first,  to  hold  in 
check  the  hostile  batteries  and  prevent  their  advancing 
to  the  position;  and,  secondly,  to  turn  sucli  guns  as  it 
may  upon  the  penetrating  infantry.  The  enemy  will  prob- 
ably press  his  infantry  strongly  into  the  breach,  and  if, 
at  the  proper  moment,  a  rapid  artillery  fire  at  short  range 
be  poured  into  the  flank  of  this  mass  of  troops,  the  effect 
will  be  destructive  in  the  extreme. 

When  the  enemy's  success  Lids  fair  to  be  more  than 
a  local  one,  the  commander-in-chief  will  try  to  withdraw 
some  of  his  guns  in  time  to  establish  a  rallying-point  in 
rear.  Such  as  are  not  ordered  back  cover  the  withdrawal 
and  continue  to  make  an  unshaken  stand.  A  withdrawal 
will  be  a  difficult  matter  after  the  infantry  assault  is  well 
advanced,  and  can  be  successfully  made  only  if  the  ground 
is  favorable.  As  for  the  guns  that  remain  behind,  it  may 
be  possible  to  save  them,  or  a  part  of  them,  if  a  tem- 
porary success  can  be  gained;  if  they  are  lost,  the  loss 
under  such  circumstances  is  to  the  credit  of  the  personnel. 
The  old  Drill  Regulations  say,  "the  loss  of  well-served 
guns  in  the  defense  of  a  position,  or  in  close  support  of 
the  other  arms,  is  honorable." 

In  covering  a  retreat,  the  duties  of  artillery  are  ob- 
vious. Its  most  dangerous  enemy  is  artillery,  or  espe- 
cially horse  airtillery  accompanied  by  cavalry.  Its  mission 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  177 

is  to  gain  time,  so  that  order  may  be  irestc^ed  and  a  rear 
guard  formed.  This  it  will  naturally  do  by  falling  back 
slowly  from  position  to  position,  moving  by  echelon,  and 
holding  the  enemy  by  its  fire  whenever  possible. 

A  few  words  concerning  artillery  on  the  march  may 
well  be  added  here. 

Two  considerations  determine  the  position  of  artil- 
lery in  an  advancing  column.  It  must  be  near  enough 
the  head  to  be  quickly  available  when  needed,  but  not 
near  enough  to  risk  being  caught  in  column  of  route  by 
ho>sti]e  artillery  fire. 

These  requirements  evidently  need  careful  balancing. 
Under  present  conditions,  artillery  caught  in  column  of 
route  within  4,000  yards  of  a  hostile  battery  would  be 
very  roughly  handled.  The  infantry,  then,  must  provide 
the  artillery  with  a  sufficient  maneuvering  zone  to  avoid 
this  risk,  and  a  part  of  the  guns  should  march  as  near 
the  head  of  the  main  body  as  is  consistent  with  this 
requirement. 

As  a  locg  column  of  guns  would  be  very  vulnerable 
in  flank,  it  should  be  broken  by  bodies  of  infantry  placed 
between  units.  Many  guns  will  thus  be  left  far  from  the 
front,  and  the  artillery  must  overcome  this  disadvantage 
by  being  prepared  to  cover  considerable  distances  at  a 
rapid  gait.  Every  effort  should  be  made  to  clear  the 
roads  for  it  when  it  is  needed  at  the  front;  the  Germans 
provide  for  this  by  having  a  special  bugle-call,  "Bear  to 
the  >right  (or  left),"  included  in  the  drill  regulations  of  all 
arms.  But  artillery  commrnders  in  rear  may  themselves 
push  ahead  when  they  expect  to  be  needed,  without  wait- 
ing for  orders,  going  across  country  if  the  roads  are  not 
cleared  for  them.  This  must,  of  course,  be  done  with 
judgment;  but  on  many  occasions  great  results  have  been 
obtained  through  timely  pushing  ahead  by  enterprising 
artillery  commanders. 

This  all  applies,  of  course,  to  large  units  of  artillery, 
marching  with  the  main  body.  In  a  force  of  -some  size, 
however,  say  a  brigade  or  more,  a  small  amount  of  artil- 
lery can  be  moved  up  into  the  reserve  of  the  advance 


178  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

guard  without  undue  risk.  Its  action  there  depends  up- 
on the  object  in  view. 

Some  writers  favor  its  being  dispersed  widely,  covsr- 
ing  as  broad  a  front  as  possible,  with  the  idea  of  deceiv- 
ing the  enemy  as  to  the  force  and  intentions  of  the  com- 
mand. Others  prefer  that  it  be  kept  well  in  hand,  in  order 
to  facilitate  control  over  it,  and  also  to  allow  reinforcing 
batteries  to  come  into  line  with  it  without  mixing  tacti- 
cal units. 

If  it  be  necessary  to  M'ush  aside  a  weak  opposing 
force,  the  advance  guard  artillery  will  go  in  as  close  as 
possible  before  opening  fire;  the  advance  guard  command- 
er should  be  pretty  certain  of  his  ground  before  ordering 
this,  however.  If  the  object  be  simply  delay,  the  artillery 
opens  at  longer  ranges,  firing  slowly  and  holding  back 
the  leading  elements  of  the  enemy. 

If  there  is  any  chance  of  a  general  action  following, 
the  advance  guard  artillery  takes  care  so  to  select  its  po- 
sitions as  to  facilitate  the  deployment  of  the  guns  of  the 
main  body. 

In  a  retrograde  movement,  the  artillery  of  the  rear 
guard  has  a  difficult  task,  in  that  it  must  remain  in  posi- 
tion long  enough  to  let  the  main  body  get  on,  but  not 
long  enough  to  become  seriously  entangled  itself.  In  gen- 
eral, the  rear  guard  will  be  stronger  in  artillery  than  aa 
advance  guard  of  the  .same  size;  and  the  guns  can  act 
on'y  by  (retiring  in  echelon  from  one  position  to  another. 
Occasionally  they  might  get  an  opportunity  for  a  brilliant 
success  by  waiting  in  a  concealed  position  well  out  on 
a  flank;  but  such  an  undertaking  is  risky,  and  could  not 
often  be  attempted. 

The  guns  of  the  main  body  are  widely  separated  from 
those  of  the  rear  guard,  pushing  on  for  positions  in  rear. 
If  the  commander  still  hopes  to  make  a  i^tand,  he  must 
get  his  guns  in  position  somewhere  as  soon  as  possible, 
and  rally  his  infantry  under  their  protection;  if  he  is  not 
in  a  position  to  risk  a  fight,  he  has  nothing  for  them  to 
do,  and  will  get  them  out  cf  the  way  as  fast  as  possible, 
clearing  the  roads  f^r  the  rest  of  his  force. 

In  a  flank  guard,  mobility  is  the  great  essential.    The 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  179 

guns  form  in  two  groups,  and,  if  a  fight  is  forced,  take 
successive  positions  facing  to  the  flank;  the  group  in  rear 
limbers  up  at  the  proper  moment  and  passes  the  other. 
This  is  a  dangerous  proceeding,  and  the  -route  to  be  fol- 
lowed requires  some  consideration. 

Guns  would  be  assigned  to  an  outpost  only  in  a  large 
force.  They  usually  remain  with  the  reserve,  but  in  spe- 
cial oases  go  farther  forward.  Such  cases  might  occur  if 
the  outpost  were  one  thrown  forward  to  hold  ground  on 
which  it  was  intended  to  fight  a  general  action;  or  if  a 
defile,  through  which  any  attack  must  come,  were  within 
range;  or  if  favorable  positions  for  the  enemy's  guns  were 
observed  beyond  (rifle  range  of  the  line. 

Outpost  duty  is  extremely  wearing  on  artillery,  since 
the  horses  must  remain  in  harness;  this  causes  rapid  de- 
terioration, which  no  amount  of  care  can  prevent. 

SUMMARY  OF  GENERAL  PRINCIPLES  GOVERNING  THE  EMPLOYMENT 
OF  ARTILLERY  IN  BATTLE. 

I.  Artillery  should  be  brought  into  action  at  the  very 
beginning  of  the  battle,  and  should  be  actively 
employed  as  long  as  an  enemy  remains  on  the 
field. 

II.  It  should  be  employed  in  masses,  and  should  con- 
centrate its  fire;  but  it  must  be  remembered  that 
massing  guns  does  not  consist  in  posting  the 
batteries  contiguously,  but  in  keeping  them  to- 
gether under  unity  of  command,  so  as  to  admit 
of  mutual  support  and  the  direction  of  their 
fire  on  a  common  objective. 

III.  It  should  take  up  a  position  as  close  to  the  enemj 

as  it  can  without  incurring  unnecessary  and 
ruinous  losses. 

IV.  It  should  not  feel  called  upon  to  blaze  away  the 

moment  it  comes  into  position,  but  it  should  en- 
deavor to  open  an  effective  fiire  with  the  least 
possible  delay. 

V.  It  must  never  be  forgotten  that  the  value  of  artil- 
lery depends  upon  the  accuracy  of  its  fire. 


180  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

VI.  Artillery  should  always  fire  at  a  definite  object,  and 
should  avoid  "shelling  the  woods,"  or  engaging 
in  any  other  ineffective  cannonade. 

VII.  Every  opportunity  should  be  taken  to  replenish 
ammunition.  The  supply  must  not  be  allowed 
to  fail,  especially  at  critical  moments. 
VIII.  The  principal  task  of  the  artillery  is  to  crush  the 
enemy's  infantry.  It  turns  its  attention  to  his 
artillery  only  as  a  means  of  getting  rid  of  an 
obstacle  to  its  attempts  upon  his  infantry,  or  as 
a  means  of  protecting  its  own  infantry  from  the 
fire  of  the  enemy's  guns.  In  a  cavalry  battle, 
the  cavalry  is  the  objective  of  the  artillery  fire. 

IX.     When  the  attack  is  successful,  the  artillery  must 

push  forward  to  secure  the  captured  position. 
X.    In  case  of  defeat,  the  artillery  must  be  prepared  to 
cover  the  retreat,  and,  if  necessary,  to  sacrifice 
itself  for  the  safety  of  the  rest  of  the  army. 

XI.  It  should  never  abandon  a  position  unless  ordered 
to  do  so.  The  loss  of  guns  is  highly  honorable 
when,  by  remaining  in  action  until  the  last  mo- 
ment, they  have  inflicted  serious  loss  on  the 
enemy. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  181 


CHAPTER   VII. 

THE  THREE  ARMS  COMBINED. 

"If  we  must  admit  that,  next  to  the  genius  of  the  general,  the 
infantry  arm  is  the  most  valuable  instrument  in  gaining  a  victory, 
it  is  no  less  true  that  most  important  aid  is  given  by  the  cavalry 
and  artillery." — Jomini. 

The  use  of  the  three  arms  combined  implies  the  em- 
ployment of  a  large  command — never  less  than  a  division 
or  a  detached  brigade — and  a  consideration  of  the  proper 
handling  of  such  a  force  requires  a  discussion  of  the  gen- 
eral subject  of  the  battle. 

THE  OFFENSIVE. 

The  Plan  of  Battle. — When  an  army  comes  in  contact 
with  the  enemy,  and  the  strategical  operations  are  about 
to  culminate  in  a  tactical  decision,  its  commander  must 
first  decide  whether  to  attack  or  stand  on  the  defensive. 
If  the  decision  be  in  favor  of  the  offensive,  he  must  next 
determine  whether  to  attack  the  enemy  in  front,  to  com- 
bine front  and  flank  attacks,  or  to  attempt  to  pierce  some 
point  of  the  hostile  line.  Having  settled  upon  the  method 
of  attack,  he  must  next  decide  upon  the  points  of  the 
opposing  line  upon  which  the  attack  should  fall.  These 
matters  determined,  he  must  provide  for  the  combination 
of  the  several  arms  so  as  to  obtain  their  most  efficient 
mutual  support  and  concerted  action,  and  make  the  best 
use  of  the  terrain.  These  decisions  and  arrangements 
constitute  the  plan  of  battle. 

RELATIVE  ADVANTAGES  OF  THE  OFFENSIVE  AND  DEFENSIVE. 

The  relative  advantages  of  the  offensive  and  defensive 
have  already  been  discussed  in  their  relations  to  infantry 
tactics,  and  but  little  remains  to  be  added.  The  question 
of  the  offensive  or  defensive  is  generally  settled  by  circum- 
stances, rather  than  by  the  deliberate  design  of  the  com- 
mander. The  advance  guards  of  the  two  opposing  forces 


182  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

meet,  and  the  stronger  generally  forces  the  weaker  into  a 
defensive  attitude.  As  reinforcements  come  up,  the  de- 
fensive may  be  changed  to  the  offensive,  or  the  reinforce- 
ments may  find  their  utmost  efforts  necessary  to  maintain 
the  fight  even  on  the  defensive.  In  the  case  of  larga 
armies,  each  will  often  be  at  the  same  time  on  the  offensive 
and  defensive  on  different  parts  of  the  field,  the  battle 
surging  to  and  fro,  according  to  the  relative  strength  of 
the  opponents  at  different  points. 

Where  the  choice  of  the  offensive  or  defensive  rests 
with  the  commander,  he  should  weigh  carefully  the  ques- 
tions of  terrain,  the  composition  of  the  army,  the  relative 
numbers  of  the  opposing  forces,  the  morale  and  character- 
istics of  his  troops,  his  own  temperament,  and  that  of  his 
adversary.  The  terrain  may  be  such  as  to  give  the  de- 
fense an  enormous  advantage,  or,  on  the  other  hand,  it 
may  peculiarly  favor  an  attack;  an  army  with  a  large  pro- 
portion of  cavalry  naturally  seeks  the  offensive,  while  one 
whose  strength  rests  mainly  in  its  artillery  assumes  the 
defensive  quite  as  a  matter  of  course;  relative  numbers 
may  justify  or  forbid  an  assault;  veteran  troops  whose 
morale  has  been  raised  to  a  high  pitch  by  a  succession  of 
victories  may  undertake  with  confidence  an  assault  which 
would  be  madness  with  inferior  soldiers;  and  raw  levies, 
or  troops  which  have  been  defeated  in  the  open,  may  some- 
times be  successfully  used  on  a  pure  defensive  behind  in- 
trenchments,  when  they  could  not  be  relied  .upon  to  act 
well  in  the  open  field.  Jackson,  after  repulsing  the  Brit- 
ish with  great  slaughter  at  New  Orleans,  was  wise  enough 
to  reject  all  suggestions  of  a  counter-assault  upon  the  posi- 
tion of  the  defeated  army;  and  Pemberton,  after  having 
been  repeatedly  and  heavily  defeated  in  the  field  by  Oant, 
successfully  resisted  all  attempts  of  the  latter  to  carry 
the  Vicksburg  intrenchments  by  assault. 

The  temperament  of  the  commander  may  be  such 
that  he  can  act  at  his  best  only  when  he  aggressively 
forces  the  fighting;  or  his  genius  may  be  of  a  defensive 
order.  In  either  case,  he  will  naturally  seek  that  mode 
of  action  which  is  most  in  accord  with  his  inclination  and 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  183. 

ability,  unless  the  other  be  thrust  upon  him  by  circum- 
stances. A  knowledge  of  the  temperament  of  his  adver- 
sary may  also  have  a  great  influence  upon  a  commander 
in  deciding  his  course  of  action.  When  Johnston  was  in 
his  front,  Sherman  knew  that  offensive  action,  combined 
with  vigilant  guarding  against  a  counter-thrust,  was  nec- 
essary; but  as  soon  as  Hood  was  placed  in  command  of 
the  Confederate  Army,  the  Union  general  at  once  prepared 
to  meet  aggressive  action  on  the  part  of  his  new  adver- 
sary.* In  discussing  the  Japanese  success  at  Mukden, 
Tabumo  pays  that  their  victory  was  not  due  "to  the  fight- 
ing or  numerical  superiority  of  their  army,  or  their  skill- 
ful plan  of  operations,  but  to  their  knowledge  of  our 
psychology."**  The  national  characteristics  of  the  troops 
should  also  be  considered.  British  soldiers  have  made 
many  gallant  assaults,  and  French  troops  have  often  con- 
ducted an  heroic  defense;  yet  the  former  have  performed 
their  greatest  achievements  on  the  defensive,  and  the 
latter,  on  the  offensive. 

A  commander  assuming  the  defensive  should  seek 
every  opportunity  to  resort  to  the  offensive  whenever  the 
enemy's  assaults  have  been  checked  with  loss;  but  a  gen- 
eral whose  aggressive  movements  are  progressing  favor- 
ably should  never  voluntarily  change  to  the  defensive 
When  Hooker,  after  his  brilliant  passage  of  the  Kappa- 
hannock  and  the  Rapidan,  advanced  upon  Lee,  a  great 
victory  was  practically  within  his  grasp;  but  his  sudden 
and  unnecessary  change  from  the  offensive  to  the  defens- 

*In  his  "Memoirs,"  General  Sherman  says:  "One  of  General 
Thomas'  staff  officers  brought  me  a  citizen,  one  of  our  spies,  who 
had  just  come  out  of  Atlanta,  and  had  brought  a  newspaper  of  the 
same  day,  or  of  the  day  before,  containing  Johnston's  order  relin- 
quishing the  command  of  the  Confederate  forces  in  Atlanta,  and 
Hood's  order  assuming  the  command.  I  immediately  inquired  of 
General  Schofield,  who  was  his  classmate  at  West  Point,  about  Hood, 
as  to  his  general  character,  etc.,  and  learned  that  he  was  bold  even 
to  rashness,  and  courageous  in  the  extreme;  I  inferred  that  the 
change  of  commanders  meant  'fight.'  Notice  of  this  important 
change  was  at  once  sent  to  all  parts  of  the  army,  and  every  divis- 
ion commander  was  cautioned  to  be  always  prepared  for  battle  in  any 
shape." 

**"The  Truth  about  the  War." — J.  Taburno,  p.  112,  et  seq. 


184  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

ive  threw  away  the  enormous  advantages  he  had  gained, 
gave  Lee  time  to  concentrate  his  army,  and  was  the 
first  step  toward  a  defeat  which  should  never  have  been 
incurred. 

DIRECTION  OF  THE  ATTACK. 

Frontal  Attack. — The  frontal  attack,  or  "attack  all 
along  the  line,"  is  the  least  skillful,  and  generally  the  least 
decisive,  mode  of  assailing  the  enemy.  When  he  is  cover- 
ing his  line  of  retreat,  such  an  attack  merely  drives  him 
back  toward  his  base,  and  generally  results  at  best  in  a 
barren  victory.  Still,  frontal  attacks  may  be  expedient 
when  the  enemy's  flanks  rest  upon  impassable  obstacles, 
and  it  is  impossible  to  maneuver  him  out  of  his  position; 
when  a  reconnaissance  in  force  is  necessary  to  develop  the 
hostile  position  or  to  seek  out  a  weak  point  in  an  adver- 
sary's line;  or  when  the  line  of  battle  of  the  opponent  is 
parallel  to,  or  coincident  with,  his  line  of  retreat.  In  the 
last  case,  a  frontal  attack  may  push  him  entirely  off  his 
line  of  retreat,  rupture  his  communications  with  his  base, 
and  result  in  his  destruction.* 

Increased  accuracy  and  range  of  small-arms  have 
greatly  diminished  the  chances  of  success  in  a  frontal  at- 
tack; the  comparative  invisibility  of  the  firer,  due  to  the 
neutral  color  of  his  uniform  and  the  use  of  smokeless 
powder,  also  adds  materially  to  the  power  of  the  defensive. 
Without  superiority  of  fire,  we  may  consider  the  frontal 
attack  as  impracticable,  but  frontal  attacks  are  not  im- 
possible, as  has  been  recently  demonstrated  by  the  Jap- 
anese in  Manchuria.  To  be  successful,  the  assailant  must 
gain  superiority  of  fire  and  be  willing  to  pay  the  price  of 
victory.  In  an  attack  all  along  the  line,  this  superiority 
of  fire  is  impossible  unless  the  assailant  greatly  outnum- 
bers his  adversary;  and  even  then  many  of  the  advantages 
of  the  initiative  are  abandoned.  The  frontal  attack  made 
by  General  Grant  at  Cold  Harbor  (June  3,  1864)  is  an  un- 
deniable blot  upon  the  reputation  of  that  great  command- 

*A  striking  illustration  of  this  is  afforded  by  the  decisive 
defeat  of  the  Sardinians  by  the  Austrians  at  Novara,  1849.  See 
Hamley's  "Operations  of  War,"  p.  64. 


OBGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  185 

er.  The  result  was  a  repulse  with  terrible  slaughter,  while 
the  losses  of  Lee  were  insignificant.  General  Grant,  in 
commenting  upon  this  battle,  says  frankly:  "I  have  al- 
ways regretted  that  the  last  assault  at  Cold  Harbor  was 

ever  made No  advantage  whatever  was  gained 

to  compensate  for  the  heavy  loss  we  sustained.  Indeed, 
the  advantages,  other  than  those  of  relative  losses,  were 
on  the  Confederate  side.  Before  that,  the  Army  of  North- 
ern Virginia  seemed  to  have  acquired  a  wholesome  regard 
for  the  courage,  endurance,  and  soldierly  qualities  gen- 
erally of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac Indeed, 

they  seemed  to  have  given  up  any  idea  of  gaining  any  ad- 
vantage of  their  antagonist  in  the  open  field.  They  had 
come  to  much  prefer  breastworks  in  their  front  to  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac.  This  charge  seemed  to  revive  their 

hopes  temporarily The  effect  upon  the  Army 

of  the  Potomac  was  the  reverse."* 

Flank  Attacks. — Frontal  attacks  being  rarely  decisive 
and  generally  impracticable  when  the  armies  are  nearly 
equal  in  size,  some  other  method  of  overthrowing  the  en- 
emy must  be  sought;  and  the  one  most  often  adopted  is 
the  combination  of  attacks  on  front  and  flank.  Flank  at- 
tacks have  already  been  discussed,  and  the  'necessity  of 
combining  such  attacks  with  a  front  attack,  to  prevent 
the  enemy  from  turning  his  whole  attention  to  the  flank- 
ing force,  has  also  been  considered.  The  increased  range 
and  power  of  modern  weapons  has,  in  fact,  led  naturally 
to  this  form  of  attack;  for,  every  effort  being  made  to  bring 
a  converging  fire  upon  the  enemy,  and,  at  the  same  time, 
to  cause  his  fire  to  diverge,  an  extension  of  the  line,  and 
an  attempt  to  overlap  the  enemy,  are  brought  about  nat- 
urally. Such  a  movement,  which  would  formerly  have 
been  dangerous  in  the  extreme,  as  tending  to  a  fatal  weak- 
ening of  the  line,  is  now  'rendered  practicable  by  the  enor- 
mously increased  power  of  the  local  defense  conferred  by 
modern  weapons  and  the  use  of  hasty  intrenchments, 
which  enable  the  weakened  portion  to  resist  counter- 

*"Memoirs,"  Vol.  II.,  p.  276. 


186  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

attacks.*  The  neutral  color  of  the  uniform  which  hides 
the  firer  on  the  defensive,  at  the  same  time  inures  to 
the  advantage  of  the  offensive  in  concealing  turning 
movements. 

Unless  the  assailant  has  a  great  superiority  of  force, 
he  can  throw  a  preponderating  weight  upon  one  of  the 
enemy's  flanks  only  by  reducing  the  strength  opposed  to 
the  other  portion  of  the  hostile  line.  While  acting  aggres- 
sively with  the  reinforced  portion,  it  is  accordingly  nec- 
essary to  protect  the  other  part  from  the  assaults  of  the 
enemy,  for  it  is  not  impossible  that  both  commanders  may 
form  the  same  plan,  as  at  Stone  River,  where  Rosecrans 
and  Bragg  each  sought  to  attack  the  other's  right  flank. 
The  protection  of  the  weakened  part  may  be  effected  by 
"refusing"  (or  withholding)  it,  in  which  case  it  is  protected 
by  distance;  by  intrenching  it  and  holding  it  on  the  defens- 
ive, in  which  case  it  is  protected  by  its  power  of  local  de- 
fense; or  by  making  feints  with  it,  such  as  to  deceive  the 
enemy  as  to  the  real  point  of  attack.  The  means  to  be 
adopted  will  depend  upon  circumstances,  but,  generally 
speaking,  the  third  method  is  altogether  the  best,  as  It 
keeps  the  enemy  in  doubt  as  to  the  point  upon  which  the 
brunt  of  the  attack  is  to  fall,  whereas  the  other  disposi- 
tions might  betray  to  the  enemy  the  plan  of  attack. 

Generally  speaking,  an  attempt  should  never  be  made 
to  attack  simultaneously  both  flanks  of  an  equal  force,  for 
in  order  to  throw  an  overwhelming  force  upon  both  flanks, 
the  assailant  must  so  weaken  his  center  as  to  expose  it 
dangerously  to  a  counter-attack  by  the  enemy.  An  illus- 
tration of  this  is  afforded  by  the  battle  of  Austerlitz, 
where  the  Allies,  attempting  to  turn  Napoleon's  right, 

*The  increased  power  of  local  defense  conferred  by  hasty  in- 
trenchments,  even  before  the  introduction  of  breech-loaders,  was 
more  than  once  shown  in  the  War  of  Secession,  and  notably  at  Chan- 
cellorsville.  In  that  battle,  Hancock  covered  the  front  of  his  divis- 
ion with  a  line  of  skirmishers,  with  intervals  of  about  three  paces, 
protected  with  slight  rifle-pits  having  an  abatis  in  front.  The  skir- 
mishers, consisting  mainly  of  three  regiments  (57th,  64th,  and  66th 
N.  Y.  Vols.)  under  Colonel  (now  General)  N.  A.  Miles,  held  their 
position  so  successfully  against  repeated  heavy  assaults  by  the  Con- 
federates, that  the  enemy  was  not  once  able  to  reach  Hancock's  line 
of  battle.  (See  Official  Report  of  General  Hancock.) 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  187 

-and  at  the  same  time  to  drive  back  his  left,  found  their 
own  center  pierced  and  the  battle  hopelessly  lost.  A  suc- 
cessful attack  upon  both  flanks  of  an  enemy  implies,  there- 
fore, a  great  numerical  superiority,  or  the  occupation  by 
th}  assailant's  center  of  a  position  so  strong  as  to  be  im- 
pregnable against  counter-assault.  Thus,  at  Dresden,  Na- 
poleon won  his  last  great  victory  by  attacking  simultane- 
ously both  flanks  of  an  army  whose  numbers  exceeded  his 
own,  but  his  center  was  so  strongly  .posted  as  to  be  abso- 
lutely secure. 

Piercing  the  Enemy's  Front. — An  attack  which  pierces 
the  enemy's  front  is  the  most  decisive  of  all,  for  it  gen- 
erally results  in  cutting  off  a  portion  of  the  hostile  army 
from  its  line  of  retreat,  and  causing  either  its  surrender 
or  its  annihilation.  Thus,  at  Austerlitz,  Napoleon,  having 
pierced  the  center  of  the  Allies,  cut  off  their  left  (consist- 
ing of  about  30,000  men),  which  he  threw  back  upon  the 
marshy  lakes,  where  most  of  the  fugitives  who  escaped 
capture  perished  by  drowning. 

An  attempt  to  pierce  the  enemy's  front  is,  under 
modern  conditions,  generally  hopeless,  unless  the  enemy 
has  himself  invited  it  by  an  undue  extension  for  the  pur- 
pose of  overlapping  both  flanks  of  the  assailant;  for  the 
attacking  force,  obliged  to  encounter  the  fire  of  the  en- 
emy's artillery  masses  from  the  moment  of  its  first  for- 
ward impulsion,  and  subjected  to  the  concentrated  fire  of 
infantry  weapons  having  at  least  five  times  the  effective 
range  of  those  of  the  Napoleonic  era,  would  probably  be 
annihilated  before  it  could  reach  the  hostile  position. 
When  the  enemy's  front  is  pierced,  it  is  necessary  to  sup- 
port the  penetrating  force  promptly,  or  the  enemy  will 
envelop  it  in  a  counter-attack  by  his  reserves,  or  will  es- 
tablish a  new  line  in  rear.  Thus,  at  Gettysburg,  Pick- 
ett's  division  actually  succeeded  in  penetrating  the  Union 
line;  but,  the  supporting  troops  having  been  repulsed, 
the  assaulting  column  was  overwhelmed  and  practicaPy 
annihilated. 

ORDERS  OF  BATTLE. 

By  the  term  "order  of  battle"  is  meant  the  relative 
tactical  position  of  the  opposing  forces  in  preparation  for 


188  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

battle  or  during  the  encounter.  Orders  of  battle  must 
exist  from  the  very  nature  of  things,  and  with  small  and 
highly  trained  armies,  such  as  those  of  Epaminoudas  or 
Frederick,  when  preparations  for  battle  were  made  with 
deliberation,  and  the  chief  reliance  was  placed  upon  shock 
action,  the  order  of  battle  assumed  in  preparation  for  the 
encounter  was  a  matter  of  the  greatest  importance.  Now, 
however,  when  battles  are  generally  those  of  rencounter 
rather  than  deliberate  preparation,  the  whole  matter  is 
generally  decided  in  accordance  with  the  circumstances 
of  the  action,  and  the  order  of  battle  is  more  likely  to  be 
adventitious  than  premeditated. 

When  an  attack  is  made  "all  along  the  line,"  the 
parallel  order  of  battle  exists  naturally.  So  too,  when 
an  attack  in  front  is  made  in  combination  with  a  flank 
attack,  the  a.ssailant  assumes  a  reentering  order  of  bat- 
tle; and  this  order  is  also  produced  when  an  army  engaged 
with  an  opponent  in  front  is  reinforced  from  such  a  direc- 
tion that  the  reinforcements  strike  the  enemy  on  the  flank, 
as  at  Waterloo  or  Koniggratz.  When  the  defender  refuses 
a  portion  of  his  force  to  meet  a  flank  attack,  he  naturally 
assumes  a  salient  or  "crotchet"  order.  When  an  attempt 
is  made  to  turn  both  flanks  of  the  enemy,  the  assailant's 
order  of  battle  is  necessarily  concave.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  assailant  attempts  to  pierce  the  enemy's  front, 
the  dispositions  made  to  support  the  attacking  column 
naturally  give  rise  to  a  convex  order  of  battle.  If  the 
defender  then  throws  forward  his  flanks  to  envelop  the 
assailant,  the  order  of  battle  assumed  by  the  former  is  a 
concave  or  enclosing  one.  When  an  attempt  is  made*  to 
strike  the  enemy  on  the  flank  and  at  the  same  time  refuse 
the  other  portion  of  the  line,  the  order  of  battle  becomes 
oblique.  This  order  requires  for  its  success  that  tn 
should  extend  beyond  the  enemy's  flank;  for  otherwise  the 
assailant  would  practically  expose  his  own  flank  to  attack. 
The  oblique  order,  which  was  the  favcrite  order  of  battle 
of  Frederick  the  Great,  may  now  be  regarded  as  practi- 
cally obsolete,  and  the  others  may  be  broadly  classed  as 
parallel,  concave,  and  convex. 

WP  have  already  seen  that  the  parallel  order  of  bat 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  189 

tie  can  rarely  be  depended  on  to  give  decisive  results.    The 
concave  order  has  the  advantage  of  opposing  a  converging 
to  a  diverging  fire.     Its  defects  are  that,  unless  it  com- 
pletely encloses  the  enemy,  one  or  both  flanks  may  be 
dangerously  exposed  to   counter-attack;   and  that  if  too 
great  an  extension  be  made,  the  center  may  be  so  atten- 
uated as  to  be  pierced  by  a  counter-assault  of  the  enemy. 
It  is  usually  much  preferable  to  the  convex  order;  and  it 
may  be  said  that  some  variety  of  the  concave  order  of 
batt]e  is  generally  assumed  by  choice,  and  some  form  of 
the  convex  order  from  necessity.    The  latter  is  necessary, 
for  instance,  when  an  army  crosses  a  river  in  the  face  of 
the  enemy,  and  the  commander  is  compelled  to  move  a 
part  of  his  force  forward  to  cover  the  passage,  and  to  push 
troops  in  on  the  flanks  to  protect  the  bridges  from  hostile 
attacks.    An  instance  of  the  adoption  of  the  convex  order 
is  furnished  by  Napoleon's  passage  of  the  Danube  at  Ess- 
ling  and  Aspern,  in  1809.     It  may  also  be  expedient  to 
assume   this   formation   on    the   defensive    under   circum- 
stances which  will  be  considered  later.     The  defects   of 
the  convex  order  are  that  the  fire  of  the  troops  is  diverg- 
ent; that  the  enemy's  fronta    fire  on  one  wing  is  likely  to 
take  the  other  wing  in  reverse;  that  if  the  line  be  pierced 
in  front,  both  wings  are,  by  the  direction  of  the  attack,  at 
once  taken  in  flank;  and  that  if  broken  at  either . flank, 
in  the  case  of  an  army  covering  the  crossing  of  a  river, 
the  entire  army  is  in  danger  of  being  cut  off  from  its 
bridges.     In  general  terms  it  may  be  said  that  any  of- 
fensive  plan   of   battle   that   does    not    contemplate   the 
turning    of   a    flank    is    faulty;    and    this    condemns    the 
voluntary    assumption    of    the   convex    order    on    the   of- 
fensive.   Whatever  the  order  of  battle  may  be,  the  airmy 
must  be   prepared   to   fellow   up    any   successful    attack, 
and  prevent  the  enemy  from  accommodating  his  disposi- 
tions to  the  altered  circumstances  of  the  action. 

POINTS  OF  ATTACK. 

The  determination  of  the  point  upon  which  the  main 
attack  is  to  fall  rests  upon  both  strategical  and  tactical 
considerations.  If  the  sole  object  of  the  attack  be  merely 

—14  — 


190  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

to  win  a  victory  and  gain  possession  of  the  field,  tactical 
considerations  alone  need  be  entertained;  but  if  the  object 
be  to  gain  the  greatest  results  from  the  battle,  strate- 
gical questions  cannot  be  ignored  in  determining  the  points 
of  attack. 

Strategical  Consideration*. — When  the  hostile  army  is 
connected  with  its  base  by  one  flank,  the  attack  should 
fall  upon  that  flank,  so  that  the  enemy  may  be  cut  off 
from  communication  with  his  base,  and  thus  be  deprived 
of  supplies  and  succor.  In  1864-5,  when  Grant  and  Lee 
confronted  each  other  on  the  Richmond-Petersburg  line, 
Grant's  attacks  were  directed  against  Lee's  right,  as  that 
was  the  flank  by  which  the  Confederate  Army  drew  its 
supplies  from  the  South.  Operations  against  Lee's  left 
might,  perhaps,  have  resulted  in  the  capture  of  Richmond, 
but  they  would  not  have  cut  him  off  from  the  district  from 
which  he  obtained  his  supplies,  nor  prevented  his  junction 
with  Johnston. 

When  the  hostile  army  is  connected  by  a  flank  with 
another  army,  a  fortress,  or  any  important  strategic  point, 
the  attack  should  fall  on  the  connecting  flank.  Thus  Na- 
poleon aimed  his  attacks  against  Wellington's  left,  at 
Waterloo,  that  being  the  flank  by  which  the  British  main- 
tained their  junction  with  the  army  of  Blucher.  At  Grave- 
lotte,  Bazaine  was  connected  by  his  left  flank  with  the 
fortress  of  Metz,  while  it  was  only  by  his  right  that  he 
could  maintain  his  communication  with  Paris  and  effect 
a  junction  with  the  army  of  MacMahon,  then  at  Chalons. 
An  attack  upon  Bazaine's  left  would,  if  successful,  result 
in  the  capture  of  Metz,  but  would  leave  his  line  of  retreat 
intact,  and  would  not  prevent  the  junction  of  the  two 
French  armies;  while  a  successful  attack  upon  his  right 
would  cut  off  his  retreat  and  drive  him  back  upon  Metz. 
Von  Moltke  accordingly  made  his  principal  attack  upon 
Bazaine's  right,  defeated  him,  shut  up  his  army  in  Metz, 
cutting  it  off  from  its  base  of  supply,  and  completely  sep- 
arating it  from  MacMahon. 

When  the  line  of  retreat  lies  obliquely  in  rear  of  one 
wing,  that  wing  should  be  the  object  of  attack,  in  order 
that  the  »nemy's  escape  may  be  cut  off.  To  drive  back 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  191 

the  other  flank  would  merely  cause  the  enemy  to  assume 
a  position  perpendicular  to  his  line  of  retreat,  and  thus 
rectify  his  position.  At  Antietam  the  Confederate  line 
of  retreat  (from  Sharpsburg  to  Shepherdstown)  lay  in  rear 
of  their  right  flank;  and  McClellan  accordingly  ordered 
Burnside  to  make  a  vigorous  attack  upon  Lee's  right  as 
soon  as  the  attention  of  the  Confederate  commander  was 
occupied  with  the  attack  mi  de  on  the  other  flank  by 
Hooker  and  Sumner.  Then,  with  the  Confederate  line  of 
retreat  in  his  grasp,  the  Union  commander  intended  to 
throw  his  center  forward  and  crush  Lee,  whose  defeated 
army  would  find  escape  impossible.  Had  Burnside  obeyed 
his  orders  promptly  and  with  energy,  the  battle  would 
probably  have  resulted  in  a  decisive  victory  for  McClellan. 
A.t  Friedland,  Napoleon,  observing  that  the  Eussian  lin* 
of  retreat  across  the  Alle  lay  in  rear  of  their  left,  directed 
his  attacks  upon  that  flank,  and,  seizing  the  bridges,  de 
stroyed  or  captured  nearly  half  of  Benningsen's  army. 

When  the  attacking  army  is  connected  by  a  flank 
with  an  allied  army,  with  its  base,  with  a  fortress,  or  any 
important  strategic  point,  the  attack  should  be  made 
from  that  flank;  for  this  being  the  point  to  be  especially 
guarded,  the  preponderance  of  force  necessary  for  an 
attack  will  naturally  be  found  there.  At  Ligny,  Bliicher, 
being  connected  by  means  of  his  right  with  Wellington, 
reinforced  that  flank  and  attacked  with  it,  thus  guarding 
his  communication  with  his  ally  while  assailing  the  enemy. 

It  is  thus  evident  that  strategical  considerations  often 
enter  with  great  force  into  the  question  cf  selecting  the 
point  of  attack;  but  tactical  considerations  are,  neverthe- 
less, generally  paramount,  as  the  great  object  is,  above 
all,  to  make  sure  of  beating  the  enemy;  for  no  victory  can 
be  so  barren  as  to  be  unwelcome. 

Tactical  Considerations. — Among  the  tactical  consider- 
ations influencing  this  important  element  of  the  plan  of 
battle  are  the  following: 

The  enemy's  advanced  posts  must  be  captured,  unless 
they  are  so  far  apart  that  the  attack  can  be  made  between 
them,  beyond  the  effective  range  of  either;  and  this,  owing 
to  the  range  of  modern  weapons,  is  generally  impossible, 


192  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

unless  the  advanced  posts  are  very  few,  and  the  hostile 
line  very  long.  When  the  advanced  posts  are  strong  and 
supported  by  each  other  and  the  main  position,  their  cap- 
ture is  imperative,  in  order  that  the  attacking  force  may 
not  be  caught  between  two  flank  fires  while  subjected  to 
a  fire  in  front.  The  advanced  posts  of  Hougomont  and 
La  Haye  Sainte,  at  Waterloo,  extended  forward  from  the 
British  position  like  the  bastions  of  a  fortress;  and  from 
the  nature  of  their  situation  their  fire  could  take  in  flank 
all  troops  endeavoring  to  penetrate  between  them  to  Wel- 
lington's main  line.  They  were  accordingly  the  objects 
of  persistent  and  determined  attacks  by  Napoleon. 

WThen  a  strongly  fortified  post  exists  in  the  line  of 
battle,  the  attack  should  fall  upon  points  where  the  line 
can  be  more  easily  penetrated,  and  from  which  the  post 
can  be  assailed  in  flank  or  rear.  At  Worth  the  fortified 
village  of  Froschweiler  resisted  the  efforts  of  the  entire 
German  V.  Corps  to  carry  it  by  frontal  assault,  but  it  was 
captured  when  attacked  on  the  right  and  rear.  But  when 
a  fortified  post  or  some  natural  feature  in  the  enemy's 
line  secures  his  line  of  retreat  or  commands  the  other 
parts  of  the  field,  it  must  be  made  the  object  of  attack 
and  captured  as  soon  as  possible.  Thus,  at  Gettysburg, 
"Round  Top  rose  like  a  huge  sentinel  guarding  the  Fed- 
eral left  flank,  while  the  spurs  and  ridges  trending  off  to 
the  north  of  it  afforded  unrivaled  positions  for  the  use  of 
artillery."  It  was  accordingly  assaulted  in  a  most  deter- 
mined manner  by  the  Confederates,  early  in  the  action, 
and  had  they  succeeded  in  capturing  it,  they  would  prob- 
ably have  won  the  battle.  The  mere  fact  of  ground  com- 
manding much  of  the  field  does  not,  however,  render  it 
necessarily  a  decisive  or  key  point.  "At  the  battle  af 
Bautzen  the  left  of  the  Allies  rested  upon  the  steep  moun- 
tains of  Bohemia,  which  province  was  at  that  time  rather 
neutral  than  hostile;  it  seemed  that,  tactically  considered, 
the  slop 3  of  these  mountains  was  the  decisive  point  to  be 
held,  when  it  was  just  the  reverse,  because  the  Allies  had 
but  one  line  of  retreat  upon  Reichenbach  and  Gorlitz,  and 
the  French,  by  forcing  the  right,  which  was  in  the  plain, 
would  occupy  the  line  of  retreat  and  throw  the  Allies  into 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  193 

the  mountains,  where  they  might  have  lost  all  their  ma- 
teriel and  a  great  part  of  the  personnel  of  their  army.  This 
course  was  also  easier  for  them  on  account  of  the  differ- 
ent features  of  the  ground,  led  to  more  important  results, 
and  would  have  diminished  the  obstacles  in  the  future."* 

When  one  of  the  enemy's  flanks  rests  upon  an  impass- 
able obstacle,  the  other  extremity  of  the  wing  thus  situ- 
ated will  offer  a  tempting  point  of  attack;  for  if  the  ene- 
my's front  can  be  pierced,  the  troops  thus  cut  off  may  be 
thrown  back  upon  the  obstacle  and  either  captured  or 
destroyed,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Allied  right  at  Austerlitz. 
If  the  penetration  of  the  enemy's  line  be  impracticable, 
the  exposed  flank  should  be  chosen  as  the  point  of  attack, 
with  a  view  to  throwing  the  enemy's  entire  army  back 
upon  the  obstacle.  Such  an  opportunity  was  offered  at 
the  battle  of  the  Alma,  in  regard  to  which  Hamley  makes 
the  following  comment:  "At  the  Alma  the  sea-cliffs  were 
on  the  Russian  left  and  the  Allied  right.  The  Allies  ad- 
vanced in  echelon  from  the  right,  close  to  the  cliffs.  The 
Russians,  defeated,  retired  on  Sevastopol  with  small  loss, 
and  hardly  any  captures  were  made.  Had  the  Allies,  leav- 
ing a  wide  interval  between  their  right  and  the  cliffs,  ad- 
vanced in  echelon  from  the  left,  the  victory  might  have 
been  decisive  of  the  campaign.  And  as  to  a  counter-attack 
by  the  enemy  between  their  right  and  the  sea,  it  was 
evidently  the  step  they  should  have  most  desired  him  to 
take.  On  the  Russian  right  the  river,  too,  was  narrower, 
the  heights  lower  and  more  gradual;  the  roads  to  the  in- 
terior lay  on  that  side — everything  indicated  it  as  the 
point  of  attack." 

In  the  preliminary  stage  of  an  action,  any  command- 
ing ground  which  will  afford  a  view  of  the  enemy's  general 
dispositions  should  be  captured,  even  though  it  possess  no 
other  tactical  merit. 

FORMULATION  OF  THE  PLAN  OF  BATTLE. 

An  intelligent  plan  f  battle  requires,  above  all,  in- 
formation of  the  numbers  and  position  of  the  enemy.  This 
information  is  gained  in  many  ways;**  but  the  most  reli 

*Jomini's  "Art  of  War"  (Mendell  and  Craighill's  translation), 
p.  187. 

**See  the  "Service  of  Security  and  Information." 


194  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

able  information,  because  the  most  fresh,  is  that  gained 
by  reconnaissance,  either  in  force,  or  by  special  bodies  or 
patrols,  acting  either  in  close  proximity  to,  or  in  actual 
contact  with,  the  enemy.  With  a  small  force,  the  infor- 
mation in  regard  to  the  position  and  apparent  plans  of 
the  enemy  is  generally  gained  by  scouts ;  with  a  large  body 
of  troops,  the  reconnaissances  made  by  scouting  parties 
and  officers'  patrols  are  continued  by  the  advance  guard 
after  it  touches  upon  the  enemy.  Only  in  those  cases 
where  the  position  and  intention  of  the  enemy  are  clearly 
understood  beforehand,  or  where  it  is  a  paramount  con- 
sideration to  force  him  to  accept  battle  without  delay, 
does  the  advance  guard  at+ack  seriously.  Ordinarily  it 
makes  tentative  demonstrations,  or  fights  a  delaying 
action  while  endeavoring  to  develop  the  hostile  position 
and  plans;  the  artillery  of  the  advance  guard  opening  fire 
at  long  range  to  cover  the  development  of  the  reconnoiter- 
ing  troops  and  to  compel  the  enemy  to  disclose  the  loca- 
tion of  his  batteries  and  the  general  outline  of  his  position. 

The  Order. — All  information  gained  by  the  reconnais- 
sance of  the  advance  guard  is  immediately  sent  to  the 
commander  of  the  main  body,  who  issues  his  orders  as 
soon  as  he  has  gained  sufficient  information  to  enable  him 
to  formulate  his  plan.  In  the  case  of  small  operations  or 
an  unexpected  encounter  of  the  hostile  forces,  the  orders 
would  generally  be  verbal;  but  for  commands  which  are 
scattered,  or  larger  than  a  division,  the  written  or  tele- 
graphic order  will  be  the  rule. 

There  are  good  reasons  for  adopting  an  almost  in- 
variable model  for  orders.  In  this  way  information  may 
be  so  grouped  that  the  eye  will  instantly  detect  an;* 
omission. 

In  orders  prescribing  operations,  the  Field  Service 
Regulations,  U.  S.  Army,  1905,  recommend  the  following 
sequence: 

1.  Information  concercing  the  enemy  and  our  other 
troops  in  the  vicinity. 

2.  Intentions  of  the  commanding  officer. 

3.  Duties  of  the  various  fractions  of  the  command, 


ORGANIZATION    AND   TACTICS. 


195 


4.  Orders  for  baggage  trains,  ammunition  columns, 
and  field  hospitals. 

5.  Location  of  the  commander  at  the  beginning  of 
the  operation;  also,  when  necessary,  place  for  delivering 
messages. 

Such  information  is  published  to  the  command  in 
orders  in  a  separate  series  under  the  caption  of  "Field 
Orders." 

The  following  model  may  be  taken  as  an  illustration 
of  an  order  for  attack: 

Field  Orders  Official     designation    of    issuing 

Number  (   ).  officer's  command. 

(*)  Place,    Date,    Hour. 

1.  Detailed   information   of   the 
enemy     and     of     our     supporting 
troops. 

2.  Plan  of  the  commander  (usu- 
ally  indicating   a  flank   to   be   at- 
tacked).     The    advance    guard    ia 
now  informed  that  its  functions  as 
such  have  ceased. 

3.  Disposition  of  troops. 

(a)  Orders     for     the    artillery, 
(first  position,  first  target,   gener- 
ally the  hostile  artillery). 

(b)  Orders    for    the    infantry, 
(indicating  the  general   means   to 
be   used   in   the   secondary   attack, 
specifically   the    direction    and    ob- 
jective of  the  main  attack;    name 
of    the    officer    charged    with    the 
main  attack). 

(c)  Orders  for  the  reserve  (giv- 
ing troops  and  position). 

(d)  Orders     for     the     cavalry 
(usually    in    force    on    one    flank, 

while  the  opposite  flank  is  covered 
by  patrols). 

4.  Orders    for    the    ammunition 
wagons    and    for    the    ambulance 
company  section   (when  early  pro- 
vision can  be  made). 

5.  Orders  for  the  heavy  baggage. 

6.  Place  of  the  commander  (usu- 
ally near  the  first  position  of  the 
artillery). 

Manner  of  communicat-  Signature, 

ing  the  order. 

*The  distribution  of  troops  is  not  given  in  the  margin  of  this 
order  as  it  already  appears  in  the  order  of  march.  Ordinarily  the 


196  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

Orders  should  be  brief,  not  couched  in  uncertain 
terms,  and  should  not  trespass  on  the  province  of  the 
subordinate.  If  the  subordinate  officer  be  well  qualified 
for  his  position,  he  may  safely  be  entrusted  with  all  mat- 
ters of  detail,  and  should  not  be  hampered  with  unneces- 
sary instructions.  If  he  be  incompetent,  he  should  be  re- 
lieved from  command  without  delay,  regardless  of  all  con- 
siderations of  personal  bravery,  past  services,  or  exem- 
plary character. 

General  G.  K.  Warren,  who  commanded  the  Fifth 
Corps  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  though  gifted  with  an 
exceptionally  fine  intellect,  and  endowed  with  superb  cour- 
age and  almost  every  quality  of  a  great  commander,  seri- 
ously impaired  the  action  of  his  corps,  on  at  least  one  oc- 
casion (at  Spottsylvania),  by  his  unwillingness  to  trust 
his  division  commanders  with  the  tactical  details  pertain- 
ing to  their  own  commands.  In  commenting  upon  War- 
ren's methods,  Grant  says:  "After  giving  most  intelligent 
instructions  to  division  commanders,  he  would  go  in  with 
one  division,  holding  the  others  in  reserve  until  he  could 
superintend  their  movements  "in  person  also,  forgetting 
that  division  commanders  could  execute  an  order  without 
his  presence."* 

Taburno  says  of  General  Kuropatkin  that  he  was  not 
content  unless  in  active  command  of  troops,  and  frequent- 
ly led  independent  operations  in  person,  thus  reflecting 
on  the  competency  of  his  subordinate  commanders.** 

THE  COMMANDER. 

The  position  of  the  commander  on  the  field  of  battle 
cannot  be  prescribed.  He  should  be  so  located  that  he 
can  receive  promptly  messages  from  any  part  of  the  field 
and  thus  retain  control.  Owing  to  the  vast  extent  of  the 
modern  battle-field,  it  is  impossible  for  the  commander  to 
view  in  its  entirety  the  field  over  which  his  command  is 
operating.  The  improvement  in  field  communications  ren- 
ders this  view  no  longer  necessary.  The  telephone  and 

distribution  of  troops  is  shown  in  marching  orders  only,  but  it  may 
be  convenient  to  write  in  the  margin  a  list  of  the  troops  employed. 

""Memoirs,"  Vol.  II.,  p.  214. 

**"The  Truth  about  the  War."  p.  109. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  197 

telegraph  keep  him  in  immediate  touch  with  his  subor- 
dinate commanders.  Staff  officers -and  reliable  aides  keep 
him  informed  of  the  operations  of  portions  of  his  command 
with  which  he  is  not  in  close  communication.  These  offi- 
cers may,  or  may  not,  be  given  discretionary  powers  to 
issue  orders  in  the  name  of  the  commander,  according  to 
the  nature  of  circumstances  and  the  degree  of  confidence 
reposed  in  the  judgment  of  his  aides  by  the  commander. 
The  necessity  of  having  a  staff  officer  at  a  distant  part 
of  the  field  was  felt  at  Spottsylvania  by  General  Grant, 
who  says  in  his  "Memoirs":  "Burnside  on  the  left  had 
got  up  to  within  a  few  hundred  yards  of  Spottsylvania 
Court  House,  completely  turning  Lee's  right.  He  was 
not  aware  of  the  advantage  he  had  gained,  and  I,  being 
with  the  troops  where  the  heavy  fighting  was,  did  not 
know  of  it  at  the  time.  He  had  gained  his  position  with 
but  little  fighting  and  almost  without  loss.  Burnside'* 
position  now  separated  him  widely  from  Wright's  corps, 
the  corps  nearest  him.  At  night  he  was  ordered  to  join 
on  to  this.  This  brought  him  back  about  a  mile,  and  lost 
to  us  an  important  advantage.  I  attach  no  blame  to 
Burnside  for  this,  but  I  do  to  myself  for  not  having  had 
a  staff  officer  with  him  to  report  to  me  his  position."* 

General  Grant  habitually  took  the  most  careful  pre- 
cautions to  secure  a  full  knowledge  of  his  plans  by  his 
subordinates,  at  least  to  the  degree  to  which  each  was 
affected  by  them.  "It  was  his  custom,"  says  General  Hor- 
ace Porter,  "when  commencing  a  movement  in  the  field, 
to  have  his  staff  officers  urder stand  fully  the  object  he 
wished  to  accomplish,  and  what  each  corps  of  the  army 
was  expected  to  do  in  different  emergencies,  so  that  these 
officers,  when  sent  to  different  points  of  the  line,  might 
have  a  full  comprehension  of  the  general's  intentions,  and 
so  that  when  communication  with  him  was  impossible  or 
difficult,  they  might  be  able  to  instruct  the  subordinate 
commanders  intelligently  as  to  the  intention  of  the  gen- 
eral-in-chief."** 

A  staff  officer  who  undertakes  the  interpretation  of 

*"Memoirs,"  Vol.  II.,  p.  225. 

**"Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War,"  Vol.  IV.,  p.  708. 


19  :  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

the  orders   of   the   chief,   or   who   assumes   the   responsibility 
of  originating  orders  iri  the  name  of  the  commander,   must 
be  assured  in  his  own  mind  that  he  thoroughly  understands 
the   views  which   he   interprets,   and   that  the   orders   which 
he   issues   are   in   complete   harmony   with   the    general    plan 
of   his   chief,   and   in    accordance    with   the    requirements   of 
the  emergency  under  which  they   are   issued.     It   is   an   au- 
thority not  to  be  assumed  lightly  by  a  staff  officer,  who 
should  remember  that  upon  the  result  of  his  action  ma.y 
depend  not  only  the  safety  of  the  ajmy,  but  Lis  own  pro- 
fessional advancement  or  ruin.     But  in  cases  of  sudden 
emergency,  when  a  subordinate   general   is   unwilling   to 
act  on  his  own  responsibility,  any  orders  are  better  than 
no  orders,  and  a  staff  officer  should  not  hesitate  to  act. 
The  successor  of  the  commander  in  case  the  latter  is 
killed  or  disabled  should  I  e  designated  beforehand  to  the 
subordinate  generals,  even  though  the  succession  fall  nat- 
urally according  to  rank;  and  the  genera!  thus  designated 
should  be  carefully  informed  of  all  the  plans  of  the  com- 
mander.    At  Chancellorsville,  General  Hooker,  being  dis- 
abled at  the  Chancellor  house,  left  the  front  of  the  army 
without  notifying  his  second  in  command,  General  Couch, 
and  without  giving  him  any  orders  whatever.    It  was  some 
time  before  the  command  was  turned  over  to  Couch,  and 
in  the  meantime  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  in  a  most  crit- 
ical .situation,  was  lighting  without  a  commander. 

At  Sedan  the  wounding  of  Marshal  MacMahon  at  the 
very  beginning  of  the  battle  was  a  great  calamity  to  the 
French;  for  he  had  not  confded  his  plans  to  anyone,  nor 
had  he  issued  any  instructions  to  his  subordinates,  who. 
as  a  result,  were  ignorant  of  the  general  situation  and 
plan  of  battle.  The  Marshal  had  taken  the  precaution  to 
designate  General  Ducrot  as  his  successor,  but  that  gen- 
eral was  at  a  distant  part  of  the  field,  and  could  not  re- 
ceive personal  instructions  from  his  wounded  chief.  To 
make  matters  worse,  Ducrot  was  junior  in  rank  to  Gen- 
eral de  Wimpffen,  who  had  just  arrived,  and  who  claimed 
and  assumed  the  command,  not  only  by  virtue  of  his  rank, 
but  by  authority  of  the  Minister  of  War,  who  had  di- 
'•ected  him  to  exercise  the  chief  command  in  case  of  any 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  191) 

accident  happening  to  MacMahon.  As  a  result,  there  was 
a  second  change  of  commanders  while  the  battle  was  ia 
progress,  and  as  the  views  of  Ducrot  and  De  Wimpffen 
were  at  variance,  and  each  put  his  own  plans  in  execu 
tion  the  moment  he  assumed  command,  the  situation  of 
the  French  army,  critical  at  best,  was  rendered  desperate. 

THE  RESERVE. 

The  commander  should  always  provide  a  reserve, 
which  he  should  hold  under  his  own  orders,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  giving  a  vigorous  blow  at  a  timely  moment,  either 
to  clinch  a  .success  already  gained  or  to  check  an  advan- 
tage gained  by  the  enemy.  The  question  of  the  propor- 
tion of  the  force  to  be  held  in  reserve  cannot  be  definitely 
decided.  The  local  reserves  will  vary  according  to  the  arm 
of  the  service,  and  will  depend  on  the  degree  to  which 
the  troops  are  likely  to  become  shattered,  out  of  hand,  or 
demoralized  by  the  attack.  Keserves  are  accordingly  more 
necessary  for  cavalry  than  infantry,  while  artillery  needs 
only  a  local  reserve  of  men  and  horses,  instead  of  batter- 
ies. The  proportion  of  the  force  to  be  held  in  hand  by 
the  commander  as  a  general  reserve  may  often  consist 
of  one-fourth  of  the  whole,  a  very  possible  division  of  the 
force  being  one-half  for  the  front  attack,  one-fourth  for 
the  flank  attack,  and  one-fourth  for  the  reserve.  In  a 
great  army  the  reserve  may  consist  of  several  army  corps. 
It  must  be  observed  that  there  is  a  difference  between 
the  general  reserve  of  a  great  army  and  the  "main  re- 
serve" or  "third  line"  of  a  smaller  body. 

The  employment  of  the  reserve  must  above  all  be 
timely.  If  it  be  used  too  soon,  it  will  not  be  available 
for  that  moment  of  exhaustion  usually  found  in  every  bat- 
tle, when  the  victory  will  turn  to  the  side  which  can  first 
take  the  offensive.  If  used  too  late,  the  tide  of  defeat 
will  have  set  in,  and  the  enemy,  flushed  with  victory,  will 
be  under  such  a  headway  of  success  that  the  reserve  will 
be  unable  to  do  more  than  cover  the  retreat.  In  genera* 
terms  it  may  be  said  that  the  reserve  should  be  carefully 
husbanded  until  its  employment  becomes  necessary;  but 
a  suitable  time  for  its  employment  should  always  be  found 


200  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

in  the  course  of  action.  To  hold  it  unemployed  mere- 
ly to  guard  against  possible  unfortunate  contingencies  is 
to  discard  a  pi,rt  of  the  strength  of  the  army  for  no  good 
end  whatever.  Probably  the  greatest  mistake — one  of  the 
few  mistakes — ever  made  by  Napoleon  was  the  withhold 
ing  of  the  Old  Guard  at  Borodino.  On  this  occasion  the 
most  resolute  of  all  commanders  seemed  to  lose  his  nerve, 
and,  saying  that  at  a  distance  of  800  leagues  from  Paris 
he  could  not  afford  to  employ  his  last  reserve,  lost  the 
only  opportunity  presented  during  the  whole  campaign  oi 
giving  a  destructive  blow  to  the  military  power  of  Russia. 
Similarly,  at  Antietam,  when  the  Confederates  were  ex- 
hausted by  the  struggle  against  Sumner  and  Hooker  on 
their  left  and  Burnside  on  their  right,  McClellan  had  in 
reserve  the  corps  of  Fitz-Jchn  Porter,  numbering  12,000 
men,  which  he  might  have  hurled  against  Lee's  center 
with  decisive  effect;  but,  overestimating  the  strength  of 
his  adversary,  and  fearing  a  counter-attack,  McClellan  let 
the  "golden  opportunity"  pass,  and  with  it  passed  his  last 
chance  of  victory  on  that  field.* 

THE  THREE  ARMS  IN  ATTACK. 

Jomini  well  says:  "It  seems  a  waste  of  breath  to  say 
that  the  commander  of  a  body  of  troops  composed  of  the 
three  arms  should  employ  them  so  that  they  will  give 
mutual  support  and  assistance;  but,  after  all,  this  is  the 
only  fundamental  rule  that  can  be  established,  for  the 
attempt  to  prescribe  for  such  a  commander  a  special 
course  of  conduct  in  every  case  that  may  arise,  when  these 
cases  may  be  infinitely  varied,  would  involve  him  in  an 
inextricable  labyrinth  of  instructions."  In  the  preceding 
chapters  it  has  been  seen  that  the  infantry  must  protect 
and  support  the  artillery;  that  the  artillery  must  prepare 


*In  considering  the  tactical  errors  which  are  at  times  made  by 
even  the  gi:eatest  generals,  the  student  should  bear  in  mind  that  the 
circumstances  and  conditions  of  the  battle  which  are  presented  in 
the  light  of  history,  and  which  can  be  discussed  by  the  critic  in  the 
calm  of  the  study,  are  never  fully  apparent  to  the  general,  who  has 
to  act  upon  uncertainty  or  imperfect  knowledge  and  in  the  excite- 
ment of  the  battle-field.  In  nothing  should  criticism  be  more  char- 
itable than  in  the  case  of  the  errors  of  a  general  in  battle. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  201 

the  way  for  the  infantry,  support  it  in  attack,  and  protect 
it  in  retreat:  and  that  the  cavalry  must  reconnoiter  the 
enemy,  protect  the  flanks  of  the  army,  support  and  gain 
time  for  the  other  arms  by  a  vigorous  charge  when  they 
are  sorely  pressed  by  the  enemy,  and  reap  the  fruits  of 
the  victory  by  an  energetic  pursuit.  These  various  func- 
tions of  the  three  arms  have  been  considered,  and  in  dis- 
cussing their  combined  action  it  now  remains  only  to  give 
a  sketch  of  the  ordinary  course  of  an  attack  in  which  the 
three  arms  are  engaged. 

The  attack  consists  of  the  preparatory  stage,  the  de- 
cisive action,  and  the  completion,  the  last  including  occupa- 
tion of  the  position,  the  pursuit,  or  the  repulse,  and  conse- 
quent withdrawal  of  the  assailants. 

The  Preparatory  Stage. — While  making  its  reconnais- 
sance, the  advance  guard  endeavors  to  drive  back  the 
enemy's  advanced  troops  covering  his  front.  The  first  se- 
rious resistance  which  will  be  encountered  will  be  from 
his  advanced  posts  which  he  will  have  established  to  mis- 
lead and  delay  the  attack,  and  some  of  which  he  will  have 
occupied  with  guns.  Owing  to  its  mobility  and  its  posi- 
tion near  the  head  of  the  column,  the  artillery  of  the  at- 
tack will  be  the  first  arm  to  arrive  from  the  main  body. 
It  will  open  fire  upon  such  of  the  enemy's  advanced  posts 
as  may  have  been  located  by  the  advance  guard,  and  by 
concentrating  upon  each  in  turn  a  superiority  of  fire  will 
force  their  abandonment,  and  thus  eventually  develop  the 
enemy's  main  line  of  defense. 

During  this  reconnaissance  by  the  artillery,  the  in- 
fantry of  the  attack  is  making  its  deployment  and  ad- 
vancing. Formerly,  the  infantry  waited  until  the  opening 
of  the  artillery  duel  before  making  any  considerable  ad- 
vance against  the  hostile  position;  but  now,  owing  to  the 
great  range  of  the  modern  field  piece,  the  infantry  must 
advance  within  dueling  range  during  the  preliminary  re- 
connaissance by  the  artillery.  The  former  will  thus  en- 
gage the  advanced  infantry  of  the  defense  and  a  succes- 
sion of  minor  engagements  will  ensue,  these,  in  a  battle  of 
great  magnitude,  lasting  for  days.  The  infantry  of  the 
attack  will  endeavor  to  gain  all  positions  reconnoitered 


202  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

by  the  artillery,  entrenching  itself  as  soon  as  possession 
is  gained. 

During  this  phase  of  the  action,  the  cavalry  of  the 
attack,  which  has  been  reconnoitering  far  to  the  front 
and  engaging  the  enemy's  cavalry,  clears  the  front.  It 
continues  its  reconnaissance,  endeavoring  to  locate  the 
enemy's  flanks,  protects  the  flanks  from  attack  by  the  hos- 
tile cavalry,  and  maintains  a  mounted  reserve  in  rear  of 
the  attacking  force,  which  can  be  sent  rapidly  to  any  por- 
tion of  the  field  to  fill  gaps  in  the  line  of  battle,  or  to  re- 
inforce "^hc  infantry  against  counter-attack. 

The  artillery  now  enters  the  duel,  during  which,  by 
concentrating  its  tire  upon  the  hostile  batteries,  it  devotes 
its  efforts  toward  silencing  the  enemy's  guns.  All  of  the 
artillery  of  the  attack  now  comes  into  action,  some  of  the 
batteries  assisting  the  infantry  in  its  continued  advance. 
The  infantry  will  now  work  its  way  from  one  point  of 
support  to  another,  intrenching  after  each  advance  untiJ 
it  finally  reaches  a  point  from  which  it  can  face  the  en- 
emy in  his  main  position  at  sufficiently  close  range  to 
hold  him  there.  The  fire  of  the  artillery  and  the  advance 
of  the  infantry  should  be  so  conducted  as  to  develop  grad- 
ually the  enemy's  position,  disclose  the  weak  points  of 
his  line,  and  force  him  to  send  in  his  reserves. 

The  Decisive  Action. — The  enemy's  line  having  been  de- 
veloped and  the  point  of  attack  having  been  decided  up- 
on, the  artillery  must  be  placed  in  such  a  position  as  to 
bring  to  bear  a  most  intense  fire  upon  this  point,  and 
support  the  infantry  assault,  at  the  same  time  keeping 
down  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  guns.  Under  the  protection 
of  this  fire,  the  troops  engaged  in  the  assault  begin  their 
final  advance.  One  reinforcement  after  another  is  now 
sent  forward  at  the  decisive  point,  not  only  replacing 
losses,  but  each  by  its  arrival  pushing  the  firing  line  near- 
er to  the  enemy's  position.  While  the  decisive  action  is 
in  progress,  the  troops  at  other  parts  of  the  general  line 
make  vigorous  attacks,  except  such  as  have  orders  to  act 
as  a  containing  force;  thus,  if  the  principal  attack  should 
fail,  success  may  still  be  achieved  at  other  points.  The 
approach  of  the  reinforcements  should  be  so  timed  and 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  203 

conducted  as  to  escape  the  observation  of  tht  enemy,  and 
the  body  of  troops  which  is  to  deliver  the  decisive  stroke 
should  be  in  full  vigor  at  the  time  of  conflict.  When  the 
infantry  has  advanced  near  enough  to  the  position  to  be 
able  to  reach  it  in  one  more  dash,  the  attack  finally  cui 
minates  by  the  entire  first  line  being  merged  in  the  firing 
line,  opening  a  rapid  magazine  fire,  and  throwing  itself 
upon  the  enemy  with  the  bayonet;  the  second  line  usually 
joining  it  in  the  charge  and  the  artillery  supporting  the 
movement  with  a  rapid  fire  of  shrapnel,  until  the  attack- 
ing infantry  arrives  so  close  to  the  enemy  as  to  render  it 
impossible  for  the  guns  to  fire  upon  him  without  endan- 
gering their  own  infantry. 

During  the  attack  a  portion  of  the  cavalry  is  on  the 
flanks  of  the  attacking  infantry,  taking  advantage  of  all 
sheltering  features  of  the  terrain  to  advance,  and  protect- 
ing the  advancing  infantry  from  attacks  by  the  hostile 
cavalry.  The  cavalry  reserve  is  held  in  rear  of  the  gen- 
eral line,  but  not  -so  far  from  the  flanks  that  it  cannot  be 
brought  up  in  time  to  reinforce  the  cavalry  on  the  flanks 
in  case  the  latter  is  repulsed  or  has  difficulty  in  forcing 
back  the  enemy's  horse. 

For  a  sustained  effort  in  the  decisive  action,  the 
troops  must  be  so  arranged  that  reserve  after  reserve  can 
be  pushed  to  the  front.  As  long  as  there  is  a  chance  of 
success,  the  commander-in-chief  should  not  hesitate  to 
utilize  his  last  available  man  for  a  final  effort. 

The  Occupation  of  the  Position. — The  attack  generally 
causes  an  intermingling  and  disorganization  of  the  first 
and  second  lines,  which  would  leave  them  in  a  very  poor 
condition  to  resist  a  sudden  and  determined  counter-attack 
by  the  enemy's  reserves;  and  it  is  accordingly  necessary 
to  push  forward  a  third  line  (which  should  still  retain  its 
formation),  to  occupy  the  captured  position  without  delay, 
furnish  a  cover  behind  which  the  first  and  second  lines 
may  be  re-formed,  and  repel  a  counter-charge.  The  artil- 
lery is  also  rushed  forward  into  the  captured  position, 
where  it  takes  the  most  advantageous  position  for  repuls- 
ing a  counter-attack,  and  to  fire  on  the  enemy's  artillery 
covering  his  retreat.  Thus  at  St.  Privat,  the  Germans, 


204  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

after  driving  the  French  from  the  position,  occupied  it 
immediately  with  138  guns.  Strong  points  will  be  occu- 
pied, all  available  cover  being  utilized  and  hastily  im- 
proved; shelter  trenches  will  be  constructed,  and  a  portion 
of  the  forces  will  establish  itself  in  a  temporary  defensive 
attitude  as  quickly  and  as  strongly  as  possible.  As  long 
as  there  is  danger  of  an  offensive  return,  strengthening 
of  the  position  must  continue.  The  commander  of  the  at- 
tacking troops  moves  forward  to  the  position  as  soon  as 
it  is  occupied,  and  superintends  the  re-formation  of  the 
troops  and  the  conduct  of  the  pursuit. 

The  Pursuit. — When  the  enemy  Las  been  defeated  and 
put  to  flight,  the  pursuit  should  be  immediately  taken  up 
by  the  cavalry  and  horse  artillery,  supported  as  soon  as 
possible  by  all  available  troops  and  batteries,  which  should 
continue  to  fire  upon  the  enemy  as  long  as  he  is  within 
range.  The  enemy  should  be  driven  completely  from  the 
field,  and,  in  the  language  of  Gneisenau  at  Waterloo,  the 
pursuit  should  be  "continued  to  the  last  breath  of  horse 
and  man."  It  is  here  that  the  \alue  vf  avalry  is  espe- 
cially manifest.  It  was  the  lack  of  cavalry  that  caused 
the  victories  of  Napoleon  at  Ltitzen  and  Bautzen  to  be 
barren,  and  it  was  the  presence  of  a  la.'ge  body  of  com- 
paratively fresh  Prussian  cavalry  that  enabled  the  Allies 
to  make  the  defeat  at  Waterloo  an  irreparable  disaster 
for  the  French. 

In  fact,  without  comparatively  fresh  troops,  an  imme 
diate  pursuit  is  generally  out  of  the  question.  At  Shilon 
the  retreat  of  the  Confederates,  wrho  had  suffered  enor- 
mously in  the  two-days  battle,  might  have  been  converted 
into  a  rout,  and  the  victory  rendered  decisive,  if  Grant 
had  been  able  to  launch  a  considerable  body  of  fresh  troops 
in  pursuit  But  the  Union  Army  had  itself  been  exhausted 
by  the  desperate  struggle;  and  though  Grant  at  first  con- 
templated sending  McCook's  division  in  pursuit,  he  de- 
cided otherwise  on  considering  the  fatigued  condition  of 
that  command,  which  had  marched  twenty-two  miles  the 
day  before,  over  country  roads  deep  in  mud,  had  been  in 
the  rain  all  night  without  rest,  and  had  been  engaged  in 
battle  all  day.  Indeed,  immediate  pursuit  was  as  plainly 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  205 

out  of  the  question  in  this  case  as  it  would  have  been  at 
Waterloo,  if  Wellington  had  been  compelled  to  rely  upon 
his  own  exhausted  troops  to  follow  the  enemy. 

Withdrawal  after  Repulse. — When  the  attack  is  unsuc- 
cessful, the  infantry  endeavors  to  withdraw  by  alternate 
bodies,  the  withdrawal  of  part  being  covered  by  the  fire 
of  the  rest.  The  principal  protection,  especially  if  the 
infantry  has  been  stubbornly  engaged,  must  be  furnished 
by  the  cavalry  and  artillery.  The  former  should  not  hes- 
itate to  sacrifice  itself  in  desperate  charges,  if  by  so  do- 
ing it  can  gain  time  for  the  re-formation  of  the  defeated' 
infantry;  and  the  latter  should  take  up  positions  from 
which  it  can  check  the  advancing  enemy,  and  as  long  as 
its  fire  is  effective,  it  should  hold  such  positions  regardless 
of  any  loss  of  guns.  These  are  the  only  rules  that  can  be 
laid  down  for  withdrawal  after  defeat.  The  manner  of  ex- 
ecuting the  details  depends  so  completely  upon  the  cir- 
cumstances of  the  action  and  the  nature  of  the  terrain 
that  it  would  be  idle  to  undertake  to  prescribe  any  partifi 
ular  method  of  action. 

SUMMARY. 

The  special  points  to  be  considered  in  preparing  and 
carrying  out  an  attack  by  a  force  consisting  of  all  three 
arms  are: 

I.     The  clearest  possible  understanding  of  the  nature 

and  extent  of  the  enemy's  position. 
II.    A  definite  object  to  te  gained  by  the  attack. 

III.  A   careful   selection   of  the  points   of  attack,   and 

the  formation  of  a  plan  of  battle,  which  should 
not  be  changed  unless  circumstances  absolutely 
compel  an  alteration  therein. 

IV.  The  concentration  of  a  powerful   artillery  fire  on 

the  point  selected  for  attack. 

V.    False  attacks  upon  other  points,  to  prevent  the 
enemy  from  divining  the  real  objective  of  the 
attack. 
VI.     The   support  of  the   infantry   attack  by  artillery, 

both  in  the  duel  and  supporting  positions. 
VII.     Prompt  use  of  the  reserves  at  the  decisive  moment. 

-15— 


206  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

VIII.  Keeping  a  force  of  cavalry  well  in  hand  to  guard 
the  flanks,  foil  *w  up  a  success,  cover  a  defeat, 
or  make  a  diversion. 

IX.  Keeping  a  formed  body  of  troops  in  hand  for  the 
occupation  of  the  position,  to  conduct  the  pur- 
suit, or  to  cover  the  withdrawal  in  case  of 
repulse. 

THE  THREE  ARMS  IN  DEFENSE. 

When  a  commander  assumes  the  defensive,  either  from 
choice  or  through  necessity,  he  should  endeavor  to  occupy 
a  position  such  as  to  guard  securely  his  line  of  retreat, 
facilitate  the  tactical  cooperation  of  the  three  arms,  and 
enable  him  to  change  at  an  opportune  moment  from  the 
defensive  to  the  offensive.  The  first  and  second  considera- 
tions are  imperative;  the  third  may  be  ignored  when  a 
purely  defensive  battle  is  intended.  A  purely  defensive 
tactical  action  is  rarely  fought  from  choice,  but  circum- 
stances may  render  such  an  action  either  sufficient  or  nec- 
essary. Thus,  when  the  troops  are  too  raw  and  unin- 
structed  to  be  used  in  offensive  operations,  they  may,  per- 
haps, be  able  to  give  a  good  account  of  themselves  on  a 
pure  defensive  behind  intrenchments.  A  rear  guard  gen- 
erally fights  a  purely  defensive  battle  to  cover  the  with- 
drawal of  the  main  body;  and  this  method  of  action  is 
also  usually  sufficient  for  an  army  covering  a  siege,  an 
important  pass,  or  Hs  own  embarkation.  So,  too,  when 
an  army  has  planted  itself  across  the  enemy's  communi- 
cations, it  is  necessary  only  to  retain  its  position  in  order 
to  ruin  him,  and  a  purely  defensive  battle  may,  perhaps, 
accomplish  this  result.  As  a  rule,  however,  no  defensive 
plan  of  battle  is  good  unless  it  provides  for  an  opportune 
change  from  the  defensive  to  the  offensive. 

Whatever  the  reason  for  adopting  a  defensive  atti- 
tude, it  certainly  invokes  the  disadvantage  of  loss  of  in- 
itiative. A  partial  compensation  may  be  found  in  an  effi- 
cient system  of  observation  and  of  rapid  transmission 
of  intelligence,  ample  reserves  free  to  move  to  the  threat- 
ened point,  and  strong  rallying  positions  in  rear  of  the 
line  of  defense. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  207 

The  troops  for  defense  will  be  generally  divided  in- 
to two  principal  parts:  one  for  occupation  of  the  intrench- 
ments,  including  local  reserves;  the  other  the  general  re- 
serve for  reinforcing  parts  of  the  line  and  for  the  deliv- 
ery of  the  de  isive  counter-attack^  or  of  the  offensive 
return. 

THE  POSITION. 

The  consideration  of  a  good  defensive  position  em- 
braces not  only  the  position  itself,  but  also  the  ground  io 
its  front  and  rear. 

The  Ground  in  Front  of  the  Position. — The  ground  in 
front  of  the  position  should  be  such  as  to  afford  a  clear 
field  of  fire,  and  such  an  unobstructed  view  as  to  prevent 
the  enemy  from  approaching  anywhere  within  effective 
range  unseen.  Time  permitting,  all  obstacles  in  front  of 
the  position  which  would  conceal  or  facilitate  the  enemy's 
attack  should  be  destroyed,  or  occupied  as  advanced  posts. 
Such  defensible  points  as  small  woods,  villages  composed 
of  stone  houses,  etc.,  may  be  occupied  as  advanced  posts, 
provided  that  they  are  within  easy  supporting  distance  of 
the  line  of  battle,  and  can  be  protected  by  it.  As  we  have 
already  seen,  the  enemy  cannot  penetrate  between  such 
posts  without  being  subjected  to  a  fire  from  flank  and 
front;  and  as  he  cannot,  therefore,  pass  them  without  first 
capturing  them,  they  have  the  effect  of  isolating  and  break- 
ing up  his  attacks.  But  it  is  an  indispensable  condition 
that  the  advanced  posts  should  be  strongly  intrenched 
and  capable  of  easy  .reinforcement.  Thus,  Hougomont,  at 
Waterloo,  was  an  iderJ  advanced  post,  as  it  was  strong 
in  itself,  had  been  further  strengthened  by  engineering  art, 
and  was  so  situated  as  to  enable  reinforcements  to  be 
continually  fed  to  it  during  the  entire  course  of  the  bat- 
tle. On  the  other  hand,  the  Austrian  advanced  posts  at 
Koniggratz  were  bad,  because  they  lacked  these  essential 
conditions;  and  their  speedy  abandonment  was  prejudicial 
to  the  morale  of  the  troops  in  the  main  position.  Unless 
the  advanced  i  osts  fulfill  the  specified  conditions,  and  can 
accordingly  be  regarded  as  salients  of  the  main  line.  It 
would  be  better  to  destroy  them,  or  merely  hold  them 


208  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

with  small  forces  for  the  sole  purpose  of  preventing  the 
unobserved  approach  of  the  enemy.  Forces  posted  thus 
in  observation  should  promptly  withdraw  without  allow- 
ing themselves  to  be  compromised  in  an  engagement  with 
the  enemy.  A  serious  mistake  in  this  rspect  was  made 
at  the  battle  of  Franklin,  Tenn.,  where  Wagner's  division, 
ordered  to  hold  an  advanced  position  for  the  purpose  of 
observing  the  enemy,  and  to  retire  on  his  approach, 
awaited  the  onslaught  of  the  entire  Confederate  army, 
and  was  driven  back  in  roat,  the  enemy  entering  the  Union 
works  on  the  heels  of  the  fleeing  soldiers,  who  acted  as 
a  shield  from  the  fire  of  the  unshaken  troops  in  the  main 
position. 

A  front  covered  by  a  river  is  not  generally  to  be  rec- 
ommended. It  will,  to  be  sure,  usually  afford  complete 
protection  from  a  front  attack,  and  if  the  enemy  attempt 
to  cross  in  the  immediate  vicinity,  and  his  movements  be 
clearly  observed,  such  a  position  will  enable  the  defender 
to  throw  superior  numbers  upon  the  first  detachments  of 
the  hostile  army  which  cross.  But  the  assailant,  screened 
by  the  river,  will  generally  be  able  to  make  feints  at  dif- 
ferent points  up  and  down  stream,  and  to  effect  a  passage 
in  spite  of  the  occupation  by  the  defender  of  a  strong  posi- 
tion at  some  point  of  the  river  front. 

An  impassible  obstacle,  such  as  a  river,  marsh,  or 
precipitous  ravine,  extending  along  part  of  the  front  of 
the  position,  may  sometimes  be  very  advantageous,  as  it 
enables  the  part  of  the  line  thus  covered  to  be  held  by  a 
small  force,  and  is  especially  good  for  artillery,  which  can 
thus  be  protected  in  front,  while  its  own  fire  is  unimpeded. 
Such  a  position  is,  however,  open  to  the  serious  objectioa 
that  it  does  not  admit  of  u  forward  movement  of  the  de- 
fender in  making  an  offensive  return;  and  the  enemy  can, 
consequently,  throw  his  entire  weight  upon  the  uncovered 
portion  without  fear  of  counter-attack  from  the  troops 
behind  the  obstacle.  Thus,  at  Kamillies,  Villeroi  had 
"paralyzed  half  his  army"  behind  the  Anderkirch  and 
Gette  rivers,  and  was.  unable  to  use  it  when  Marlborough 
threw  his  weight  upon  the  other  portion  of  the  French  line. 

If  the  ground  in  front  of  the  position  be  intersected 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  209 

by  an  impassable  obstacle  which  ends  just  before  reach- 
ing the  position,  it  will  be  a  great  advantage  to  the  de- 
fender, as  it  will  compel  the  assailant  to  separate  his 
forces,  while  the  defender  can  throw  his  weight  from  one 
side  to  the  other  at  will.  Such  a  position  was  occupied 
by  the  Confederates  at  the  battle  of  Port  Gibson,  Missis- 
sippi, where  a  deep  and  precipitous  ravine  in  front  of  the 
position  compelled  General  McClernand  to  divide  his  forces 
to  attack,  in  such  a  manner  that  one  flank  could  not  rein- 
force the  other.  As  a  result,  when  Osterhaus,  command- 
ing the  left,  suffered  a  repulse,  he  could  not  be  assisted 
by  the  forces  on  the  right,  and  was  severely  handled  be- 
fore he  could  be  reinforced  from  the  rear.  At  Cold  Har- 
bor the  front  of  Gibbon's  division  was  cut  in  two  by  a 
marsh,  which,  widening  as  it  neared  the  Confederate  posi- 
tion, constituted  an  obsta^e  to  which  the  failure  of  the 
attack  at  that  point  was  mainly  due. 

When  time  permits,  the  ground  in  front  of  the  posi- 
tion may  be  covered  with  military  obstacles,  such  as  ab- 
atis, wire  entanglements,  small  pits,  etc.*  Such  a  meas- 
ure is  rarely  practicable  except  in  the  defense  of  fortified 
positions,  but  generally  in  preparation  for  a  defensive  bat- 
tle the  ground  may  be  cleared  in  front  and  rude  abatis 
constructed.  Fences  and  hedges  found  on  the  field  may 
often  be  utilized  with  excellent  effect.  Such  obstacles  as 
a  barbed-wire  fence  or  a  thick-set  thoirny  hedge  are  pe- 
culiarly good.  In  his  report  of  the  battle  of  Franklin, 
General  Cox  says:  "On  reaching  the  Osage  orange  hedge 
in  front  of  Stiles'  left,  they  (the  Confederates)  first  en- 
deavored to  force  their  way  through  it  and  pull  it  aside. 
The  tough  and  thorny  nature  of  the  shrub  foiled  them  in 
this,  and  they  attempted  to  file  around  the  hedge  by  the 
flank,  and  under  a  terrible,  withering  fire  from  Stiles' 
and  Casement's  brigades  and  the  batteries  on  that  flank. 
They  soon  abandoned  this  effort,  and  most  of  those  re- 
maining unhurt  lay  down  behind  the  hedge,  and,  after 

*For  a  description  of  these  obstacles,  see  Beach's  "Manual  of 
Military  Field  Engineering." 


210  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

keeping  up  a  desultory  fire  for  a  time,  straggled  to  the 
rear,  singly  and  in  small  squads."* 

In  general  terms,  the  ground  in  front  of  the  position 
should  be  such  as  to  impede  the  enemy's  progress,  and 
break  up  and  isolate  his  attacks,  without  interfering  in 
any  way  with  the  defender's  fire. 

The  Position  Proper. — One  of  the  very  first  requisites 
of  a  defensive  position  is  that  it  should  be  suited  in  ex- 
tent to  the  size  of  the  force  which  is  to  occupy  it.  If  the 
position  be  too  extended,  it  must  be  too  weakly  occupied 
in  some  parts;  while  if  its  extent  be  too  small,  the  force 
will  be  too  much  crowded  for  efficient  action,  and  will  be 
exposed  to  unnecessary  loss.  The  number  of  men  per 
yard  for  the  suitable  occupation  of  a  position  under  the 
present  conditions  of  war  is  a  matter  in  regard  to  which 
the  best  authorities  differ. 

The  experiences  of  the  British  in  South  Africa  tend 
to  show  that  about  one  man  to  a  yard  of  front  will  be 
sufficient.  With  the  dispersed  formation  of  the  present 
day,  and  the  increased  range  of  modern  firearms,  fewer 
men  will  suffice  to  hold  the  same  extent  of  ground  than 
formerly.  When  the  strength  of  the  defense  and  the  at 
tack  is  spoken  of,  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  nowaday? 
strength  implies  amount  of  fire  rather  than  number  of  men. 

In  a  close  country  this  number  would  undoubtedly 
hiave  to  be  greatly  increased.  Thus  Werder,  on  the  Lis- 
aine,  in  January,  1871,  in  order  to  oppose  with  any  pros- 
pect of  success  the  larger  army  of  Bourbaki,  held  his  posi- 
tion with  less  than  two  men  per  yard  of  front.  It  is  not 
to  be  supposed  that  the  troops  will  habitually,  or  even 
often,  be  posted  in  equal  strength  along  the  entire  front, 
especially  if  the  front  be  of  considerable  extent.  "A  di- 
vision," says  Meckel,  "may  be  over-dispersed  by  extending 
2,000  yards  if  it  has  its  troops  posted  in  equal  strength 
all  along  its  front.  It  may,  however,  occupy  a  still  greater 
front  without  incurring  this  reproach,  if  the  main  forces 
are  concentrated  on  a  front  of  800  to  1,600  yards,  and  the 

*Official  Report  of  General  J.  D.  Cox,  Commanding  23d  Army 
Corps. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  211 

remaining  portion  of  the  line  is  occupied  with  small,  un- 
important detachments." 

An  essential  requirement  for  a  good  defensive  posi- 
tion is  that  good  cover  should  exist  for  the  troops.  This 
cover  may  be  natural  or  artificial.  Natural  cover  that 
will  conceal  the  position  of  the  reserves  and  the  move- 
ments of  troops  from  one  part  of  the  field  to  another  may 
often,  indeed  generally,  be  found,  if  the  commander  under- 
stands how  to  utilize  the  terrain;  but  protection  for  the 
troops  actually  engaged  in  combat  must  generally  be  pro- 
vided by  intrenchments. 

All  lines  on  the  defensive  should  be  strongly  in- 
trenched The  reverse  slope  of  a  hill  affords  no  protection 
against  modern  artillery  fire.  If  time  permits  and  no  ad- 
equate natural  cover  exists,  covered  approaches  should 
be  constructed  so  as  to  allow  the  reinforcement  of  the 
firing  line  without  exposing  the  reinforcing  troops  to  hos- 
tile fire. 

As  intrenchments  compensate  for  a  considerable  nu- 
merical inferiority,  they  enable  a  commander  to  hold  i 
part  of  his  line  with  a  comparatively  light  force,  and  thus 
to  assemble  the  greater  portion  of  his  strength  at  another 
part  for  offensive  movements.  Brialmont  divides  the  field 
into  a  defensive  and  an  offensive  zone.  On  the  former  the 
object  is  to  hold  the  enemy  in  check  as  long  as  possible 
with  the  least  number  of  men;  to  provide,  in  fact,  for  a 
pure  defense.  On  the  latter  they  are  intended  merely  to 
shelter  the  troops  until  everything  is  ready  for  the  at- 
tack, and,  in  case  of  repulse,  to  support  them  when  driven 
back.  On  the  former  zone  the  intrenchments  should  be 
continuous;  on  the  latter  they  should  be  constructed  for 
only  a  part  of  the  first  line,  with  intervals  through  which 
the  troops  may  advance.  The  intrenchments  should  never 
be  so  constructed  as  to  constitute  a  serious  obstacle  to 
the  advance  of  the  defender  when  he  decides  to  make  a 
counter-stroke.  When  Burnside  made  the  famous  assault 
upon  the  crater  caused  by  the  explosion  of  the  mine  at 
Petersburg,  the  Union  breastworks,  which  were  continu- 
ous, had  not  been  prepared  for  the  forward  movement  of 
the  assaulting  columns,  which  "clambered  over  them  aa 


212  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

best  they  could,"  and  their  ranks  were  thus  broken  at  the 
very  beginning  of  the  attack. 

The  intrenchments  should  not  be  constructed  before 
some  definite  plan  can  be  formed;  and  the  commanders  of 
the  troops  that  are  to  occupy  them  should  be  clearly  in- 
structed as  to  the  general  plan  of  action  and  the  part  they 
are  to  perform.  At  Koniggratz,  Benedek  caused  his  en- 
gineers to  construct  elaborate  batteries  and  breastworks 
for  the  supporting  infantry;  but  the  subordinate  com- 
manders were  neither  consulted  nor  notified,  and  the 
works  were  not  occupied  during  the  battle.  It  is  always 
best  to  have  the  troops  construct  the  intrenchments  them- 
selves; for  the  men  are  better  satisfied  with  their  owe 
work  than  that  which  is  done  for  them.  In  the  United 
States  service,  the  construction  of  field  works  by  the 
troops  that  are  to  occupy  them  is  not  only  desirable,  but 
necessary,  owing  to  the  small  number  of  engineer 'troops. 
At  Fair  Oaks,  General  McClellan  desiring  that  the  posi- 
tion of  Seven  Pines  should  be  strongly  held,  Lieutenant 
McAllester,  of  the  Engineers,  was  directed  by  the  chief 
engineer,  General  Barnard,  to  fortify  the  ground.  Select- 
ing a  suitable  position,  he  began  the  construction  of  a 
redoubt,  rifle-pits,  etc.,  but,  being  unable  to  procure  men 
enough  to  push  the  work  rapidly,  he  could  not  complete 
the  fortification  before  the  battle.*  At  Fredericksburg 
the  Confederate  engineers  constructed  redoubts  for  the 
artillery,  which  failed  to  satisfy  the  troops  detailed  to 
occupy  them.  "Without  delay,  the  men  made  the  redoubts 
as  snug  as  possible,  and,  finding  the  epaulements  not  to 
their  liking,  went  to  work  with  pick  and  shovel  throwing 
the  dirt  a  little  higher,  and  fashioning  embrasures  to  fire 
through.  The  engineers  objected,  and  said  they  were  'ruin- 
ing the  works';  but  the  cannoneers  said,  'We  have  to  fight 
here,  not  you ;  we  will  arrange  them  to  suit  ourselves.'  "** 

Any  strong  points  in  the  line  itself,  such  as  small 
woods,  stone  houses,  etc.,  are  very  advantageous,  espe- 
cially as  furnishing  good  points  of  support  for  offensive 

*Webb's  "The  Peninsula,"  p.  100. 

""""Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War,"  Vol.  III.,  p.  97. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  213 

returns;  but  they  must  not  constitute  obstacles  to  the 
free  movement  of  troops  within  the  position.  Fulfilling 
this  condition,  they  should  be  strongly  fortified  and  held; 
otherwise  they  should  either  be  destroyed  or  the  line 
should  be  so  occupied  as  not  to  incorporate  them. 

Strong  points  are  necessary  for  the  proper  protection 
of  the  Hanks,  which  should  be  so  secured  as  to  render  it 
very  difficult  for  the  enemy  either  to  force  or  turn  them. 
Impassable  obstacles  are  not,  however,  always  the  best, 
as  they  prevent  an  extension  for  an  offensive  return;  and, 
moreover,  if  the  line  be  penetrated  by  the  enemy,  the 
troops  on  the  flank  may  be  cut  off  and  thrown  back  up- 
on the  obstacle.  Thus,  at  the  battle  of  Blenheim  (August 
13,  1704),  Marshal  Tallard  having  rested  his  right  flank 
on  the  Danube,  his  front  was  pierced  by  Marlborough,  and 
his  right  hemmed  in  against  the  river,  where  it  was  com- 
pelled to  surrender. 

A  flank  is  generally  best  supported  by  resting  it  upoa 
a  hill  easily  defended  and  difficult  of  access  by  the  en- 
emy; on  a  village  which  can  be  pat  iii  a  good  state  of 
defense;  or,  best  of  all,  on  a  strong  fortification.  When  a 
flank  has  no  such  points  of  support,  it  may  be  practicable 
to  protect  it  by  hastily  constructed  field-works  mutually 
flanking  each  other  with  their  fire.  The  flank  should  al- 
ways, if  possible,  be  so  strongly  posted  that  it  cannot  be 
easily  carried  by  direct  assault;  nor  turned  by  the  enemy, 
except  by  making  so  long  a  detour  as  to  separate  his 
forces,  and  give  the  defender  ample  opportunity  to  meet 
the  movement. 

When  it  is  impossible  to  rest  the  flank  on  secure 
points  of  support,  it  should  at  least  be  protected  by  hold 
ing  a  reserve  immediately  in  its  rear,  -so  as  to  oppose  a 
front  readily  to  an  attack  upon  the  flank;  or  by  refusing 
a  part  of  the  line,  so  as  to  form  a  crotchet.  The  latter 
expedient  is,  however,  open  to  several  serious  objections, 
chief  of  which  is  that  it  presents  a  salient  angle  to  the 
enemy,  and  thus  exposes  a  weak  point  to  attack.  A  flank 
unsupported — or,  as  it  is  generally  termed,  "in  the  air" — 
is  a  perilous  defect  in  a  defensive  position,  and  one  by 
which  an  able  and  enterprising  adversary  is  almost  sure 


214  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

to  profit.  At  Gettysburg  the  proper  support  of  the  Union 
left  was  the  Kound  Top,  on  which,  in  fact,  it  eventual'y 
rested;  but  on  the  second  day  of  the  battle,  General  Sick- 
les, commanding  the  Third  Corps,  on  the  extreme  left, 
took  up  a  position  in  front  of  the  true  line  of  defense, 
with  his  left  flank  unsupported.  Two  brigades  were  re- 
fused as  a  crotchet,  and  a  salient  was  thus  presented  to 
the  enemy,  of  which  he  quickly  took  advantage.  A  furi- 
ous attack  of  the  Confederates  smashed  in  the  salient, 
rolled  up  the  Third  Corps,  and  was  finally  checked  with 
great  difficulty  by  the  Second  Corps  on  the  right,  and  the 
Fifth  Corps,  which  had  been  hurried  in  on  the  left.  Th> 
line  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  rectified  during  the. 
night,  and  the  great  battle  of  the  following  day  found 
Meade  in  the  position  which  should  have  been  occupied 
in  the  first  place. 

Perhaps  the  most  serious  defect  of  a  defensive  posi- 
tion is  an  impassable  obstacle  intersecting  it;  for  in  this 
case  a  part  of  the  defender's  army  may  be  defeated  before 
it  can  receive  assistance  from  the  portion  on  the  other  side 
of  the  obstacle.  At  Fair  Oaks,  McClelland  position  wa» 
intersected  by  the  Chickahominy,  three  corps  being  on 
the  left  bank  and  two  on  the  right.  No  adequate  means 
of  communication  existed  between  the  two  parts  of  the 
army  separated  by  the  river,  and  heavy  rains  had  swollen 
the  stream  and  seriously  injured  the  few  bridges  that  did 
exist.  While  the  Union  army  was  in  this  position,  the 
two  corps  on  the  right  bank  were  struck  by  the  Confeder- 
ate army  under  Johnston  (May  31,  1862),  were  driven  back 
with  heavy  loss,  and  were  rescued  from  a  great  disaster 
only  by  the  arrival  of  Sumner,  who,  by  almost  super- 
human efforts,  at  last  succeeded  in  getting  his  corps  across 
a  single  dilapidated  bridge,  which  threatened  at  every 
moment  to  give  way  under  the  weight  of  the  troops 
crossing  it.  After  the  battle,  numerous  strong  and  good 
bridges  were  thrown  across  the  stream. 

Commanding  ground  from  which  the  enemy  can  look 
into  or  even  enfilade  a  part  of  the  position  is  highly  dan- 
gerous for  the  defense.  Salients  in  a  position,  if  exposed 
to  concentrated  artillery  fire,  are  a  source  of  weakness. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  215 

In  order  to  conceal  the  main  position  as  long  as  pos- 
sible, advanced  lines  may  be  established  in  front  of  or 
beyond  the  flanks  of  the  main  trenches.  They  serve  to 
prevent  reconnaissance,  force  the  enemy  to  make  a  pre- 
mature and  perhaps  a  false  deployment,  and  may  cause 
him  to  come  under  the  fire  of  the  main  position  unex- 
pectedly. The  retreat  of  this  screen  must  not  mask  the 
fire  of  the  principal  position.  Ranges  should  be  meas- 
ured and  marked,  and  the  troops  made  familiar  with  the 
distances. 

The  Ground  in  Rear  of  the  Position.  —  The  ground  m 
rear  of  the  position  should  have  sufficient  depth  for  the 
reserves,  for  the  general  reserve,  for  the  mounted  troops, 
and  should  offer  a  series  of  good  defensive  positions 
which  could  be  taken  up  in  the  event  of  retreat;  above 
all,  the  army  should  not  have  an  impassable  obstacle  in 
its  rear.  A  position  with  a  river  at  its  back  is  generally 
a  bad,  and  sometimes  a  fatal,  one;  for,  if  defeated,  the 
army  will  probably  have  but  few  bridges  over  the  stream, 
across  which  it  will  be  compelled  to  defile  in  all  the  COD- 
fusion  of  retreat;  and  even  these  may,  perhaps  (as  at 
Friedland),  be  seized  by  the  enemy.  Even  if  the  bridges 
have  not  been  captured  by  the  victor,  each  constitute* 
practically  a  difficult  defile  in  which  the  retreat  may  be 
seriously  blocked.* 

But  in  war,  more  than  in  anything  else,  there  are 
exceptions  to  every  general  rule;  and  circumstances  may 
make  it  advantageous  for  a  commander  to  stand  on  the 
defensive  with  a  river  at  his  back.  If  the  stream  be 
crossed  with  many  good  bridges  in  rear  of  the  position, 
it  may  be  possible  for  the  army  to  retreat  across  the 
river,  and  check  the  pursuit  by  the  destruction  of  the 
bridges.  Thus,  at  Koniggratz,  the  Austrians  retreated 
over  many  bridges,  which  they  destroyed  after  crossing, 

*In  his  official  report  of  the  battle  of  Bull  Run,  Colonel  (after- 
wards General)  Burnside  says:  "The  enemy  opened  fire  upon  the 
retreating  mass  of  men.  Upon  the  bridge  crossing  Cub  Run,  a  shot 
took  effect  upon  the  horses  of  a  team  that  was  crossing.  The  wagon 
was  overturned  directly  in  the  center  of  the  bridge,  and  the  passage 
was  completely  obstructed." 


216  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

and  the  Prussian  pursuit  was  so  checked  that  Von  Moltke 
lost  all  touch  of  the  retreating  army  for  three  days.  So, 
too,  if  the  army  be  largely  composed  of  raw  troops,  who 
cannot  be  depended  upon,  its  fighting  power  may  be  stim- 
ulated by  the  knowledge  that  it  has  no  chance  of  retreat. 
General  Morgan,  having  been  criticised  for  taking  up  a 
position  at  The  Cowpens  (January  17,  1781)  with  a  river 
at  his  back,  replied:  "Had  I  crossed  the  river,  one-half  of 
the  militia  would  have  abandoned  me.  Had  a  swamp  been 
in  rear,  they  would  have  made  for  it.  ...  As  to  a  re- 
treat, I  wished  to  cut  oft'  all  hope  of  one."  General  Sam 
Houston  adopted  similar  tactics,  with  success,  at  the 
battle  of  San  Jacinto,  where  his  small  force  of  undisci- 
plined Texans  was  confronted  by  a  greatly  superior  force 
of  Mexicans  under  Santa  Anna.  In  this  case  the  bridge 
over  Vince's  Bayou  (an  unfordable  stream  in  rear  of  his 
position)  was  destroyed  by  his  order,  and  his  troops  had 
absolutely  no  means  of  retreat.  It  thus  became  literally 
a  case  of  "victory  or  death,"  as  the  Mexicans  were  not  in 
the  habit  of  giving  quarter  to  Texans. 

Requirements  of  a  Good  Position. — To  be  perfect,  a  de- 
fensive position  should  possess  the  following  requirements : 
I.     Good  view  to  the  front,  the  flanks,  and  in  the  posi- 
tion itself. 

II.     Clear  field  of  fire  to  the  front  and  flanks  from  com- 
manding ground  if  practicable. 

III.  Extent  suited  to  JLe  size  of  the  command. 

IV.  Location  such   as   to   make   the  enemy   attack   or 

abandon  his  advance. 

V.     Ground  in  front,  such  as  will  impede  progress  of 
assailants,  but  without  cover  against  fire  and 
unfavorable  for  intrenchments. 
VI.     Concealment  from  view  of  the  enemy  and  shelter 

from  his  fire  for  all  of  the  defender's  forces. 
VII.     Flanks  resting  on  ground  either  naturally  strong, 

or  capable  of  being  made  so  artificially. 
VIII.     Sufficient  depth  of  position  and  good  communica- 
tions laterally  and  to  the  rear. 

IX.    Favorable  conditions  of  ground  for  assuming  the 
offensive  in  the  decisive  counter-attack. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  217 

X.    Water  of  good  quality  in  sufficient  quantity  for  the 

need  of  the  troops. 

XI.  Line  of  retreat  running  straight  to  the  rear  and 
behind  the  center  of  the  position.  In  case  a 
flank  position  parallel  to  the  enemy's  line  of  ad- 
vance is  assumed,  the  flank  nearest  to  the  enemy 
should  rest  on  an  impassable  obstacle  and  the 
ground  should  permit  of  a  line  of  retreat  per- 
pendicular to  the  front  for  some  distance  in  rear 
of  the  position. 

XII.     The  terrain  should  be  adapted  to  the  action  of  that 
arm  in  which  the  defender  is  proportionately 
strongest  or  superior  to  the  enemy. 
No  position  can  be  expected  to  fulfill  all  these  condi- 
tions, but  a  good  position  will  fulfill  many  or  most  of  them. 

ORDERS  OF  BATTLE. 

In  regard  to  this  subject  there  are  some  considera- 
tions relative  to  the  defensive  which  have  not  been  dis- 
cussed in  the  foregoing  pages.  On  the  defensive,  as  on 
the  offensive,  the  order  of  battle  may  be  either  straight, 
concave,  or  convex;  and  the  defender  may  also  assume 
the  crotchet  formation  for  the  purpose  f  protecting  one 
of  his  flanks.  Whether  the  straight  order  on  the  part  of 
the  defender  wi1!  be  the  same  as  the  parallel  order  will 
depend,  of  course,  upon  the  dispositions  of  the  assailant. 
Provided  that  the  defender  can  hold  each  part  of  his  line 
strongly,  that  his  flanks  rest  securely,  and  the  reserves 
can  be  so  held  as  to  admit  of  the  ready  reinforcement  of 
all  parts  of  the  line  where  the  enemy  can  make  his  heav- 
iest attacks,  the  straight  order  is  usually  the  best  that 
the  defender  can  adopt. 

The  Concave  Order. — When  the  flanks  rest  so  securely 
as  to  forbid  attacks  upon  them,  the  concave  order  is,  un- 
doubtedly, the  best  for  the  defense.  This  was  strikingly 
exemplified  by  Lee's  position  at  Cold  Harbor. 

In  order  that  the  concave  order  of  battle  may  be  ad- 
vantageous to  the  defense,  it  is  an  indispensable  condition 
that  the  flanks  should  rest  securely.  Otherwise  it  would 


218  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

afford  the  enemy  an  opportunity  to  turn  both  flanks  by  a 
movement  directly  forward. 

The  Convex  Order. — For  the  defender,  as  well  as  the  as- 
sailant, the  convex  order  is  generally  assumed  from  neces- 
sity rather  than  choice. 

The  convex  order  of  battle  may  often  be  advantage- 
ously employed  by  a  rear  guard  in  covering  the  retreat 
of  an  army  across  a  river  or  through  a  defile.* 

The  Crotchet  Order. — When  a  general  finds  it  necessary 
to  refuse  one  wing  of  his  army  to  protect  it  against  a  flank 
attack  by  the  enemy,  the  order  of  battle  thus  produced  is 
known  as  the  crotchet  or  rectangular  order.  A  striking 
illustration  of  the  defects  of  this  formation  is  furnished 
by  the  battle  of  Prague  (1757),  where  the  Austrian  army 
practically  occupied  two  sides  of  a  square.  Frederick, 
throwing  his  weight  upon  the  enemy's  right  wing,  crushed 
it,  out  off  a  portion  of  the  Austrian  army,  and  drove  the 
rest  in  wild  confusion  into  Prague.  The  objections  to  this 
order  of  battle  are  summed  up  by  Hamley  as  follows: 

1.  "The  whole  force  of  the  assailant  may  be  brought  to 

bear  on  one  face  of  the  angle. 

2.  "The  advance  of  either  face  causes  a  gap  at  the  angle. 

3.  "The  face  assailed  will  then  be  liable  to  be  turned  on 

both  flanks. 

4.  "The  fire  of  the  assailant's  artillery  enfilades  one  or 

both  faces. 

5.  "The  defeat  of  the  assailed  wing  compromises  the  re- 

treat of  the  other,  supposing  the  original  front  of 
the  army  to  have  covered  its  proper  rear. 

6.  "The  troops  at  the  angle,  exposed  to  a  cross-fire,  must 

crowd  on  each  other  in  falling  back,  and  so  create 

t   a  weak  point  in  that  decisive  part  of  the  line." 

Nevertheless,  under  certain  circumstances,  the  crotchet 

order  may  be  adopted  with  advantage.    It  certainly  has  it) 

its  favor  the  fact  that  the  reserve  can  be  so  posted  as  to 

reinforce  readily  any  part  of  the  line,  and  the  nature  of 

the  ground  may  be  such  as  to  obviate  the  fourth  objection 

*See  "The  Service  of  Security  and  Information"  (third  edi- 
tion), p.  215. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  219 

stated  above.  At  Gettysburg,  Meade's  order  of  battle  was 
a  salient  one,  and  a  close  approximation  to  the  crotchet 
order.  Yet  Gulp's  Hill  and  Cemetery  Kidge  served  as  huge 
traverses  to  protect  each,  wing  from  a  reverse  or  enfilade 
fire  from  the  portion  of  the  enemy  fronting  the  other.  The 
terrain  offered  similar  advantages  to  the  Austrians  at  Kon- 
iggratz.  In  both  cases,  however,  the  salient  order  was  as- 
sumed as  a  matter  of  necessity. 

FORMULATION  OF  THE  PLAN  OF  DEFENSE. 

As  in  the  offensive,  the  information  in  regard  to  the 
movements  and  probable  intentions  of  the  enemy  is  gained 
by  reconnaissance,  and,  in  the  case  of  a  large  force,  also 
by  engagements  of  advance  guards  or  outposts,  which  the 
enemy  endeavors  to  drive  in,  either  as  a  preliminary  part 
of  the  attack  or  for  the  purpose  of  discovering  the  position 
by  a  reconnaissance  in  force.  A  shrewd  commander  can 
often  divine  the  intentions  of  his  adversary  from  his  tenta- 
tive attacks,  discriminating  between  those  which  are  ap- 
parently feints  and  those  which  seem  to  be  indicative  of 
serious  designs.  In  case  of  doubt,  it  is  a  good  rule  for  the 
commander  on  the  defensive  to  take  it  for  granted  that  the 
assailant  is  going  to  do  just  what  he  would  himself  do  if 
the  situation  were  reversed.  As  soon  as  practicable,  the 
commander  issues  his  orders,  which  aire  formulated  in  the 
same  manner  as  in  the  case  of  a  force  acting  on  the 
offensive. 

The  following  model  serves  as  an  illustration  of  an 
order  for  the  occupation  of  a  defensive  position. 

Field  Orders  Official  designation  of  issuing  offi- 

Number  (   ).  cer's  command. 

Place,    Date,    Hour. 

1.  Information  of  the  enemy  and 
of  our  supporting  troops. 

2.  Plan  of  the  commander,   (po- 
sition to  be  defended;   formal  dis- 
solution of  the  order  of  march). 

3.  Disposition  of  troops. 

(a)  Orders     for    the    artillery, 
(position,  target,  and  amount  of  in- 
trenching). 

(b)  Orders  for  the  infantry  of 
the    first    line,    (division    of    front 


220  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

into    sections    and    assignment    of 
troops,   amount  of   intrenching). 

(c)  Orders     for     the     reserve 
(troops,   position). 

(d)  Orders    for    the    engineers 
(defensive   works,   bridging   to   be 
done  in  the  rear). 

(e)  Orders  for  the  cavalry  (usu- 
ally   covering    the    most    exposed 
wing  with  the  main  force,  patrols 
being  principally  employed  on  the 
other  flank). 

4.  Orders  for  ammunition  carts, 
and  field  hospital. 

5.  Orders  for  the  heavy  baggage. 

6.  Place  of  the  commander. 
Manner  of  communicat-  Signature. 

ing  the  order. 

The  defense  consists  of  the  preparatory  stagey  the  de- 
cisive action,  and  the  completion;  the  last  includes  the  coun- 
ter-attack or  the  withdrawal  from  the  position. 

During  the  preparatory  stage,  bodies  of  cavalry  are 
used  incessantly  in  scouting  and  in  driving  back  reconnol- 
tering  parties  of  the  enemy.  As  soon  as  the  main  line 
of  the  enemy's  advance  becomes  known,  the  cavalry  will 
clear  the  front — a  portion  with  horse  artillery  taking  post 
near  the  flanks  to  discover  any  attempt  on  the  part  of  the 
enemy  to  conduct  a  turning  movement,  or  ready  to  attack 
the  flanks  of  the  enemy  should  occasion  offer.  The  main 
portion  of  the  cavalry  with  ho-rse  batteries  is  assembled 
with  the  general  reserve  in  rear  of  the  line  to  prevent 
reconnaissance,  to  protect  the  flanks,  or  to  join  with  it  in 
a  counter-attack  or  to  cover  a  retreat. 

In  the  preparation  for  the  main  attack,  the  enemy  of 
necessity  will  first  assail  the  advanced  posts  which  have 
been  occupied  for  the  purpose  of  checking  him  and  con- 
cealing the  true  defensive  line.  It  is  in  the  reconnais- 
sance of  these  advanced  posts  that  the  hostile  batteries 
will  first  oome  into  action.  If  it  has  been  decided  that  the 
artillery  of  the  defense  is  to  engage  in  the  duel,  fire  will 
be  opened  on  the  enemy's  guns  at  thu  stage  by  batteries 
designated  for  the  purpose.  As  a  rule,  the  guns  in  the 
main  line  of  defense  are  not  brought  into  action  until  the 
general  features  of  the  attack  are  developed,  only  such 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  221 

being  employed  as  may  be  necessary  to  assist  in  the  pro- 
tection of  the  advanced  po«sts,  in  order  to  avoid  betraying 
the  nature  and  extent  of  the  true  position,  and  to  compel 
the  enemy's  infantry  to  deploy  early  in  the  action.  Any 
advance  of  the  hostile  batteries  must  be  opposed  by  the 
guns  of  the  defense,  fire  being  directed  at  the  advancing 
echelon  as  well  as  keeping  down  the  fire  of  that  remaining 
in  position.  As  soon  a>s  the  points  of  concentration  of  the 
enemy's  artillery  are  known,  the  reserve  batteries  of  the 
defense  are  brought  up  and  a  converging  fire  is  opened 
upon  them. 

Should  the  artillery  of  the  defense  decline  the  duel, 
the  batteries  will  not  open  fire  unless  especially  favorable 
targets  are  presented,  such  as  artillery  in  motion  within 
effective  ranges;  although  designated  batteries  must  open 
fire  upon  the  enemy's  infantry  columns  whenever  they 
appear. 

The  advanced  troops,  when  compelled  to  withdraw, 
should  retire  along  designated  routes,  which  would  be  so 
located  as  to  prevent  masking  the  fire  from  troops  in  rear. 

The  Decisive  Action. — The  dispositions  for  the  real  at- 
tack have  now  been  completed,  and  the  defender  endeav- 
ors to  make  his  final  tactical  arrangements  accordingly. 
The  infantry  is  reinforced  at  the  decisive  points,  and  the 
artillery,  now  ignoring  the  assailant's  guns,  turns  its  at- 
tention upon  his  infantry,  which  it  endeavors  to  crush 
with  shrapnel.  The  cavalry  seeks  every  opportunity  to 
strike  the  flanks  of  the  hostile  infantry  when  the  atten- 
tion of  the  enemy  is  chained  to  the  troops  in  front,  or  when 
shattering  losses,  or  an  exhaustion  of  ammunition,  deprive 
his  infantry  in  a  great  measure  of  its  power  of  resistance. 

As  the  enemy  approaches  for  the  final  charge,  the  en- 
tire fiirst  line  of  the  defender's  infantry  is  generally  merged 
into  the  firing  line,  which  opens  a  rapid  fire,  while  the  sec- 
ond line  is  held  in  readiness  to  charge  to  meet  the  enemy 
at  the  moment  of  collision.  The  cavalry  and  horse  artil- 
lery assist  the  general  reserve  in  a  counter-attack,  either 
just  before  or  just  after  the  enemy  reaches  the  position. 
The  counter-attack  is  made  in  accordance  with  the  prin- 
ciples of  attack  already  considered.  The  extent  to  which 

—16— 


222  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

it  is  carried  will  depend  upon  the  degree  of  the  enemy's 
repulse,  the  number  of  intact  troops  he  still  holds  in  hand, 
or  the  policy  of  the  commander  of  the  defensive  force  in 
regard  to  assuming  a  vigorous  offensive,  as  Wellington 
did  at  Waterloo,  or  of  inviting  another  attack,  as  he  did 
at  Busaco. 

In  case  of  defeat,  the  withdrawal  of  the  defenders  from 
the  position  is  similar  to  the  withdrawal  of  a  defeated  at- 
tacking force. 

NIGHT  ATTACKS. 

The  first  essential  for  the  effectiveness  of  the  defend- 
er's fire  being  a  clear  view  of  the  assailants,  the  attempt 
has  often  been  made  by  the  latter  to  take  advantage  of 
the  cover  of  darkness  to  get  within  close  proximity  of  the 
enemy  without  suffering  loss.  WThen  a  night  attack  can 
be  successfully  made,  its  results  are  generally  very  great, 
as  its  success  naturally  implies  the  surprise  of  the  defend- 
er; but  the  operation  is  attended  with  so  many  difficulties 
that  the  history  of  night  attacks  presents  many  more  in- 
stances of  failure  than  of  success. 

The  advantages  of  a  night  attack  are:  1.  The  fire  of 
the  enemy  is  encountered  only  at  short  ranges,  and  the 
dispositions  ordinarily  necessary  for  an  attack  may  ac- 
cordingly be  greatly  simplified.  Thus,  the  attack  may  be 
made  in  close  order,  with  only  a  few  skirmishers  in  ad- 
vance; or,  at  least,  the  firing  line  may  be  more  dense  than 
it  otherwise  would  be,  the  distances  between  the  several 
echelons  may  be  greatly  reduced,  and  small  columns  may 
be  retained  to  the  last  moment.  2.  The  enemy  is  taken  by 
surprise,  and  his  confusion  and  alarm  are  heightened  by 
the  darkness.  The  disadvantages  are:  1.  The  attacking 
columns  are  liable  to  lose  their  way  in  the  dark.  2.  The 
different  columns  of  the  assailant  are  in  danger  of  mistak- 
ing each  other  for  hostile  bodies,  and  thus  not  only  in- 
curring losses  at  their  own  hands,  but  giving  warning  to 
the  enemy,  and  preventing  the  surprise  on  which  the  suc- 
cess of  the  attack  depends.  3.  The  concentration  of  the 
troops  in  the  dark  is  difficult  and  likely  to  lead  to  great 
confusion.  4.  The  ground  cannot  be  so  well  known  to  the 


OKGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  223 

assailant  as  to  the  defender,  who,  if  not  surprised,  can  a^t 
intelligently  in  the  dark  in  his  own  position,  while  the  a» 
sailant  is  groping  in  an  unknown  locality. 

An  accurate  knowledge  of  the  terrain  over  which  the 
movement  is  to  be  made  being  essential  to  the  success  of 
a  night  attack,  the  ground  should,  if  practicable,  be  first 
reconnoitered  by  the  officers  designated  to  command  the 
assaulting  columns;  if  this  be  impracticable,  guides  should 
be  selected  who  have  frequently  traversed  it  at  night. 

The  leaders  of  the  different  larger  tactical  units  should 
be  carefully  instructed  beforehand  as  to  the  part  they  are 
to  perform;  a  portion  of  the  field  should  be  assigned  to 
each  column,  and  there  should  be  a  watchword  to  enable 
the  different  columns  to  identify  each  other  on  meeting. 
It  is  also  advisable,  when  practicable,  to  adopt  a  distinct- 
ive badge  (such,  for  instance,  as  a  band  of  white  cloth 
around  the  left  arm)  by  which  the  attacking  troops  may  be 
recognized  in  close  conflict.  The  commanding  general 
should  assure  himself  that  the  leaders  of  the  different  col- 
umns understand  their  orders  perfectly,  and  that  each 
has  been  furnished  with  the  watchword.  In  the  attack 
made  by  General  Butler's  command,  on  the  Confederate 
position  at  Big  Bethel  (June  10,  1861),  the  attacking  force 
consisted  of  two  columns,  which  moved  at  midnight,  one 
from  Camp  Hamilton  and  the  other  from  Newport  News. 
General  Butler  had  given  the  watchword  "Boston"  to  be 
shouted  if  unrecognized  troops  were  encountered;  but  Colo- 
nel Bendix,  who  commanded  one  of  the  columns,  was  not 
instructed  on  this  point,  and  on  meeting  the  other  column 
at  dawn,  he  mistook  it  for  the  enemy,  and  opened  fire. 
The  watchword  was  shoutad,  but  was  not  understood,  and 
the  firing  continued.  Much  confusion  was  caused  before 
the  error  was  discovered;  the  troops  were  demoralized  by 
the  unfortunate  rencounter;  the  march  was  delayed;  the 
hostile  position  was  not  reached  until  long  after  daylight: 
and  the  whole  movement  terminated  in  a  miserable  fiasco. 

From  the  time  the  forward  movement  is  begun,  lateral 
communication  should  be  kept  up  between  the  attacking 
columns.  No  talking  nor  smoking  should  be  allowed,  no 
loading  should  be  permitted  without  orders,  the  utmost 


224  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

silence  should  be  preserved,  and  if  the  enemy  open  fire,  no 
persons  should  be  allowed  to  halt  to  help  the  wounded, 
but  all  men  not  disabled  should  press  steadily  on.  Eacb 
column  should  be  preceded  by  pioneers,  and  on  encounter- 
ing obstacles,  tliu  infantry  should  lie  down  while  the  ob- 
structions are  removed.  The  column  should  approach  as 
closely  as  possible  to  the  enemy  without  firing,  and  should 
then  charge  with  the  bayonet,  rushing  forward  rapidly 
and  with  a  shout. 

From  the  very  nature  of  things,  night  attacks  are 
better  adapted  to  small  forces  than  to  large  ones;  for  the 
visibility  of  the  assailants  and  the  noise  of  marching  in- 
crease rapidly  with  the  size  of  the  attacking  column.  The 
size  of  the  force  attacked  is  also  an  important  considera- 
tion; for  a  small  force  can  be  quickly  swept  away  or  cap- 
tured by  a  surprise  at  night,  while  a  strong  body  will  gen- 
erally be  able  to  maintain  the  fight  until  help  arrives. 
Night  attacks  are  generally  made  by  small  bodies;  often 
upon  the  enemy's  outposts  by  patrols,  for  the  purpose  of 
harassing  them  or  capturing  pickets.* 

In  the  case  of  large  forces,  a  dark  night  is  not  favor- 
able for  an  assault,  as  the  chances  of  confusion  and  the 
resulting  miscarriage  of  the  attack  are  too  great.  A  moon- 
light night  is  much  better;  for  there  will  then  be  enough 
light  to  enable  the  attacking  columns  to  find  their  way, 
while  their  movements  will  not  be  visible  at  any  consider- 
able distance.  The  capture  of  Kars  by  the  Russians,  in 
1877,  furnishes  one  of  the  best  instances  of  a  night  attack 
recorded  in  military  annals.  The  strength  of  the  Turkish 
position,  the  almost  total  absence  of  sheltering  features 
of  ground  for  the  attacking  infantry,  and  the  lack  of  favor- 
able positions  for  field  artillery  absolutely  precluded  an 
assault  by  daylight.  On  the  other  hand,  it  was  feared  that 
an  attack  in  the  dark  might  miscarry  and  cause  a  disaster. 
It  wan  accordingly  decided  to  postpone  the  attack  until  a 
moonlight  night  would  enable  the  columns  to  find  their 
way  without  difficulty,  and,  at  the  same  time,  conceal  the 
movement  until  the  attacking  troops  arrived  near  the  posi- 

*See  "The  Service  of  Security  and  Information,"  Chapter  IV. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  225 

tion.  The  night  of  November  15th  was  accordingly  fixed 
upon;  but  a  snow-storm  and  cloudy  weather  necessitated 
a  further  postponement  of  the  attack  to  the  night  of  the 
17th.  All  the  arrangements  were  made  with  the  utmost 
secrecy,  and  the  Turks  had  no  suspicion  of  the  impending 
assault.  Five  separate  columns  of  assault  were  forme:!, 
and  two  columns  of  demonstration;  about  5,000  men  be- 
ing held  in  reserve.  The  artillery  was  not  to  follow  the 
troops,  but  was  to  remain,  ready  for  action,  near  the  re- 
serves, until  daylight  or  the  receipt  of  further  orders.  The 
cavalry  was  to  be  stationed  at  important  points  on  the 
roads  by  which  the  Tuiks  might  retreat.* 

On  the  appointed  evening  the  troops  for  the  assault 
assembled  at  the  designated  places  of  rendezvous,  and 
at  8:30  p.  m.  the  columns  moved  forward.  A  full  moon 
w-as  shining,  and  the  night  was  clear  and  cold,  the  tem- 
perature being  below  the  freezing-point.  Not  the  least 
noise,  save  the  tread  of  the  infantry,  broke  the  silence 
of  the  night  as  the  dimly  outlined  skirmi3hers  moved 
stealthily  forward,  followed  by  the  column  of  assault, 
which,  as  they  approached  the  position,  deployed  into  a 
line  of  company  columns.  About  9  o'clock  some  shots 
were  heard  at  the  Turkish  outposts,  but,  as  the  Russians 
did  not  reply,  the  firing  ceased.  Some  of  the  Russian 
batteries  now  opened  a  cannonade  to  attract  the  atten- 
tion of  the  enemy  to  another  part  of  the  field.  Before 
9:30  a  musketry  fire  from  the  defenders  burst  forth  along 
the  whole  line  of  attack,  and  almost  immediately  the  Turk- 
ish  works  blazed  with  a  heavy  fire  of  infantry  and  artil- 
lery. All  the  columns  approached  close  to  the  enemy's 
position  before  they  were  discovered;  the  second  column 
capturing  the  Turkish  pickets  and  rushing  into  one  of  the 
forts  almost  before  the  defenders  knew  it  was  approach- 
ing. The  assault  was  followed  by  desperate  fighting,  and 

*The  strength  of  the  attacking  columns  was  as  follows: — First 
column,  six  battalions  and  sixteen  guns;  Second  column,  three  bat- 
talions; Third  and  fourth  columns  (under  one  command),  ten  bat- 
atlions  and  sixteen  guns;  Fifth  column,  five  battalions  and  eight 
guns;  Sixth  column  (engaged  in  demonstration),  five  battalions  and 
twenty-four  guns;  Seventh  column  (engaged  in  demonstration),  six 
battalions  and  twenty-four  guns. 


226  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

it  was  not  until  shortly  after  dawn  that  the  entire  works 
were  in  the  poisse&sion  of  the  Russians.  "It  was,"  says 
Greene,  "a  good  night's  work — a  fortified  place  of  the 
first  order  captured  in  open  assault,  with  17,000  prisoners 
303  guns  of  various  calibers,  25,000  or  more  small-arms, 
and  an  immense  quantity  of  provisions  and  material  of 
all  kinds."  There  was  practically  no  artillery  prepara- 
tion for  the  assault,  which  was  decided  by  a  hand  to-hand 
fight  in  which  the  bayonet  was  freely  used.* 

Though  night  attacks  are  open  to  many  objections,  and 
their  success  is  problematical  at  best,  night  marches  can 
often  be  made  by  which  a  force  may  be  put  in  position  to 
attack  at  early  dawn.  In  this  manner,  Daun  surprised 
Frederick  the  Great  in  the  early  morning  at  Hochkirch 
(October  14,  1758);  and  other  striking  instances  of  this 
method  of  attack  are  not  lacking.  At  Petersburg  (June -17, 
1864),  a  similar  attack,  at  early  dawn,  upon  the  redans 
and  lines  on  the  ridge  near  the  Shand  house,  was  made 
with  complete  success.  General  Griffin,-  who  commanded 
the  two  brigades  engaged  in  the  assault,  describes  it  as 
follows:  "I  spent  the  entire  night  moving  my  troops 
through  the  felled  timber,  getting  them  in  proper  position, 
and  preparing  for  the  attack.  I  placed  my  brigade  on  the 
left  of  the  Second  Corps  in  a  ravine  immediately  in  front 
of  the  Shand  house,  which  the  enemy  Jield,  and  within  one 
hundred  yards  of  their  lines,  with  Curtin  on  my  left  and 
a  little  further  to  the  rear  on  account  of  the  conformation 
of  the  ground.  We  were  so  near  the  enemy  that  all  our 
movements  had  to  be  made  with  the  utmost  care  and 
caution;  canteens  were  placed  in  knapsacks  to  prevent 
rattling,  and  all  commands  were  given  in  whispers.  I 

formed  my  brigade  in  two  lines Colonel  Curtiu 

formed  his  in  the  same  way My  orders  were  not 

to  fire  a  shot,  but  to  depend  wholly  on  the  bayonet  in  car- 
rying the  lines.  Just  as  the  dawn  began  to  light  up  the 
east,  I  gave  the  command,  'Forward.'  It  was  passed  alonsj 

*The  above  description  of  the  capture  of  Kars  is  based  upon 
the  full  and  excellent  account  in  Greene's  "Russian  Campaigns  in 
Turkey"  (p.  404  et  seq.)t  a  perusal  of  which  is  recommended  to 
the  student. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  227 

the  line  in  whispers,  the  men  sprang  to  their  feet,  and 
both  brigades  moved  forward  at  once  in  well-formed  lines, 
sweeping  directly  over  the  enemy's  works,  taking  them 
completely  by  surprise,  and  carrying  all  before  us.  One 
gunner  saw  us  approaching  and  fired  his  piece.  This  was 
all  we  heard  from  them,  and  almost  the  only  shot  fired  on 
either  side.  The  rebels  were  asleep  with  their  arms  in 
their  hands,  and  many  of  them  sprang  up  and  ran  away 
as  we  came  over.  Others  surrendered  without  resistance. 
We  swept  their  line  for  a  mile  from  where  my  right  rested, 
gathering  in  prisoners  and  abandoned  arms  and  equip- 
ments all  the  way.  Four  pieces  of  artillery,  with  cais- 
sons and  horses,  a  stand  of  colors,  600  prisoners,  1,500 
stand  of  arms,  and  some  ammunition  fell  into  our  hands."* 

In  Egypt,  in  1882,  Lord  Wolseley  broke  camp  at  Kas- 
sassin,  made  a  night  march  of  about  twelve  miles,  with  a 
force  of  14,000  men,  and  halted  within  1,000  yards  of  the 
Egyptian  position  at  Tel-el-Kebir,  without  having  encoun- 
tered a  single  sentinel  or  patrol.  The  dispositions  for 
attack  were  completed  without  being  perceived  by  the 
enemy,  and  in  the  gray  of  morning  the  assault  was  made. 
The  attacking  troops  were  within  800  yards  of  the  works 
before  the  defenders  gave  the  least  sign  of  life,  and  a 
rapid  and  vigorous  assault  was  crowned  with  the  most 
complete  success. 

From  the  nature  of  night  attacks,  it  is  evident  that 
the  forces  actually  employed  therein  should  generally  con- 
sist exclusively  of  infantry;  but  artillery  should  be  held  in 
readiness  to  push  forward  to  assist  the  assaulting  col- 
umns as  soon  as  the  attack  is  developed  and  there  is 
no  longer  any  occasion  for  secrecy.  Artillery  may  also 
be  used  in  making  a  feint,  and  attracting  the  attention 
of  the  enemy  to  a  false  point  by  its  cannonading.  Cav- 
alry cannot  well  move  with  the  silence  required  by 
night  attacks;  as  the  noise  made  by  the  horses  i* 
largely  beyond  the  control  of  the  men.  Moreover,  a 

*General  Griffin,  in  a  paper  contributed  to  the  Massachusetts 
Historical  Society,  quoted  by  General  Humphreys  in  "The  Virginia 
Campaign  of  1864-65,"  p.  217. 


228  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

mounted  column  is  more  liable  than  infantry  to  be  im- 
peded by  unfavorable  terrain.  'Still,  when  the  ground  is 
perfectly  known,  a  night  attack  by  cavalry  may  be  ad- 
visable, as  the  enemy  will  be  unable  to  make  such  full  use 
of  his  rifle-fire  in  the  dark  as  he  would  by  daylight,  and 
the  prospect  of  surprise  will  be  heightened  by  the  ob- 
scurity of  night.  At  Laon,  Blucher's  famous  night  attack 
on  Marmont  is  said  to  have  been  decided  by  the  Prussian 
cavalry. 

Night  attacks  will  probably  be  as  rare  in  the  future 
as  they  have  been  in  the  past;  but  it  is  not  unlikely  that 
night  movements  for  the  purpose  of  placing  troops  in  a 
position  from  which  they  can  attack  in  the  early  morning 
will  be  very  frequently  employed.  In  Manchuria,  the  Jap- 
anese habituaMy  made  movements  of  troops  by  night  :a 
order  to  reinforce  the  advanced  lines  or  to  bring  up  re- 
serves from  the  rear,  thus  utilizing  the  darkness  to  cross 
zones  which  in  daylight  would  have  been  impassable. 

Actual  attacks  at  night  by  large  forces  will  still  be 
advisable  only  under  the  following  conditions: 
I.     When  the  attacking  army  is  in   such  high  spirits, 
and  rendered  so  audacious  by  previous  success, 
that  it  is  in  a  condition  to  undertake  anything. 
II.    When  the  enemy  is  known  to  be  demoralized,  short 
of  ammunition,  or  grossly  careless  in  the  perform- 
ance of  his  outpost  duties. 

III.  When  reinforcements   are   expected   by  the  enemy, 

and  the  capture  of  the  position  is  dependent  up- 
on prompt  action,  while  an  assault  does  not  seem 
to  be  practicable  by  daylight. 

IV.  For  the  purpose  of  cutting  through  a  superior  force 

of  the  enemy,  in  which  case  a  surprise  is  neces- 
sary, and  may  be  best  effected  under  cover  of 
the  darkness. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  229 


CHAPTER  VIIIt 

CONVOYS. 

"Lines  of  convoys  are  the  muscles  of  the  military  body,  which 
would  become  paralytic  if  they  were  sundered." — Von  Billow. 

The  two  streams  of  transport  in  rear  of  the  army,  the 
one  going  to,  the  other  returning  from  it;  the  one  supply- 
ing energy  by  means  of  recruits,  equipments,  munitions, 
and  provisions,  the  other  draining  off  the  incumbrances  in 
the  shape  of  sick  and  wounded,  prisoners,  and  trophies; 
are  of  an  importance  inferior  only  to  that  of  the  fighting 
efficiency  of  the  troops  itself.  Indeed,  it  is  upon  the  effi- 
ciency of  the  transport  service  that  the  maintenance  of 
the  fighting  power  of  the  army  depends. 

The  regularity  of  the  transport  service  must,  there- 
fore, be  insured  as  much  as  possible;  and  this  regularity 
depends  upon  good  organization,  efficient  administration, 
and  freedom  from  hostile  interference.  In  one'p  own  coun- 
try, interference  on  the  part  of  the  enemy  is  limited  to 
his  regular  forces;  in  the  enemy's  country,  more  particu- 
larly in  insurgent  districts,  assaults  from  partisans  and 
armed  inhabitants  are  also  to  be  apprehended.  Hence 
the  transport  should  at  no  time  be  without  adequate  armed 
protection. 

The  transport  supplying  an  army  is  divided  into  the 
trains  which  accompany  it  and  are  under  its  immediate 
protection,  and  the  means  of  transport  which  operate  in 
its  rear  and  require  a  special-  escort.  The  latter  are  termed 
convoys;  and  are  broadly  classed  as  convoys  ly  land  and  con- 
voys ~by  water.  In  the  former,  the  term  "convoy"  includes 
both  the  train  and  its  escort.  In  convoys  by  sea,  the 
term  is  sometimes  restricted  to  the  naval  force  guarding 
the  transports. 

CONVOYS  BY  LAND. 

On  land,  transportation  is  effected  by  means  of  rail- 
roads, wagon-trains,  pack-trains,  or  carriers.  The  last  may 


230  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

be  left  out  of  consideration,  as  we  shall  probably  never 
have  occasion  to  employ  them;  nor  need  pack-trains  be 
here  considered,  as  they  follow  the  troops  to  which  they 
are  attached,  so  closely  as  to  be  practically  under  their 
constant  and  immediate  protection.  The  only  means  of 
land  transport  that  require  consideration  in  discussing 
convoys  are,  therefore,  wagon-trains  and  railroads. 

Wagon-trains. — Where  the  exigencies  of  the  service  do 
not  demand  great  mobility,  such  as  is  required  of  the 
transport  accompanying  independent  cavalry  or  raiding 
columns,  wheeled  transport  is  to  be  preferred,  as  an  ani- 
mal can  pull  from  six  to  eight  times  the  weight  it  can 
carry  on  its  back.  In  our  service  we  have  two  kinds  of 
wagons,  a  heavy  and  a  light  one;  the  former  known 
as  the  "army  wagon/'  the  latter  as  the  "escort  wagon"; 
both  of  which  have  stood  the  test  of  rough  usage  under 
all  kinds  and  conditions  of  service.  The  escort  wagon, 
drawn  by  four  mules,  is  the  standard  means  of  transpor- 
tation.* Being  of  light  cf  n;,truction,  it  is  of  great  service 
where  celerity  of  movement  is  required,  as,  with  its  light 
load,  it  has  the  mobility  of  cavalry  so  long  as  it  follows 
the  road.  The  mule  has  been  found  preferable  to  the 
horse  in  our  service  as  a  drau  ht  animal,  and  will  doubt- 
less be  used  for  this  purpose  in  the  future  as  it  has  been 
in  the  past. 

Organization. — Wagon-trains  should  \>e  under  the  im- 
mediate charge  of  officers  of  the  Quartermaster's  Depart- 
ment, or  other  staff  departments,  depending  on  the  cargo, 
assisted  by  such  other  officers  as  may  be  available;  and 
the  personnel  of  the  train  should  consist  of  men  regularly 
enlisted  in  a  quartermaster's  corps.  These  men,  being  ac- 
customed to  military  discipline,  will  be  more  efficient  than 
hired  civilians,  and  can  better  be  depended  upon  in  mo- 
ments of  danger.  It  will,  however,  frequently  be  foun«l 
necessary  to  impress  animals,  wagons,  and  drivers,  in 
which  case  increased  watchfulness,  discretion,  and  deter- 
mination will  be  called  for  on  the  part  of  the  commander. 

*Field  Service  Regulations,  par.  396. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  231 

The  senior  line  officer  of  the  convoy  should  command 
both  the  train  and  the  escort,  leaving  the  immediate 
charge  of  the  latter  to  the  second  in  rank.  The  commander 
should  be  able  to  speak  the  language  of  the  inhabitants, 
and  should  be  provided  with  detailed  maps,  and  furnished 
with  all  obtainable  information  of  the  enemy  and  the  coun- 
try. He  should  know  the  exact  strength,  physically  and 
morally,  of  his  escort,  in  order  that  he  may  take  no  un- 
justifiable risks.  He  should  also  know  in  what  direction 
to  retire,  if  compelled  by  the  enemy  to  do  so. 

The  train  should  be  primarily  divided  into  as  many 
divisions  as  there  are  officers  available  to  command.  It 
should  also  be  divided  into  convenient  sections  (generally 
from  20  to  30  wagons  each)  and  half-sections,  all  com- 
manded by  wagonmasters,  who  should  be  non-commissioned, 
officers  of  the  quartermaster's  corps.  The  wagons  should 
be  arranged  from  front  to  rear,  according  to  their  con- 
tents, as  follows:  1.  Ammunition;  2.  Money;  3.  Rations; 
4.  Quartermaster's  stores;  5.  Officers'  baggage;  6.  Private 
conveyances  that  may  be  permitted  to  accompany  the  con- 
voy. All  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  belonging 
to  the  train  should  be  mounted  (on  mules  if  necessary), 
and  the  drivers  should  be  armed  with  pistol  and  carbine. 
Each  section  should  have  four  extra  teamsters,  and  also 
a  ready-harnessed  team,  marching  in  rear  of  its  last  wag- 
on, to  assist  in  dragging  broken-down  vehicles  off  the 
road,  and  starting  stalled  teams.  Each  section  should  also 
have  detailed  to  it  a  police  guard  of  about  one  squad  un- 
der a  non-commissioned  officer,  when  the  strength  of  the 
escort  permits.  This  guard  assists  in  every  way  to  keep 
the  train  moving,  besides  serving  purposes  of  defense.  It 
is  especially  desirable  with  large  trains,  but  it  will  not 
always  be  possible  to  .spare  these  details  from  the  escort. 
When  the  train  is  an  impressed  one,  quartermaster's 
men  are  usually  not  available;  and  a  strong  police  guard 
detailed  from  the  escort  (one  man  to  every  two  wagons) 
is  then  indispensable,  to  prevent  irregularities  on  the 
part  of  hostile  or  unwilling  drivers,  and  to  expedite  thf> 
march. 


232  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

March  of  the  Convoy. — If  special  rules  and  precautions 
are  necessary  for  the  safety  and  uniformity  of  movement 
of  troops  on  the  march,  they  are  no  less  so  for  the  long, 
unwieldy  wagon  columns  of  which  the  convoy  is  com- 
posed. Trains  move  with  an  average  speed  of  two  to 
two  and  one-half  miles  per  hour,  depending  on  the  oonditio  i 
of  the  roads  and  draught  animals,  and  the  load  of  the 
wagons.  When  the  road  is  wide  enough,  or  the  ground 
otherwise  permits,  the  wagons  should  move  two  or  more 
abreast,  thus  shortening  the  column,  accelerating  the 
march,  and  greatly  lessening  the  duties  of  the  escort; 
but  on  the  ordinary  roads  in  the  United  States  thb  forma- 
tion is  rarely  practicable,  as  it  would  block  the  road  to 
the  transport  coni'ng  from  the  opposite  direction. 

The  train  should  be  supplied  with  spare  wagons,  and 
every  wagon  should  carry  spare  parts.  Before  starting, 
teams  and  wagons  should  be  inspected  by  officers,  defects 
remedied,  and  any  unauthor'zed  private  articles  found  in 
the  wagons  should  be  thrown  away.  Care  should  be  taken 
not  to  overload  the  train  when  it  can  be  avoided,  as  such 
a  measure  would  impair  mobility,  exhaust  the  animals, 
and  render  the  wagons  unnecessarily  liable  to  stalling  and 
breaking  down.  When  a.  wagon  breaks  down,  it  must 
be  dragged  off  the  road  at  once,  to  keep  the  way  open 
for  the  rest  of  the  train.  Its  contents  are  then  loaded 
on  the  spare  wagons  when  they  come  up.  If  the  broken 
wagon  cannot  be  dragged  off  the  road,  or  if  there  be  no 
reserve  vehicles,  the  load  should  be  distributed  among 
the  nearest  wagons.  If  this  be  impossible  without  over- 
loading, the  contents  -of  the  disabled  vehicle  must  be  de- 
stroyed and  thrown  aside.  When  practicable,  the  dam- 
aged wagon  is  patched  up  on  the  spot  with  spare  parts 
and  follows  at  the  rear  of  the  column. 

The  sections  march  with  distances  of  twenty-five  yards, 
and  the  wagons  two  yards,  to  avoid  checks,  more  espe- 
cially in  going  up  and  down  hill. 

As  to  halts,  the  same  rules  obtain  as  with  marching 
troops;  excepting  that  in  the  ascent  of  long  slopes  the 
teams  must  be  given  more  frequent  breathing-spells.  Long 
halts  should  be  avoided  as  much  as  possible.  When  the 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  233 

halt  is  for  any  length  of  time,  the  train  should  be  parked 
for  security,  and  sentinels  should  be  posted  at  a  distance 
from  the  train  rarely  less  than  300  yarls.  The  hour  of 
starting  depends  upon  circumstances.  It  is  desirable  to 
start  early  enough  to  insure  the  termination  of  the  day's 
march  b afore  dark;  but  a  start  before  daylight  should  be 
avoided,  as  it  interferes  with  the  needed  rest  of  the  men, 
and  still  more  with  that  of  the  animals.  When  the  con- 
voy is  closely  following  a  large  body  of  troops,  the  time 
of  starting  is  regulated  by  the  march  of  the  column,  which 
should  gain  two  miles  from  the  camp  before  the  train 
starts.  This  is,  however,  a  regulation  more  applicable  to 
the  trains  with  the  army  than  to  a  regular  convoy. 

Camps. — Camping-places  should  be  selected  with  ref- 
erence to  wood  and  water,  grass  for  the  animals,  space  for 
parking  the  train,  and  considerations  of  safety.  The  vi- 
cinity of  towns  and  villages  in  a  hostile  country  is  not 
ordinarily  desirable;  but,  on  account  of  the  facilities  they 
offer  for  making  repairs  to  iron,  wood,  and  leather  work, 
it  may  often  be  advantageous  to  camp  near  them.  To 
increase  the  chances  of  escape  from  the  enemy,  the  camp 
should,  if  possible,  be  ~o  selected  that  there  will  be  more 
than  one  road  leading  from  it  in  the  direction  of  its  proper 
line  of  retreat. 

Upon  going  into  camp,  the  animals  should,  if  practi- 
cable, be  turned  out  to  herd  under  guard.  In  the  absence 
of  forage,  it  may  be  necessary  to  keep  them  on  herd  dur- 
ing the  night  A  guard  is  always  placed  over  the  park 
of  wagons  and  the  camp,  and  at  night  it  is  increased  to 
insure  safety  from  surprise. 

There  are  various  methods  of  parking  trains,  their 
employment  depending  upon  the  available  space  and  the 
proximity  and  nature  of  the  enemy.  The  most  important 
formations,  and  the  ones  in  which  every  train  should  b»? 
drilled,  are,  for  ordinary  camping  purposes,  the  park  in 
column  of  subdivisions,  and,  for  purposes  of  defense,  the 
park  in  two  lines  facing  each  other,  and  the  corral,  which 
may  be  in  the  form  of  a  square,  diamond,*  oval,  or  circle. 

*See  Field  Service  Regulations,  1905,  par.  570. 


234  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

With,  the  convoy  subdivided  and  commanded  as  above  in- 
dicated, a  little  improvised  drill  will  enable  these  forma- 
tions to  be  readily  taken  up. 

The  park  in  column  of  subdivisions  is  the  habitual 
camping  formation  when  no  hostilities  are  to  be  appre- 
hended. Column  of  sections  or  half-sections  may  be  used, 
according  to  the  space  available,  the  distance  between 
the  sections  from  rear  wheel  to  pole  being  twenty  yards. 
If  possible,  an  interval  of  six  or  eight  yards  should  sep- 
arate the  wagons  to  admit  of  the  animals  being  tied  to 
them  for  feeding  and  for  rest  over  night,  as  habitually 
practiced  in  our  service.  When  the  space  does  not  admit 
of  such  a  wide  front,  the  wagons  may  be  placed  axle  to 
axle,  and  the  animals  tied  to  a  picket-rope  in  front  of 
the  wagons;  this  will  reduce  the  size  of  the  park  consid- 
erably, and  thus  lighten  the  guard  duty.  The  distances 
and  intervals  may  be  altered  to  suit  the  various  condi- 
tions in  which  the  convoy  may  be  placed. 

The  park  in  two  lines  is  essentially  a  defensive  forma- 
tion. The  wagons  are  placed  axle  to  axle,  the  "leaders'* 
of  the  opposite  teams  facing  each  other  at  a  distance  of 
a  few  feet.  This  formation  can  be  quickly  assumed  on 
the  march,  and  it  affords  some  protection  from  a  dash  of 
cavalry,  as  only  the  animals  at  the  ends  of  the  double 
column  are  directly  exposed  to  damage,  and  the  wagons 
cannot  be  speedily  carried  off. 

The  corral  may  be  resorted  to  on  the  march  when  the 
enemy  is  threatening,  or  in  camp  as  protection  against 
attacks  of  regular  or  irregular  troops,  or  insurgent  inhab- 
itants. The  wagons  are  placed  axle  to  axle,  pole  point- 
ing inward;  the  animals  being  kept  inside.  If  square,  the 
corral  is  rounded  off  by  placing  one  wagon  obliquely  at 
each  corner.  One  or  more  places  of  egress  should  be  left, 
which  are  closed  at  night,  or  in  case  of  attack,  by  plac- 
ing a  wagon  across  each  from  the  inner  side. 

The  Escort. — The  size  and  composition  of  the  escort 
depend  on  various  factors.  When  the  train  is  large  and 
valuable,  a  strong  escort  will  be  necessary;  when  the  con- 
voy is  marching  in  the  vicinity  of  the  enemy,  or  through 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  235 

an  insurgent  country,  more  troops  will  be  required  than 
when  at  a  distance  from  large  hostile  forces  or  in  a  friend- 
ly region;  in  open  country,  cavalry  will  be  more  in  demand; 
while  in  a  close  country,  where  cavalry  cannot  be  well 
Employed,  and  the  trains  are  in  danger  of  ambuscade,  the 
proportion  of  infantry  must  be  increased.  For  the  escort 
of  convoys,  Napoleon  generally  allowed  2  infantry  sol- 
diers for  every  wagon,  1  mounted  soldier  for  every  9 
wagons,  and  1  gun  for  every  120  wagons;  but  when  the 
train  is  small,  the  fighting  power  represented  by  the  escort 
must  not  fall  below  a  certain  minimum,  and  the  propor- 
tion above  g'ven  is  then  disregarded.  In  general,  250  in- 
fantry and  25  cavalry  may  be  assumed  as  the  smallest 
allowable  escort  for  a  train  of  50  or  60  wagons.* 

The  great  length  and  unwieldiness  of  a  wagon-train 
make  apparent  at  once  the  difficulty  of  guarding  it  at  all 
points.  If  the  escort  were  divided  up  along  the  entire 
length  of  the  convoy,  it  would  nowhere  be  strong  enough 
to  oppose  an  effectual  resistance  to  a  dash  of  the  enemy. 
If,  on  the  contrary,  it  were  held  in  one  icompact  body,  part 
of  the  train  might  be  captured  or  destroyed  before  the 
troops  could  come  into  action.  It  is,  therefore,  plain  that 
a  division  of  the  escort  is  imperative. 

A  wagon-train  is  most  sensitive  to  a  check  at  its  head. 
If  checked  there,  the  whole  column  is  brought  to  a  halt, 
and  any  excitement,  caused  by  the  appearance  of  the  en- 
emy, or  any  unusual  occurrence,  is  apt  to  throw  it  into 
confusion,  unless  the  discipline  be  excellent  and  the  police 
guard  be  efficient.  If  a  check  arise  at  any  other  point  of 
the  column,  only  the  wagons  in  rear  of  such  point  are  af- 
fected. The  flanks  are  the  parts  most  vulnerable  to  attack. 

The  tactics  employed  by  tLe  enemy  in  attempting  the 
capture  or  destruction  of  a  convoy  wo^ld  therefore  prob- 
ably be  to  make  a  feint  upon  its  head,  so  as  to  bring  the 
whole  to  a  halt;  and,  then,  taking  advantage  of  the  ensu- 
ing confusion,  to  make  his  principal  attack  in  flank  or 
rear. 

To  meet  this  tactics,  it  is  necessary  to  discover  the 

*Furse's  "Military  Transport,"  p.  264. 


236  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

enemy  while  yet  distant,  and,  if  possible,  to  hold  and  beat 
him  there.  This  will  enable  the  commander  either  to  turn 
the  train  off  into  some  other  road,  and  slip  by  without 
direct  molestation  by  the  enemy,  or  to  make  such  timely 
preparation  for  defense  as  the  situation  may  warrant.  Re- 
connaissance is,  therefore,  necessary;  and  the  thorough 
performance  of  this  duty  is  the  first  requirement  for  safe- 
ty. For  this  reason,  cavalry  in  sufficient  force  is  indis- 
pensable as  a  component  part  of  the  escort.  The  latter 
is  divided  into:  1.  The  advanced  cavalry;  2.  The  advance 
guard;  3.  The  main  bo<?y;  4.  The  rear  guard. 

The  Advanced  Cavalry. — In  open  country  this  body,  pos- 
sessing superior  mobility  and  power  of  reconnaissance, 
marches  about  five  miles  ahead  of  the  train.  It  sends 
small  patrols  several  miles  to  its  front  and  flanks,  and 
scouts  the  country  thoroughly.  Any  information  gained 
is  at  once  sent  to  the  commander  of  the  advance  guard. 

On  coming  to  a  bridge,  the  commander  of  the  advanced 
cavalry  examines  it  carefu'ly,  sends  word  of  its  existence 
and  condition  to  the  rear,  leaves  a  guard  to  hold  it  until 
relieved  by  the  advance  guard,  and  pushes  on  with  the 
remainder  of  his  men.  In  the  absence  of  such  precautions 
on  the  part  of  the  advanced  cavalry  and  the  advance  guard, 
a  few  concealed  riflemen  might  kill  the  teams  of  a  wagon 
on  the  bridge,  thus  blocking  it  and  checking  the  whole 
train.  A  defile  should  be  approached  with  the  usua1  pre- 
cautions; after  a  careful  examination  of  the  flanks,  the 
cavalry  should  pass  through  rapidly,  leaving  a  guard  on 
the  near  side.  Having  gained  the  farther  side,  the  cavalry 
should  carefully  search  the  vicinity,  and  send  out  patrols 
to  front  and  flanks.  On  the  arrival  of  the  advance  guard, 
the  cavalry  moves  forward. 

When  the  enemy  is  encountered,  word  is  sent  to  the 
rear  at  once.  Should  the  hostile  force  consist  of  a  small 
mounted  party,  the  advanced  cavalry  should  disperse  it. 
If  the  enenr  be  so  strong  that  this  cannot  be  done,  the 
advanced  cavalry  should  not  commit  itself  to  an  engage- 
ment in  which  it  might  be  worsted  and  driven  back  in 
confusion,  but  should  take  up  a  position  of  defense  or  ob- 


ORGANIZATION-  AND  TACTICS.  237 

servation,  and  make  every  endeavor  to  gain  exact  knowl- 
edge of  the  composition,  strength,  and  location  of  the  hos- 
tile forces;  remembering  that  the  advanced  cavalry  is  pri- 
marily charged  with  the  duty  of  information  and  only  in- 
directly with  that  of  security. 

In  close  country,  the  cavalry  should  march  nearer 
the  advance  guard,  to  avoid  being  cut  off  and  destroyed. 
When  the  country  is  rough  and  not  readily  accessible  to 
cavalry,  a  patrol  on  the  main  road  (and  on  parallel  roads, 
if  there  be  any  reasonably  near)  is  sufficient,  the  remain- 
der of  the  cavalry  being  employed  elsewhere.  In  this  case 
the  reconnoitering  on  the  flanks  as  well  as  in  the  imme- 
diate vicinity  of  the  road  is  done  by  the  infantry  of  the 
advance  guard,  which  should  gain  neighboring  heights 
affording  a  good  view.  In  a  terrain  which  is  much  cut  up 
the  search  of  the  ground  near  the  road  must  be  most 
thorough.  Progress  is  naturally  slow  under  these  circum- 
stances, but  any  delay  caused  by  the  precautions  taken  is 
fully  repaid  by  the  safe  passage  of  the  convoy. 

The  Advance  Guard. — The  advance  guard,  in  strength 
varying  from  one-sixth  to  one-fourth  of  the  escort,  marches 
about  a  mile  in  front  of  the  convoy,  and  should  have  some 
cavalry  for  messenger  and  scouting  service.  Its  duties 
are  to  search  more  thoroughly  the  immediate  vicinity  of 
the  road,  to  serve  as  a  support  to  the  advance  cavalry, 
and  to  engage  the  enemy  promptly.  Its  formation  is  that 
usual  for  an  advance  guard.  It  should  be  accompanied 
by  a  working  party  and  tool-wagon  to  repair  the  road, 
bridges,  etc.,  in  order  that  the  march  of  the  train  may  not 
be  delayed.  The  reserve  of  the  advance  guard,  and  the 
entire  body  (so  far  as  may  be  compatible  with  its  gen- 
eral duties),  should  be  held  well  in  hand,  to  enable  it  to 
offer  a  firm  front  to  the  enemy  from  the  start,  taking 
the  offensive  whenever  practicable,  but  not  engaging  in 
pursuit. 

At  %  bridges  and  defiles  the  advance  guard  leaves 
guards,  which  lesume  their  march  when  the  detachment 
of  infantry  heading  the  train  arrives.  Unnecessary  de- 
tachments should,  however,  be  avoided,  as  it  is  difficult, 

—17— 


238  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

if  not  impossible,  for  detached  infantrymen  to  rejoin  the 
advance  guard  until  the  latter  comes  to  a  halt.  The  leav- 
ing of  many  detachments  would,  therefore,  necessitate 
the  halting  of  the  advance  guard  or  a  dangerous  diminu- 
tion of  its  strength. 

It  is  important  that  the  advance  guard  be  not  driven 
in  on  the  train,  as  at  least  part  of  the  convoy  would  thus 
be  jeopardized.  The  advance  guard  commander  should, 
therefore,  constantly  observe  the  ground,  and,  as  he  ad- 
vances, he  should  note  positions  into  which  to  throw  his 
men  if  suddenly  attacked  in  force.  If  attacked,  he  should, 
at  all  hazards,  hold  the  enemy  in  check  until  the  com- 
mander of  the  convoy  has  had  time  to  complete  his  prep- 
arations for  action,  when  the  advance  guard  will  either 
be  reinforced  or  ordered  to  fall  back  upon  the  main  body. 

The  Main  Body.  —  The  main  body  of  the  escort  is 
charged  with  the  duty  of  fighting  the  enemy  at  his  prin- 
cipal point  of  attack.  Its  greatest  strength  should  accord- 
ingly be  in  a  compact  body  about  the  middle  of  the  train. 
It  must,  however,  detach  a  number  of  small  bodies  of  in- 
fantry; a  platoon  marching  at  the  immediate  head,  another 
at  the  immediate  rear  of  the  train,  and  patrols  and  flank 
guards  being  sent  out  to  scour  the  country  for  half  a  mile 
on  either  side  of  the  road  and  offer  the  first  resistance 
when  the  enemy  is  encountered.  The  commander  of  the 
escort  marches  with  the  main  body,  which,  after  furnish- 
ing all  detachments,  should  still  be  equal  to  at  least  one- 
third  of  the  whole  escort.  The  main  body  should  be  held 
as  a  central  reserve  from  which  to  succor  any  part  of  the 
column.  When  the  train  is  not  over  a  mile  in  length,  the 
reserve  can  bring  its  fire  to  bear  on  either  end  of  the  col- 
umn without  change  of  position,  if  the  terrain  be  open;  or, 
in  any  case,  it  can  advance  readily  to  the  assistance  of  the 
front  or  rear.  When  the  column  is  longer,  the  reserve 
should  still  be  able  to  give  timely  support,  if  the  reconnais- 
sance duty  be  conscientiously  performed  and  the  patrols 
and  flank  guards  offer  a  stout  resistance.  In  case,  how- 
ever, the  train  is  of  very  great  length,  a  division  of  the 
main  body  may  become  imperative.  The  details  of  the  ar- 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  239 

rangements  would  vary  according  to  circumstances;  but 
care  should  always  be  taken  to  have  as  few  subdivisions  as 
possible,  and  to  march  them  near  the  middle  of  the  division 
of  the  train  to  which  they  are  assigned. 

The  Rear  Guard. — This  body  marches  a  short  distance 
in  rear  of  the  wagon  column,  keeping  a  sharp  lookout,  and 
being  at  all  times  ready  to  fight.  Its  strength  should  be 
about  one-sixth  of  the  escort,  and  it  should  have  the  usual 
rear-guard  formation.  In  addition  to  its  other  duties,  it 
asists  wagons  that  have  fallen  to  the  rear,  and  aids  in 
transferring  the  loads  of  broken-down  vehicles  to  reserve 
wagons. 

Defense  of  the  Convoy. — When  the  duty  of  reconnais- 
sance is  efficiently  performed  a  surprise  of  the  convoy  is 
impossible,  and  the  enemy,  unless  he  be  superior  in  force, 
should  be  engaged  and  held  where  first  encountered.  If 
the  enemy  be  repulsed,  pursuit,  if  made  at  all,  should  be 
conducted  by  only  a  small  detachment,  to  make  sure  of  the 
retreat  of  the  hostile  force.  If  the  attack  be  made  by  ir- 
regular troops  or  armed  inhabitants,  their  repulse  should 
be  as  severe  and  bloody  as  possible,  in  order  to  teach  them 
a  wholesome  respect  for  the  convoy  escorts.  In  an  insur- 
gent district,  this  is  of  especial  importance,  if  the  lines  of 
communication  are  to  be  kept  open.  The  passage  of  a 
defile,  when  the  enemy  is  in  the  vicinity,  is  always  a  danger- 
ous operation,  for  the  train  is  compelled  to  pass  in  single 
file,  and,  owing  to  the  confined  space,  the  reinforcement  of 
the  different  parts  is  always  difficult  and  often  impossible. 
It  is  inexcusable  to  enter  a  defile  without  having  made  the 
most  careful  reconnaissance.  The  advance  ^uard,  as  soon 
as  it  passes  through,  takes  up  a  defensive  position  far 
enough  beyond  the  exit  from  the  defile  to  permit  the  con- 
voy to  be  parked  or  form  corral  upon  emerging;  and  the 
convoy  then  passes  through  as  quickly  as  possible.  If  nec- 
essary to  halt  at  the  entrance  of  the  defile,  the  first  half 
of  the  convoy  may  be  parked,  and  the  second  half  will  then 
probably  come  up  in  time  to  pass  through  without  halting. 
On  emerging,  the  second  half  may  then  be  parked,  and  the 
first  half  passes  through  and  takes  its  place  at  the  head  of 


240  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

the  column;  the  second  half  then  follows.  While  the  parts 
of  the  convoy  are  thus  parked,  the  horses  rest,  and  may  be 
fed  and  watered.  The  main  body  either  pushes  through 
the  defile  quickly  to  reinforce  the  advance  guard,  or  re- 
mains to  cover  the  passage  at  the  entrance,  according  to 
circumstances. 

The  discovery  of  the  enemy  at  one  point  should  be  the 
signal  for  increased  alertness  at  all  parts  of  the  escort. 
Neighboring  detachments  should  asist  one  another,  but 
otherwise  no  one  should  move  without  orders.  When  the 
enemy  is  not  in  for^o,  he  should  be  disposed  of  without  re- 
quiring the  wagons  to  be  halted  or  parked.  When  the 
enemy  is  reported  in  strength,  it  is  advisable  to  form  cor- 
ral at  once,  as  this  operation  requires  some  time.  If  the 
enemy  be  in  position  at  the  entrance  of  a  defile,  he  prob- 
ably means  to  attempt  the  capture  of  the  whole  train  by 
cutting  in  on  one  or  both  flanks,  or  by  making  a  strong  at- 
tack on  the  rear  and  driving  the  wagons  in  on  the  head  of 
the  column  which  has  teen  stopped  in  front,  thus  crowding 
everythng  into  a  confused  mass.  As  soon  as  the  enemy's 
intentions  are  evident,  the  main  body  of  the  escort  should 
defeat  the  main  attack,  the  advance  guard  taking  energetic 
steps  to  clear  the  defile  so  as  to  allow  the  train  to  resume 
its  march.  When  the  main  attack  is  made  on  one  flank, 
and  is  discovered  in  time,  the  main  body  may  take  up  a 
position  on  that  flank,  and  hold  the  enemy  at  bay  while  the 
train  marches  off.  The  same  means  may  be  adopted  when 
the  attack  comes  from  both  flanks;  in  that  case  the  greater 
part  of  the  main  body  should  endeavor  to  defeat  the  enemy 
quickly  on  the  nearest  flank,  and  then  hasten  to  the  assist- 
ance of  the  smaller  part,  which,  in  the  meantime,  has  en- 
gaged him  on  the  other  flank. 

Should  the  enemy  bar  the  road  in  front  in  force,  and 
render  it  necessary  for  the  train  to  retire,  the  utmost  care 
should  be  exercised  to  prevent  wagons  from  being  upset 
while  turning  around.  One  such  mishap  at  a  narrow  place 
might  cause  the  loss  of  the  portion  of  the  train  between 
the  obstruction  and  the  enemy.  When  the  enemy  follows 
in  pursuit,  defiles  should  be  obstructed,  for  which  purpose 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  241 

(in  the  absence  of  other  means)  some  wagons  may  be  upset 
in  narrow  places. 

When  the  strength  of  the  enemy  makes  it  necessary  to 
form  corral,  the  main  body  should  at  once  send  out  skir- 
mishers to  contest  the  ground  with  the  enemy  and  .ain  the 
time  required  for  corralling.  In  the  meantime,  the  com- 
mander should  make  an  inspection  of  the  ground,  select  a 
favorable  defensive  position  at  some  distance  from  the 
park,  and  occupy  it  with  the  remainder  of  his  troops,  be- 
hind which  the  advanced  bodies,  if  driven  in,  can  rally  and 
form  a  reserve.  When  time  permits,  the  position  should 
be  intrenched,  in  order  to  make  an  attack  as  costly  to  the 
enemy  as  possible.  If  the  enemy  be  repulsed,  no  pursuit 
should  be  made  except  as  already  indicated.  If,  in  forming 
corral,  the  different  detachments  keep  their  relative  posi- 
tions, the  corral,  when  completed,  will  be  surrounded  by  a 
ring  of  small  detachments,  which  should  all  remain  at  their 
posts,  unless  otherwise  ordered.  When  the  assailant  con- 
fines himself  to  one  feint  and  one  main  attack,  the  com- 
mander of  the  convoy  may  gradually  withdraw  the  troops 
from  those  parts  which  are  not  threatened,  in  order  to 
crush  the  enemy  at  the  decisive  point. 

If  the  enemy  should  carry  the  first  position  taken  up 
by  the  troops  of  the  main  body,  the  men  in  the  fighting 
lines  should  fall  back  under  cover  of  the  fire  of  the  reserve 
to  a  second  line,  or,  if  there  be  no  such  second  line,  to  the 
wagon  park.  The  enemy  will  then  h^ve'  to  make  another 
costly  attack,  which,  unless  he  be  in  greatly  superior  num- 
bers, he  will  be  reluctant  to  do,  if  he  has  been  roughly  han- 
dled in  his  first  attempt.  When  the  cargo  of  the  convoy 
consists  of  ammunition,  the  wagons  should  be  parked  close 
together,  and  the  escort  formed  at  isome  distance  to  avoid 
drawing  the  fire  upon  the  train.  When  the  enemy  is  in 
such  strength  as  to  render  the  defeat  of  the  escort  certain, 
an  attempt  should  be  made  to  secure  the  escape  of  at  least 
a  portion  of  the  train.  In  the  famous  capture  of  the  Prus- 
sian convoy  of  3,000  wagons  under  Colonel  Mosel,  by  the 
Austrian s,  in  June,  1758— an  event  which  'compelled  Fred- 
erick to  raise  the  siege  of  Olmutz,  and  exercised  a  great 


242  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

influence  on  the  campaign — the  commander  of  the  escort 
succeeded  in  saving  250  wagons,  37  of  which  were  loaded 
with  money.* 

THE  ATTACK  OF  CONVOYS. 

The  most  favorable  time  for  attacking  a  convoy  is 
when  it  is  passing  through  a  wood,  a  defile,  or  over  a 
bridge;  when  it  going  around  a  sharp  bend  in  the  road, 
when  ascending  or  descending  difficult  slopes,  or  passing 
over  bad  pieces  of  road;  when  the  convoy  is  beginning  to 
form  corral;  when  the  teams  are  being  watered;  or  when- 
ever the  conditions  are  such  that  the  escort  cannot  take 
rapid  measures  for  defense.  The  assailant  should  endeav 
or  to  surprise  the  convoy  while  it  is  in  a  difficult  situation. 

The  principles  of  attack  on  a  convoy  have  already 
been  considered  incidentally  in  the  discussion  of  the  de- 
fense. To  summarize  them  briefly,  they  consist  in  bring- 
ing the  convoy  to  a  halt,  throwing  it  into  confusion,  and 
making  the  principal  attack  from  an  unexpected  quarter. 
Surprise  and  celerity  being  the  main  features  of  the  at- 
tack, cavalry  is  especially  suitable  for  this  purpose. 

From  the  very  nature  of  things,  the  attack  of  a  con- 
voy is  much  easier  than  its  defense.  The  assailant  can 
exercise  to  the  fullest  extent  the  power  of  the  initiative, 
and  select  a  favorable  time  and  point  of  attack;  while  the 
commander  of  the  escort,  unable  to  cover  every  point,  and 
in  doubt  as  to  the  objective  of  the  attack,  may  be  deceived 
by  a  feint,  and  oppose  an  insignificant  force  to  the  real 
assault.  Were  convoys  operating  in  the  immediate  vicin- 
ity of  the  hostile  army,  their  defense  would  be  well-nigh 
impossible,  except  by  using  an  army  as  an  escort.**  But 

*For  an  interesting  description  of  the  conduct  and  capture  of 
this  convoy,  see  Carlyle's  "History  of  Frederick  the  Great"  (Har- 
per's edition),  Vol.  V.',  p.  241. 

**In  his  retreat  through  Bohemia,  after  raising  the  siege  of 
Olmfitz,  Frederick  was  compelled  to  employ  half  of  his  army  to 
escort  a  convoy  of  4,000  wagons.  In  1846,  General  Taylor,  who 
was  on  the  Rio  Grande,  finding  the  country  in  his  rear  so  infested 
with  Mexican  guerrillas,  and  so  threatened  with  the  regular  forces 
of  the  enemy,  as  to  make  it  impassable  for  wagon-trains,  left  the 
7th  U.  S.  Infantry  intrenched  at  Fort  Brown,  and  with  the  rest 
of  his  command  marched  back  to  his  base  at  Point  Isabel,  twenty- 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  243 

the  front  of  the  army  generally  interposes  between  the 
convoys  and  the  main  forces  of  the  enemy,  and,  as  a  re- 
sult, only  guerrillas  and  hostile  raiding  parties  are  usually 
encountered.  When  the  front  of  an  army  is  on  the  pro- 
longation of  the  line  of  communication  with  its  base — 
when,  in  other  words,  it  is  connected  with  its  base  by  a 
flank — convoy  duty  is  extremely  hazardous,  and  a  strong 
escort  and  a  vigilant  and  resolute  commander  are  requi- 
site for  the  safety  of  the  train. 

CONVOYS  OF  PRISONERS. 

When  large  bodies  of  prisoners  are  conducted  by  foot 
marches,  the  usual  strength  of  the  escort  is  1  infantry 
soldier  to  every  10  prisoners;  cavalry  being  added  to  the 
escort,  if  practicable,  in  the  proportion  of  1  trooper  to 
every  10  infantrymen.  The  commander  of  the  escort 
should  be  able  to  speak  the  language  of  the  prisoners;  if 
unable  to  do  so,  he  should  be  provided  with  an  inter- 
preter. The  prisoners  should  be  organized  into  bodies  of 
suitable  size,  preferably  their  own  companies,  under  their 
own  non-commissioned  officers.  The  commissioned  officers 
should  march  in  a  separate  body  at  the  head  or  rear  of 
the  column;  and,  on  giving  their  parole  that  they  will  not 
attempt  to  escape,  they  should  be  allowed  io  retain  their 
swords.  The  parole  should  be  written  out  and  signed  in 
the  language  of  the  prisoners.  All  considerations  of  chiv- 
alry and  sympathy  for  brave  men  in  misfortune  demand 
that  the  prisoners  should  be  treated  with  kindness;  but 
they  must,  nevertheless,  be  given  to  understand  that  any 
attempt  to  escape,  or  to  offer  violence  in  any  way  to  their 
guard,  will  be  repressed  with  prompt  and  severe  measures. 
In  the  enemy's  country,  communication  of  any  kind  be- 
tween the  prisoners  and  the  inhabitants  must  be  pre- 
vented. When  halting  for  rest,  or  when  the  convoy  is  men- 
aced by  the  enemy,  the  prisoners  must  be  closed  up  in  a 
compact  body.  At  night  they  should  be  placed  in  in- 
closures  or  large  buildings,  if  such  be  available,  as  they 

five  miles  distant,  from  which  place  his  entire  force  acted  as  an. 
escort  to  the  wagon-trains,  fighting  two  battles  before  they  reached 
Fort  Brown. 


244  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

are  thus  more  easily  guarded;  but  it  must  not  be  forgot- 
ten that  vigilant  eyes  constitute  a  better  guard  than  any 
walls,  and  the  prisoners  in  the  buildings  must  be  care- 
fully watched. 

CONVOYS  BY  RAILROAD. 

The  safety  of  transports  by  rail  is  primarily  insured 
by  guarding  the  tracks,  which  duty  falls  to  the  troops  de- 
tailed for  service  on  the  lines  of  communication.  The 
usual  method  is  to  post  guards  at  points  where  the  rail- 
road can  be  easily  and  effectually  destroyed  (tunnels, 
bridges,  etc.),  and  to  patrol  constantly  between  them. 
Where  this  is  impossible  or  insufficient,  the  train  to  be 
convoyed  should  be  preceded  by  a  pioneer  train,  for  the 
purpose  of  discovering  places  where  concealed  preparations 
for  wrecking  the  train  have  been  made,  such  as  removing 
spikes,  sawing  through  the  timbers  of  trestles  or  bridges, 
etc.  The  locomotive  of  the  pioneer  train  should  have  some 
empty  platform  cars  in  its  front,  to  receive  the  shock  of 
any  concealed  torpedoes  that  may  be  encountered,  and 
some  coaches  b  hind  for  a  working  party  and  a  portion 
of  the  escort.  The  working  party  should  be  provided  with 
the  usual  tools  of  a  "wrecking  train,"  and  should  carry  a 
supply  of  rails,  fish-plates,  etc.,  to  use  in  repairs.  The 
platform  car  just  in  front  of  the  locomotive  may  be  forti- 
fied with  shields  of  boiler  iron  or  sand-bags,  and  occupied 
by  detachments  of  sharpshooters;  or  it  may  be  practicable 
to  mount  a  field-piece  on  it,  and  thus  scatter  small  par- 
ties of  guerrillas  by  firing  a  few  shells.  Field-pieces  were 
used  on  platform  cars  by  the  French  at  Paris  and  Metz, 
and  also  by  the  British  at  Alexandria  and  Suakim.* 

The  train  to  be  guarded  follows  at  a  distance  varying 
from  half  a  mile  to  two  miles  in  rear,  with  the  remainder 
of  the  escort  placed  in  or  on  the  cars  at  the  head  and  rear 
of  the  train.  A  telegraph  operator  with  apparatus  for 
cutting  in  on  the  telegraph  line  should  be  on  the  train, 
in  order  that  assistance  in  the  form  of  reinforcements  or 
wrecking-trains  may  be  summoned  if  necessary. 

In  case  the  enemy  has  destroyed  or  obstructed   the 

"The  British  in  South  Africa  and  both  the  Russians  and  Jap- 
anese in  Manchuria  successfully  employed  armored  trains  for  their 
convoys  by  rail. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  245 

track,  and  is  in  position,  the  train  should  steam  back  some 
distance  to  allow  the  escort  to  disembark  without  molesta- 
tion. If  the  track  be  undisturbed  and  the  enemy  be  with 
out  artillery,  nothing  more  is  to  be  feared  than  direct 
musketry  fire  on  the  train  as  it  passes,  which  can  be  re- 
turned by  the  men  in  an  upon  the  cars.  In  such  a  case 
it  is  not  probable  that  much  harm  will  be  done;  though, 
in  view  of  the  great  power  of  the  modern  infantry  rifle,  a 
fatal  injury  to  the  locomotive  is  not  imDOSsible. 

When  it  is  not  practicable  to  have  the  convoy  preceded 
by  a  pioneer  train,  it  may  be  at  least  possible  to  use  a 
single  locomotive  as  a  kind  of  advance  guard  to  the  train 
proper.  An  officer  should  accompany  it,  and  a  system  or 
signals  by  means  of  the  locomotive  whistle  should  also  be 
devised.  When  such  signals  cannot  be  conveniently  up 
safely  used,  a  signal  detachment  with  flags  should  ridt 
on  the  tender. 

In  railroad  riots  a  pioneer  train  should  be  used  in  fron* 
of  the  train  proper,  sharpshooters  being  placed  on  the  plat- 
form car  nearest  the  engine.  The  train  proper  should  also 
have  a  platform  car  immediately  in  front  of  the  locomo- 
tive, which  should  also  be  occupied  by  sharpshooters,  to 
pick  off  any  rioters  engaged  in  misplacing  switches,  re- 
moving rails  or  doing  other  malicious  mischief  after  the 
passage  of  the  pioneer  train.  When  there  is  a  sufficient 
number  of  parallel  tracks,  the  train  convoyed  should  be 
flanked  on  each  side  by  a  train  carrying  troops.  Where 
these  precautions  are  not  practicable,  guards  should  nt 
least  be  placed  on  the  tender  of  the  locomotive,  and  on 
the  top  of  the  cars,  while  the  main  force  should  be  held 
in  readiness  to  disembark  instantly. 

CONVOYS  BY  WATER. 

On  the  sea,  convoy  duty  is,  of  course,  performed  by 
the  Navy.  Transport  on  navigable  streams  is  primarily 
secured  by  the  field  forces  holding  the  region  through 
which  the  stream  flows;  but  convoy  duty  may,  and  often 
will,  fall  to  the  gunboats  of  the  Navy,  as  it  generally  did 
in  the  War  of  Secession.  When  the  duty  developed  on 
troops,  especially  on  rivers  and  canals  in  dangerous  dis- 


246  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

triets,  and  more  particularly  when  the  banks  are  wooded, 
when  the  river  passes  through  defiles,  or  the  country  offer* 
good  concealment,  the  escort  itself,  on  board  a  vessel,  im- 
mediately precedes  the  transport,  and  is  provided  with 
means  for  making  a  quick  landing.  The  safest  way,  how 
ever,  in  a  hostile  country,  is  to  have  the  escort  march  on 
both  sides  of  the  stream,  reconnoitering  the  vicinity,  and 
scouring  the  woods  along  the  banks.  This  will  necessarily 
make  progress  slow,  but  it  may  be  necessary  in  order  to 
avoid  such  a  predicament  as  that  in  which  Porter's  gun- 
boats found  themselves,  near  Vicksburg,  in  1863.  These 
boats  had  proceeded  up  Deer  Creek,  which  was  very  diffi- 
cult of  navigation,  and  but  for  the  opportune  arrival  of 
General  Sherman  with  some  infantry,  they  would  prob- 
ably have  fallen  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  who  was  ob- 
structing the  stream  in  front  and  in  rear  of  the  boats,  and 
whose  riflemen  were  lining  the  banks,  and  picking  off  ev- 
ery man  who  showed  himself  on  deck.* 

A  novel,  but  effective,  use  of  cavalry  in  escorting  con- 
voys by  water  is  said  to  have  been  made  on  the  Mississippi 
in  the  War  of  Secession.  The  banks  of  this  river  afforded 
excellent  concealment  for  small  bodies  of  guerrillas,  who 
fired  into  the  boats,  causing  infinite  annoyance,  and,  in 
the  aggregate,  a  great  loss  of  life.  Owing  to  the  dis- 
persion and  concealment  of  these  riflemen,  it  was  difficult 
to  reach  them  with  artillery  projectiles,  and  by  the  time 
infantry  could  land,  the  partisans  were  generally  beyond 
the  reach  of  harm.  Some  of  the  boats  were  accordingly 
fitted  up  with  stalls  for  horses,  and  supplied  with  small 
detachments  of  cavalry.  When  fired  upon,  the  boats  im- 
mediately drew  up  to  the  shore,  the  gangway  was  dropped, 
the  cavalry  rushed  ashore,  and  charging  upon  the  guerril- 
las, pursued  and  dispersed  them.  This  mode  of  action  was 
so  effective  that  the  annoying  bands  of  partisans  were 
soon  broken  up. 

*Sherman's  "Memoirs,"  Vol.  I.,  p.  335. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  247 


CHAPTER  IX. 
HISTORICAL  SKETCH  OF  MODERN   INFANTRY. 

"Victorious  nations,  from  the  beginning  of  the  world,  have 
owed  their  success  to  good  infantry." — Duparcq. 

Strategy  is  unchangeable  in  its  essential  features,  and 
the  wars  of  antiquity  still  furnish  valuable  lessons  in  this 
branch  of  military  art.  Tactics,  on  the  other  hand,  is  de- 
pendent upon  the  nature  of  the  weapons  used;  with  each 
change  in  arms  the  method  of  handling  troops  in  battle 
changes,  and  a  knowledge  of  tactics  must  be  sought  in 
the  lessons  of  the  most  roeent  wars,  and  in  the  study  of 
existing  conditions.  The  tactical  lessons  of  the  wars  of 
ancient  times  are,  therefore,  of  very  little  value;  though 
a  consideration  of  tactics  from  the  time  of  the  introduc- 
tion of  gunpowder  is  instructive  as  showing  a  constant 
tendency  toward  the  extended  order  of  fighting  which  char- 
acterizes the  infantry  tactics  of  the  present  day. 

The  Middle  Ages. — In  the  darkness  of  the  Middle  Ages 
military  science,  like  all  other  branches  of  human  knowl- 
edge, had  sunk  to  the  lowest  degree.  Cavalry  existed  in 
the  form  of  knights  encased  in  armor,  and,  though  numer- 
ically weak,  it  constituted  by  far  the  greatest  part  of  the 
power  of  the  armies  which  then  took  the  field.  Artillery 
(if  it  can  be  said  to  have  existed  at  all)  was  'composed 
merely  of  aitisans  handling  the  rude  enginery  then  used 
in  siege  warfare;  and  the  infantry  was  a  mere  rabb]e, 
armed  with  pikes,  bows,  halberds,  or  clubs,  and  clad  in  the 
ordinary  garments  of  laborers. 

The  victory  of  the  .Swiss  mountaineers  over  the  flower 
of  the  Austrian  chivalry  at  Morgarten  raised  the  infantry 
into  respectability;  and  the  deeds  of  the  English  archers 
at  Cr£cy,  Poitiers,  and  Agincourt,  and  the  triumph  of  the 
Swiss  infantry  over  Charles  the  Bold  at  Granson  and 
Morat,  restored  it  to  the  dignity  it  had  enjoyed  in  the 
armies  of  Greece  and  Rome.  But  the  introduction  of  the 


248  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

musket  really  marks  the  birth  of  modern  infantry,  and  its 
growth  in  importance  has  since  teen  in  direct  proportion 
to  the  improvements  in  the  weapon  which  the  invention 
of  gunpowder  first  placed  in  its  hands. 

Infantry,  when  armed  with  the  pike,  was  formed  in 
solid  squares  or  heavy  columns,  in  which  formation  the 
weakness  of  the  individual  soldier  was  remedied,  and  a 
degree  of  resistance  that  would  otherwise  have  been  im- 
possible was  offered  to  the  knights.  In  the  front  and  on 
the  flanks  of  these  great  columns  were  placed  several  ranks 
of  heavily  armored  soldiers,  and  as  the  pike  carried  by 
these  men  was  more  than  fifteen  feet  in  length,  the  weap- 
ons of  six  ranks  could  project  beyond  the  face  of  the  square. 
Even  when  the  infantry  was  armed  with  the  bow,  this 
formation  was  often  used,  as  it  was  practicable  for  many 
ranks  to  use  their  weapons  by  discharging  their  arrows 
over  the  heads  of  those  in  front. 

The  Introduction  of  the  Musket. — The  introduction  of  the 
musket  necessitated  a  radical  change  in  tactics.  Not  more 
than  two  ranks  (or  at  most  three)  could  use  the  musket, 
and  a  retention  of  the  old  columns  would  have  caused  the 
loss  of  much  of  the  fighting  power,  besides  presenting  too 
great  and  dense  a  target  to  the  newly  invented  cannon. 
Still,  the  musketry  fire  being  slow,  and  the  range  and  pen- 
etration slight,  it  was  felt  that  musketry  alone  could  not 
give  sufficient  power  of  resistance;  and  pikemen  were  re- 
tained to  sustain  the  musketeers  in  receiving  a  charge,  or 
to  supplement  the  fire  action  with  the  necessary  shock  of 
collision.  At  first  these  pikemen  greatly  exceeded  the 
musketeers  in  number;  but  Maurice  of  Nassau  (1584-1609) 
reduced  them  to  a  numerical  equality,  his  battalion  con- 
sisting of  250  musketeers  and  250  pikemen — the  former 
on  the  flanks  and  the  latter  in  the  center.  Maurice's 
troops  were  formed  in  ten  ranks,  the  pikemen  being  in 
close  order,  and  the  musketeers  having  an  interval  vary- 
ing from  three  to  six  paces  between  files.  Each  musketeer, 
after  firing,  hastened  back,  through  the  interval,  to  the 
rear  rank  to  load,  his  place  being  taken  by  the  second- 
rank  man,  and  so  on,  a  continuous  fire  being  thus  main- 
tained. (See  Fig.  7.) 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  249 

fifft^  ,7 
Ballalion    in  lh«  Army  of  Maarice  of  Jtassrcm 


The  Thirty  Years9  War. — Gustavus  Adolphus  of  Swe- 
den (1611-1632)  shaped  all  the  details  of  the  organization 
and  tactics  of  his  Army  to  the  great  aim  of  increasing  its 
mobility  and  the  effectiveness  of  its  fire  action.  The  pikcj 
was  lightened  by  reducing  its  length  to  ten  feet.  The  car- 
tridge was  introduced,  and  the  musket  was  not  only  made 
less  cumbersome,  so  that  it  could  be  fired  without  a  rest, 
but  in  place  of  the  old  slow-match  it  was  furnished  with  a 
wheel-lock,  in  which  flint  striking  against  a  revolving  wheel 
was  used  to  ignite  the  charge.  The  infantry  was  divided 
into  regiments  of  1,008  men;  each  regiment  being  divided 
into  eight  companies,  each  composed  of  72  musketeers  and 
54  pikemen.  The  company  was  divided  into  three  troops; 
the  center  troop,  consisting  of  pikemen,  being  under  com- 
mand of  the  captain,  and  the  right  and  left  troops,  each 
composed  of  musketeers,  being  commanded  by  the  lieuten- 
ant and  first  sergeant  respectively.  The  number  of  ranks 
was  reduced  to  six,  which  in  battle  deployed  into  three, 
the  front  rank  kneeling  so  that  all  could  fire.  The  in- 
fantry was  usually  formed  in  two  lines.  The  Imperialists, 
using  a  single  line  of  heavy  columns,  from  ten  to  forty-five 
ranks  deep,  found  themselves  outflanked  by  the  smaller 
army  of  Gustavus  and  unable  to  cope  with  its  superior 
fire.  They  were  also  under  the  disadvantage  of  having 
clumsy  muskets  which  required  ninety-four  distinct  mo- 
tions in  loading. 

The  Wars  of  Louis  XIV. — In  the  time  of  Turenne  and 
Conde'  (1643-1675),  the  invention  of  the  bayonet  and  the 
flint-lock  musket  ca-ised  the  pike  to  disappear  and  the 
number  of  rank:}  to  be  reduced  to  four,  each  composed  of 
muskoteers,  the  rear  ranks  loading  for  the  first  two.  At 


250  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

the  same  time,  a  great  improvement  was  made  in  the  mo- 
bility and  tactical  handling  of  armies,  by  organizing  bat- 
talions and  regiments  into  brigades,  and  grouping  the  brig- 
ades into  divisions. 

It  is  remarkable  that  the  many  brilliant  campaigns 
of  the  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession  (1702-1715),  con- 
ducted by  such  great  generals  as  Marlborough,  Eugene, 
Vendoine,  and  Villiars,  should  have  made  no  important 
changes  or  developments  in  tactical  science;  but  tactics 
remained  practically  unchanged  from  the  time  of  Gustavus 
Adolphus  until  the  wars  of  Frederick  the  Great  (1740-1763). 

The  Wars  of  Frederick  the  Great. — Frederick,  like  the 
great  Swede,  recognized  the  paramount  importance  of 
mobility  and  fire  action,  and  he  brought  both  to  a  degree 
of  perfection  until  then  unknowTn.  The  Prussian  soldiers 
were  drilled  to  the  highest  state  of  proficiency.  The  bat- 
talions consisted  of  ten  companies,  which  always  maneu- 
vered in  open  column,  the  distance  and  alignments  being 
carefully  preserved,  so  that  line  could  be  quickly  and  ac> 
curately  formed  for  the  purpose  of  opening  fire  or  ad- 
vancing upon  the  enemy.  The  ranks  were  reduced  to 
three,  the  iron  ramrod  was  introduced,  and  the  rapidity 
of  fire  was  so  increased  that  each  soldier  carried  a  piece 
of  leather  to  protect  his  hand  from  the  heat  of  the  barrel.* 

Frederick's  army  was  divided  into  two  wings,  but 
contained  neither  divisions  nor  brigades.  It  was  formed 
in  two  lines  for  camping  and  marching,  as  well  as  for 
battle.  Both  lines  were  deployed,  the  interval  between 
the  battalions  in  the  first  line  being  8  yards.  The 
interval  between  those  of  the  second  varied;  the  lines 
being  equal  in  length,  but  the  second  generally  contain- 
ing la  smaller  number  <o*  battalions.  The  distance  be- 
tween the  lines  was  about  250  yards.  There  were  neither 
reserves  nor  skirmishers.  Figures  8,  9,  and  10  show  the 
manner  in  which  Frederick's  army  habitually  encamped 

*Grivet  says  that  Frederick's  infantry  soldiers  were  able  to 
fire  six  shots  a  minute  ("Etudes  sur  la  Tactique,"  p.  19).  Consid- 
ering the  musket  then  in  use,  this  seems  incredible,  though  they 
certainly  fired  with  a  rapidity  never  known  before. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  251 

Figure  8, 

fndrick'3  Army  tn  Lxn*  of  Battle  or  Encampment. 


C*v.  Infim-try  Infantry  Cav. 

f'8>  9.     f  Marchuy    bg    Ihe  Flank 

H  n  111  ii  i  nun  mi 

Aft   Wwg  J&gkt    Wny 

mi  linn  MUM  1111 


Fio.  70.  JU&rafangr  lo  the  front 


Infantry 


In  two  lines  and  marched  in  two  columns  by  the  flank, 
or  in  four  to  the  front. 

"The  Austrians,"  says  Hamley,  "carried  the  system 
of  selecting  and  occupying  strong  positions  to  its  very 
extreme.  To  its  extreme,  too,  they  carried  the  pedantry 
of  war,  embodied  in  their  blind  addiction  to  arbitrary 
ru'es  and  ancient  precedents.  Such  a  foe  was,  to  a  dex- 
terous tactician  and  a  highly  trained  army,  u.  very  whet- 
stone of  skill.  Moving  around  their  slow,  inert  masses, 


252  ORGANIZATION   AND   TACTICS. 

like  a  panther  around  an  ox,  he  found  the  unguarded 
part,  and  cast  himself  upon  it  with  all  his  force."  Fred- 
erick's great  victories  were  all  won  by  moving  his  army 
by  the  flank  so  as  to  place  it  oblique  to  and  outflanking 
the  enemy's  line,  and  then  wheeling  into  line  and  attack- 
ing the  hostile  flank.* 

The  effective  firing  of  the  Prussians  was  followed  up 
with  repeated  bayonet  charges.  At  this  time  the  bay- 
onet was,  in  fact,  a  weapon  of  great  importance;  for  the 
effective  range  of  the  musket  was  only  100  yards,  its 
extreme  range  only  165,  and  in  damp  weather  it  was 
practically  useless  as  a  fire-arm.  Yet  the  rapid  volleys 
of  the  Prussians  were  terribly  effective,  and  Frederick 
owed  his  success  almost  entirely  to  the  firing  and  maneu- 
vering power  of  his  army,  which,  though  extremely  slow 
and  clumsy  in  comparison  with  modern  armies,  was  im- 
measurably superior  in  these  respects  to  its  adversaries. 

The  American  Revolution. — The  next  advance  in  tactics 
was  brought  forth  by  the  American  Revolution.  Though 
"light  troops" — notably  the  Pandours  and  Croats  of  the 
Austrians — had  been  employed  in  former  wars  to  harass 
an  enemy  on  the  march,  the  true  skirmisher  had  not  yet 
appeared  on  the  field  of  battle.  The  American  command- 
ers, finding  at  their  disposal  numbers  of  men  expert  in 
the  use  of  firearms  and  skilled  in  the  arts  of  forest  war- 
fare, but  unfitted,  by  lack  of  drill  and  discipline,  for  the 
line  of  battle,  threw  them  forward  to  annoy  the  enemy 
and  delay  his  advance  with  their  fire.  Withdrawing  rap- 
idly when  no  longer  able  to  check  the  hostile  advance, 
they  uncovered  the  front  of  the  Continental  troops,  upon 
whom  the  brunt  of  battle  always  fell.  At  a  later  period 
of  the  war,  select  bodies  of  infantry  were  sometimes  em- 
ployed for  this  purpose,  and  skirmishing  was  adopted  as 
a  regular  element  of  tactics.  Its  utility  was  observed 
by  the  French  soldiers  serving  in  America,  and  its  intro- 

*See,  for  instance,  the  account  of  the  battle  of  Leuthen,  In 
Jomini's  "Great  Military  Operations,"  or  Carlyle's  "History  of  Fred- 
erick the  Great." 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  253 

duct  ion  and  development  became  one  of  the  marked  tacti- 
cal features  of  the  wars  of  the  French  Revolution.* 

The  Napoleonic  Era. — Social)  and  political  conditions 
had  a  peculiar  and  great  influence  on  the  organization 
and  tactics  of  the  French  army  in  the  wars  waged  by  the 
First  Republic.  The  general  withdrawal  of  the  Royalist 
officers  from  the  military  service  of  France  opened  the 
way  for  the  promotion  of  a  number  of  remarkably  ablo 
non-commissioned  officers;  some  of  whom  ultimately  at- 
tained the  rank  of  general,  marshal,  and  even  king.** 
The  upheaval  of  society  and  the  universal  demand  of  the 
Republic  upon  its  citizens  for  military  service  drew  into 
the  ranks  the  ablest  and  moist  ambitious  men;,  and. 
though  comparatively  deficient  in  training,  the  French 
troops  were  far  superior  in  intelligence  and  individuality 
to  any  army  to  which  they  were  opposed.  They  were 
admirably  adapted  to  skirmishing,  and  they  furnished 
many  excellent  leaders  for  small  commands.  The  result 
was  soon  apparent  in  important  tactical  changes,  already 
foreshadowed  in  the  new  system  of  Menil-Durand,  which, 
adopted  just  before  the  outbreak  of  the  Revolution, 
seemed  made  to  order  for  the  peculiar  troops  who  were 
to  use  it. 

In  place  of  the  precise  linear  tactics  of  Frederick, 
requiring  the  most  perfect  drill  and  the  most  rigid  disci- 
pline, the  organization  became  flexible,  and  the  great  in- 
novation was  made  of  small  columns  for  maneuver  and 
assault  and  deployed  lines  for  firing.  This  was  an  enor- 
mous stride  in  the  direction  of  mobility  and  effective  fire; 
for  small  columns  can  easily  march  over  extended  dis- 
tances and  rough  ground  which  would  throw  deployed 
lines  into  disorder;  the  employment  of  skirmishers  ad- 

*  Although  the  American  Revolution  presented  the  first  in- 
stances of  the  practical  employment  of  skirmishers,  their  extended 
use  had,  it  is  claimed,  been  advocated  by  Menil-Durand,  in  France, 
as  early  as  1774.  For  a  full  and  interesting  description  of  the  sys- 
tem of  that  distinguished  tactical  writer,  see  Grivet's  "Etudes  sur 
la  Tactique,"  Chapter  IV. 

**Murat  and  Bernadotte  rose  from  the  ranks  to  the  thrones  of 
Naples  and  Sweden  respectively. 

—18— 


254  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

mitted  of  effective  firing  on  advance,  and  the  deployed 
lines  were  suited  to  defensive  action.  The  division  was 
revived  as  a  unit  in  higher  organization;  and  it  was  di- 
vided into  three  "demi-brigades,"  each  consisting  of  three 
battalions.  There  were,  at  this  time,  no  regiments  in 
the  French  army. 

The  French  battalion  consisted  of  ten  companies,  two 
of  which  were  skirmishers.  It  habitually  operated  in 
close  column  of  divisions  (each  division  consisting  of  two 
companies),  its  front  being  covered  by  the  skirmishers. 
In  deploying  the  column,  the  two  skirmish  companies 
moved  to  the  right  and  left  respectively,  taking  position 
on  the  flanks  and  slightly  in  rear  of  the  battalion,  the 
interval  between  two  battalions  deployed  being  equal  to 
the  front  of  two  companies.  In  deploying  for  firing,  the 
skirmishers  unmasked  the  front  as  each  company  arrived 
on  the  line.  When  several  battalions  were  employed  to- 
gether, they  were  in  a  line  of  division  columns  at  deploy- 
ing intervals,  the  flank  companies  of  all  the  battalions 


Figure  13. 


covering  the  entire  front  with  a  chain  of  skirmishers. 
Each  company  was  formed  in  three  ranks.  (See  Figures 
11,  12,  and  13.)*  When  the  battalions  were  formed  in  two 

^Figures  11  to  19,  inclusive,  are  from  G rivet's  "Etudes  sur  la 
Tactique." 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  255 

lines,  those   of  the  second   were  opposite  the   middle   of 
the  the  intervals  of  the  first. 

This  system  (known  as  the  French,  or  perpendicular, 
tactios)  was  habitually  used  in  Napoleon's  earlier  cam- 
paigns. At  Castiglione  the  demi-brigades  of  Massem's 
division  were  each  formed  with  the  center  battalion  de- 
ployed and  the  flank  battalions  in  column  by  division. 
(See  Fig.  14.)*  At  Arcola,  Augereau  used  the  same  forma- 


tion.  At  Rivoli  the  French  acted  offensively  with  bat- 
talion columns  covered  with  skirmishers,  and  defensively 
with  deployed  battalions.  At  Marengo,  Desaix's  division 
was  foirmed  in  echelon  from  the  left,  the  first  and  third 
demi-brigades  formed  as  Mass6na's  had  been  at  Castig- 
lione, and  the  second  deployed.  (See  Fig.  15.)  In  this 
manner  the  flanks  were  protected  from  the  Austrian  cay- 
airy,  and  two4hirds  of  the  division  was  deployed  in  suit- 
able formation  for  firing. 

Figure  15. 


flartnotie*  </  OnatM-* 

91 


In  1805  Napoleon  made  some  important  changes  in 
the  organization  of  his  army,  instituting  the  army  corps, 
and  substituting  for  the  demi-brigade  the  two-battalion 
regiment.  The  brigade  consisted  of  two  regiments;  and 

*At  this  time  the  number  of  companies  in  a  battalion  had 
been  reduced  to  8. 


256  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

the  division,  of  two  brigades  and  a  regiment  of  light  in- 
fantry. The  "perpendicular"  system  of  tactics  was  now 
at  the  height  of  its  perfection.  Recognizing  the  difficulty 
of  effecting  the  passage  of  lines  in  action,  and  desiring 
that  the  reinforcement  of  the  first  line  by  the  second 
might  not  cause  an  intermingling  of  different  brigades, 
Napoleon  prescribed  that  the  habitual  formation  of  a  di- 
vision tshould  be  by  "linked  brigades,"  or  brigades  side 
by  side.  This  had  the  additional  advantage  of  giving  a 
separate  object,  when  the  terrain  so  required,  to  each 
brigade.  The  battalions  of  the  light  infantry  regiment, 
when  not  employed  as  skirmishers,  were  held  in  rear  of 
the  interval  between  the  brigades.  (See  Figure  16.) 

Figure  16. 
if  S  D'**™  by   Lm**4 

**** 


At  Austerlitz,  St.  Hilaire's  division  was  formed  for 
assault  as  shown  in  Figure  17.  Soult's  other  divisions, 
as  well  as  those  of  Bernadotte,  were  similarly  foraied. 

Figure  77.     - 
Ofv&ion  of 


In  1806,  in  the  period  between  the  campaigns  of  Aus- 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 


257 


terlitz  and  Jena,  the  flank  companies  of  the  battalions 
were  consolidated  into  separate  battalions  of  light  in- 
fantry; the  battalions  being  thins  reduced  to  six  corn- 
pa  nieiS  each. 

The  tactical  system  of  Frederick  (as  employed  by  the 
Austrians  and  Russians)  had  encountered  that  of  Napo- 
leon at  Auisterlitz  and  met  with  complete  disaster;  and 
at  the  double  battle  of  Jena-Auerstadt,  in  the  following 
year,  the  latter  system  triumphed  so  decisively  over  the 
former  as  to  relegate  it  completely  to  the  military  past. 
In  this  battle  the  Prussians,  making  no  use  of  skirmish- 
ers, advanced,  with  the  precision  of  the  drill-ground,  in 
column  of  companies,  in  two  or  more  lines,  executed  a 
change  of  direction,  and  wheeled  into  line,  suffering  mean- 
while from  a  biting  fire  of  the  French  skirmishers,  upon 
whom  they  opered  with  volleys.  The  French,  on  the 
other  hand,  advanced,  at  Auerstadt,  in  a  column  of  bat- 
talions, each  in  close  column  by  division,  the  whole  pre- 
ceded by  a  cloud  of  skirmishers,  under  whose  protecting 
fire  the  column  deployed  into  line  of  battalion  columns 
and  then  into  line.  At  Jena  the  French  divisions  were 
mostly  in  three  lines  of  battalion  columns  at  deploying 
intervals,  the  first  line  consisting  of  the  light  infantry 
regiments.  Suchet's  division,  however,  being  exposed  to 


cavalry  attacks,  assumed  the  formation  shown  in  Figure 
18,  the  17th  Light  Infantry  and  a  select  battalion  being 


258  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

deployed  in  the  first  line,  the  34th  and  40th  regiments 
of  the  line  in  close  column  by  division  on  the  right  and 
(eft  respectively,  while  Vedel's  brigade  was  deployed  as 
a  second  line.  In  the  course  of  the  battle  the  regiment 
and  battalion  of  the  first  line  ployed  into  columns  of  at- 
tack, and,  covered  by  skirmishers,  moved  against  the 
wood  and  village  of  Close  witz;  the  34th  attacked  on  the 
left  of  these  troops;  and  the  40th,  supported  by  Yedel's 
brigade,  all  in  columns  of  attack,  advanced  to  the  former 
front.  At  this  period  the  flexibility  of  the  organization 
of  the  French,  and  the  ease  and  skill  with  which  their 
troops  were  handled  tactically,  are  both  remarkable. 

The  next  change  in  French  tactics  was  altogether  for 
the  worse,  but  was  doubtless  the  outgrowth  of  unavoid- 
able conditions.  In  Napoleon's  later  campaigns  the  com- 
position of  his  armies  was  distinctly  inferior  to  that  of 
the  forces  formerly  commanded  by  him.  The  heavy  losses 
in  many  great  campaigns  and  the  enormous  increase  in 
the  size  of  the  ainniies*  caused  the  ranks  to  be  filled 
with  raw  conscripts  and  German,  Italian,  and  other  for- 
eign levies  of  inferior  training  and  morale  and  half- 
hearted zeal.  The  casualties  of  war  and  the  allurements 
of  civil  vocations  an  a  well-established  government  de- 
prived the  army  of  many  of  its  best  officers  in  the  lower 
grades;  and  the  deficiency  in  qualified  battalion  and  com- 
pany leaders,  and  the  lack  of  intelligence  and  individual- 
ity in  the  ranks,  rendered  the  former  tactics  scarcely  pos- 
sible. Enormous  columns  were  now  used  instead  of 
small  ones,  the  indifferent  soldiers  being  herded  together, 
as  it  were,  for  mutual  confidence.  Fire  action  now  de- 
vo'ved  principally  upon  the  artillery;  and  the  infantry  in 
hfuge  columns  wias  used  mainly  for  shock.  Augereau's 
corps,  at  Eylau,  was  formed  in  two  columns,  each  consist- 
ing of  a  division  in  a  column  of  battalions,  each  in  close 
column  by  division.**  In  the  meantime  the  Russians  had 

*At  Marengo  the  French  numbered  less  than  30,000;  at  Wag- 
ram  they  numbered  150,000. 

**It  is  impossible  here  to  avoid  sharing  Jomini's  lament  over 
the  poverty  of  military  nomenclature.  Each  of  Augereau's  col- 
umns consisted  of  half  an  army  corps  (a  division),  and  the  front 
of  paah  column  was  that  of  a  division  (two  companies). 


ORGAN  IZATIOK  AND  TACTICS. 

begun  to  imitate  the  successful  French  tactics,  and  in 
this  battle  their  tactical  formations  were  actually  supe- 
rior to  those  of  their  opponents;  Benningsen  forming  his 
divisions  after  the  manner  ir-f  Masse~na  at  Castiglione. 

The  use  of  heavy  columns  by  the  French  culminated 
in  the  remarkable  formation  of  Macdonald's  corps  at 
Wagram,  which  is,  perhaps,  the  most  famous  column  of 
attack  mentioned  in  military  history.  Eight  battalions 
were  deployed  in  line,  one  behind  another  at  close  dis- 
tances, while  on  the  right  flank  six,  and  on  the  left  flank 
seven,  battalions  were  formed  in  heavy  column,  each  bat- 
talion in  close  column  by  division.  The  rear  of  the  square 
was  closed  with  cavalry.  (See  Fig.  19.)  This  column  broke 
the  Austrian  line,  though  at  the  cost  of  enormous  losses 
on  its  own  part. 


CiaM  Battalion* 
/*{.//>•. 


Cohmn  t*f  Ofefefe/i 


In  the  Russian  campaign  a  return  was  made  to  sma1!- 
er  columns.  In  the  attack  on  the  great  redoubt  at  Boro- 
dino the  attacking  force  wais  formed  in  two  lines  of  bat- 
talion columns  at  deploying  intervals,  each  column  hav- 
ing a  front  of  two  companies.  In  1813  Napoleon  pre- 
scribed for  the  attack  formation  of  infantry,  lines  of  bat- 
talions formed  in  close  column  by  division.  Realizing  that 
untrained  soldiers  could  not  be  relied  upon  in  these  forma- 


260  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

tions,  he  caused  the  young  conscripts,  of  which  his  army 
was  now  largely  formed,  to  be  drilled  assiduously  in  form- 
ing battalion  square,  deploying  into  line,  and  forming 
column  of  attack.  Every  day  the  troops  were  halted  on 
the  march  and  exercised  in  these  maneuvers.  Qualified 
leaders  were  provided  for  the  new  levies  by  summoning 
officers  from  the  veteran  army  in  Spain.  The  prescribed 
formation  was  generally  used  at  Liitzen,  Bautzen,  and 
Leipsic,  though  regimental  and  brigade  columns  were  also 
employed.  The  use  of  heavy  columns  was  extremely  rare. 
At  Bautzen,  Ney  formed  his  corps  in  heavy  columns,  each 
consisting  of  a  division;  but  this  was  for  the  purpose  of 
making  a  turning  movement,  and  the  troops  made  the 
actual  attack  in  small  columns.  The  Allies  had,  by  this 
time,  completely  adopted  the  tactics  of  the  French,  and 
the  use  of  skirmishers  was  now  universal. 

In  the  extraordinary  campaign  in  Champagne,  in  the 
following  year,  Napoleon  made  constant  use  of  small  col- 
umns of  attack,  which  could  deploy  readily  for  firing  or 
form  square  quickly  to  resist  cavalry;  but  a  fatal  resump- 
tion of  heavy  columns  of  attack  was  made  at  Waterloo, 
where  Ney  formed  D'Erlon's  corps  in  four  columns,  each 
consisting  of  battalions  deployed  one  behind  another  at 
five  paces  distance,  thus  giving  a  total  depth  of  twenty- 
four  ranks.* 

On  th<?  eve  of  the  battle  of  Leipsic,  in  1813,  Napoleon 
reduced  the  number  of  ranks  from  three  to  two,  in  order 
that  his  army,  though  smaller  in  numbers,  might  oppose 
to  the  Allies  an  approximately  equal  front.  The  two- 

*This  is  the  formation  as  given  by  Thiers  and  usually  accepted 
by  military  writers;  but  th'e  exact  formation  of  D'Brlon's  corps _ on 
this  occasion  is  a  matter  of  much  uncertainty.  Grivet,  following 
General  Lamarque,  claims  that  the  columns  were  composed  of  bat- 
talions one  behind  another,  each  battalion  in  close  column  by  divi- 
sion. Charras  is  of  the  same  opinion.  Brialmont  says  that  it  is 
not  clear  what  the  groundwork  of  the  formation  was,  and  Jomini 
despairs  of  making  anything  out  of  the  chaos  of  contradictory 
statements.  It  is  certain  only  that  the  French  attacked  fa  deep 
columns  of  some  sort,  and  that  they  suffered  disastrously  in 
consequence. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  261 

-ank  formation  had  been  adopted  by  the  English  three 
'ears  before. 

The  tactics  of  the  British  was,  in  fact,  superior  to 
the  deteriorated  tactics  with  which  the  French  opposed 
them  in  Spain  and  at  Waterloo.  In  the  Peninsula  War 
they  habitually  received  the  enemy  in  a  "thin  red  line" 
of  only  two  ranks,  supported  by  a  similar  line  a  short 
distance  in  rear,  and  supplemented  the  effects  of  their 
fire  with  a  counter-charge  in  line,  overlapping  the  column 
on  the  flanks,  and  pouring  into  it  a  concentric  fire  at 
short  range  before  closing  upon  it  with  the  bayonet.  The 
oounter^chalrge  was  geineralfy  pushed  only  a  'short  dis- 
tance, the  infantry  being  quickly  re-formed  to  await  (in 
fact,  to  invite)  another  attack.*  The  line  was  generally 
limited  to  defensive  action  and  short  offensive  returns; 
for  greater  mobility  and  cohesion,  the  attack  was  usually 
made  in  small  columns,  which,  before  collision,  deployed 
into  line.  Thus,  at  Salamanca,  Pakenham's  division  ad- 
vanced in  line  of  battalions,  each  in  close  column  by  di- 
vision, which  deployed  into  line,  overlapped  the  head  of 
the  opposing  French  column,  and  speedily  overthrew  it. 

The  French  generals  in  Spain  seem  to  have  been 
seized  with  a  mania  in  regard  to  the  employment  of  deep 
columns  of  attack.  Notwithstanding  the  overthrow  of 
the  great  Austrian  column  at  Caldiero  by  Masse'na's  skir- 
mishers and  small  columns,  and  in  spite  of  their  own 
repeated  bitter  experience  in  opposing  heavy  columns  to 
the  British  lines,  they  persisted  in  this  perverted  tactics, 
often  forming  an  entire  division  in  a  column  of  battal- 
ions, each  in  dose  column  of  divisions  or  even  of  com- 
panies. In  thrusting  forward  these  lengthened  columns 
with  narrow  fronts,  they  voluntarily  gave  to  the  British 
much  of  the  advantage  that  an  army  gains  by  attacking 
its  adversary's  flank;  and  repeated  disaster  seemed  un- 
able to  correct  this  tactical  folly. 

These  heavy  columns  were  always  more  formidable 

*See  Napier's   description  of  the  battle  of  Vimiero    ("Penin- 
sula War,"  Book  II.,  Chapter  5),  and  the  battle  of  Busaco 
Book  XI.,  Chapter  7). 


262  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

in  appearance  than  in  fact.  At  Eylau,  Essling,  and  Water- 
loo they  met  with  bloody  disaster,  and  Jo-mini  is  of  th« 
opinion  that  Maedonald's  famous  column  would  have  been 
repulsed  also,  but  for  the  successes  of  Davout  and  Oudinot 
against  the  Austrian  left.  Napier,  in  commenting  on  the 
battle  of  Vimiero,  makes  the  foil  lowing  incomparable  crit- 
icism of  the  column:  "The  column  is  good  for  all  move- 
ments short  of  the  actual  attack,  but  as  the  Macedonian 
phalanx  was  unable  to  resist  the  Roman  legion,  so  will 
the  close  column  be  unequal  to  sustain  the  fire  and 
charge  of  a  firm  line  aided  by  artillery.  The  repugnance 
of  men  to  trample  on  their  own  dead  and  wounded,  the 
cries  and  groans  of  the  latter,  and  the  whistling  of  can- 
non-shots a.s  they  tear  open  the  ranks,  produce  disorder, 
especially  in  the  center  of  the  attacking  columns,  which, 
blinded  by  smoke,  unsteadfast  of  footing,  bewildered  by 
words  of  command  coming  from  a  multitude  of  officers 
crowded  together,  can  neither  see  what  is  taking  place, 
nor  advance  nor  retreat,  without  increasing  the  confusion. 
No  example  of  courage  can  be  useful,  no  moral  effect 
produced  by  the  spirit  of  individuals,  except  upon  the 
head,  which  is  often  firm  and  even  victorious  when  the 
rear  is  flying  in  terror.  Nevertheless,  columns  are  the 
soul  of  military  operations;  in  them  is  the  victory,  and 
in  them  is  safety  to  be  found  after  a  defeat.  The  secret 
consists  in  knowing  when  and  where  to  extend  the  front."* 

The  British  infantry  fire  was  also  greatly  superior  to 
that  of  the  French.  Indeed,  Baron  de  Marbot  attributes 
Wellington's  success  mainly  to  the  superior  training  of 
the  British  soldier  in  musketry  firing.  Certainly,  in  this 
respect,  the  British  army  was  superior  to  any  other  in 
Europe.  At  this  period,  the  fire  of  the  infantry,  though 
very  deadly  at  short  range,  was  not  of  much  account  be- 
yond 200  yards;  but  by  giving  the  musket  a  high  angle 
of  elevation,  it  could  be  used  with  effect  against  troops 
in  mass  at  double  that  distance. 

It  is  amazing  that  the  British,  after  having  «o  often 

*Napier's  "Peninsula  War,"  Book   II.,  Chapter   6. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  263 

triumphed  with  the  line  over  the  heavy  column,  should 
afterwards  have  made  use  themselves  of  deep  columns 
of  attack.  Yet  Pakenham — a  veteran  of  the  Peninsula, 
whose  small  columns  and  deployed  lines  had  been  so  ef- 
fective at  Salamanca — in  attacking  Jackson's  position  at 
New  Orleans,  formed  the  attacking  force  in  heavy  col- 
umns, the  principal  one,  consisting  of  nearly  3,000  effect- 
ives, having  a  front  of  only  60  men;  a  formation  all 
the  worse,  as  the  Americans  were  mostly  skilled  marks- 
men, armed  with  the  rifle.  The  atacking  troops  encoun- 
tered a  fire  more  deadly  than  any  to  which  they  had  ever 
subjected  the  French;  and  their  enormous  losses  and  com- 
plete repulse  furnished  additional  proof  of  the  folly  of 
opposing  heavy  columns  to  a  line  capable  of  delivering 
an  effective  fire. 

As  a  result  of  his  experience  in  the  Napoleonic  wars, 
Jomini  advocated  for  attack  a  formation  in  lines  of  bat- 
talion columns,  each  battalion  being  in  close  column  by 
division,  the  whole  front  being  covered  with  skirmishers, 
and  the  intervals  between  the  columns  varying  from  the 
front  of  a  single  column  to  the  interval  necessary  for  the 
deployment  of  a  battalion.* 

The  Crimean  War. — The  Crimean  War  showed  clearly 
the  tactical  stagnation  into  which  the  belligerent  powers 
had  fallen  in  the  long  peace  of  forty  years  which  they 
had  enjoyed.  At  the  Alma,  the  British,  influenced  by 
their  military  traditions,  and  apparently  forgetting  that 
Wellington's  lines  were  designed  for  defensive  action,  ad- 
vanced to  the  attack  in  deployed  lines  with  a  front  of 
two  miles,  marching  over  a  mile  of  broken  ground,  cross 
ing  a  stream,  and  finally  attacking  in  great  disorder.  The 
Russians,  on  the  other  hand,  awaited  the  attack,  and 
made  a  counter-assault,  in  heavy  columns,  in  which  their 
fire  action  was  reduced  to  a  minimum  and  every  tactical 
disadvantage  seemed  to  have  been  voluntarily  assumed. 
At  Inkerman  the  deployed  lines  used  by  the  British  on 

*For  a  full  and  interesting  discussion  of  this  formation,  see 
Jomini's  "Art  of  War"  (Mendell  and  Craighill's  translation),  p.  34£ 
et  seq. 


264  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

the  defensive  again  asserted  their  superiority  over  the 
heavy  attacking  columns.  But  the  Crimean  War,  as  a 
whole,  was  merely  a  "gigantic  contest  between  two  vast 
intrenched  camps,"  in  which  the  few  conflicts  in  the  open 
field  were  characterized  more  by  stubborn  fighting  than 
by  military  skill,  and  its  bloody  struggles  produced  no 
improvements  in  tactical  science.  Most  of  the  English, 
and  a  portion  of  the  French,  infantry  were  armed  with 
the  rifle,  which  greatly  increased  the  losses  invited  by 
the  Russian  tactical  formations,  and  the  suicidal  nature 
of  heavy  columns  on  the  battle-field  became  more  evident 
than  ever.  The  Russian  infantry,  with  the  exception  of 
a  few  select  regiments,  was  still  armed  with  the  smooth- 
bore musket.  The  range  of  the  rifle  at  this  time  did  not 
exceed  800  yards,  and  it  was,  in  fact,  very  inaccurate  at 
any  range  beyond  half  that  distance. 

"  The  Italian  War.— In  the  Italian  War  of  1859  the 
French  and  Austrians  were  both  armed  with  the  rifle, 
but  the  Sardinians  still  retained  the  smooth-bore  musket. 
The  Austrian  rifle  being  much  superior  to  that  of  the 
French,  Napoleon  III.  depended  mainly  upon  the  newly 
invented  rifled  cannon  for  fire  effect,  and  directed  his  in- 
fantry to  close  quickly  in  shock  action  with  the  bayonet. 
Small  columns  of  attack  were  used,  the  columns  being 
covered  with  clouds  of  skirmishers.  Even  when  on  the 
defensive,  the  French  infantry  was  to  place  its  reliance 
on  shock  tactics.  The  order  issued,  in  anticipation  of  an 
Austrian  attack,  to  the  French  army  covering  the  siege 
of  Peschiera,  prescribes  the  disposition  of  the  infantry  iu 
battalions  alternately  deployed  and  in  column  of  divis 
ions.  The  deployed  battalions  were  to  use  file  firing,  and 
the  columns  were  to  charge  the  enemy  with  the  bayonet. 
The  essence  of  the  French  tactics  was  to  close  quickly 
with  the  enemy,  so  as  either  to  use  the  bayonet  or  to 
engage  in  fire-fight  at  a  range  such  as  to  neutralize  the 
superiority  of  the  Austrian  rifle.  This  tactics,  so  differ- 
ent from  that  developed  by  later  wars,  was  adopted  by 
the  Austrian's,  and  used  by  them,  seven  years  afterwards, 
to  their  own  distress. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  265 

The  War  of  Secession.  —  The  War  of  Secession,  cele- 
brated for  its  long  duration,  its  stubborn  battles,  and  its 
enormous  loss  of  life,  is  also  remarkable  as  a  turning- 
point  of  tactics,  there  being  scarcely  a  feature  of  the  tac- 
tics of  the  present  day  that  did  not  have  its  germ,  its  pro- 
totype, or  its  deve^pment  in  that  great  contest.  The 
Union  and  Confederate  Armies  were  both  armed  with  the 
rifle  (with  an  extreme  range  of  1,000  yards,  and  a  deadly 
range  of  half  that  distance),  and  in  the  former  the  breech- 
loader made  its  appearance  before  the  end  of  the  war. 
The  marksmanship  and  skill  in  handling  fire-arms  were 
of  a  high  order  in  both  armies,  and  the  infantry  fire  was 
so  deadly  as  to  effect  marked  changes  in  tactical  forma- 
tions. The  principal  tactical  developments  of  the  War  of 
Secession  were: 

I.    Attacks  by  rushes; 
II.    Attacks  in  successive  deployed  lines; 

III.  The  use  of  heavy  lines  of  skirmishers  in  place  of 

the  old  line  of  battle: 

IV.  The  use  of  hasty  intrenchments. 

The  first  instance  of  attack  by  rushes  was  at  the  bat- 
tle of  Fort  Donelson,  February  15,  1862.  General  Morgan 
L.  Smith's  brigade,  consisting  of  the  Eighth  Missouri  and 
Eleventh  Indiana,  was  formed  for  attack  with  both  regi- 
ments deployed,  the  former  in  front  and  preceded  by  five 
of  its  companies  as  skirmishers  at  two  paces  interval. 
Advancing  up  a  bare  slope,  the  assailants  came  under  a 
heavy  fire,  the  regiment  in  irear  quickly  formed  on  the 
left  and  abreast  of  the  one  in  front,  the  entire  brigade 
lay  down,  and  the  skirmishers  plied  the  enemy  with  an 
effective  fire.  When  the  enemy's  fire  slackened,  the  brig- 
ade again  rushed  on,  absorbed  the  skirmishers,  and  again 
lay  down  and  pened  fire.  "Soon  as  the  fury  of  the  fire 
abated,  both  regiments  rose  up  and  rushed  on,  and  in 
that  way  they  at  length  closed  upon  the  enemy,  falling 
when  the  volleys  grew  hottest,  dashing  on  when  they 
slackened  or  ceased.  Meanwhile  their  own  fire  was  con- 
stant and  deadly."*  By  a  series  of  such  rushes  the  en- 

"Official  Report  of  General  Lew.  Wallace,  commanding  Third 
Division. 


266  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

emy's   position   was   carried   with   but   slight   loss.     (See 
Fig.  20.) 

_              9/) 
rmolio*   of  M.Lj&nHh'j   Brigade  of  Ferl  Done/ion 


d®Mii 


II*  Indian*. 

This  brilliant  movement  was  far  in  advance  of  the 
tactics  then  generally  in  use.  On  the  same  field  Lan- 
man's  brigade  (to  which  an  additional  regiment  had  been 
attached)  was  formed  in  column  of  battalions,  each  con- 
sisting of  five  companies  deployed  in  line;  four  of  the  reg- 
iments composing  the  brigade  thus  forming  a  column  of 
eight  battalions  or  sixteen  ranks,  while  the  fifth  regiment 
was  deployed  as  skirmishers  on  the  flanks.  (See  Fig.  21.) 


Leumen's    Brigade    4t  forl  Done/son 


7&  Awvw. 


This  attack  succeeded  also,  but  with  a  loss  of  nearly 
twice  as  many  men  per  regiment  as  Smith's  brigade 
incurred. 

The  formation  of  French's  division  at  Fredericksburg 
(December  13,  1862)  may  be  taken  as  a  typical  attack 
formation  of  the  War  of  Secession.  Kimball's  brigade 
was  in  advance,  deployed  in  line  of  battle;  Andrews' 
brigade,  in  similar  formation,  followed  at  a  distance  of 
about  150  yards;  and  at  an  equal  distance  and  in  the 
same  formation,  Palmer's  brigade  formed  the  rear  of  the 
column.  The  head  of  the  column  was  covered  by  three 
regiments  deployed  as  skirmiishers.  (See  Figure  22.)  Han- 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  267 

cock's  division,  in  this  battle,  was  formed  in  the  same 
manner;  and  Pickett's  division  at  Gettysburg,  and  Sher- 
idan's at  Chattanooga,  had  essentially  the  same  forma- 
tion in  successive  lines,  though  in  the  two  latter  cases 
the  lines  were  only  two  at  the  time  of  assault. 

Though  the  attack  formations  varied  considerably  in 
matters  of  detail,  the  following  may  be  given  as  tlio  one 

Fifjure  22. 
Formation  of  French's  Division  at  Fredericksburg. 


IO&N.Y. 


so  generally  used  as  to  constitute  practically  a  "normal 
formation."  The  division  was  formed  in  three  lines  of 
deployed  brigades,  at  distances  varying  from  150  to  300 
yards,  the  leading  brigade  being  preceded  by  one,  or  some- 
times two,  lines  of  skirmishers.  The  skirmishers  being 
reinforced  by,  and  absorbed  in,  the  first  line,  and  the  lat- 
ter, if  checked,  being  reinforced  and  pushed  forward  by 
the  second,  and  the  third  line  being,  if  necessary,  sim- 
ilarly absorbed,  the  assaulting  force,  at  the  moment  )i 
collision,  generally  consisted  of  all  the  successive  lines 
merged  into  a  dense  and  irregular  one. 

Heavy  columns   of  attack  were  not,  however,   infre- 


268 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 


quently  used,  and  the  lessons  taught  by  their  employ- 
ment are  a  e  nfirmation  of  those  learned  from  the  wars 
of  the  early  part  of  the  century.  At  Kenesaw  Mountain 
(June  27,  1864)  the  assault,  upon  the  Confederate  position 
was  one  of  the  great  tactical  failures  of  the  war.  The 
attacking  columns  consisted  of  three  divisions;  one  (New- 
ton's) from  Howard's  corps,  one  (Davis')  from  Palmer's 
corps,  and  one  (M.  L.  Smith's)  from  Logan's  corps.  New- 
ton's division  was  formed  as  shown  in  Figure  23.  Seven 
of  the  eight  regiments  composing  Barker's  brigade  were 
formed  one  behind  another,  each  in  clo>se  column  by  di- 


.  Pbrmertipn    ef  Afc>v/o/>fr  \Civis/on  gf 
S7&  lnd. 


I2S1*  Ohio 


•Skirmishers 


Griqatt* 


28*/f 


26$0tuo.          Markers 
Srtgacte 


=  44*  m,. 


vision.  At  d  ^ploying  interval  from  Harker,  five  regiments 
of  Wagner's  brigade  were  likewise  formed  in  close  column 
by  division  left  in  front;  and,  echeloned  to  their  left  and 
rear,  Kimball's  brigade,  consisting  of  seven  regiments, 
was  formed  in  a  similar  column  right  in  front.  It  was 
originally  intended  that  these  two  brigades  should  form 
a  f ingle  column;  tut  Wagner  eo'ulcl  not  gam  enough 
ground  to  the  front,  owing  to  the  obstac'es  presented 
by  the  Federal  shelter-trenches,  and  Kimball  could  not 
take  sufficient  distance  to  the  rear,  cwing  to  the  irregu- 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  2(59 

larity  of  the  ground.  The  two  brigades  thus  overlapped, 
and  Kimball's  formed  a  separate  column.  Each  of  the 
leading  columns  was  covered  by  a  regiment  deployed  as 
skirmishers.  These  skirmishers,  advancing  slowly  andl 
firing,  were  overtaken  by  the  assaulting  columns,  in  the 
intervals  of  which  they  continued  to  advance.  The  lead- 
ing brigades  met  with  a  bloody  check,  and  Kimball,  mov- 
ing up  and  attacking  on  the  left,  was  also  repulsed  with 
heavy  loss.  Davis'  and  M.  L.  Smith's  divisions  were  each 
formed  in  column  of  deployed  regiments  at  close  distance. 
The  regiments  being  at  this  time  much  reduced,  and  the 
number  of  regiments  in  a  brigade  being  correspondingly 
increased,  these  columns  also  presented  a  narrow  front 
and  great  depth;  and,  like  the  others,  they  suffered  heavy 
loss,  and  were  unable  to  make  a  lodgment  in  the  enemy's 
works.* 

Columns  of  deployed  regiments  were  used  also  by  the 
Confederates  in  the  attack  upon  McPherson,  near  Dallas, 
May  28,  1864,  and  in  the  battle  of  Atlanta,  nearly  two 
months  later.  In  each  case  the  columns  met  with  enor- 
mous losses,  though  temporarily  successful  in  the  latter 
instance. 

In  the  attack  of  Hancock's  corps  on  the  Confederate 
position  at  Spottsylvania,  Barlow's  division  was  formed 
in  two  lines  of  masses,  each  regiment  in  close  column  by 
division.  Brooke's  and  Miles'  brigades  in  the  first  line, 
Smyth's  and  Brown's  in  the  second.  Birney's  division  was 
formed  in  two  deployed  lines  on  Barlow's  right.  Mott's 

*The  author  is  indebted  to  Brevet  Brigadier-General  L.  P. 
Bradley,  U.  S.  A.,  and  Major-General  Nathan  Kimball,  U.  S.  Vols., 
for  valuable  information  and  comments  relative  to  the  attack  of 
Newton's  division  at  Kenesaw.  The  former  says,  "The  assault  on 
Kenesaw  was  a  bad  affair,  badly  planned  and  badly  timed,  and  the 
formation  of  our  column  was  about  the  worst  possible  for  assault 
on  a  fortified  line — a  column  of  regiments,  each  regjment  in  column 
of  divisions."  The  latter  says:  "Harker  and  I  were  at  Newton's 
headquarters  when  we  received  our  orders.  We  condemned  the 
formation  at  the  time.  Newton  said  that  such  were  the  orders,  and 
of  course  we  obeyed  and  did  the  best  we  could.  Such  formations 
have  only  the  appearance  of  strength,  but  are  really  suicidal  in 
their  weakness." 

—19— 


270  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

divis'on  was  deployed  in  one  line  in  rear  of  Birney,  and 
Gibbon's  division  was  held  in  reserve.  In  Barlow's  di- 
vision, in  the  excitement  and  carnage  of  the  assault,  the 
intervals  and  distances  between  the  regiments  and  lines 
were  lost,  and  the  division  entered  the  enemy's  works  in 
a  confused  and  almost  solid  mass. 

The  assault  of  Upton's  brigade  upon  the  "Angle"  at 
Spottsylvania  was  one  of  the  most  skillful  attacks  made 
during  the  war.  The  brigade  was  formed  in  four  lines  as 
shown  in  Figure  24.  The  result  of  'his  charge  also  show.? 
the  inevitable  mingling  of  successive  lines  whenever  stub- 
born resistance  is  encountered.  The  121st  New  York  and 


of  Uplonis    Brigade  af  <Spdl3ylrania 

5«  A**.  96$ Pa.  121*  N.Y. 

' 

49*  Pa. 


96th  Pennsylvania  were  instructed  to  turn  to  the  right 
as  soon  as  the  works  were  carried,  while  the  5th  Maine 
was  to  change  front  to  the  left  and  enfilade  the  enemy 
in  that  direction.  The  second  line  was  to  halt  at  the  en- 
emy's works  and  open  fire  to  the  front  if  necessary.  The 
third  line  was  to  lie  down  behind  the  second  and  await 
orders;  while  the  fourth  was  to  halt  at  the  edge  of  a 
wood  about  200  yards  from  the  works  and  also  await 
further  instructions.  The  Confederates  were  driven  out 
of  their  works,  but  only  after  a  hand-to-hand  struggle  so 
stubborn  that  each  successive  line  of  the  assailants  was 


ORGANIZATION   AND    TACTICS.  271 

merged  with  its  predecessors  in  the  mellay.  The  Confed- 
erate line  was  completely  broken,  but  Upton,  being  un- 
supported by  a  formed  body  of  troops,  was  compelled  to 
withdraw. 

The  effective  rifles  with  which  the  troops  were  armed 
and  the  wooded  country  which  formed  the  theater  of  so 
many  of  the  principal  campaigns  combined  to  develop  the 
use  of  skirmishers,  and  to  carry  their  employment  to  a 
degree  before  unknown.  Sherman's  army  habitually  fought 
in  strong  skirmish  lines,  the  men  taking  advantage  of 
every  feature  of  the  ground  to  increase  the  effect  of  their 
own  fire  and  shelter  themselves  from  that  of  the  enemy. 
In  some  instances  the  (regimental  skirmish  line  consisted 
of  half  the  strength  of  the  regiment;*  the  remaining  half 
being  re-Id  in  reserve,  generally  in  line  of  battle,  ready  to 
reinforce  the  skirmishers  or  absorb  them  in  its  advance. 
This  was  the  dawn  of  the  tactics  of  the  present  day. 

Perhaps  the  most  marked  tactical  feature  of  the  War 
of  Secession  was  the  employment  of  hasty  intrenchments. 
These  were  unknown  in  the  early  part  of  the  war,  and 
were  the  outgrowth  of  the  intelligence  of  the  American 
vo]unteer  applied  to  the  experience  of  many  bloody  bat- 
tles. In  the  latter  part  of  the  war,  an  army  in  the  vicin 
ity  of  the  enemy  always  proceeded  to  intrench  as  soon 
as  it  halted.  Even  the  skiimishera  were  in  the  hab- 
it of  rolling  logs  together,  or  of  making  a  lunette  of 
rails  with  earth  in  front  to  cover  their  bodies.**  In 
many  oases  the  intrenching  was  done  while  the  troops 
were  under  heavy  fire.***  At  Mud  Creek,  Georgia. 

*This  formation  does  not  seem,  however,  to  have  been  general. 

**Sherman's  "Memoirs." 

***The  following  extract  from  the  "History  of  the  Fifty-fifth 
Illinois  Infantry,"  referring  to  an  action  in  front  of  Atlanta,  Aug- 
ust 3,  1864,  gives  a  vivid  picture  of  the  manner  of  seizing  and  forti- 
fying a  position  under  the  enemy's  fire: 

"The  point  to  be  gained  was  about  three  hundred  yards  in 
advance  of  the  main  Union  line,  and  about  the  same  distance  from 
the  intrenched  position  of  the  enemy.  The  advance  was  gallantly 
made  across  open  ground  the  whole  of  which  was  swept  by  an 
enfilading  fire  from  the  skirmishers  in  the  rifle-pits  on  the  right. 
The  rebel  batteries  in  the  main  line  also  kept  up  a  vigorous  bom- 


272  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

June  16,  1864,  Baird's  division,  in  a  comparatively  open 
field,  intrenched  itself  under  fire  within  400  yards  of  the 
Confederate  intrenched  position;  a  heavy  skirmish  line 
was  thrown  out  to  the  front,  keeping  up  an  effective 
fire  while  the  troops  in  rear  labored  vigorously  at  the 
trenches  until  "a  good  set  of  works"  was  completed.* 

The  tactical  lessons  of  the  War  of  'Secession  were  to 
be  confirm  ad  in  a  striking  manner  by  great  wars  on  the 
continent  of  Europe  a  few  years  later. 

The  Austro-Prussian  War.  —  In  the  Austro  -  Prussian 
War  of  1866  the  Prussian  infantry  was  entirely  armed 
with  a  breech-loading  rifle — the  "needle  gun" — while  their 
opponents  were  armed  with  the  muzzle-loader.  The  Prus- 
sians generally  attacked  in  company  columns,  which  were 
a  great  improvement  in  mobility  and  flexibility  over  the 
battalion  columns  formerly  in  use.  These  company  col- 
umns were  habitually  supported  by  half-battalion  columns 
or  by  battalions  formed  in  double  column.**  The  columns 
were  preceded  by  skirmishers,  designed  simply  to  feel  and 
develop  the  enemy,  and  not,  as  at  present,  to  commence 
the  fight  and  maintain  it  from  beginning  to  end.  But  the 
Prussian  soldiers  were  not  slow  to  appreciate  the  power 
of  .their  weapon;  and  they  felt  an  irresistible  temptation 
to  leave  the  column,  which  offered  too  gocd  a  target  to 
the  enemy,  and  rush  forward  to  the  skirmish  line,  where 
they  could  use  their  weapons  with  effect.  The  result  was 
an  immense  and  decisive  development  of  fire,  accompanied 

bardment  of  the  position  we  were  aiming  to  reach.  The  summit 
was  speedily  gained,  and  with  astonishingly  small  loss;  for  expe- 
rience had  taught  the  veterans  how  to  move  rapidly  while  hug- 
ging the  ground  closely,  and  to  take  advantage  of  every  inequality. 
The  grass,  moreover,  though  scanty,  was  tall  enough  to  seriously 
interfere  with  the  rebels'  aim.  Upon  arrival  at  the  desired  point, 
a  few  minutes  sufficed  to  dig  burrows  for  individual  protection. 
We  lay  upon  face  or  back  in  the  roasting  rays  of  the  afternoon 
sun,  slowly  sinking  ourselves  into  shallow  pits  to  avoid  the  shower 
of  balls  that  hissed  a  foot  or  two  above  us;  and  when  darkness 
came,  these  little  pits  were  enlarged  into  a  continuous  trench  with 
a  traverse  embankment  upon  the  exposed  flank." 

*"Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War,"  Vol.  IV.,  p.  409. 

**The  Prussian  company  consists  of  250  men,  and  the  bat- 
talion is  composed  of  four  companies.  In  1866  the  Prussian  in- 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  273 

with  much  disorder  and  a  melting  away  of  the  columns 
designed  for  shock  action.  The  Austrians,  adhering  to 
columns  and  trusting  to  the  bayonet,  were  mowed  down 
hopelessly  by  the  terrible  fire  of  their  adversaries,  against 
whom  their  own  antiquated  arms  and  obsolescent  tactics 
gave  them  no  chance  from  the  beginning.* 

fantry  was  formed  in  three  ranks;  but  the  company  column  con- 
sisted of  three  platoons  of  two  ranks  each,  as  shown  in  Figure  25. 
The  captain's  position  was  in  front  of  the  first  platoon.  The  lieu- 


tenant  commanding  each  platoon  was  on  its  right  and  abreast  of 
its  front  rank.  The  German  infantry  is  now  formed  in  two  ranks, 
and  corresponding  changes  have  been  made  in  the  formations  in 
line;  but  the  company  column  remains  essentially  as  it  was  in  1866. 

In  explanation  of  the  figure,  it  should  be  stated  that  the  port- 
tpe'efahnrich  is  a  candidate  for  a  commission  serving  a  probation 
as  a  non-commissioned  officer.  Perhaps  the  best  English  transla- 
tion of  this  term  would  be  service  cadet.  The  feldwebel  is  a  kind 
of  company  sergeant-major,  his  authority  and  duties  being  of 
somewhat  more  importance  than  those  of  our  first  sergeant. 

*The  complete  failure  of  the  Austrians  to  appreciate  the  para- 
mount importance  of  fire  action,  and  their  fatuous  reliance  on  the 
bayonet,  are  shown  by  the  following  extracts  from  the  regulations 
in  force  in  their  Army  in  1866.  After  stating  certain  circumstances 
in  which  columns  or  lines  should  be  used,  these  regulations  say 


274  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

This  war,  like  the  War  of  Secession,  foreshadowed 
the  extensive  use  of  skirmishers,  and  rendered  it  evident 
that  fire  action,  instead  of  merely  preparing  the  way  for 
the  shock,  must  accompany  the  latter  to  the  last  moment, 
and  must  be  the  prime  consideration  in  tactics.  The  Prus- 
sian officers  do  not  seem,  however,  to  have  appreciated 
quickly  the  new  conditions  of  warfare;  for  they  depre- 
cated the  disorder  and  tumult  of  the  impromptu  attack 
formation  which  had  sprung  into  being  under  the  Aus- 
trian fire,  and  they  waited  for  the  appalling  losses  of  «i 
greater  war  to  emphasize  the  necessity  of  a  change  in 
their  prescribed  tactical  methodjs. 

The  Franco-German  War.  —  The  Franco-German  War 
(1870-71)  found  both  combatants  armed  with  breech-load- 
ing rifles.  The  French  weapon  was  considerably  superior 
to  that  of  the  Germans,  the  Chassepot  rifle  being  effect- 
ive at  1,300  yards — nearly  twice  the  range  of  the  needle 
gun.  The  Prussians  still  adhered  to  their  old  tactics,  and 
the  French  had  produced  nothing  new.  In  the  famous 
attack  of  three  brigades  of  the  Prussian  Guards  upon  the 
French  position  at  St.  Privat  each  regiment  was  formed 
in  two  lines,  the  first  consisting  of  company  columns,  and 
the  second  either  of  company  or  half-battalion  columns. 
Thus,  the  Kaiser  Franz  Regiment  had  one  battalion  in 

"You  will  decide,  then,  to  attack  in  line  or  in  column,  accord- 
ing to  the  configuration  of  the  terrain,  the  relations  of  other  exist- 
ing combats,  the  morale  of  your  troops,  or  their  degree  of  tactical 
skill;  but,  once  decided  in  this  respect,  rest  assured  that  in  order 
to  strike  the  enemy  with  terror,  to  protect  yourself  in  some  degree 
from  his  fire,  and  to  gain  the  victory,  nothing  is  necessary  but  a 
rapid,  uninterrupted  march,  followed  with  an  impetuous  ehock  with 
cold  steel. 

"Marching  upon  the  enemy,  be  careful,  then,  whatever  hap- 
pens, not  to  halt  to  reply  to  his  fire.  The  time  thus  lost  will  cause 
the  attack  to  fail  and  will  lead  to  disorder.  In  a  critical  moment, 
on  the  contrary,  always  accelerate  your  march.  ...  If  circum- 
stances require  that  you  should  wait  firmly  a  bayonet  charge  by 
the  enemy,  deploy  your  troops  and  receive  him  with  battalion  fire. 
After  the  last  volley,  delivered  at  about  fifty  paces,  you  will  imme- 
diately fix  bayonets  and  throw  your  troops  upon  the  enemy,  with 
ensemble  if  possible,  but  always  with  impetuosity." 

In  the  light  of  subsequent  events,  it  is  hard  to  realize  that 
these  regulations  were  ever  seriously  prescribed. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 


275 


company  columns  in  the  first  line,  and  two  battalions  In 
half  -battalion  columns  in  the  second;  while  the  Fourth 
Grenadier  Guards*  on  its  right  had  nine  companies  in 
the  first  line,  and  three  in  the  second,  all  in  company  col- 
umn. (See  Figure  26.)  The  attack  by  the  Kaiser  Franz 


of  /£• 


*  3tf>r»af. 


*Forming  with  the  Kaiser  Franz  Regiment  the  4th  Brigade. 


276  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

Regiment  may  be  regarded  as  a  typical  one.  As  soon  as 
the  enemy's  fire  began  to  be  felt,  the  flank  companies  of 
the  2d  Battalion,  which  was  in  the  first  line,  deployed 
as  skirmishers,  and,  soon  after,  the  half-battalion  on  the 
right  pushed  forward  abreast  of  the  leading  battalion, 
while  the  other  three  half-battalions  formed  similarly  on 
the  left  of  the  Second.  The  fire  of  the  French  was  mur- 
derously effective.  The  men  fell  rapidly  on  all  sides.  In 
an  instinctive  desire  to  close  with  the  enemy,  the  troops 
rushed  forward.  ~ne  columns  lost  their  cohesion.  The 
companies  melted  into  small  groups;  and,  unable  longer 
to  endure  the  eremy's  fire,  the  regiment  finally  halted 
and  united  the  wrecks  of  the  companies  at  about  500  yards 
from  the  French  position.  Here,  unable  to  advance  and 
unwilling  to  retire,  it  lay  down  and  continued  to  fire.  Tlie 
experience  of  the  other  regiments  was  essentially  the 
same.  In  ten  minutes  the  three  brigades  had  lost  nearly 
6,000  men;  within  half  an  hour  five  battalions  bad  lost 
all  their  officers,  and  in  the  Fourth  Brigade  only  one 
field  officer  remained  unharmed.  The  attack,  though  hero- 
ically made,  was  a  dismal  failure,  and  it  became  evident 
that  tactical  science  had  not  kept  pace  with  the  improve- 
ment in  weapons. 

Fortunately  for  the  Germans,  their  military  system 
is  one  which  requires  ends,  not  meaus;  which  has  decen- 
tralization as  its  markod  feature;  and  which,  by  ignoring 
methods  and  asking  only  results,  leaves  subordinate  com- 
manders free  from  the  stunting  influence  of  the  opposite 
system,  and  renders  them  able  to  solve  the  problems  pre- 
sented by  new  conditions.  A  new  tactics  soon  appeared 
without  having  been  regularly  formulated  or  sanctioned 
by  official  order.  This  tactics,  born  of  experience  and 
common  sense,  was  seen  on  the  next  great  battle-field, 
and  is  described  in  the  German  Official  History  as  follows: 

"In  the  battle  of  Sedan  the  Germain  infantry  fights 
almost  entirely  in  open  order.  The  conditions  of  the 
ground  and  other  circumstances  lead,  even  during  the  first 
introductory  movements,  to  a  division  of  the  units,  which 
open  out  by  battalions  and  companies  in  different  direc- 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  277 

tions,  so  as  to  dominate  from  the  first  as  large  a  space 
as  possible,  and  to  act  in  support  wherever  it  may  be 
necessary.  Under  the  superior  musketry  fire  of  the  en- 
emy, the  company  columns  mostly  break  up  into  skir- 
mishing lines  as  soon  as  the  engagement  begins;  the 
troops  of  the  next  line  find  themselves  shortly  under  the 
necessity  of  following  the  example,  and  during  the  course 
of  the  struggle  intermix  with  the  front  line.  In  rear  of 
these  there  remain  but  a  few  formed  or  reassembled  de- 
tachmerts  as  the  immediate  fighting  reserve." 

The  tactics  of  the  German  infantry  as  developed  in 
the  course  of  the  war  was  generally  as  follows:  As  soon 
as  it  was  intended  to  use  the  infantry  actively,  company 
columns  were  formed  in  the  first  line  and  covered  with 
skirmishers,  generally  a  zug  from  each  company.*  Com- 
pany columns  or  half-battalion  columns  were  used  in  the 
second  line.  When  the  skirmishers  arrived  within  effect- 
ive range  (450  or  500  yards)  of  the  hostile  position,  they 
sought  cover  and  generally  lay  down.  At  this  point  they 
were  usually  reinforced  by  a  second  zug  also  deployed  as 
skirmishers;  a  heavy  skirmish  line  now  being  necessary 
to  answer  the  enemy's  fire.  The  supports,  not  nearer 
than  100  or  150  paces  to  the  skirmish  line,  were  now  ex- 
tended, partly  to  avoid  loss  and  partly  to  facilitate  the 
reinforcement  of  the  skirmish  line.  In  extended  order 
and  in  the  din  and  tumult  of  battle  it  was  found  impos- 
sible to  keep  the  supports  under  thorough  control.  A  de- 
sire to  answer  the  fire  whose  effects  they  felt,  and  the 
encouraging  example  of  thedr  officers,  speedily  absorbed 
them  in  the  skirmish  line;  and  it  generally  happened  that 
soon  after  the  beginning  of  an  action,  a  whole  regiment 
was  engaged  in  the  skirmish  line,  another  regiment  in 
second  line  acting  as  its  support;  or  if  the  second  regi- 
ment were  by  the  course  of  the  action  deflected  to  the 
right  or  left,  the  battle  at  this  point  was  fought  by  a 

The  three  platoons  constituting  the  company  column  were 
termed  "zi'tge,"  and  the  zug  thrown  out  as  skirmishers  was  gener- 
ally the  third.  For  the  Prussian  method  of  deploying  skirmishers 
at  this  time,  see  Upton's  "Armif's  of  Asia  and  Europe,"  p.  274'. 


278  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

regiment  in  a  heavy,  irregular  skirmish  line  without  sup- 
ports. In  no  instance  were  troops  in  close  order  brought 
into  the  front  line  in  action.  If  the  fight  became  station- 
ary and  reinforcements  were  sent  up,  they  were  "doubled 
up"  with  the  old  skirmishers,  and  men  of  different  bat- 
talions and  regiments  were  thus  intermingled.*  The  skir- 
mishers almost  invariably  advanced  by  rushes,  seeking 
some  shelter  as  the  objective  point  of  each  rush,  or 
throwing  themselves  flat  on  open  ground  as  soon  as  the 
enemy's  fire  became  unendurable.  Hohenlohe  thus  de- 
scribes the  attack  of  the  Kaiser  Franz  Regiment  at  Le 
Bourget:  "At  this  point  there  were  two  battalions  of  the 
Franz  Eegiment  who  had  to  attack  over  2,000  paces  of 
open  ground.  The  officer  commanding  this  regiment  had 
already  practiced  it  in  the  attack.  In  accordance  with 
his  practice,  he  sent  forward  the  whole  of  the  leading 
line,  which  consisted  of  two  companies,  in  thick  swarms 
osf  skirmishers,  and  made  them  advance  over  the  open 
ground  in  two  parts  (by  wings)  which  alternately  ran  in 
300  paces.  After  each  rush  the  whole  of  the  wing  which 
made  it  threw  itself  down,  and  found  some  cover  among 
the  high  potatoes;  there  they  recovered  their  breath  while 
the  other  wing  rushed  in.  As  soon  as  they  arrived  with- 
in the  range  of  the  needle  gun,  the  wing  which  was  lying 
down  opened  a  fire  of  skirmishers  on  that  edge  of  the 
village  which  they  were  attacking.  I  can  still  remember, 
as  I  write,  the  delight  which  we  felt  as  from  our  position 
we  watched  this  attack,  which  had  been  so  carefully 
thought  out  and  was  so  well  carried  through.  The  best 
of  the  thing  was  that,  as  the  commander  of  the  regiment 
assured  me,  these  troops  suffered  no  loss  up  to  the  time 
when  they  reached  the  edge  of  the  village.  It  was  not 
until  the  street  fighting  began  that  the  regiment  endured 
the  losses  which  it  had  to  deplore  on  that  day."** 

The  development  of  infantry  tactics  in  the  Franco- 
German  War  is  well  summarized  in  Von  Scherff's  state- 

*Boguslawski. 

**"Letters  on  Infantry"   (tr.  by  Walford),  p.  135. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  279 

ment  that  "in  the  War  of  1870-71  the  enemy's  position 
(whether  in  the  open  field  or  on  the  borders  of  woods  and 
villages)  was  invariably  carried  by  swarms  of  skirmishers,  fol- 
lowed only  at  greater  or  less  distances  by  lines  and  col- 
umns in  close  order." 

The  Russo-Turkish  War. — The  tactical  developments 
of  the  Franco-German  War  were  carefully  noted  by  all 
European  nations,  and  each  changed  its  drill  regulations, 
more  or  less,  to  conform  to  the  new  conditions  of  tac- 
tics. The  Kusso-Turkish  War  demonstrated,  however, 
that  the  lesson  had  not  yet  been  entirely  learned,  and 
that  some  features  of  warfare  altogether  new,  and  oth- 
ers old  in  America  but  novel  in  Europe,  were  still  further 
to  influence  tactics. 

The  Turks,  armed  with  the  Peabody-Martini  rifle,  a 
weapon  vastly  superior  to  any  heretofore  used,  were 
able  to  pour  out  upon  their  adversaries  a  fire  of  unprece- 
dented severity;  while  the  adoption  and  development  of 
the  American  system  of  hasty  intrenchments  gave  them, 
at  the  same  time,  a  shelter  from  their  assailants  that 
was  unknown  to  the  French  in  the  great  war  seven  years 
before.  "The  whole  campaign,"  says  Greene,  "may  be 
said  to  have  consisted — practically — of  the  attack  and 
defense  of  more  or  less  hastily  fortified  positions."* 

The  old  tactics  of  the  Crimean  War  had  been  aban- 
doned by  the  Kussians,  and  an  assimilation  to  the  Prus- 
sian tactics  had  been  adopted  in  1875.  In  place  of  the 
heavy  columns  of  battalions  or  regiments,  company  col- 
umns were  substituted,  and  the  typical  formation  for  at- 
tack may  be  described  as  follows:  In  each  regiment**  the 
battalions  were  formed  side  by  side,  two  companies  of  each 
in  the  first  line  and  two  in  the  second,  while  the  fifth 
or  rifle  company  was  held  in  reserve,  ready  to  be  thrown 
around  the  flank  to  pursue  the  defeated  enemy  or  to  re- 
ceive his  counter-attack  if  the  assault  should  be  repulsed. 

""Russian  Campaigns  in  Turkey,"  p.  422. 

**Nearly  all  the  regiments  consisted  of  three  battalions.  In 
some,  consisting  of  four  battalions,  the  formation  was  slightly 
different. 


280  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

The  formation  was  in  two  ranks,  and  the  companies  of 
the  first  line  were  either  in  column  of  platoons  or  de- 
ployed, while  those  of  the  second  line  were  either  in  col- 
umns of  platoons  or  half-platoons.  Each  of  the  leading 
companies  threw  forward  a  half -platoon  as  skirmishers 
in  groups  of  four.  The  distance  from  the  skirmishers  to 
the  first  line  was  about  300  paces,  and  that  from  the  first 
to  the  second  line  from  300  to  440  paces.  (See  Figure  27.) 

27. 


Attack  formation  cfa  Russian  fteo/m*nf 
in   /977. 


*•*•*•*•*•*•*•  •  \  *•*•*•*•  V/«» 


Another  formation  sometimes  used  was  one  in  which  the 
battalions  were  deployed  in  line,  side  by  side,  the  rifle 
companies  preceding  the  line  as  skirmishers.  (See  Fig- 
ure 28.)  "In  no  instance,  however,  does  it  appear  that 


there  was  more  than  one  line  of  skirmishers;  behind  them 
the  troops  marched  with  dogged  bravery,  in  solid  line  of 
two  ranks,  shoulder  to  shoulder,  or  in  company  columns 
with  platoon  fronts,  far  inside  the  line  of  rapid  effective 
fire;  and  they  continued  this  march  until  the  fire  caused 
a  break  in  their  lines  and  a  retreat,  or  until  they  reached 
the  work  after  enormous  losses,  and  held  it  as  the  result 
of  a  hand-to-hand  fight.  The  skirmish  line  was  so  small 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  281 

in  comparison  with  the  main  force  that  it  really  amounted 
to  nothing,  and  the  attack  was  in  fact  made  in  solid  line."* 
In  this  war,  as  in  the  war  between  France  and  Ger- 
many, a  new  tactics  was  born  of  necessity  on  the  field  of 
battle.  In  iSkobeleff's  assault  at  Plevna  the  regiments 
were  formed  in  successive  lines  of  deployed  battalions, 
the  intervals  between  the  men  in  each  battalion  being 
about  2  paces,  and  the  distance  between  battalions  being 
about  300  paces.  The  leading  battalion  deployed  its  rifle 
company  about  200  paces  to  the  front  in  a  thin  line  of 
skirmishers,  the  whole  regiment  thus  forming,  in  reality, 
a  succession  of  skirmish  lines  —  the  only  formation,  ac- 
cording to  'Skobeleff,  in  which  infantry  can  successfully 
assault  intrenched  positions.**  (See  Figure  29.) 

Figure  29. 

"**^*. 

forma/ion   cfo  ffuMioo  fi&y/m*al  in  &Ao&«./eff2  A**ovtt  dt  Pftmo* 


That  Lutt  of  J*/><nA?Ae/w. 


&-  Qaffo/ton; 

Since  the  Kusso-Turkish  conflict  there  have  been  no 
wars  of  sufficient  magnitude  to  effect  any  appreciable 
changes  in  tactics. 

The  experiences  of  the  British  in  South  Africa  and 
of  the  two  great  contending  armies  in  Manchuria  have  but 
confirmed  the  contention  of  Skobeleff.  The  broad  prin- 
diples  which  govern  infantry  attack  formations  remain 
unaltered.  Dispersion  combined  with  depth  are  these  fouii- 

""Russian  Campaigns  in  Turkey,"  p.  448. 
**IMd.,  p.  450. 


282  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

dations — dispersion  so  as  to  offer  a  minimum  target  to 
the  enemy's  fire  and  insure  elasticity — depth  to  allow  of 
a  constant  stream  of  reinforcements  to  fill  up  gaps  in  the 
front  line.  But  it  is  in  their  application  that  these  prin- 
ciples have  undergone  a  change  to  the  extent  of  wider 
intervals  between  the  skirmishers  and  greater  distances 
between  the  successive  lines. 

In  summing  up  this  .sketch  of  the  history  of  infantry 
tactic®,  we  see  that  the  development  has  constantly  been 
on  the  lines  of  increased  mobility  and  more  effective  fire 
action.  The  heavier  columns  suitable  to  an  earlier  epoch 
give  way  to  the  lines  of  Frederick;  the  latter  succumb  to 
the  more  flexible  perpendicular  system  of  the  French;  this 
in  turn  is  unable  to  cope  with  the  thin  lines  of  the  Brit- 
ish; and  finally  the  line  is  dissolved  into  skirmishers,  and 
the  columns  no  longer  appear  in  the  forefront  of  the 
action. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  283 


CHAPTER   X. 
HISTORICAL  SKETCH  OP  MODERN  CAVALRY. 

"History  proves  that  cavalry  is  in  every  respect  an  indis- 
pensable arm  of  the  service." — Prejentsoff. 

At  the  time  of  the  invention  of  fire-arms  the  cavalry 
consisted  of  men-at-arms,  armed  with  the  lance,  sword, 
and  dagger,  to  which  weapons  were  generally  added  the 
battle-axe,  battle-hammer,  or  mace.  Literally  iron-clad 
himself,  and  with  his  horse  further  weighted  down  with 
defensive  armor,  the  cavalier  of  this  epoch  had  reduced 
mobility  to  a  minimum,  and,  in  seeking  protection  from 
the  weapons  of  his  foes,  had  well-nigh  deprived  himself 
of  the  power  of  injuring  his  enemies  in  return.  Invincible 
when  opposed  to  the  miserable,  unarmored  foot  troops  of 
his  time,  he  was  unable  to  penetrate  the  armor  of  an  op- 
posing cavalier,  and  warfare  between  men-at-arms  had 
become  almost  bloodless.  At  the  battle  of  Zagonari,  in 
Italy,  in  1423,  the  only  men  who  lost  their  lives  were 
three  knights,  who,  having  fallen  from  their  horses,  were 
drowned  in  a  morass.  At  Agincourt  some  of  the  French 
knights,  being  unhorsed,  were  unable  to  rise  from  the 
mud,  and  were  ridden  over  and  miserably  suffocated.  The 
charge  could  be  made  only  at  a  slow  trot,  and  altogether 
the  cavalry  was  at  the  lowest  ebb  of  military  efficiency, 

The  introduction  of  gunpowder  as  a  military  factor 
was  at  once  felt  by  the  cavalry.  Already  overweighted 
with  iron,*  the  cavaliers  made  a  vain  attempt  to  neutral- 
ize the  new  force  by  adding  to  the  thickness  of  the  armor, 
and  it  was  next  sought  to  adapt  fire-arms  to  the  use  of 
the  cavalry.  To  this  end,  the  petronel  was.  introduced. 

*The  armor  of  a  knight  is  said  to  have  frequently  weighed 
200  pounds. 


284  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

This  weapon  consisted  of  a  simple  iron  or  brass  tube, 
with  a  touch-hole  on  top,  fixed  on  a  straight  wooden 
handle,  which  was  rested  against  the  breast  in  firing.  The 
muzzle  was  generally  steadied  by  a  rest  with  a  fork, 
which  stood  up  from  the  pommel.  This  weapon  was  sub- 
sequently much  improved  and  developed  into  the  arquebus, 
which  was  fired  from  -the  shoulder,  and  furnished  first 
with  the  match-lock  and  afterwards  with  the  wheel-lock. 
The  proportion  of  arquebuses  to  lances  was  one  to  four. 
Too  slow  and  unwieldy  to  deliver  effective  shock,  and 
with  fire  action  incomparably  inferior  to  that  of  the  rude, 
but  improving,  infantry  which  it  now  encountered,  the 
cavalry  of  this  period  was  all  that  cavalry  should  not  be; 
and  Machiavelli,  writing  about  1515,  declared  that  "well- 
organized  infantry  could  hardly  be  beaten  except  by 
infantry." 

The  pistol,  invented  in  1521,  and  soon  introduced  as 
a  military  weapon,  added  considerably  to  the  power  of 
the  trooper,  though  the  tactics  adopted  shows  how  far 
the  mounted  arm  still  fell  short  of  its  proper  function. 
The  German  cavalry  was  now  formed  in  deep  bodies,  habit- 
ually in  seventeen  ranks.  It  made  no  attempt  to  use 
shock  action,  but  rode  up  to  the  enemy  without  charging, 
and  when  at  close  range  the  front  rank  discharged  its  pis- 
tols and  wheeled  to  the  right  and  left  at  a  trot,  unmask- 
ing the  second  line  and  re-forming  in  rear  to  load.  Each 
rank  repeated  this  maneuver  in  turn.  For  a  time  this 
tactics  seems  to  have  worked  well;  but  the  French  cav- 
alry finally  adopted  the  tactics  of  charging  with  impetu- 
osity while  the  Germans  were  firing,  and  almost  invaria- 
bly overthrew  them. 

Great  improvements  in  the  German  cavalry  were 
made  by  Charles  V.  In  imitation  rf  the  French  organiza- 
tion, the  cavalry  had  been  formed  into  unwieldy  com- 
panies of  some  600  combatants;  Charles  now  organized 
it  in  squadrons  of  400  troopers  each,  and  reduced  the 
number  of  ranks — first  to  ten  and  afterwards  to  eight. 
Henry  IV.  of  France  introduced  a  still  shallower  forma- 
tion of  six  ranks.  , 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  285 

The  tactics  of  this  period  shows  a  peculiar  intermin- 
gling of  cavalry  and  infantry.  In  many  cases  musketeers 
on  foot  were  interspersed  among  the  troopers,  and,  as  the 
latter  charged  at  a  slow  trot,  were  able  to  keep  up  with 
them.  By  their  fire  they  aided  in  breaking  the  enemy's 
ranks,  which  were  +hen  overthrown  by  the  cavalry.  The 
interinirgling  of  individual  musketeers  and  troopers  seems 
not  to  have  given  satisfactory  results,  though  the  com 
bination  of  bodies  of  infantry  with  those  of  cavalry  was 
happily  used  by  Henry  IV.  at  the  battle  of  Goutras,  in 
1587.  In  that  battle  the  infantry  was  placed  on  the  flanks 
and  the  cavalry  in  the  center.  Between  the  different 
squadrons  were  placed  small  bodies  of  select  musketeers, 
20  men  in  each,  formed  in  four  iranks,  the  first  lying 
down,  the  second  kneeling,  the  third  stooping,  and  the 
fourth  standing  erect,  so  that  all  could  fire  simultaneous- 
ly. The  attack  of  the  Koyalist  cavalry  was  awaited  until 
it  arrived  within  20  paces,  when  the  infantry  fired  a 
volley,  and  the  Huguenot  cavalry,  immediately  making  a 
counter-charge,  drove  the  Royalists  from  the  field. 

The  lance  gradually  disappeared,  and  the  armor  of 
the  cavalry  was  lightened,  as  its  inability,  even  at  its  heav- 
iest weight,  to  resist  musket  shots  became  more  and 
more  manifest.  In  the  time  of  Maurice  of  Nassau  (1584- 
1609)  the  cavalry  was  provided  with  cuirass  and  helmet, 
and  armed  with  pistol  and  sword.  Like  the  infantry,  the 
Dutch  mounted  troops  were  brought  to  a  much  higher 
state  of  efficiency  than  their  adversaries.  When  charged 
by  the  Spanish  cavalry,  they  fired  a  volley,  then  opened 
out  quickly  from  the  center,  and,  sword  in  hand,  charged 
their  opponents  on  the  flanks. 

About  this  time  squadrons  were  formed  into  regi- 
ments, and  the  number  of  ranks  was  reduced  to  three. 
Dragoons  now  constituted  a  portion  of  the  cavalry  of  each 
army.  They  were  first  employed  by  Marshal  de  Brissac 
in  1550,  and  were  originally  mounted  infantry,  fighting  on 
foot,  using  their  horses  merely  for  transportation;  but 
they  assumed  more  and  mere  the  characteristics  of  cav- 

—20- 


286  ORGANIZATION    AND    TACTICS. 

alrymen,  and  finally  became  a  body  of  troops  trained  to 
fight  either  on  foot  or  on  horseback. 

The  Thirty  Years'  War. — The  genius  of  Gustavus  Adoi- 
phus  was  manifested  in  every  branch  of  the  military  art, 
and  especially  in  organization  and  tactics.  The  reforms 
in  the  composition  and  employment  of  mounted  troops 
made  by  that  great  commander  were  scarcely  less  than 
those  made  by  him  in  his  infantry.  He  organized  his 
cavalry  in  troops  of  70  men  each,  grouped  them  into 
regiments  consisting  of  eight  troops,  and  reduced  the 
number  of  ranks  to  three.  The  cavalry  was  divided  into 
heavy  and  light;  the  former  being  provided  with  cuirass 
and  helmet,  and  the  latter  having  no  armor.  The  cavalry 
had  been  accustomed  to  caracoling;  but  this  was  now  for- 
bidden, and  it  was  directed  to  charge  straight  on  the  en- 
emy. The  men  of  the  first  rank  fired  their  pistols,  drew 
swords,  and  closed  with  the  enemy;  the  second  and  third 
ranks  supported  the  first,  and  generally  reserved  their 
fire  until  the  hostile  line  was  broken.  The  action  of  the 
cavalry  was  essentially  shock,  though  the  charge  was 
still  made  at  a  trot.  Gustavus  is  said  to  have  attached 
small  pieces  of  artillery  to  his  cavalry,  thus  really  orig- 
inating horse  artillery;  but  this  is  doubtful,  and  there  i* 
no  authentic  account  of  such  use  of  artillery  until  the 
time  of  Frederick  the  Great. 

The  Imperialists  opposed  to  Gustavus  a  heavy  cav- 
alry composed  of  cuirassiers,  carbineers,  dragoons,  and  a 
light  cavalry  of  Croats  and  hussars.  The  light  cavalry 
was  chiefly  used  in  the  minor  operations  of  war,  the  main 
reliance  being  placed  upon  the  heavy  cavalry  for  the  work 
of  the  battle-field.  The  latter  was  formed  by  Tilly  in  ten 
ranks,  and  by  Wallenstein  in  eight.  The  cuirassiers  were 
heavily  armored,  and  were  lacking  in  the  essential  qual- 
ity of  mobility;  and  all  the  heavy  cavalry  depended  prin- 
cipally on  fire  action.  The  carbineers  fired  by  successive 
ranks,  retiring  to  load.  Th^  cavalry  of  the  Imperialists 
was  inferior  in  composition,  arms,  and  tactics  to  that  of 
Gustavus,  and  the  Swedish  cavalry  largely  contributed  to 
the  two  great  victories  o>f  Leipsic  and  Liitzen. 


ORGANIZATION    AND   TACTICS.  287 

The  Wars  of  Louis  XI V.— It  is  remarkable  that  the 
long  wars  of  Louis  XIV.  produced  no  material  change 
either  in  the  organization  or  tactics  of  cavalry.  Marlbor- 
ough  used  cavalry  with  telling  effect,  and  his  great  vic- 
tories of  Blenheim,  Ramillies,  and  Malplaquet  were  largely 
due  to  the  decisive  use  made  of  this  arm;  but  the  cavalry 
still  relied  on  mounted  fire  action,  and  the  charge  was 
made  at  a  slow  pace.  Marlborough  used  his  cavalry  in 
large  masses,  and  to  this,  and  the  fact  that  the  French 
cavalry  was,  in  arms  and  training,  in  nowise  superior  to 
his  own,  was  his  success  due. 

Contemporaneously  with  the  later  campaigns  of  the 
Spanish  Succession  were  waged  the  wars  of  Charles  XII. 
of  Sweden  with  the  Danes,  Saxons,  and  Russians.  Charles 
abolished  all  defensive  armor,  armed  his  cavalry  with  the 
long,  straight  sword,  especially  adapted  to  thrusting,  pro- 
hibited the  use  of  fire-arms  on  horseback,  and  taught  the 
cavalry  to  charge  at  full  speed.  The  true  r61e  of  cavalry 
was  now  beginning  to  be  understood.  In  the  reign  of 
Louis  XV.  the  lance  was  revived  in  the  French  cavalry, 
and  the  cuirass  and  helmet  were  replaced  with  the  buff- 
leather  vest  and  saber-proof  cap.  Marshal  Saxe  recog- 
nized shock  action  as  the  paramount  function  of  cavalry, 
and  declared  that  "cavalry  that  could  not  charge  2,000 
paces  at  full  speed  without  breaking  was  unfit  for  service." 
Hu  ideas,  based  upon  Lis  own  experience  and  that  of 
Charles  XII.,  foreshadowed  the  brilliant  use  of  cavalry 
soon  to  be  seen  on  European  battle-fields. 

The  Wars  of  Frederick  the  Great. — When  Frederick  the 
Great  ascended  the  throne  of  Prussia,  he  found  the  cav- 
alry trained  to  charge  at  a  slow  trot,  and  place  its  reli- 
ance on  mounted  fire  action.  In  his  first  battle,  Mollwit/, 
the  inefficiency  of  the  cavalry  was  very  manifest,  and  he 
resolved  to  make  radical  changes  in  the  nature  and  use 
of  that  arm.  As  soon  as  the  peace  of  Breslau  gave  him 
leisure  for  a  careful  overhauling  of  his  army,  he  prohibited 
mounted  fire  action,  and  trained  the  cavalry  to  charge  in 
good  order  at  full  speed,  relying  solely  upon  the  shock. 


288  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

The  greatest  care  was  taken  in  the  instruction  of  the  re- 
cruits and  the  training  of  the  horses,  and  the  cavalry  was 
brought  to  such  a  state  of  perfection  that  it  is  said  that 
8,000  or  10,000  horsemen  could  charge  together^  boot  to 
boot,  for  many  hundred  yards,  halt  in  perfect  order,  and 
immediately  begin  a  new  charge.  Frederick  also  intro- 
duced the  formation  from  column  front  into  line,  in  place 
of  the  former  method  of  changing  direction  and  then 
wheeling  into  line. 

Frederick's  cavalry  conristed  of  cuirassiers,  dragoons, 
and  hussars.  The  first  had  cuirasses  and  helmets;  the 
others  were  without  defensive  armor.  The  cuirassiers 
and  dragoons  were  formed  into  companies  or  troops  of 
70  men  each,  two  troops  forming  a  squadron,  and  five 
squadrons  composing  a  regiment.  Each  hussar  regiment 
consisted  of  ten  squadrons,  each  numbering  144  sabers. 
The  hussars  were  mainly  relied  upon  for  detached  action, 
but  they  were  also  used  in  battle;  all  the  cavalry  being, 
in  fact,  used  as  circumstarces  demanded,  for  any  duty 
that  might  property  be  assigned  to  mounted  troops. 
Frederick's  cavalry  was  at  first  formed  in  three  rankn, 
but  it  was  foui^d  that  in  two  ranks  the  maneuvers  were 
more  precise  and  rapr1,  and  the  third  rank  was  accord- 
ingly discontinued. 

The  cavalry  was  habitually  formed  in  three  lines;  the 
first  composed  of  cuirassiers,  with  intervals  of  only  10 
paces  between  squadrons,  and  the  second  composed  of 
dragoons,  with  intervals  of  60  paces  between  squad- 
rons, through  which  the  first  line  could  retire  in  case  it 
was  repulsed.  The  hussars,  generally  in  platoon  columns, 
formed  a  third  or  reserv?  line,  which  was  especially  en- 
trusted with  the  protection  of  the  flanks.  The  cavalry, 
in  masses  of  from  twenty  to  sixty  squadrons,  was  formed 
on  the  flanks  of  the  army,  and  its  'Own  outward  flank  was 
generally  rotccted  by  a  hussar  regiment  in  double  col- 
umn of  squadrons.  Three  or  four  squadrons  of  dragoons 
were  generally  advanced  about  150  paces  ahead  of  the 
second  line,  in  such  a  position  that  they  could  at  once 
take  in  flank  any  reserve  of  the  opposing  cavalry  that 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  289 

might  fall  upon  the  flank  of  the  first  line.  This  may  be 
regarded  as  the  normal  formation,  though  it  was  often 
altered  to  a  greater  or  less  degree  to  suit  the  circum- 
stances of  the  action.  It  was  finally  changed,  so  that 
the  second  line,  instead  of  being  directly  behind  the  first, 
projected  bey  or  d  one  or  both  flanks,  and  the  third  line 
similarly  projected  beyond  the  flanks  of  the  second.  The 
flanks  being  thus  guarded,  the  hussar  regiment  was  no 
longer  employed  as  a  special  guard  for  the  outer  flank. 
(See  Fig.  30.) 

In  attacking,  the  lin'  s  moved  forward  simultaneously, 
beginning  at  a  walk,  then  passing  to  a  trot,  and  covering 
Ihe  last  200  yards  at  a  run.  The  men  charged  with  a  yell, 
1o  heighten  the  moral  effect.  As  soon  as  the  opposing 


1GB  4TS  (****  «    =J 

I  Hussar* 


third     tint.  -  £O  tiyutidrons    Ru&Mtr*     (enptetfaa 

force  was  broken,  the  pursuit  wais  taken  up,  and  no  respite 
was  allowed  the  defeated  enemy  until  he  was  driven  com- 
pletely from  th3  field.  In  case  it  became  necessary  to  re- 
form the  disordered  line^,  the  cavalry  always  rallied  to 
the  front  instead  of  to  the  rear.  Frederick's  cavalry  lead- 
ers were  instructed  always  to  seize  the  initiative,  and 
forestall  any  attack  of  the  enemy. 

Although  the  cavalry  was  forbidden  to  fire  in  action, 
the  use  of  mounted  firing  was  permitted  in  the  pursuit, 
and  the  troopers  were  carefully  trained  in  the  use  of  fire- 
arms, in  order  that  they  might  be  able  to  meet  the  exi- 
gencies of  detached  action.  The  dragoons  were  able  to 
fight  well  on  foot,  though  that  kind  of  fighting  was  never 
adopted  when  shack  action  was  possible.  The  day  after 
t 


290  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

the  battle  of  Rossbach  the  Prussian  dragoons,  finding  the 
rear  guard  of  the  enemy  posted  in  a  chateau  and  enclosed 
gardens,  dismounted,  and,  attacking  on  foot,  drove  the 
French  from  their  cover. 

To  compensate  for  the  loss  of  fire  action  on  its  part, 
and  not  leave  it  exposed  helplessly  to  the  fire  of  the  op- 
posing infantry  and  artillery  before  coming  within  saber- 
reach,  Frederick  invented  horse  artillery,  consisting  of 
light  guns,  attached  to  the  cavalry,  which  were  used  to 
pave  the  way  for  the  charge,  and  to  continue  firing  until 
masked  by  the  cavalry. 

When  Frederick  ascended  the  throne,  the  Prussian 
cavalry  numbered  13,000  sabers,  .aid  its  proportion  to  the 
infantry  was  about  one-fifth;  at  the  close  of  his  reign  the 
cavalry  numbered  30,000  sabers,  and  was  equal  to  one- 
fourth  of  the  numerical  strength  of  the  infantry.  No 
other  general  of  ancient  or  modern  times  understood  so 
well  as  Frederick  how  to  make  a  decisive  use  of  cavalry 
on  the  field  of  battle,  :.nJ.  no  other  commander  ever  had 
such  a  perfect  cavalry  fighting  force,  or  such  able  cavalry 
leaders;  the  name  of  Seidlitz  or  Ziethen  being  a  synonym 
for  all  that  a  cavalry  general  should  be.  The  victories  of 
Prague  and  Leuthen  were  due,  in  a  great  measure,  to  the 
judicious  and  energetic  use  of  cavalry;  and  at  Rossbach 
the  Prussian  cavalry,  4,000  strong,  almost  unaided,  de- 
feated the  army  of  tie  Allies,  which  lost  3,000  killed  and 
wounded,  5,000  prisoners,  and  70  guns.  It  is  claimed* 
that  out  of  twenty-two  pitched  battles  fought  by  Fred- 
erick, his  cavalry  played  a  decisive  part  an  at  least  fifteen 
of  them,  and  history  seems  to  bear  out  the  claim. 

But,  perfect  as  Frederick's  cavalry  was  on  the  field  of 
battle,  it  was  distinctly  inferior  to  that  of  the  Austrians 
in  all  the  details  of  the  service  of  security  and  information. 
The  Austrian  light  cavalry,  and  especially  the  irregular 
cavalry,  composed  of  Pandonrs  and  Croats,  formed  a  per- 
fect screen  around  their  army,  which  they  kopt  posted 
with  regard  to  every  movement  of  Frederick.  TYlrl<*  keep- 

*Nolan's  "Cavalry:   Its  History  and  Tactics,"  p.  35. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  291 

ing  the  Prussian  monarch  completely  in  the  dark  with  re- 
gard to  the  movements  of  his  adversary.  Unable  to  cope 
in  action  with  Frederick's  horsemen,  they  were,  neverthe- 
less, able  to  elude  them,  and  far  surpassed  them  in  every- 
thing pertaining  to  the  strategic  service  of  cavalry.  Fred- 
erick's convoys,  messengers,  and  mail-bags  were  captured; 
for  nearly  a  month,  on  one  occasion,  he  was  shut  out  com- 
pletely from  the  rest  of  the  world,  and  his  knowledge  of 
passing  events  limited  to  his  own  camp;  a  force  of  4,000 
Austrian  light  cavalry  made  a  raid  and  captured  Berlin; 
and  at  Sohr  and  Hochkirch  he  was  surprised  by  the  en- 
emy, and  was  saved  from  disaster  only  by  his  own  military 
genius.  Frederick's  cavalry,  in  its  organization  and  tac- 
tics, forms  a  model  for  cavalry  pure  and  simple  on  the 
battle-field,  even  at  this  day;  that  of  his  opponents  equally 
furnishes  a  model  for  the  strategic  use  of  mounted  troops. 

The  Napoleonic  Era. — The  cavalry  of  the  French  Repub- 
lic, in  1793,  consisted  of  twenty-nine  regiments  of  heavy 
cavalry,  two  regiments  of  carbineers,  and  fifty-four  regi- 
ments of  light  cavalry,  aggregating  about  66,000  sabers. 
The  heavy  cavalry  was  armed  with  pistol  and  straight 
sword,  and  the  carbineers  had,  in  addition  to  the  same 
weapons,  a  carbine  with  bayonet.  The  light  cavalry  con- 
sisted of  dragoons,  chasseurs  &  cheval,  and  hussars,  all  pro- 
vid^d  with  saber  and  pistcl,  and  with  either  carbine  OP 
musketoon.  Each  regiment  consisted  of  four  squadrons, 
each  composed  of  200  troopers. 

This  force,  sufficiently  formidable  if  properly  trainofi, 
organized,  and  handled,  was  largely  composed  of  ill-in- 
structed recruits,  was  almost  incapable  of  shock  action, 
and  was  disseminated  as  divisional  cavalry  among  the 
many  small  divisions  composing  the  several  French  airmies. 
Hoche  first  formed  the  cavalry  into  divisions;  and  Napo- 
leon, in  his  first  Italian  campaign,  united  his  cavalry  in  a 
similar  manner.  At  a  later  period  Napoleon  formed  brig- 
ades and  divisions  of  cavalry,  and  finally  combined  the 
divisions  in  cavalry  corps.  In  the  Russian  campaign,  in 
18125  a  d'vision  of  light  cavalry  was  attached  to  each 
army  corps  (but  none  to  the  infantry  divisions),  besides 


292  OKGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

which  there  were  four  corps  of  reserve  cavalry,  under 
Murat.  This  enormous  force,  aggregating  80,000  sabers, 
and  constituting  one-sixth  of  the  entire  army,  consisted 
of  cuirassiers,  dragoons,  lancers,  and  chasseurs  &  cheval, 
all  in  a  high  state  of  efficiency,  resulting  from  the  experi- 
ence of  many  campaigns. 

In  the  dispositions  preceding  the  battle,  the  light 
cavalry  was  generally  placed  in  echelon  behind  the  flanks 
of  the  corps  to  which  it  belonged;  the  reserve  cavalry,  in 
second  line,  usually  in  rear  of  the  center;  and  the  cavalry 
of  the  guard,  sometimes  reinforced  with  a  portion  of  the 
reserve  cavalry,  in  the  third  line.  During  the  battle  the 
positions  of  the  several  bodies  of  cavalry  were  changed 
as  circumstances  demanded.  This  disposition  was  very 
different  from  that  of  Frederick,  who  always  placed  his 
cavalry  entirely  upon  the  flanks.  It  is  to  be  observed  that 
Napoleon's  armies  were  generally  much  larger  than  those 
of  Frederick,  and  that  if  the  French  cavalry  had  been 
placed  on  the  flanks,  it  often  could  not  have  received  the 
orders  of  the  Emperor  until  the  time  for  its  decisive  em- 
ployment had  passed.  As  a  rule,  the  cavalry  of  Napoleon 
attacked  in  column  of  regiments  Oir  brigades  deployed  one 
behind  another  at  a  distance  of  50  or  60  paces.  Murat 
habitually  formed  the  reserve  cavalry  fop  attack  with  two 
regiments  of  cuirassiers  in  the  first  line,  with  an  inter- 
val of  about  12  paces;  four  regiments  of  dragoons  or 
chasseurs  in  second  line,  about  200  yards  in  rear  of  the 
first,  three  regiments  being  in  line,  with  intervals  of  about 
18  paces,  and  half  of  the  fourth,  in  column  of  squad- 
rons, being  behind  each  flank.  The  lines  advanced  simul- 
taneously. In  case  of  the  repulse  of  the  first  line,  the 
center  (regiment  of  the  second  line  ployed  its  center  squad- 
rons in  rear  of  its  flanks  and  allowed  the  first  line  to 
pass  through,  immediately  re-forming  and  continuing  the 
attack,  the  cuirassiers  re-forming  as  a  second  line.  The 
four  «quadron&  in  rear  of  the  flanks  of  the  second  line 
were  employed  in  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy.  (See  Fig.  31.) 

In  the  battle  of  Eckmtihl,  April  22,  1809,  the  reserve 
cavalry  was  formed  with  rixteen  squadrons  of  Wiirtem- 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  2(J3 


31. 

ftabttua/  forrnatfa)  tfa  Diokion  tf 


first  Line  ' 


On*. 


berg  and  twelve  of  Bavarian  cavalry  in  the  first  line,  each 
body  formed  in  column  of  deployed  regiments.  At  400 
yards  distance  was  the  isecond  line,  composed  of  two  di- 
visions of  French  cuirassiers  under  Nansouty  and  St.  Sul- 
pice,  each  in  the  same  formation  as  the  cavalry  of  the 
first  line.  Just  before  collision  with  the  Austrian  cavalry, 
the  Bavarians  and  Wurtembergers  moved  towards  the 
flanks  and  advanced  abreast  of  the  cuirassiers,  the  attack 
being  thus  made  in  a  single  line  of  columns  of  deployed 
regiments,  consisting  of  sixty-eight  squadrons.  (See  Fig- 
ure 32.) 


St.  Sulpices  Diu 
(20  Squadrons. 


294  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

Master  of  everything  pertaining  to   the  art  of   war, 
Napoleon  made  the  most  perfect  use  of  his  cavalry.     In 
delivering  a  decisive  shock  on  the  field  of  battle,  and  in 
the  relentless  and  unflagging  pursuit  of  a  beaten  enemy, 
his  cavalry  rivaled  that  of  Frederick;  while  in  screening 
and  reconnoitermg  duty  it  went  everywhere  and  learned 
everything.  The  Emperor  used  cavalry  successfully  agaiast 
the  enemy's  cavalry,  infantry,  and  artillery,  and  combined 
its  use  with  that  of  the  other  arms  in  the  most  harmoni- 
ous manner.     The  artillery  prepared  the  way  by  its  fire, 
the  infantry  bore  the  brunt   of  the   combat,   and   heavy 
forces  of  cavalry  were  held  in  readiness  to  make  charges 
at  decisive  moments.    The  formation  of  the  French  left  at 
Austerlitz   illustrates  the  perfect  manner  in   which   the 
three  arms  we/re  combined.    The  infantry  of  Lannes'  corps 
was  drawn  up  in  two  lines,  the  first  deployed  and  the  sec- 
ond in  line  of  battalions  in  close  column  by  division,  from 
which  battalion  squares   could  be   readily  formed.     The 
divisional  artillery  was  in  the  intervals  between  brigades, 
and  a  battery  of  position,   consisting  of  18  heavy  guns, 
was   on   the   hill,   known   LS   the    Santon,    on   which   the 
left  rested.    The  light  cavalry  belonging  to  the  corps  was 
on  the  left  wing,  echeloned   slightly  to  the  front.     The 
reserve    cavalry,    under    Murat,    wa>s    drawn    up    behind 
Lannes'  corps,  each  cavalry  division  being  in  two  lines  of 
regiments  in  column  of  squadrons,  one  division  being  held 
in  reserve.    In  the  course  of  the  battle  the  first  line  was 
broken  by  Lichtenstein's  cavalry,  which  penetrated  through 
the  intervals  of  the  second,  when  it  was  struck  by  the 
reserve  cavalry  and  driven  back.    Between  the  fire  of  the 
battalion  squares,  which  it  received  in  passing  both  in  at- 
tack and  retreat,  and  the  shock  and  pursuit  of  the  reserve 
cavalry,  Li  cht  en  stem's  force  lost  half  its  numbers  and  was 
eliminated  as  a  factor  in  the  battle. 

The  uses  made  of  the  cavalry  on  the  field  of  battle 
by  Napoleon  were  many  and  great.  At  Marengo  a  charge 
by  Kellerman's  cavalry  checked  the  victorious  Austrian 
infantry,  and,  in  conjunction  with  the  attack  of  Desaix, 
turned  defeat  into  victory;  at  Austerlitz  the  success  on 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  295 

the  French  left  was  mainly  due  to  the  cavalry;  at  Eylau 
a  charge  by  Murat  upon  the  flank  of  the  Russians,  who 
had  overthrown  Augereau's  corps,  saved  the  day;  at 
Wagram,  Macdonald's  column,  having  suffered  great  losses, 
and  being  compelled  to  halt  by  a  heavy  attack  of  the  Aus- 
trians  in  front  and  on  the  flank,  was  relieved  by  <a  vig- 
orous charge  of  Nansouty's  cavalry,  and  resumed  its  ad- 
vance; at  the  pass  of  Somosierra  the  Polish  lancers,  charg- 
ing over  difficult  ground,  captured  the  batteries  of  the 
Spaniards  and  put  their  entire  army  to  flight;  at  Borodino 
the  great  redoubt  was  captured  by  a  charge  of  the  cuir- 
assiers; and  at  Dresden  the  victory  was  decided  in  Napo- 
leon's favor  by  a  brilliant  charge  by  Murat,  which  over- 
whelmed the  Austrian  left,  and  resulted  in  the  capture  of 
10,000  prisoners.  The  charges  of  Napoleon's  masses  of 
cavalry  have  been  likened  to  avalanches  throwing  down 
and  sweeping  away  everything  in  their  path,  and  they 
generally  marked  the  decisive  moment  of  the  battle. 

Notwithstanding  the  vigor  with  which  Napoleon's 
cavalry  was  used,  and  its  great  reliance  on  shock  action, 
it  was  unable  to  charge  at  full  speed  after  the  manner 
of  the  cavalry  of  Frederick.  The  constant  wars  of  Napo- 
leon did  not  give  an  opportunity  for  the  careful  training 
in  peace  time  that  had  made  the  Prussian  cavalry  ?o 
formidable  in  war;  and,  in  order  that  the  proper  degree 
of  cohesion  might  be  maintained,  the  French  cavalry 
charged  at  a  trot  or  controlled  canter.*  Napoleon  re- 
stored the  cuirass  and  helmet,  which  had  fallen  into  dis- 
use, and  they  have  been  retained  in  most  armies  until  the 
present  day. 

Though  in  the  use  of  cavalry  Napoleon,  like  Fred- 
erick, placed  his  reliance  upon  shock,  fire  action  was  not 
altogether  neglected.  "I  cannot,"  said  the  Emperor,  "ac- 
custom myself  to  see  3,000  elite  cavalry  (cuirassiers)  at  the 

*It  is  claimed,  however,  that  the  cavalry  of  Murat  began  to 
charge  at  a  trot,  hut  that  it  usually  (and  in  the  later  campaigns 
habitually)  finished  at  full  speed,  the  formation  being  both  deep  and 
dense,  so  that  nothing  was  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  trooper. 


296  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

mercy,  in  the  event  of  a  surprise,  of  a  few  light  troops, 
or  liable  to  be  checked  on  the  march  by  a  handful  of  poor 
marksmen  posted  behind  trees  and  houses."*  At  Eylau 
an  effective  use  of  mounted  fire  action  was  made  by  the 
Twentieth  Chasseurs  &  Gheval  under  peculiar  circumstances. 
It  is  thus  described  by  Captain  Parquiu:  "Toward  2  p.  m., 
an  enormous  mass  of  cavalry  advanced  on  us  at  a  walk, 
the  snow  and  the  boggy  soil  not  permitting  a  faster  gait. 
Colonel  Castex  asked  if  the  carbines  were  loaded.  Receiv- 
ing an  affirmative  reply,  he  commanded  'Advance  carbine  P 
and  ordered  the  officers  into  the  ranks.  The  enormous 
mass  of  dragoons  kept  advancing  upon  us  at  a  walk,  but 
our  colonel  remained  undisturbed;  and  when  the  Russians 
were  within  six  paces,  he  commanded  'Fire!'  The  effect 
was  terrible.  Nearly  the  whole  of  the  first  rank  of  the 
Russians  was  placed  hors  de  combat.  There  was  a  moment 
of  hesitation  on  the  part  of  the  enemy;  but  soon  the  dead 
and  wounded  were  replaced  by  the  second  rank  and  the 

mellay  became  general The  Twentieth  Chasseurs 

lost  more  than  a  hundred  men;  the  enemy  [driven  back] 
lost  at  least  three  hundred."** 

In  the  great  cavalry  fight  at  Eckmuhl  the  cuirassiers 
of  Nansouty  and  St.  Sulpice  received  the  charging  Aus- 
trian cavalry  with  a  discharge  of  fire-arms,  followed  by 
an  attack  at  a  gallop.***  There  seems,  however,  to  have 
been  but  a  single  volley,  and  the  remainder  of  the  mellay 
consisted  of  a  prolonged  and  desperate  contest  of  steel 
against  steel.  The  authenticated  instances  of  mounted 
fire  action  by  Napoleon's  cavalry  were  few,  however,  and 
it  is  evident  that  in  the  use  of  mounted  troops  he,  like 
Frederick,  depended  almost  exclusively  on  shock.  For 
fire  action  the  cavalry  habitually  depended  upon  the 
horse  artillery,  of  which  there  were  forty-eight  batteries, 
aggregating  288  guns,  or  a  little  more  than  4  guns  to 
every  1,000  cavalry. 

"Letter  to  the  Minister  of  War  in  1811. 

**"Souvenirs    du    Capitaine    Denis    Charles    Parquin,    20i6me 
regiment  de  Chasseurs  &  Cheval." 
***Thiers. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  297 

The  invasion  of  Kussia  first  brought  into  prominent 
notice  a  peculiar  force  of  light  cavalry,  the  Cossacks, 
which  perhaps  contributed  more  than  any  ether  troops  to 
the  overthrow  of  Napoleon.  The  Russian  Army  also  con- 
tained a  great  force  of  cuirassiers,  dragoons,  hussars,  and 
Uhlans,  but  their  influence  on  the  final  result  of  the  cam- 
paign was  as  nothing  compared  with  that  of  the  clouds 
of  irregular  light  cavalry  furnished  by  the  Cossack  tribes. 
The  Cossack  cavalry  was  armed  with  the  lance,  sword, 
and  pistol;  and  extreme  mobility  and  expert  horsemanship 
were  its  chief  characteristics.  General  Morand  describes 
the  Cossacks  as  follows:  "These  natural  horsemen  are 
not  organized  in  divisions;  pay  no  attention  to  regular 
alignments  and  the  order  so  highly  prized  by  us;  clasp 
their  horses  tight'y  between  their  knees;  rest  their  feet 
in  great  stirrups,  which  serve  as  supports  to  them  when 
using  their  weapons,  so  that  they  can  bend  their  bodies 
forward  to  deliver  a  blow,  or  backward  to  avoid  one. 
Trained  to  pass  at  once  from  a  halt  to  a  gallop,  and  from 
a  gallop  to  a  halt,  their  horses  second  their  dexterity, 
and  appear  to  be  part  of  themselves.  These  men  are  al- 
ways on  the  lookout,  move  with  extreme  rapidity,  have 
but  few  wants,  and  warlike  thoughts  are  the  only  ones 
that  can  arouse  their  interest."*  Their  tactics  was  pe- 
culiar, consisting  of  the  lava**  or  enveloping  movement, 
made  rapidly  and  in  dispersed  order,  for  the  purpose  of 
harassing  the  enemy,  exhausting  him,  and  forcing  him  to 
break  his  ranks,  preparatory  to  charging  him  with  the 
sword.  In  executing  the  lava,  firing  was  generally  em- 
ployed. If  charged  by  the  enemy,  the  Cossacks,  like  the 
Sioux,  gave  way  quickly,  only  to  re-form  promptly  and 
renew  the  attack.  In  the  campaigns  of  1813-14  the  Cos- 
sacks, arming  themselves  with  infantry  muskets,  captured 
from  the  French,  are  said  to  have  developed  a  system  of 
fighting  on  foot  somewhat  similar  to  that  employed  a  half- 
century  later  by  our  own  cavalry. 

*De  Brack's  "Cavalry  Outpost  Duties,"  (translated  by  Carr), 
p.  328. 

**This  term  is  said  to  be  from  an  old  Tartar  word,  laou,  signi- 
fying to  work  from  a  circumference  toward  a  center. 


298  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

There  are  different  accounts  of  the  tactics  of  the  Cos- 
sacks on  the  battle-field,  and  various  estimates  of  their 
worth  in  action;  but  all  accounts  prove  their  inestimable 
value  in  everything  pertaining  to  the  service  of  security 
and  information.  De  Brack  (quoting  De  la  Valette)  says: 
"The  Cossacks  rendered  military  operations  very  danger- 
ous, especially  for  the  officers  charged  with  the  duty  of 
making  reconnaissances.  Many  of  these,  and  especially 
the  officers  of  the  headquarters  staff,  selected  by  the  com- 
manding general,  preferred  to  send  in  reports  obtained 
from  peasants  to  exposing  themselves  at  a  di3tance  to 
the  attacks  of  the  Cossacks.  Under  such  circumstances 
it  was  impossible  for  the  Emperor  to  keep  himself  prop- 
erly informed  in  regard  to  the  enemy."*  General  Mo- 
rand  further  says:  "The  march  of  the  Grand  Army  was 
first  delayed  by  the  Cossacks,  and  later  they  cut  it  off 
from  every  source  of  supply,  and  swarmed  around  its 
flanks  like  savage  bees  engaged  in  tormenting  and  ex- 
hausting a  roaring  lion  with  their  innumerable  stings."** 
This  irritating  plague,  elusive  and  omnipresent,  made  it- 
self especially  felt  at  the  time  when  Napoleon's  own  cav- 
alry, depleted  in  numbers  and  exhausted  by  hardship,  was 
less  than  one-fourteenth  of  the  strength  of  his  infantry. 
Never,  indeed,  had  a  commander  greater  cause  to  deplore 
his  lack  of  cavalry  than  the  Great  Emperor,  who  under- 
stood its  use  so  well.  For  want  of  cavalry  to  conduct  a 
pursuit,  his  brilliant  victories  of  Ltitzen  and  Bautzen  were 
barren;  and  for  days  before  the  battle  of  Leipsic  he  was 
in  the  dark  as  to  the  movements  of  the  Allies,  while  the 
latter  were  thoroughly  informed  in  regard  to  Lis  own. 
His  military  genius  was  paralyzed  by  lack  of  information, 
and  to  his  deficiency  in  light  cavalry,  more  than  to  any 
other  cause,  is  to  be  attributed  his  downfall. 

The  Crimean  and  Italian  Wars. — For  nearly  forty  years 
after  Waterloo  no  important  campaigns  were  conducted; 
and  the  first  great  war  demonstrated  the  completeness 


*De  Brack  (translated  by  Carr),  p.  327. 
**De  Brack  (translated  by  Carr),  p.  328. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  299 

with  which  the  essential  principles  of  tactics  had  been 
forgotten  in  the  long  peace.  In  the  service  of  security  and 
information  the  cavalry  (of  both  the  Russians  and  the  Al- 
lies) was  deficient  to  a  lamentable  degree.  In  the  flank 
march  from  the  Alma  to  Balaklava  the  head  of  the  col- 
umn, marching  through  a  thick  wood,  was  composed  of 
the  commanding  general  and  staff,  followed  by  thirty  field 
guns  in  column  of  sections.  "What  this  might  have  por- 
tended," says  Hamley,  "was  presently  made  evident,  for 
in  an  open  space  Lord  Raglan  came  suddenly  on  a  Russian 

column  moving  at  right  angles  to  his  own  force 

We  had  been  absolutely  unaware  of  this  march  of  an 
army  across  our  front  till  we  stumbled  on  it;  while  Men- 
schikoff  remained  in  such  complete  ignorance  that  the 
Allied  Army  was  defiling  within  four  or  five  miles  of  him 
that  even  on  the  28th  [three  days  later]  a  messenger 
from  him  arrived  in  Sebastopol,  part  of  whose  errand  was 
to  get  news  of  the  movements  and  position  of  the  enemy."* 
In  this  extraordinary  march  neither  army  was  seen  by 
the  cavalry  of  the  other. 

Nor  was  the  use  of  cavalry  on  the  field  any  more  in- 
telligent than  its  use  in  reconnaissance.  At  Balaklava 
(the  only  battle  of  the  entire  war  in  which  cavalry  played 
any  considerable  part)  a  heavy  force  of  Russian  cavalry, 
advancing  to  attack  the  British  Heavy  Brigade,  deliber- 
ately slackened  its  pace  before  contact,  and  received  a 
counter-charge  at  a  halt.  In  this  action  the  flank  of  the 
Russian  cavalry  was  exposed  to  the  Light  Brigade,  whose 
commander,  Lord  Cardigan,  failed  to  avail  himself  of  the 
opportunity  thus  presented,  because  his  orders  did  not 
contemplate  such  action;  but  he  afterwards  engaged  in  a 
heroic,  but  senseless,  charge  on  the  Russian  batteries, 
which  furnishes  a  theme  for  poets,  but  not  a  model  for  a 
cavalry  general. 

In  the  Italian  War  of  1859  the  use  of  cavalry  was 
slight.  This  was  largely  due  to  the  nature  of  the  coun- 
try, which  was  cut  up  with  irrigating  ditches  and  filled 

*"The  War  in  the  Crimea,"  p.  76. 


300  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

with  mulberry  groves  and  rice  plantations.  At  Solferino 
there  was  a  'considerable  combat  between  the  French  and 
Austrian  cavalry;  but  the  use  of  mounted  troops  in  the 
campaign  produced  such  unimportant  results  that  many 
military  men  argued  that  the  day  of  cavalry  had  gone  en- 
tirely into  the  past;  and  at  the  close  of  the  war  Austria 
made  a  material  reduction  in  her  mounted  force. 

The  War  of  Secession. — At  the  beginning  of  the  war  the 
cavalry  of  the  United  States  Army  consisted  of  two  reg- 
iments of  dragoons,  one  of  mounted  rifles,  and  two  of  cav- 
alry, aggregating  about  4,000  men.  Each  regiment  con- 
sisted of  ten  troops,  each  troop  having  a  war  strength  of 
100  men.  The  arms  of  the  dragoons  were  the  saber,  car- 
bine, and  revolver;  the  mounted  rifles  were  armed  with 
the  rifle  and  hunting-knife;  and  the  arms  of  the  cavalry 
were  similar  to  tho<se  of  the  dragoons.*  The  designation 
of  all  the  regiments  was  changed  in  1861  to  "cavalry"; 
each  regiment  was  given  two  additional  troops;  and  all 
were  alike  armed  with  the  saber,  revolver,  and  carbine. 
This  small  force  was  augmented  by  a  new  regiment  of 
cavalry  belonging  to  the  regular  Army,  and  by  great  lev- 
ies of  volunteers,  until  the  cavalry  of  the  United  States 
reached  the  enormous  aggregate  of  80,000  men — a  mounted 
force  equal  in  numbers  to  the  cavalry  of  Napoleon  at  the 
height  of  his  power.  Each  regiment  was  organized  on  the 
model  of  the  regular  regiments  in  service  at  the  begin- 
ning of  the  war.  In  the  Southern  States  large  forces  of 
cavalry  were  also  organized;  and  in  the  course  of  the  long 
war  the  tactical  and  strategical  uses  of  cavalry  were  such 
as  to  revolutionize  the  tactics  of  that  arm. 

To  avoid  the  confusion  into  which  European  critics  of 
our  cavalry  methods  have  generally  fallen,  the  cavalry  in 

*It  was  prescribed  in  G.  O.  No.  13,  A.  G.  O.,  August  15,  1855, 
that  three  squadrons  of  each  cavalry  regiment  should  be  armed 
with  the  Springfield  rifle-carbine;  one  squadron  of  each  with  the 
movable  stock  carbine,  with  the  barrel  ten  or  twelve  inches  long,  as 
might  be  found  best  by  experiment;  one  squadron  of  the  First  Cav- 
alry with  the  breech-loading  Merrill  carbine;  and  one  squadron  of 
the  Second  Cavalry  with  the  breech-loading  Perry  carbine. — Price's 
"Across  the  Continent  with  the  Fifth  Cavalry,"  p.  29. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  301 

the  War  of  Secession  should  be  divided  for  description 
into  regular  cavalry  and  partisan  cavalry;  the  first  consist- 
ing of  troops  armed  and  trained  as  dragoons  and  forming 
a  part  of  larger  armies;  and  the  latter  made  up  of  mounted 
soldiers  placing  habitual  or  entire  reliance  on  fire-arms, 
and  used  mostly  in  detached  action,  though  often  engaged 
as  part  of  a  larger  army  in  battle. 

Confederate  Partisan  Cavalry.— The  best  type  of  Con- 
federate partisan  cavalry  is  found  in  the  forces  commanded 
by  John  Morgan  and  N.  B.  Forrest,  two  cavalry  generals 
without  previous  military  training  or  education,  but  en- 
dowed with  natural  soldierly  capacity,  which  in  the  case 
of  the  latter  amounted  to  military  genius. 

Morgan's  force,  at  the  height  of  its  efficiency,  con- 
sisted, nominally,  of  ten  regiments  of  500  men  each;  but, 
in  reality,  it  never  exceeded  4,000  men.  The  men  were,  at 
first,  armed  with  a  variety  of  rifles,  muskets,  and  shot- 
guns, but  were  finally  uniformly  provided  with  the  En- 
field  muzzle-loading  rifle,  of  a  pattern  between  the  ia- 
fantry  rifle  and  the  carbine.  Each  trooper  had  a  brace  of 
Colt's  "army  (revolvers,"  but  the  saber  was  practically  an 
unknown  weapon  in  the  command.  Two  small  howitzers, 
and  at  a  later  date  several  light  Parrott  guns,  were  at- 
tached to  the  command. 

Morgan's  men  habitually  fought  on  foot,  using  tac- 
tics adapted  from  that  in  use  in  the  "old  army"  for  skir- 
mishing, but  extended  so  as  to  be  applicable  to  regiments, 
or  even  brigades,  as  well  as  to  the  small  detachments  for 
which  it  was  originally  devised.  One-fourth  of  the  men 
being  detailed  to  hold  the  horses,  the  rest  dismounted 
and  deployed,  an  single  rank,  to  the  front,  rear,  or  either 
flank,  the  intervals  between  the  men  being  about  two 
yards.  In  fighting  on  open  ground  the  command  was  gen- 
erally formed  in  two  lines,  the  distance  between  them  de- 
pending upon  circumstances.  The  first  line  fired  and  lay 
down,  and  the  second,  passing  through  the  intervals  some 
yards  to  the  front,  then  fired  and  lay  down,  the  lines  thus 
passing  each  other  in  succession  and  keeping  up  a  steady 
fire.  In  withdrawing,  the  lines  passed  each  other  in  a 
-21- 


ORGANIZATION  AND 

similar  manner.  The  general  line  was  usually  somewhat 
concave,  the  flanks  extending  slightly  toward  the  front, 
the  design  being  to  bring  a  converging  tire  upon  the  en- 
emy. The  deployment  was  often  covered  by  the  flank  com- 
panies as  mounted  skirmishers. 

Forrest's  command  at  one  time  numbered  about  6,000 
men,  and  was  divided  into  three  divisions,  each  consisting 
of  three  brigades,  each  brigade  composed  of  two  regi- 
ments. The  arms  were  practically  the  same  as  those  of 
Morgan's  command,  with  the  addition  of  the  saber,  which 
was  attached  to  the  saddle,  but  does  not  seem  to  have 
been  frequently  used.  Two  light  guns  were  attached  to 
each  brigade.  Forrest's  tactics  was  similar  to  that  of 
Morgan,  though  he  generally  kejt  in  hand  a  mounted  re- 
serve, which  sometimes,  as  at  Okolona,  in  February,  1S64, 
fell  with  decisive  effect  upon  the  enemy's  flank  while  the 
dismounted  troopers  engaged  in  front.  At  Guntown,  Miss  , 
in  June,  1864,  Forrest's  men.  dismounted  and  posted  be- 
hind cover,  consisting  of  a  low  breastwork  of  logs  and 
fallen  timber,  repulsed  a  well-conducted  attack  of  Union 
infantry,  by  using  rifle  fire  until  the  assailants  were  with- 
in close  pistol  range,  and  then  opening  fire  with  revolvers. 
This  gave,  practically,  the  same  effect  as  fire  from  mag- 
azine rifles,  twelve  shots  being  rapidly  delivered  at  close 
quarters.  In  the  same  battle  Forrest's  cavalry  made  a 
successful  dismounted  charge,  which  decided  the  contest, 
after  which  they  mounted  and  followed  in  pursuit. 

Both  Morgan's  and  Forrest's  commands  were  used  at 
times  as  component  parts  of  large  armies  in  battle.  Bat 
their  services  were  of  greater  value  in  independent  opera- 
tions, and  especially  in  raids,  which  may  be  said  to  have 
bad  their  first  complete  development  in  the  War  of  ^ 
cession.  Raids  had.  it  is  true,  been  made  before.  Haddick 
had  made  a  raid  in  the  Seven  Years'  War.  in  which  he 
captured  Berlin:  in  1S13  Tchernicbeff,  with  3.000  Cos- 
sacks and  4  guns,  had  passed  around  Xapoleon's  army  and 
captured  the  city  of  Cassel:  in  the  same  year  Tettenborn, 
another  Cossack  leader,  had  made  a  raid  in  which  he  cap- 
tured Hamburg:  and  in  1S31  Dembinski.  a  Polish  rebel 


ORGANIZATION  AXD  TAC; 

leader,  with,  a  command  of  about  4,000  mounted  men,  made 
a  successful  raid  from  Kurszany  to  Warsaw,  a  distance 
of  nearly  600  miles,  in  the  course  of  which  he  eluded  the 
Russians  and  captured  considerable  quantities  of  supplies. 
But  in  strategic  results,  in  skillful  execution,  and  far- 
reaching  effects  the  American  raids  surpassed  all  previ- 
ous operations  of  the  kind,  and  have  as  yet  been  unequaled. 
Morgan  and  Forrest  each  made  a  number  of  raids,  in 
which  they  captured  many  prisoners  and  immense  quan- 
tities of  supplies,  besides  interfering  so  seriously  with 
the  communications  of  the  Union  Army  as  almost  to  par- 
alyze its  advance.  After  the  battle  of  Murfreesboro,  or 
Stone's  River,  a  forward  movement  by  Bosecrans  was  im- 
possible until  the  Confederate  cavalry  could  be  checked 
in  its  devastating  detached  operations.  The  Army  was 
dependent  mainly  upon  the  Louisville  &  Xashville  Bail- 
road  for  its  supplies;  and,  owing  to  the  persistent  raids 
of  the  enemy,  that  road  was  operated  only  seven  months 
and  twelve  days  Li  1862.  The  report  of  its  superintendent 
for  that  year  states:  "All  the  bridges  and  trestleworks 
on  the  main  stem  and  branches,  with  the  exception  of  the 
bridge  over  Barren  River  and  four  small  bridges,  were  de- 
stroyed and  rebuilt  during  the  year.  Some  of  the  struct- 
ures were  destroyed  twice  and  some  three  times.  In  ad- 
dition to  this,  most  of  the  water  stations,  several  depots, 
and  a  large  number  of  cars  were  burnt,  a  number  of  en- 
gines badly  damaged,  and  a  tunnel  in  Tennessee  nearly 
filled  up  for  a  distance  of  800  feet."*  The  enemy's  cavalry 
bad  steadily  increased  in  numbers,  efficiency,  and  audacity, 
until  it  had  become  "a  greater  problem  how  to  meet  this 
arm  of  the  enemy's  force  than  his  infantry/'*  Morgan 
made  his  first  raid  with  a  force  of  about  900  men,  travel- 
ing ove-  1.000  miles  in  twenty-four  days,  taking  posses- 
sion of  seventeen  towns,  destroying  all  the  military  sup- 
plies found  in  them,  capturing  nearly  1.200  Union  soldiers, 
and  dispersing  1,500  home  guards.  He  lost  only  90  men 
and  gained  about  300  recruits  on  the  raid. 

*Cist's  "The  Army  of  the  Cumberland,"  p.  138. 


304  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

When  Sherman  began  his  campaign  in  Georgia,  in 
1864,  his  communications  from  Louisville  to  Chattanooga, 
a  distance  of  about  335  miles,  were  in  danger  ?f  being  in- 
tercepted, and  his  advance  being  brought  to  a  standstill, 
by  destructive  raids  of  Confederate  cavalry.  General  Sher- 
man says:  "There  was  great  danger,  always  in  my  mind, 
that  Forrest  would  collect  a  heavy  cavalry  command  in 
Mississippi,  cross  the  Tennessee  River,  and  break  up  our 
railroad  below  Nashville."*  Two  successive  expeditions 
were  accordingly  sent  against  Forrest,  the  first  being  de- 
feated with  heavy  loss  at  Guntown,  and  the  second,  con- 
sisting of  two  divisions,  defeating  him  at  Tupelo,  and  "so 
stirring  up  matters  in  North  Mississippi  that  he  could 
not  leave  for  Tennessee."  But  Forrest  was  still  a  thorn 
in  the  flesh  of  Sherman,  who,  after  the  fall  of  Atlanta, 
sent  Newton's  division  back  to  Chattanooga,  and  Corse's 
division  to  Rome,  and  instructed  Rousseau  at  Nashville, 
Granger  at  Decatur,  and  Steadman  at  Chattanooga,  to 
adopt  the  most  active  measures  to  protect  the  railroad 
communications  from  raids  by  Forrest  and  Wheeler.** 
Finally  General  Grant  urged  Sherman  to  drive  Forrest 
out  of  Middle  Tennessee,  as  a  preliminary  to  any  other 
move.***  In  the  whole  range  of  military  history  it 
would  be  hard  to  find  the  name  of  another  cavalry  leader 
who,  with  the  same  numbers,  caused  his  enemies  so  much 
trouble  as  N.  B.  Forrest. 

In  Virginia  a  force  of  mounted  troops  under  Mosby 
waged  war  in  true  guerrilla  style.  They  were  armed  in 
the  same  manner  as  Morgan's  cavalry,  but,  when  not 
actively  engaged,  remained  at  their  own  homes,  or  billeted 
among  sympathizers.  When  any  operation  against  the 
convoys,  or  a  raid  upon  the  communications,  of  the  United 
States  armies  was  contemplated,  the  men  were  assembled 
at  some  designated  rendezvous.  The  operation  terminated, 
they  again  dispersed  to  their  homes,  and  Union  cavalry 
operating  in  the  region  infested  by  the  guerrillas  couM 

*"Memoirs,"  Vol.  II.,  p.  52. 
**Ibid.,  p.  30. 
***Ibid.,  p.  141. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  305 

rarely  find  anything  but  apparently  peaceable  farmers. 
Mosby's  men  were,  however,  regularly  enlisted,  and  con- 
stituted a  part  of  the  Confederate  army  under  Lee.*  These 
enterprising  partisans  neutralized  a  large  force  of  cavalry 
for  the  protection  of  the  Union  communications,  and 
caused  much  loss  and  infinite  annoyance  to  the  Union 
commanders.  In  a  report  to  General  Stuart,  in  Septem- 
ber, 1863,  Mosby  says:  "The  military  value  of  the  species 
of  warfare  I  am  waging  is  not  to  be  measured  by  the  num- 
ber of  prisoners  and  material  of  war  captured  from  the 
enemy,  but  by  the  heavy  details  it  compels  him  to  make 
in  order  to  guard  his  communications,  and  to  that  extent 
diminish  his  aggressive  strength."**  Mosby's  guerrillas 
each  received,  by  way  of  reward,  a  portion  of  the  plunder 
captured;  as  a  punishment,  offenders  were  transferred  to 
the  line  of  the  Confederate  army.  Mosby's  guerrillas  have 
often  been  confounded  by  ill-informed  European  critics 
with  the  regular  Confederate  cavalry,  a  mistake  scarcely 
more  justifiable  than  would  be  a  confounding  of  the  Franc- 
tireurs  with  the  French  dragoons.*** 

The  essential  characteristics  of  the  Confederate  parti- 
san cavalry  were  extreme  mobility,  habitual  and  almost 
exclusive  reliance  upon  fire  action,  and  the  tactics  of 
fighting  dismounted,  using  horses  only  in  marches  and  in 
pursuit.  The  saber  was  held  in  disrepute;  but  this  is  not 
remarkable,  as  the  men  had  never  had  much  or  any  train- 
ing in  its  use,  while  they  had  all  been  accustomed  to  the 
use  of  fire-arms  from  youth.  Great  a®  were  the  deeds  cf 
the  partisan  troops  in  the  War  of  Secession,  the  history 
of  the  cavalry  in  the  same  conflict  shows  that  the  latter 

*Mosby  says:  "All  I  did  had  the  sanction  of  the  commander 
of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  of  which  my  own  command — 
the  Forty-third  Battalion  of  Virginia  Cavalry — was  a  part.  I  was 
independent  simply  in  the  sense  that  General  Lee  and  "General 
Stuart  had  such  confidence  in  me  that  they  never  undertook  to 
trammel  me  with  orders,  but  gave  me  full  discretion  to  act  as  I 
chose." — Mosly's  "War  Reminiscences,"  p.  81. 

**Scott's  "Partisan  Life  with  Mosby,"  p.  392. 

***The  Franc-tireurs  were  irregular  troops,  resembling  "home 
guards." 


306  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

could  do  all  that  lay  in  the  power  of  the  former  and 
muich  more. 

The  Regular  Cavalry.*  —  In  both  the  United  States 
and  the  Confederate  Armies  the  cavalry  was  all  light,  and 
consisted  entirely  of  dragoons.**  The  Confederate  cav- 
alry, being  recruited  from  a  population  accustomed  to 
horsemanship  and  the  use  of  arms,  reached  a  condition  of 
efficiency  much  sooner  than  that  of  the  Union  Army,  to 
which  it  may  be  said  to  have  furnished,  in  some  degree,  ;i 
model.  It  will,  therefore,  be  considered  first. 

The  Confederate  Cavalry. — The  cavalry  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  may  be  taken  as  the  finest  type  of  the 
Confederate  cavalry.  During  the  greater  portion  of  the 
war  it  was  under  the  command  of  General  J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 
an  educated  soldier  of  great  merit,  and  a  born  cavalry 
commander.  Ignoring  the  cavalry  traditions  of  the  Old 
World,  and  seeking  only  the  most  ready  means  to  meet 
the  ends  in  view,  he  originated  a  new  method  of  using 
mounted  troops,  and  may  be  said  to  be  the  father  of  the 
cavalry  tactics  of  the  present  day. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  Gettysburg  campaign,  Stuart's 
cavalry,  which  was  then  at  the  height  of  its  efficiency 
and  numerical  strength,  consisted  of  six  brigades,  and 
aggregated  about  10,000  men.  The  personnel  of  the  com- 
mand was  excellent,  and  it  was  well  mounted,  the  troops 
furnishing  their  own  horses.  The  men  were  generally 
armed  with  revolver  and  saber.  One  or  two  squadrons 
of  each  regiment  were  armed  with  breech-loading  car- 
bines, the  rest  being  provided  with  Enfield  rifles.  The 
cavalry  was  trained  to  use  the  saber  or  to  depend  upon 
fire  action,  as  circumstances  might  dictate;  and  the  tacti- 
cal versatility  of  the  command  was  well  illustrated  ;n 

*In  order  to  prevent  misconception,  it  is  repeated  that  under 
the  caption  "Regular  Cavalry"  is  considered  not  merely  the  cavalry 
of  the  Regular  Army,  but  all  cavalry  used  as  cavalry  instead  of 
mounted  infantry. 

**The  Sixth  Pennsylvania  Cavalry  was,  at  first,  armed  with 
the  lance,  and  known  as  "Rush's  Lancers."  The  lance  was  soon 
abandoned,  however,  and  the  saber  and  carbine  were  adopted  in 
its  stead. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  307 

the  combat  of  Poolesville,  Md.,  of  which  General  -Stuart 
reports:  "Guarding  well  my  flanks  and  rear,  I  pushed 
boldly  forward,  meeting  the  head  of  the  enemy's  column 
going  towards  Poolesville.  I  ordered  the  charge,  which 
was  responded  to  in  handsome  style  by  the  advance  squad- 
ron (Irving's)  of  Lee's  brigade,  which  drove  back  the  en- 
emy's cavalry  upon  the  column  of  infantry  advancing  to 
occupy  the  crest  from  which  the  cavalry  were  driven. 
Quick  as  thought,  Lee's  sharpshooters  sprang  to  the 
ground,  and,  engaging  the  infantry  skirmishers,  held  them 
in  check  till  the  artillery  in  advance  came  up,  which,  un- 
der the  gallant  Pelham,  drove  back  the  enemy's  force 
upon  the  batteries  beyond  the  Monocacy."* 

More  formidable  in  battle  than  the  troops  of  Morgan 
or  Forrest,  the  cavalry  of  Stuart  rivaled  them  in  detached 
action.  Stuart  made  a  number  of  successful  raids  (on 
three  occasions  passing  entirely  around  the  Union  Army), 
in  which  he  captured  great  quantities  of  stores,  destroyed 
valuable  public  property,  gained  important  information, 
and  created  consternation  among  his  enemies.  So  well 
did  his  cavalry  perform  the  duties  of  outpost  and  recon- 
naissance, that  it  is  said  that  a  force  of  but  little  more 
than  300  of  his  men  at  one  time  watched  efficiently  more 
than  fifty  miles  of  front,  and  reported  every  important 
movement  of  the  United  States  forces.** 

The  United  States  Cavalry. — During  the  first  two  years 
of  the  war  the  cavalry  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  per- 
formed but  little  valuable  service.  Unappreciated  by  the 
first  commander  of  that  army,  and  frittered  away  in  in- 
numerable detachments,  it  was,  as  a  body,  deficient  in 
instruction,  wanting  in  esprit  de  corps,  and  lacking  in  the 
self-confidence  so  indispensable  for  cavalry.  Finally  as- 
sembled into  a  corps  by  Hooker,  its  improvement  was  rap- 
id; it  profited  by  the  lessons  of  its  enterprising  opponent, 
rose  to  an  equality  with  its  antagonist,  and  finally  dem- 
onstrated its  superiority  over  the  foe  to  which,  at  the 
outset,  it  had  been  so  distinctly  inferior. 

"Official  Records  of  the  Union  and  Confederate  Armies,  Series 
I,  Vol.  XIX.,  Part  IT.,  p.  53. 

**McClellan's  "Campaigns  of  Stuart's  Cavalry,"  p.  32. 


308  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

The  battle  of  Beverly  Ford,  Va,  (June  9,  1863),  was 
the  first  engagement  in  which  the  United  States  cavalry 
manifested  real  efficiency;  and  this  action,  more  than  any 
other,  illustrates  the  many-sided  nature  of  the  American 
cavalry.  In  this  battle  a  cavalry  charge  was  repulsed  by 
cavalry  mounted;  an  attack  by  cavalry  dismounted  against 
cavalry  dismounted  and  behind  cover  was  repulsed  by 
sharpshooters  in  front,  aided  by  mounted  charges  on  the 
flanks  of  the  assailants;  a  mounted  charge  with  saber 
against  dismounted  cavalry  using  fire  action  and  sup- 
ported by  a  mounted  detachment  was  successfully  made; 
and  two  opposing  brigades  of  cavalry  met  in  direct  charge 
with  the  saber.  In  brief,  every  possible  condition  of  cav- 
alry action  seems  to  have  been  encountered  in  this  re- 
markable engagement. 

As  the  United  States  cavalry  improved,  more  and 
more  reliance  was  placed  by  it  on  the  saber,  which  was 
regarded  as  its  first  weapon,  though  the  effective  use  of 
the  carbine  was  sedulously  cultivated.*  At  the  battle  of 
Winchester,  Va.  (September  19,  1864),  the  Union  cavalry 
made  charges  on  foot  or  mounted,  according  to  the  nature 
of  the  terrain;  and,  finally,  Merritt's  division  made  the 
finest  cavalry  charge  of  the  war,  first  striking  Early's  in- 
fantry on  the  flank,  and  then  squarely  in  the  face  as  it 
changed  front  to  meet  the  attack.  The  charge  was  first 
made  by  Devin's  brigade,  which  returned  to  rally,  the 
charge  being  continued  by  Lowell's  brigade,  which  rallied 
similarly,  and  the  entire  division  (three  brigades)  then 
charging  in  a  body,  simultaneously  with  an  advance  of 
the  infantry  in  front.  The  last  charge  completely  routed 

*In  a  letter  to  the  author,  General  J.  H.  Wilson  says:  "I 
think  you  are  in  error  in  a  statement  that  'as  the  cavalry  improved 
more  and  more  reliance  was  placed  by  it  on  the  saber.'  I  should 
say  that  just  the  reverse  was  the  case.  At  the  outset  the  saber  was 
everything:  at  the  end  it  had  found  its  true  place  for  occasional 
use  only."  The  views  of  General  Merritt  and  General  Wilson  on 
this  subject  are  diametrically  opposed.  Each  of  these  distin- 
guished commanders  had  long  and  varied  service  in  the  handling  of 
cavalry,  and  each  doubtless  expresses  the  result  of  his  own  obser- 
vation and  experience. 


ORGANIZATION    AND   TACTICS.  309 

the  Confederate  infantry,  the  first  cavalry  division  captur- 
ing in  the  three  charges  775  prisoners,  70  officers,  7  battle- 
flags,  and  2  guns.  Simultaneously  wich  the  successful 
attack  of  Merritt  on  the  enemy's  left  flank,  Wilson  drove 
back  and  turned  the  Confederate  right,  cleared  the  main 
road  to  the  front  and  captured  the  enemy's  main  line  of 
works.  In  the  pest  of  Sheridan's  "Valley  Campaign"  the 
superiority  of  the  Union  cavalry  over  its  adversary  In 
tactical  handling  and  general  efficiency  was  manifest,  and 
was  mainly  due  to  its  equal  expertness  in  the  use  of  car- 
bine or  saber.  In  his  report  of  the  battle  of  Tom's  Brook 
(October  9,  1864),  General  Early  says:  "This  is  very  dis- 
tressing to  me,  and  God  knows  I  have  done  all  in  my 
power  to  avert  the  disasters  which  have  befallen  this  com- 
mand; but  the  fact  is,  the  enemy's  cavalry  is  so  much 
superior  to  ours,  both  in  numbers  and  equipments,  and 
the  country  is  so  favorable  to  the  operations  of  cavalry, 
that  it  is  impossible  for  ours  to  compete  with  his.  Lo- 
max's  cavalry  is  armed  entirely  with  rifles  and  has  no 
sabers,  and  the  consequence  is  they  cannot  fight  on  horse- 
back, and  in  this  open  country  they  cannot  successfully 
fight  on  foot  against  large  bodies  of  cavalry.  "This,"  says 
General  Merritt,  "is  a  statement  on  "hich  those  who 
think  our  cavalry  never  fought  mounted  and  with  the 
saber  should  ponder.  The  cavalry  had  >rcant  justice  done 
it  in  reports  sent  from  the  battle-field;  and  current  his- 
tory, which  is  so  much  made  up  of  first  reports  and  first 
impressions,  has  not  to  a  proper  extent  been  impressed 
with  thi3  record."* 

The  battle  of  Winchester  demonstrated  the  efficiency 
of  the  United  States  cavalry  in  using  the  saber;  the  bat- 
tles of  Dinwiddie  Court  House  and  Five  Forks,  in  the  fol- 
lowing spring,  illustrated  equally  its  effectiveness  when 
using  the  carbine.  In  the  first  of  these  battles  (March  31, 
1865),  the  Union  cavalry  dismounted,  and,  fighting  behind 
such  cover  as  it  could  find,  held  in  check  a  superior  force 
of  Confederate  infantry;  and  in  the  second  (fought  on  the 

""Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War,"  Vol.  IV.,  p.  514. 


310  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

next  day)  it  made  a  front  attack,  dismounted,  upon  the 
enemy,  while  the  Fifth  Corps  attacked  his  left  flank.  In 
this  action  the  dismounted  cavalry  carried  earthworks 
manned  by  Confederate  infantry.  In  the  subsequent  pur- 
suit of  Lee,  the  mobility  and  effective  fire  action  of  the 
cavalry  were  brilliantly  displayed.  Pressing  rapidly  ahead, 
Sheridan  attacked  the  flank  of  Swell's  corps,  consisting 
of  6,000  men,  and  constituting  the  rear  guard  of  Lee's 
army.*  Holding  the  enemy  with  the  fire  of  one  divisiou, 
he  pushed  the  others  ahead,  moving  them  behind  his  own 
line,  until  he  had  planted  Merritt's  entire  cavalry  corps 
directly  across  the  enemy's  line  of  retreat.  Holding  Ewell 
in  check  with  the  cavalry,  Sheridan  hastened  forward  the 
Sixth  Corps,  and  thus  placing  the  Confederate  rear  guard 
between  two  fires,  compelled  its  surrender.  The  following 
remarks  of  Sir  Henry  Havelock  on  this  action,  though 
made  more  than  a  quarter  of  a  century  ago,**  constitute, 
perhaps,  the  be>st  criticism  that  has  ever  been  made  upon 
it:  "The  mode  in  which  Sheridan,  from  the  special  arm- 
ing and  training  of  his  cava'ry,  was  able  to  deal  with  this 
rear  guard,  first  to  overtake  it  in  retreat,  then  to  pass 
completely  leyond  it,  to  turn,  face  it,  and  take  up  at  leisure 
a  position  strong  enough  to  enable  him  to  detain  it  in 
spite  of  its  naturally  fierce  and  determined  efforts  to 
break  through,  is  highly  characteristic  of  the  self-reliant, 
all-sufficing  efficiency  to  which  at  this  time  the  Northern 
horsemen  had  been  brought.  The  practical  experience  of 
nearly  four  years  of  continual  war,  the  entire  and  un- 
trammeled  confidence  placed  in  good  men  amongst  the 
Northern  leaders,  when  they  proved  themselves  to  be  so, 
and  the  complete  freedom  left  them  of  devising  and  exe- 
cuting the  improvements  their  daily  experience  suggested, 
had  enabled  Sheridan,  and  one  or  two  more  of  similar  bent 

*Gordon's  corps  originally  formed  the  rear  guard  of  Lee's 
army;  but  that- corps  having  been  defeated  by  Humphrey's  corps 
and  deflected  to  the  right  in  retreat,  Swell's  corps  was  left  as  the 
real  rear  guard  of  the  retreating  army. 

**In  "Three  Main  Military  Questions  of  the  Day,"  London, 
1867,  p.  97. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  311 

of  mind,  to  shake  themselves  free  of  the  unsound  tradi- 
tions of  European  cavalry  theory,  and  to  make  their  own 
horse  not  the  jingling,  brilliant,  costly,  but  almost  help- 
less unreality  it  is  with  us,  but  a  force  that  was  able,  on 
all  grounds,  in  all  circumstances,  to  act  freely  and  effi- 
ciently, without  any  support  from  infantry.  Not  only  is 
there  no  European  cavalry  with  which  the  writer  is  ac- 
quainted that  could  have  acted  the  part  now  played  by 
the  force  under  Sheridan,  but  there  is  not  on  record,  that 
he  is  aware  of,  an  instance  in  the  eventful  wars  of  the 
last  or  the  present  century  in  Europe  of  a  strong  rear 
guard  having  been  thus  effectually  dealt  with." 

In  a  similar  manner  Sheridan  outstripped  and  headed 
Lee's  entire  army,  bringing  it  to  bay  until  the  main  body 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  came  up,  when,  resistance 
being  hopeless,  Lee  surrendered. 

The  nature  and  tactics  of  the  United  States  cavalry 
in  the  West  were  essentially  the  same  as  those  of  Sher- 
idan's cavalry.  It  is  said  of  Minty's  cavalry  brigade,  in 
the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  which  may  be  taken  as  a 
type  of  the  mounted  troops  of  the  Western  armies,  that 
"it  made  five  successful  saber  charges  against  superior 
numbers  of  infantry;  four  successful  saber  charges  against 
artillery,  in  battery,  supported  by  infantry  and  cavalry, 
resulting  in  the  capture  of  guns;  and  over  one  hundred 
saber  charges  against  the  enemy's  cavalry.  It  made 
twenty-five  charges  dismounted,  and  captured  three  strong- 
ly fortified  and  intrenched  positions,  when  fully  manned 
and  defended  by  infantry  and  artillery."*  At  Nashville 
the  dismounted  cavalry  under  Wilson  fought  so  success- 
fully against  the  Confederate  infantry  that  Hood,  in  ans- 
iety  and  alarm,  sent  a  message  to  Chalmers,  saying,  "For 
God's  sake,  drive  the  Yankee  cavalry  from  our  left  and 
rear  or  all  is  lost!"**  The  Union  cavalry  was  not  driven 
back,  and  the  battle  resulted  in  Hood's  complete  defeat. 

*Vale's  "History  of  Minty  and  the  Cavalry,"  p.  5. 
**"BattIes  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War,"  Vol.   IV.,   p.   469. 


312  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

It  should  be  observed  that  in  this  battle  the  Union  cav- 
alry was  armed  with  the  breech-loading  carbine  and  its 
opponents  with  the  muzzle-loading  rifle.*  As  soon  as  the 
victory  was  gained,  the  cavalry  mounted  and  pursued  the 
retreating  enemy. 

Long  before  the  close  of  the  war  the  United  States 
cavalry  had  developed  a  degree  of  efficiency  in  detached 
action  that  placed  it  on  a  level  with  its  adversaries,  if  it 
did  not  surpass  them.  In  screening  and  reconnoitering 
duty,  and  in  all  the  details  of  the  service  of  security  and 
information,  it  furnishes,  as  yet,  the  best  model  for  the 
military  student;**  and  in  raiding  its  achievements  have 
never  been  surpassed.  It  is  not  the  purpose  here  to  give 
a  narrative  of  the  raids  made  by  the  Union  cavalry.  It 
will  suffice  to  give  a  brief  sketch  of  the  raids  of  Grierson 
and  Wilson,  which  may  be  taken  as  a  type  of  those  made 
by  the  mounted  troops  of  the  United  States.  In  1863, 
Grierson,  with  a  brigade  of  cavalry,  numbering  about  1,700 
men,  left  La  Grange,  Tenn.,  on  April  17th,  and  reached 
Baton  Rouge,  La.,  on  the  2d  of  the  following  month,  hav- 
ing marched  more  than  300  miles  through  hostile  coun- 
try, passing  in  rear  of  the  Confederate  Army,  destroying 
the  railroad  at  several  points,  and  burning  considerable 
quantities  of  supplies.  General  Grant  states  that  this  raid 
was  of  great  importance  in  attracting  the  attention  of  the 
enemy  from  the  main  movement  against  Vicksburg.*** 

In  point  of  numbers  engaged  and  the  amount  of  de- 
struction wrought,  the  greatest  raid  of  the  war  was  that 

*Before  the  close  of  the  war  nearly  all  the  Union  cavalry 
regiments  were  armed  with  breech-loading  carbines.  In  the  early 
part  of  the  war  they  were  often  very  poorly  armed.  The  Fourth 
Iowa  Cavalry,  for  instance,  was  at  first  armed  with  sabers,  Aus- 
trian rifles,  muzzle-loading  holster  pistols,  and  a  revolver  of  a  very 
defective  pattern.  It  received  breech-loading  carbines  in  the  spring 
of  1863.  In  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  the  issue  of  carbines  was 
made  nearly  a  year  earlier.  (See  Scott's  "History  of  the  Fourth 
Iowa  Cavalry,"  and  Preston's  "History  of  the  Tenth  Cavalry,  New 
York  State  Volunteers.") 

**See  the  chapters  on  "Reconnaissance"  and  "The  Cavalry 
Screen,"  in  "The  Service  of  Security  and  Information." 

***"Memoirs,"  Vol.  I.,  p.  489. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  313 

made  by  General  J.  H.  Wilson,  in  the  spring  of  1865.  Wil- 
son's command,  numbering  about  13,000  cavalry  and  18 
guns,  left  Chickasaw,  Ala.,  on  the  22d  of  March.  Each 
trooper  was  armed  with  a  Spencer  magazine  carbine, 
and  was  provided  with  five  days'  rations,  24  pounds  of 
grain,  a  pair  of  extra  horse-shoes,  and  100  rounds  of  car- 
tridges. A  train  of  250  wagons,  carrying  supplies,  ac- 
companied the  command,  which  was  also  provided  with  a 
ponton  train.  The  line  of  march  lay  through  Elyton, 
Montevallo,  Selma,  and  Montgomery,  Ala.,  and  West 
Point,  Columbus,  and  Macon,  Ga.,  terminating  at  the  last- 
named  point  on  the  20th  of  April.  The  command  (not- 
withstanding its  being  accompanied  by  a  train)  had  lived 
entirely  upon  the  country;  had  marched  525  miles  in 
twenty-eight  days;  had  defeated  Forrest  at  Plantersville 
and  Selma,  the  Confederate  works  at  the  latter  place  be- 
ing carried  by  the  Union  cavalry  in  an  assault  on  foot; 
had  captured  6,820  prisoners  and  280  guns;  and  had  .de- 
stroyed a  gun-boat,  an  armored  ram  ready  for  sea,  99,009 
stands  of  small-arms,  1,000,000  rounds  of  artillery  ammu- 
nition, 235,000  bales  of  cotton,  20  locomotives,  250  cars, 
and  all  the  mills,  iron  works,  factories,  railroad  bridges, 
and  military  establishments  found  on  the  line  of  march. 
At  Macon,  Wilson  learned  of  the  armistice  between  Sher- 
man and  Johnston,  the  fall  of  Richmond,  and  the  disper- 
sion of  the  Confederate  Government.  Distributing  his 
troops  along  the  line  of  the  Ocmulgee  and  Altamaha  riv- 
ers, he  fitly  terminated  his  remarkable  expedition  by  the 
capture  of  the  fugitive  President  of  the  Confederacy. 

Mounted  Infantry.  —  To  protect  his  communications 
from  the  enemy's  raids,  Rosecrans,  not  having  a  sufficient 
force  of  cavalry,  organized  a  brigade  of  mounted  infantry, 
which  was  placed  under  the  command  of  Colonel  John  T. 
Wilder,  an  enterprising  and  meritorious  officer.  Five  regi- 
ments of  infantry  composed  the  brigade,  to  which  a  light 
battery  was  attached.  The  command  was  at  first  mounted 
on  horses  or  mules  impressed  in  the  country,  and  was 
armed  with  the  Spencer  magazine  rifle,  using  metallic  car- 
tridges. It  soon  reached  a  high  state  of  efficiency,  as 


314  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

mounted  infantry  pure  and  simple,  the  horses  being  used 
merely  as  a  means  of  locomotion,  and  all  the  fighting 
being  on  foot.  At  the  battle  of  Hoover's  Gap  (June  24, 
1863),  it  repulsed  with  great  slaughter  a  determined  attack 
made  by  a  division  of  Confederate  infantry;  and,  owing  to 
its  mobility  and  its  superior  arms,  it  constituted  a  formid- 
able force  both  in  detached  action  and  in  the  line  of  b-at- 
tle.  But,  though  this  force  was  the  most  perfect  body 
of  mounted  infantry  used  in  the  War  of  Secession,  it  did 
nothing  that  the  cavalry  did  not  do  equally  well,  while 
the  decisive  mounted  charges  of  the  latter  in  the  Shenan- 
doah  Valley  would  have  been  impossible  with  even  such 
exceptionally  good  mounted  infantry  as  Wilder's  brigade. 

The  Austro-Prussian  War. — In  1866  the  Prussians  had 
in  the  field  a  force  of  30,000  cavalry,  consisting  of  cuiras- 
siers, armed  with  saber  and  pistol;  Uhlans,  armed  with 
saber,  pistol,  and  lance;  and  dragoons  and  hussars,  both 
armed  with  sword  and  carbine.  Each  regiment  consisted 
of  four  squadrons,*  each  15f)  sabers  strong.  Two  (and  in 
some  cases  three)  regiments  formed  a  brigade,  and  three 
brigades  a  division.  The  Austrian  cavalry  aggregated 
about  27,000  sabers,  and  was  simi]ar  in  its  composition, 
arms,  equipment,  and  organization  to  the  cavalry  to  which 
it  was  opposed. 

The  results  accomplished  by  the  cavalry  in  this  short 
but  momentous  war  were  insignificant.  The  reconnais- 
sance duty  on  both  sides  was  performed  so  negligently 
that  on  the  day  before  the  battle  of  Koniggratz  the  out- 
posts of  the  two  opposing  armies  faced  each  other  within 
a  distance  of  four  and  one-half  miles,  without  either  army 
suspecting  the  near  and  concentrated  presence  of  the 
other  one.**  After  each  battle  the  pursuit  by  the  cavalry 
was  exceedingly  feeble,  and  after  the  battle  of  Koniggratz 
the  Prussians  lost  all  touch  with  the  Austrian  Army,  and 
for  three  days  were  completely  in  the  dark  in  regard  to 

*Each  regiment  had,  in  addition  to  its  four  field  squadrons, 
a  depot  squadron. 

**"Prussian  Official  History"  (translated  by  Wright  and  Hoz- 
ier),  p.  161. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  315 

its  movements.  There  was,  moreover,  no  attempt  to  ex- 
ecute raids,  although  excellent  opportunities  were  offered 
the  Austrians  to  paralyze  the  advance  of  the  Prussians 
upon  Vienna  by  operating  against  their  communications. 
In  everything  pertaining  to  the  detached  action  of  mounted 
troops,  the  Austrian  and  Prussian  cavalry  in  this  war  were, 
in  fact,  pitifully  impotent. 

On  the  battle-field  the  cavalry  was  used  with  vigor 
and  gallantry;  but  its  action  taught  nothing  new.  At 
Nachod  the  Prussian  cavalry  was  used  with  energy  to 
cover  the  passage  of  the  main  army  through  the  defile, 
but  its  lack  of  firing  power  limited  it  to  the  tactical  of- 
fensive, and  it  suffered  heavy  loss.  At  Koniggratz  the  Aus 
trian  cavalry  displayed  admirable  courage  in  covering  the 
retreat  of  the  infantry,  and  several  great  cavalry  actions 
occurred,  which  were  stubbornly  contested,  and  with  va- 
rying success,  though  resulting  generally  in  favor  of  the 
Austrians,  when  the  Prussian  cavalry  alone  was  encoun- 
tered. In  these  cavalry  combats  steel  alone  was  used; 
and  in  the  tactical  formations  employed  and  the  weapons 
used  they  differed  in  no  appreciable  degree  from  the  cav- 
alry battles  of  a  century  before. 

The  Franco-German  War. — When  the  Germans  entered 
France,  in  1870,  the  cavalry  of  the  invading  armies  con- 
sisted of  336  squadrons,  aggregating  a  little  more  than 
50,000  sabers.  In  composition,  organization,  and  arms  it 
was  the  same  as  in  the  Austro-Prussian  War.  The  cav- 
alry of  the  French  armies  aggregated  40,000  sabers,  and 
consisted  of  cuirassiers,  carbineers,  dragoons,  lancers, 
chasseurs,  hussars,  chasseurs  d'Afrique,  and  Spahis.  The 
chasseurs  d'Afrique  were  troops  designed  originally  for 
service  in  Algeria.  They  were  mounted  on  Arab  horses,  and 
may  be  classed  as  light  dragoons.  The  Spahis  were  light 
cavalry  composed  of  native  Algerians,  officered  by  French- 
men, except  in  the  subaltern  grades.  The  cuirassiers  and 
carbineers  (twelve  regiments)  were  classed  as  heavy  or 
reserve  cavalry;  the  lancers  and  dragoons  (twenty-two  reg- 
iments), as  cavalry  of  the  line;  and  the  rest  (twenty-nino 
regiments),  as  light  cavalry.  Each  regiment  had  four 


316  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

squadrons  in  the  field,  besides  which  the  light  and  part 
of  the  heavy  cavalry  had  two  depot  squadrons  to  each 
regiment;  the  other  regiments  had  one  depot  squadron 
each.  The  squadrons  averaged  125  sabers.  The  formation 
of  brigades  and  divisions  was  similar  to  that  of  correspond- 
ing units  in  the  German  Army. 

The  inefficiency  of  the  Prussian  cavalry  in  1866  had 
been  taken  to  heart  by  its  own  officers,  and  in  the  inter- 
val between  the  two  wars  with  Austria  and  France  the  in- 
struction of  the  Prussian  horsemen  had  continually  held 
in  view  a  more  vigorous  and  enterprising  action  in  the  field. 
The  result  was  visible  at  the  opening  of  the  campaign  in 
France,  the  German  cavalry  being  used  in  detached  action 
with  a  vigor  that  astonished  and  disconcerted  its  oppo- 
nents. The  German  cavalry  "overflowed  the  country  miles, 
and  even  several  marches,  ahead  of  the  main  body  of  the 
infantry,"  scouting  vigilantly,  reporting  every  movement 
of  the  enemy,  and  screening  its  own  army  from  him  with 
a  veil  of  horsemen.  In  this  duty  the  vigilant  Germans 
found  an  opponent  deficient  in  enterprise,  and  bewildered 
by  a  method  of  cavalry  employment  which,  in  the  French 
Army,  had  become  a  lost  art.  So  negligently  did  the 
French  cavalry  perform  the  duty  of  'Security  and  informa- 
tion that  Forton's  cavalry  division  was  surprised  in  its 
own  camp  at  Vionville;  and  at  Beaumont  there  was  a  re- 
markable surprise,  which  can  best  be  described  in  the 
words  of  Borbstaedt:*  "In  the  most  inexcusable  way, 
nothing  whatever  was  done  on  the  part  of  the  cavalry  to 
reconnoiter  the  wooded  country  south  of  Beaumont,  in 
order  to  ascertain  with  certainty  whether  the  supposition 
of  the  enemy  being  on  his  march  to  Stenay  was  founded 

in  fact  or  not The  French  troops  in  the  open 

encampment  south  of  Beaumont  were  enjoying  their  easr-, 
and,  incredible  as  it  may  >seem,  had  not  the  remotest  idea 
of  the  storm  that  was  on  the  point  of  bursting  over  them. 
The  men  were  employed  in  cooking,  and  a  good  many  of 
the  horses  had  been  taken  to  water.  Thus  it  happened 

*Borbstaedt's  "History  of  the  Franco-German  War"  (trans- 
lated by  Dwyer),  pp.  549-50. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  317 

that  the  (Seventh  and  Eighth  Infantry  Divisions,  on  de- 
bouching from  the  woods,  threw  themselves  without  furth- 
er hesitation  on  the  camp,  which  was  only  about  3,000 
paces  distant,  and  completely  surprised  the  enemy's  troops. 
The  Prussian  and  Saxon  shells  falling  in  the  midst  of  tht» 
camp  was  what,  all  of  a  sudden,  alarmed  the  French,  ey- 
eryone  rushing  to  take  up  his  arms;  but  Prussian  infantry 
had  meanwhile  reached  the  camp  and  put  to  flight  the  iso- 
lated bodies  of  troops  that  formed  themselves.  The  French 
artillery  had  no  time  to  harness  their  horses  and  put  them 
to  the  guns,  which  were  completely  abandoned.  All  the 
tents,  the  entire  baggage,  and  considerable  camp  stores 
fell  into  the  hands  of  the  victors,  and  the  remnants  of  the 
French  division  sought  safety  in  most  disorderly  flight 
through  Beaumont  up  to  the  heights  north  of  the  town. 
where  the  remaining  three  brigades  of  the  corps  had  been 
encamped." 

On  the  field  of  battle  both  the  French  and  the  German 
cavalry  were  used  with  energy  and  great  gallantry ; ,  but 
the  desperate  cavalry  charges,  in  almost  every  instance, 
resulted  solely  in  appalling  losses  on  the  part  of  the  assail- 
ants.* At  Worth  (August  6,  1870),  Michel's  cuirassiers  and 
part  of  Nansouty's  lancers  charged  upon  the  infantry  of 
the  German  XI.  Corps,  and  were  almost  annihilated  by 
rifle  fire.  Later  in  the  day  Bonnemain's  division  of  heavy 
cavalry  attacked  the  same  corps,  making  the  charge 
through  hop-gardens  and  over  other  impracticable  ground, 
and  was  repulsed  with  destructive  losses.  At  Mars-la-Tour 
(August  16,  1870),  a  number  of  charges  were  made  by  the 
cavalry  of  both  armies,  the  battle  furnishing  instances 
of  the  action  of  cavalry  against  cavalry,  and  cavalry 
against  infantry.  The  greatest  cavalry  action  of  the  day 
was  between  the  German  cavalry  division  of  General  von 
Barby  and  the  French  cavalry  division  of  General  Legrand, 
six  regiments  in  each.  The  French  division  was  formed 
as  follows:  In  the  first  line  were  two  regiments  of  hus- 
sars; in  the  second  line*  a  regiment  of  dragoons  was  eche- 
loned to  the  right  of  the  first;  in  the  third  line  a  regiment 
of  lancers  covered  a  part  of  the  second  line,  and  extended 

—22— 


318  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

beyond  its  right;  a  regiment  of  dragoons  was  similarly 
formed  in  the  fourth  line;  and  in  the  fifth  line  a  regiment 
of  chasseurs  d'Afrique  was  echeloned  behind  the  left  flank 
of  the  fourth.  (See  Figure  33.) 

The  formation  of  Von  Barby's  division  was  quite  sim- 
ilar, the  left  flank  being  protected  by  echelons  to  the  rear. 
The  two  divisions  coming  together,  there  was  a  series  of 
shocks,  and  of  flank  attacks  by  successive  echelons  on 
either  side,  until  the  two  divisions  were  commingled  in  a 
eonfused  mass  of  struggling  horsemen,  vigorously  plying 
the  saber  and  lance  in  the  mellay.  The  French  were  final- 
ly crowded  back,  and  their  leader  sounded  the  recall.  The 
retreating  French  were  pursued  by  some  squadrons  of  the 
German  cavalry  until  the  latter  came  under  the  fire  of 

fi5y&9\33. 
' Charge  of  @9*eA    Cotxrtry    oj   / 

7 /to*  ZVftvi. 


infantry  and  dismounted  chasseurs  d'Afrique,  when  they 
retired  and  rejoined  the  main  body  of  the  cavalry  division, 
which  had  been  assembled  by  Von  Barby,  on  the  ground 
where  the  collision  had  occurred. 

In  only  one  of  the  many  cavalry  combats  in  the  bat- 
tle of  Mars-la-Tour  was  anything  really  accomplished.  In 
this  case,  a  headlong  charge  by  General  von  L»redow,  with 
Six  squadrons,  composed  equally  of  cuirassiers  and  Uhlans, 
upon  the  French  infantry,  checked  the  advance  of  the 
French  Sixth  Corps,  and  gained  time  for  the  arrival  of 
tbe  German  infantry,  so  sorely  needed  on  that  part  of 
tbe  field. 


ORGANIZATION   AND   TACTICS.  319 

At  Sedan  a  desperate  charge  was  made  upon  the 
Prussian  i-ifantry  by  a  great  body  of  French  cavalry,  con- 
sisting of  the  heavy  divisions  of  Margueritte  and  Bonne- 
main,  and  several  regiments  detached  from  army  corps. 
This  was  the  greatest  cavalry-infantry  combat  of  the  war. 
Nothing  in  the  existing  circumstances  justified  the  charge, 
except,  perhaps,  the  desperate  position  of  the  French 
army;  for  the  Prussian  infantry,  on  which  the  attack  fell, 
was  strong  in  numbers  (seventeen  battalions),  unshaken 
by  infantry  or  artillery  fire,  well  supplied  with  ammuni- 
tion, and  possessed  of  the  confidence  resulting  from  a  suc- 
cession of  great  victories.  The  charge  is  thus  described 
by  General  Sheridan,  who  was  an  eye-witness: 

"Presently,  up  out  of  the  little  valley  where  Floing 
is  located,  oame  the  Germans,  deploying  just  on  the  rim 
of  the  plateau  a  very  heavy  skirmish  line,  supported  by 
a  line  of  battle  at  close  distance.  When  these  skirmish- 
ers appeared,  the  French  infantry  had  withdrawn  withia 
its  intrenched  lines,  but  a  strong  body  of  their  cavalry, 
already  formed  in  a  depression  to  the  right  of  the  Floing 
road,  now  rode  at  the  Germans  in  gallant  tstyle,  going 
clear  through  the  dispersed  skirmishers  to  the  main  line 
of  battle.  Here  the  slaughter  of  the  French  was  awful, 
for,  in  addition  to  the  deadly  volleys  from  the  solid  battal- 
ions of  their  enemies,  the  skirmishers,  who  had  rallied  in 
knots  at  advantageous  places,  were  now  delivering  a  se- 
vere and  effective  fire.  The  gallant  horsemen,  therefore, 
had  to  retire  precipitately,  but  re-forming  in  a  depression, 
they  again  undertook  the  hopeless  task  of  breaking  the 
German  infantry,  making  in  all  four  successive  charges. 
Their  ardor  and  pluck  were  of  no  avail,  however,  for  the 
Germans,  growing  stronger  every  minute  by  the  accession 
of  troops  from  Floing,  met  the  fourth  attack  in  such  large 
force  that,  even  before  coming  in  contact  with  their  ad- 
versaries, the  French  broke  and  retreated  to  the  protec- 
tion of  the  intrenchments,  where,  from  the  beginning  of 
the  combat,  had  been  lying  plenty  of  idle  infantry,  some 


320  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

of  which  at  least,  it  seemed  plain  to  me,  ought  to  have 
been  thrown  into  the  fight."* 

After  Sedan,  the  war  produced  no  cavalry  action  of 
importance.  All  the  engagements  thus  far  considered 
were,  on  the  part  of  the  cavalry,  combats  with  sword  and 
Jance  alone.  Dismounted  fire  action  was  effectively  used 
by  the  French  at  Spicheren,  where  the  necessity  of  send- 
ing reinforcements  to  the  front  left  only  two  squadrons 
of  dragoons  and  a  company  of  sappers  to  hold  the  village 
of  Forbach.  On  the  approach  of  the  advance  guard  of  the 
Prussian  Thirteenth  Division,  the  dragoons  opened  fire,  and 
for  some  time  held  the  enemy  in  check.  Finally,  when 
both  of  their  flanks  had  been  turned,  the  dragoons  re- 
mounted, charged  the  enemy,  and  retired  to  another  posi- 
tion in  rear.  At  Noisseville,  on  the  31st  of  August,  a 
squadron  of  Clerembault's  cavalry  division  dismounted  and 
held  the  German  infantry  in  check  with  its  fire  until  the 
division  was  rejoined  by  its  own  infantry,  from  which  it 
had  been  separated.  On  the  same  occasion  a  regiment 
of  dragoons,  belonging  to  the  same  division,  dismounted 
and  drove  the  enemy  out  of  the  viMage  of  Coincy,  which 
they  held  until  relieved  by  their  own  infantry.  At  Pont- 
a-Mousson  (August  15th),  a  squadron  of  Prussian  hussars, 
using  the  carbine,  skirmished  successfully  with  a  detach- 
ment of  French  infantry,  which  they  drove  out  of  the 
village,  thus  opening  a  passage  for  the  cavalry.  But  the 
use  of  fire  action  was  very  slight.  Borbstaedt  says  that 
the  French  cavalry  received  Von  Barby's  charge  with  a 
volley  from  their  carbines;  and  Bonie  says  that  in  the 
same  engagement  the  German  dragoons  fired  upon  the 
advancing  French  cavalry;  but  both  statements  have  been 
denied. 

The  inability  of  the  German  cavalry  to  use  fire-arms 
effectively  led  it,  more  than  once,  into  an  embarrassing 
position.  The  day  after  the  battle  of  Weissenburg,  two 
cavalry  regiments,  conducting  a  reconnaissance  towards 
Hagenau,  were  stopped  by  a  small  party  of  French  in- 
fantry at  a  broken  bridge  and  compelled  to  retire;  and  in 

*Sheridan's  "Memoirs,"  Vol.   II.,   p.   401. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  321 

the  winter  campaign  on  the  Loire  the  conditions  were  to 
the  German  cavalry  mortifying  in  the  extreme.  The  coun- 
try was  filled  with  Franc-tireurs,  who  boldly  stated  that 
they  had  "come  out  to  hunt  Prussians,"  and  the  Uhlans, 
with  their  lances  and  sabers,  were  obliged  either  to  avoid 
every  village  and  wood  occupied  by  these  undisciplined 
and  untrained  bands  of  men  who  could  shoot,  or  else  to 
bring  infantry  along  for  their  own  protection.  Their  mo- 
bility was  thus  reduced  to  a  minimum,  and  it  was  only 
when  the  Uhlans  armed  themselves  with  rifles  captured 
from  the  French  that  they  again  began  to  be  of  value  to 
their  army.* 

Raiding  seens  not  to  have  been  thought  of  by  either 
army  in  this  great  war,  though  the  French  might,  it  would 
seem,  have  made  profitable  use  of  this  method  of  employ- 
ing cavalry.  Bazaine  allowed  15,000  cavalry  to  be  shut  up 
in  Metz,  where  they  were  utterly  useless,  when  he  might, 
immediately  after  the  battle  of  Gravelotte,  have  sent  them 
out  to  destroy  the  railroad  communications  to  the  east  of 
the  Moselle,  on  which  all  three  German  armies  depended, 
relying  upon  their  making  their  way  safely  to  Paris  or 
the  south  of  France.  If  successful,  the  results  of  the  raid 
would  have  been  momentous,  at  least  checking  for  a  time 
the  progress  of  the  German  armies;  if  unsuccessful,  the 
raid  would  have  resulted  in  the  capture  of  the  cavalry, 
which  eventually  had  to  surrender  in  Metz  without  having 
done  the  enemy  any  damage  whatsoever. 

In  organization,  armament,  and  tactics  the  cavalry 
of  the  Franco-German  War  did  not  differ  appreciably  from 
that  of  the  Napoleonic  era.  In  the  European  cavalry  serv- 
ice the  art  of  war  seems  to  have  been  at  a  standstill, 
and  the  cavalry  constituted  just  such  a  force  as  Hamley 
must  have  had  in  mind  when  he  stated  that,  although 
improvements  in  weapons  had  materially  affected  the  ac- 
tions of  infantry  and  artillery,  science  had  done  nothing 
for  cavalry.**  It  might  have  been  expected  that  the  large, 

*See  essay  on  "Mounted  Riflemen,"  by  Captain  J.  R.  Lumley, 
late  Thirteenth  Prussian  Uhlans,  in  Ordnance  Notes,  No.  169. 
**"Operations  of  War,"  p.  362. 


322  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

carefully  trained  and  thoroughly  appointed  force  of  cav- 
alry in  the  German  Army  would  have  produced  results 
commensurate  with  its  numbers  ana  the  cost  of  its  main- 
tenance; but  it  did  not,  and  the  French  cavalry  did  vastly 
less.     Not  one  battle  was  decided  by  the  use  of  cavalry; 
only  one  charge  (Von  Bredow's)  produced  appreciable  re- 
sults; and  while  the  detached  action  of  the  German  cav- 
alry was  brilliantly  performed  in  the  earlier  stages  of  the 
war,  its  success  was  mainly  due  to  the  incapacity  of  the 
opposing  cavalry,  and  it  failed  as  soon  as  it  encountered 
bodies  of  partisans  who  could  use  the  rifle.     When  we 
compare  the  enormous  results  wrought  by  the  American 
cavalry  in  the  War  of  Secession  with  the  feeble  service 
rendered  by  the  German  cavalry  in  France  a  few  years 
later,  it  is  impossible  to  avoid  the  conclusion  that  there 
was  something  radically  wrong  in  the  tactics  and  arms 
of  European  cavalry.    The  Germans  were  not  slow  to  ap- 
preciate their  defects  and  the  causes  of  the   same;  and 
the  following  views  of  Von  Schmidt,  expressed  soon  after 
the  close  of  the  war,  have  been  carefully  considered  in  the 
reforms  since  made  in  the  German  cavalry  service:    "The 
experiences  of  the  last  campaign  have  proved  irrefutably 
that  it  is  indispensably  necessary  that  cavalry  should,  to 
a  certain  extent,  be  able  to  fight  on  foot,  if  it  wrould  be 
prepared  to  fulfill  all  the  tasks  which,  without  demand- 
ing too  much  from  it,  will,  in  certain  situations,  fall  to 
its  lot  in  the  field.     Although  during  the  last  campaiga 
abnormal  circumstances  'required  that  cavalry,  in  order  to 
fulfill  the  task  entrusted  to  it,  should  dismount  and  ex- 
change the  saber  for  the  carbine  more  frequently,  perhaps, 
than  will  hereafter  be  necessary,  yet  similar  circumstances 
will  arise  in  future  wars  and  render  the   same  mode   of 
action  necessary,  especially  when  hostile  cavalry  divisions 
endeavor    to    prevent    our    screening    and    reconnoitering 
operations  by  occupying   defiles   and   localities   with   dis- 
mounted men.     If  in  such  cases  the  cavalry  had  to  call 
upon  infantry,   it  would  suicidally  degrade  itself  to   the 
rank  of  a  secondary  arm,  and  surrender  the  last  vestige 
of  its  independence.    However  important  the  services  that 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  323 

might  in  certain  cases  be  rendered  by  battalions  of  in- 
fantry being  attached  to  cavalry  divisions,  such  a  proced- 
ure would  in  the  further  course  of  operations  be  very  prej- 
udicial to  the  cavalry;  the  infantry  would  be  like  a  leaden 
weight  attached  to  its  feet,  destroying  its  mobility  and 
rapidity  of  movement,  in  which  the  whole  power  of  the 
arm  resides."* 

The  Russo-Turlcisli  War. — In  the  Russian  campaign  in 
Turkey,  in  1877,  the  invading  army,  numbering  about 
200,000  combatants  of  all  arms,  contained  204  squadrons 
of  cavalry,  aggregating  about  37,000  sabers.  The  cavalry 
was  composed  of  dragoons,  hussars,  lancers,  and  Cossacks, 
in  about  equal  proportions.  The  dragoons  were  armed 
with  the  saber  and  musket  with  bayonet;  the  hussars  and 
lancers,  with  the  saber,  lance,  and  revolver  for  the  front 
rank,  and  the  saber,  carbine,  and  revolver  for  the  rear 
rank;  and  the  Cossacks,  with  lance,  musket,  and  curved 
sword.  Each  regiment  consisted  of  four  squadrons,  and 
each  cavalry  division  was  composed  of  four  regiments. 

The  Turkish  cavalry  numbered  85  squadrons  of  reg- 
ular troops,  armed  with  saber  and  Winchester  rifle.  In 
addition  to  these  were  considerable  numbers  of  irregular 
cavalry,  known  as  bashi-bazouks,  who  are  characterized  by 
Greene  as  "insubordinate  and  unruly,  occupied  in  maraud- 
ing and  pillaging  instead  of  reconnoitering,  cowardly  and 
disobedient  in  battle,  and  of  no  military  service  whatever 
to  the  Turks." 

The  only  cavalry  operations,  either  on  the  field  of 
battle  or  in  the  theater  of  war,  worthy  of  note  in  this 
campaign,  are  found  in  Gourko's  first  expedition  across 
the  Balkans.  On  the  30th  of  June,  a  few  days  after  the 
Russian  Army  had  crossed  the  Danube,  General  Gourko 
was  directed  to  push  south  to  Tirnova  and  >Selvi,  recon- 
noiter  the  surrounding  country,  and  be  prepared,  on  the 
receipt  of  orders,  to  seize  a  pass  in  the  Balkan  Mountains, 
for  the  passage  of  the  main  army.  He  was,  at  the  same 
time,  to  send  cavalry  on  a  raid  to  the  south  of  the  moun- 
tains to  destroy  the  railroads  and  telegraphs,  and  do  such 

*"Instructions  for  Cavalry"  (translated  by  Bell),  p.  186. 


324  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

other  danage  as  might  be  possible.  The  force  under 
Gourko's  command  consisted  of  8,000  infantry,  4,000  cav- 
alry, and  32  guns. 

"On  the  19th  of  July,  the  Shipka  pass  was  in  th€» 
hands  of  the  Russians,  and  the  principal  cbjects  of  Gour- 
ko's expedition  were  accomplished.  In  eight  days  from 
the  time  of  leaving  Tirnova,  and  sixteen  days  from  the 
Danube,  he  had  gained  possession  of  three  passes  (Hain- 
kioi,  Travna,  and  Shipka),  covering  a  length  of  thirty  miles 
in  the  BaJkans,  and  one  of  them  the  great  high-road  from 
Bulgaria  to  Roumelia;  he  had  dispersed  various  Turkish 
detachments,  numbering  in  all  about  10,000  men,  had 
captured  11  guns  and  a  large  quantity  of  ammunition, 
clothing,  and  provisions,  and  had  disarmed  the  Turkish, 
population  throughout  a  large  part  of  the  valley  of  the 
Tundja;  and  all  with  the  loss  of  less  than  500  men.  His 
men  and  horses  had  lived  off  the  country  and  what  they 
captured  from  the  Turks,  and  on  the  19th  they  still  had 
three  days'  rations  of  hard  bread  (out  of  the  five  they  had 
taken  with  them)  untouched."* 

After  resting  a  few  days  at  Shipka,  Gourko  sent  raid- 
ing detachments  southward,  which  destroyed  a  number  of 
bridges  and  culverts,  several  railway  stations,  and  some 
miles  of  railroad  and  telegraph  line,  besides  gaining  im- 
portant information  in  regard  to  the  location  of  the  Turk- 
ish forces.  Pushing  forward  some  thirty  miles  from  Ship- 
ka, Gourko  was  finally  pressed  back  by  superior  forces  of 
Turks,  50,000  of  whom  he  held  in  check  for  two  days.  Hia 
cavalry  passed  to  the  northern  side  of  the  Balkans,  where 
it  rested  and  refitted,  the  passes  of  Shipka  and  Tirnova 
being  held  by  the  infantry. 

"This  expedition  of  Gouirko,"  says  Greene,  "was  more 
than  a  mere  cavalry  raid;  it  was  an  admirably  conducted 
movement  of  an  advance  guard  composed  of  all  arms. 
With  8,000  infantry,  4,000  cavalry,  and  32  guns,  it  had. 
in  less  than  a  month,  gained  possession  of  one  of  the  prin- 
cipal passes  of  the  Balkans,  from  which  the  Russians, 
though  terribly  attacked,  never  let  go  their  hold,  and  which 

*Greene's  "Russian  Campaigns  in  Turkey,"  p.  174. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  325 


they  finally  used  in  January  for  the  passage  of  a 
portion  of  their  army.  It  had  carried  a  panic  throughout 
the  whole  of  Turkey  between  the  Balkans  and  Constanti- 
nople; and  its  scouting  parties  had  penetrated  to  within 
seventy  miles  of  Adrianople,  the  second  city  of  the  em- 
pire, and  had  destroyed  the  railroad  and  telegraph  on  the 
two  principal  lines;  finally,  it  had  gathered  accurate  in- 
formation concerning  the  strength  and  positions  of  the 
large  Turkish  force  advancing  toward  the  Balkans.  In 
this  expedition  alone  of  the  whole  campaign  was  the  cav- 
alry energetically  handled.  On  several  occasions  it  fought 
on  foot;  it  was  constantly  on  the  move;  it  subsisted  on  the 
country;  and  on  the  29th  and  30th  of  July  fourteen  squad- 
rons of  it  (1,800  men)  held  their  own  against  4,000  infantry 
and  several  hundred  bashi-bozouks  and  Tcherkesses;  and  it 
finally  covered  Gourko's  retreat  before  a  force  more  than 
three  times  superior  to  his  own.  The  irregular  cavalry 
of  the  Turks  never  waited  long  enough  to  come  to  hand- 
to-hand  blows;  on  one  occasion  (July  16th),  while  fight- 
ig  on  foot  against  infantry,  the  dragoons  advanced  with 
fixed  bayonets,  but  the  Turks  retired  without  accepting  a 
hand-to-hand  struggle."* 

In  the  campaign  in  Egypt,  in  1882,  the  British  cav- 
alry vigorously  pursued  the  defeated  enemy  after  the  bat- 
tle of  Tel-el-Kebir,  and,  pushing  on  more  than  fifty  miles 
ahead  of  the  infantry,  seized  Cairo  within  less  than  forty- 
eight  hours  after  the  battle. 

At  the  battle  of  La  Placilla,  in  Chili,  in  1891,  the  Con- 
gressional cavalry,  by  a  bold  charge  upon  the  right  flank 
of  the  Gobernistas,  decided  the  battle;**  and  the  cavalry 
of  the  Gobernistas  also  distinguished  itself  by  covering 
the  retreat  of  the  disorganized  army  so  efficiently  that 
the  defeated  troops  were  able  to  reach  Valparaiso  almost 
without  molestation. 

Conclusions.  —  In  considering  the  use  of  cavalry  in  mod- 
ern wars,  we  cannot  fail  to  be  impressed  with  the  follow- 
ing manifest  facts: 

*Greene's   "Russian  Campaigns  In  Turkey,"  p.  183. 
**Offiei'al  Report  of  General  Estanislao  del  Canto,  commanding 
the  Congressional  army. 


326  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

1.  The  most  successful  cavalry  on  the  battle-field  has 
always  been  that  which  possessed  the  power  of  giving  the 
most  effective  shock;  in  other  words,  the  one  which  united 
the  greatest  mobility  with  the  highest  power  of  cohesion 
and  the  most  effective  use  of  their  weapons  in  the  mellay. 

2.  Mounted  fire  action  is  often  useful  in  pursuit,  and 
exceptional  circumstances  have  even  made  it  useful,   in 
some  cases,  before  the  charge;  but  cavalry  depending  up- 
on  such  action  instead  of  the  shock  has  rarely  accom- 
plished important  results  on  the  field  of  battle,  and  never 
against  good  opposing  cavalry  relying  upon  the  shock. 

3.  Extreme  mobility  is  an  essential  characteristic  of 
good  cavalry.     An  army  having  only  a  good  heavy  cav- 
alry, irresistible  in  battle,  may  nevertheless  be  ruined  ;n 
the  course  of  a  campaign  by  an  adversary  possessing  only 
a  highly  mobile  and  efficient  light  cavalry. 

4.  Cavalry    unable    to    deliver    effective    dismounted 
fire  action  is  essentially  a  dependent  arm,  unable  to  act 
on  a  tactical  defensive,  and  easily  checked  by  insignificant 
bodies  of  hostile  infantry  well  posted  in  defensive  posi- 
tions.    The  use  of  cavalry  in  reconnaissance,  in  raids,  'n 
pursuit,  and  in  holding  defensive  positions,  requires  that 
it  should  be  armed  with  a  good  fire-arm  and  be  expert  m 
its  use.     In  this  way  only  can  it  act  with  independence 
and  vigor. 

5.  The  dragoon,  being  armed  and   trained   to   fight 
either  on  horseback  or  on  foot,  fulfills  all  the  requirement 
of  cavalry,  both  in  battle  and  in  detached  action. 

In  the  discussion  of  cavalry  tactics  in  the  following 
pages,  it  will  be  assumed,  therefore,  that  the  cavalry  con- 
sists of  men  equally  capable  of  mounted  action  with  the 
saber  and  dismounted  action  with  the  carbine;  in  other 
words,  of  dragoons. 


ORGANIZATION    AND    TACTICS.  327 

CHAPTER  XL 

HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OP    FIELD    ARTILLERY. 

"In  proportion  as  the  importance  of  fire-arms  ha?  increased, 
and  their  ascendency  in  the  field  of  battle  become  established,  so 
also,  step  by  step,  has  the  influence  of  artillery  advanced." — Van 
Sckell. 

Ancient  Missile  Machines.  —  Artillery,  as  the  term  is 
now  understood,  was  a  direct  result  <of  the  invention  of 
gunpowder.  Before  that  momentous  event,  the  artillery 
consisted  of  machines  for  throwing  heavy  missiles,  the 
motive  force  being  given  by  the  sudden  release  of  a  weight 
or  spring  which  had  been  raised  or  stretched  by  means  of 
windlasses  or  levers.  The  best  known  of  these  weapons 
were  the  ballista,  the  onager,  the  catapult,  and  the  sprin- 
gal;  the  first  two  throwing  projectiles  by  means  of  a 
spring  from  a  bag  or  wooden  bucket,  and  the  last  twi) 
being  of  the  nature  of  gigantic  crossbows,  throwing  sim- 
ilar missiles  from  a  trough  or  platform.  These  machines 
were  of  many  different  kinds,  but  all  were  operated  on 
the  same  general  principle.  Some  are  saia  to  have  been 
capable  of  throwing  projectiles  weighing  nearly  700  pounds 
a  distance  of  more  than  1,000  yards;  but  this  is  probably 
an  exaggeration,  as  many  of  the  most  important  castles 
and  fortresses  were  built  on  sites  commanded  by  hills  not 
more  than  four  or  five  hundred  yards  away.  It  is  certain, 
however,  that  both  their  range  and  their  power  were  con- 
siderable. Their  projectiles  consisted  mainly  of  stones, 
arrows,  beams,  and  incendiary  missiles;  though  all  man- 
ner of  things,  including  putrid  carcasses  and  infected  hu- 
man corpses,  were  sometimes  thrown  from  them  into  be- 
sieged towns  and  castles.  Though  used  mainly  in  sieges, 
these  engines  sometimes  constituted  a  rude  sort  of  field 
artillery,  though,  owing  to  their  lack  of  mobility,  they 
were  not  of  great  value  or  general  use  on  the  battle-field. 


328  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

Early  Cannon. — It  is  a  remarkable  fact  that  the  date 
of  the  invention  of  gunpowder,  the  name  of  its  inventor, 
and  the  time  of  its  first  application  to  the  pin  poses  of  war 
are  all  matters  of  uncertainty.  It  is  claimed  that  gun- 
powder was  early  known  to  the  Chinese  and  to  the  inhab: 
itants  of  India;  and  the  Saracens  are  said  to  have  used 
it  in  Spain  in  the  thirteenth  century,  though  this  was 
some  time  before  its  alleged  invention  by  Schwartz  in 
Germany.  It  is  known  that  cannon  came  into  use  in  Eu- 
rope during  the  fourteenth  century,  and  it  is  claimed  that 
they  first  appeared  in  battle  at  Cre^cy  (1346),  where  they 
were  used  by  the  English.  There  is,  however,  no  well- 
authenticated  mention  of  their  use  in  "battle  before  the  lat- 
ter part  of  the  fifteenth  century;  and,  indeed,  if  used  in 
the  field  before  that  time,  their  insignificant  power  and 
lack  of  mobility  must  have  given  them  but  little  import- 
ance in  action. 

The  earliest  cannon  were  simply  tubes,  closer!  at  one 
end,  in  which  the  powder  was  exploded  by  means  of  ig- 
nition through  a  touch-hole.  These  rude  guns  were  at 
first  known  as  vases  and  bombards,  the  former  being  in 
shape  not  unlike  a  druggist's  mortar,  and  the  latter  also 
of  a  conical  rather  than  cylindrical  form.  The  bombard 
was  usually  mounted  on  trestles,  or  on  a  rude  carriage, 
the  fore  part  of  which  was  supported  by  two  wheels,  while 
the  trail  rested  on  the  ground.  In  range  and  accuracy 
they  were  so  insignificant  that  it  required  two  centuries 
for  them  to  overcome  the  competition  of  the  old  missile 
engines;  and  the  crudeness  of  their  construction  was  such 
that  they  were  almost  as  dangerous  to  friend  as  to  foe.* 
The  first  guns  were  generally  constructed  of  iron  bars, 
soldered  or  welded  together,  and  strengthened  with  iron 

*The  old  Scotch  chronicler,  Robert  Lyndsay  of  Pitscottie,  in- 
cidentally gives  a  picture  of  the  faulty  construction  of  the  early 
cannon,  in  his  quaint  narrative  of  the  death  of  James  II.  of  Scot- 
land in  1460:  "While  this  Prince,  more  curious  than  became  him 
or  the  majesty  of  a  king,  did  stand  near  hand  the  gunners  when 
the  artillery  was  discharged,  his  thigh-bone  was  dung  in  two  with 
the  piece  of  a  misframed  gun  that  brake  in  shooting,  by  the  which 
he  was  stricken  to  the  ground  and  died  hastily." 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  329 

hoops.  Sometimes  they  were  made  of  hammered  iron,  or 
plates  of  iron  or  copper  with  lead  run  between  them;  and 
at  a  later  date  they  were  made  of  bell-  or  gun-metal.  As 
early  as  1453,  the  Turks  employed  brass  cannon  of  enor- 
mous size,  which  were  used  without  carriages,  being  rolled 
along  with  hand-spikes  and  fired  from  the  ground,  the 
muzzle  being  elevated  with  wedges,  and  the  breech  sunk 
in  the  earth.  The  most  famous  of  these  was  the  great 
gun  of  Mahomet  II.,  the  bore  of  which  had  "a  measure 
of  twelve  palms,"  which  fired  a  stone  ball  weighing  above 
600  pounds,  and  which  required  for  its  transportation  200 
men  and  sixty  oxen.*  The  use  of  cannon  was  at  first  lim- 
ited almost  exclusively  to  the  attack  and  defense  of  cas- 
tles and  walled  towns;  but  by  the  end  of  the  fifteenth 
century  bronze  guns  began  to  appear  on  the  field  of  battle. 
They  were  of  all  imaginable  calibers,  had  a  great  length 
of  bore,  were  mounted  on  heavy  ana  unwieldy  carriages 
without  limbers,  and  fired  projectiles  of  stone,  lead,  iron, 
or  bronze.  Mu»:n  more  dependence  seems  to  have  been 
placed  upon  their  moral  than  upon  their  physical  effect, 
and  the  noise  of  the  discharge  seems  to  have  been  re- 
garded as  a  matter  of  great  importance. 

The  Franco-German-Spanish  Wars.  —  In  the  wars  be- 
tween Frauds  I.  of  France  and  Charles  V.  of  Germany 
and  Spain,  we  first  find  artillery  playing  a  part  of  s^me 
importance  in  battle.  The  old  bombards  had  disappeared, 
and  a  rude,  but  genuine,  artillery  had  taken  their  place. 
Culverins  (usually  18-pounders),  drawn  by  oxen,  consti- 
tuted the  siege  train,  while  the  field  artillery,  though  con- 
taining many  kinds  of  pieces  of  diverse  calibers,  consisted 
mainly  of  2-,  4-,  6-,  and  8-pounders,**  known  as  falcons- 
•falconets,  and  sakers.  Trunnions  of  sufficient  strength  to 
withstand  the  force  of  the  recoil  having  been  invented 
some  years  before,  the  easy  elevation  and  depression  of 
the  piece  became  possible,  and  carriages  were  devised 
which  answered  at  once  for  the  transportation  and  service 

*For  an  interesting  description  of  this  famous  gun,  see  Gib- 
bon's "Decline  and  Fall  of  the  Roman  Empire,"  Chapter  LXVIII. 
**So  classed  from  the  weight  of  the  projectile. 


330  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

of  the  piece.  The  personnel  of  the  artillery  consisted  of 
gunners  taken  from  the  fortresses  and  men  hired  as  their 
assistants;  while  for  transportation,  dependence  was  now, 
and  for  very  many  years  afterwards,  placed  upon  drivers 
and  animals  hired  or  impressed  in  the  theater  of  opera- 
tions. On  the  field,  the  tactics  of  the  artillery  consisted 
merely  in  deploying  the  guns  in  advance  of  the  line  of 
troops,  where  they  were  usually  able  to  fire  only  a  few 
rounds;  for  if  the  army  advanced,  their  lack  of  mobility 
did  not  permit  them  to  accompany  it,  and  if  the  troops 
were  driven  back,  the  pieces  generally  fell  into  the  hands 
of  the  enemy.  Considerable  skill  was  shown  in  concealing 
the  guns  between  masses  of  troops  up  to  the  moment  of 
the  engagement,  in  order  that  the  enemy  might  not  make 
such  dispositions  as  to  guard  against  their  effect. 

At  Marignano  (1515)  the  French  artillery,  consisting 
of  70  large  cannon  and  300  smaller  ones,  was  posted  so 
as  to  sweep  a  causeway  over  which  the  Swiss  infantry, 
then  regarded  as  the  most  redoubtable  troops  in  Europe, 
moved  to  the  assault.  Many  desperate  charges  were  re- 
pulsed, mainly  by  the  fire  of  the  guns,  and  the  battle  re- 
sulted in  the  victory  of  the  French;  being  probably  the 
first  important  action  ever  won  by  artillery. 

At  Pavia  (1525)  the  French  artillery  nearly  scored  an- 
other great  victory.  It  had  thrown  the  German  Emperor^ 
troops  into  great  confusion,  when  Francis,  by  an  ill-timed 
attack  with  his  gendarmery,  masked  the  front  of  his  guns, 
and,  by  silencing  their  fire,  lost  the  battle. 

The  French  Religious  War  (1585-94). — In  the  war  be- 
tween the  Catholics  and  Huguenots  in  France,  the  skill- 
ful use  of  artiMery  is  supposed  to  have  contributed  not  a 
little  to'  the  success  of  Henry  IV.  He  is  said  to  have  dis- 
played considerable  tactical  skill  in  massing  his  guns  at 
the  extremities  of  a  concave  formation,  so  as  to  flank  his 
line  and  subject  the  enemy  to  an  oblique  fire.  He  seema, 
at  any  rate,  to  have  been  impressed  with  the  value  of 
field  artillery;  for  in  the  latter  part  of  his  reign  more  than 
400  pieces  were  made,  varying  in  caliber  from  }-pdrs.  to 
33-pdrs.  They  were  without  limbers,  but  the  33-pdr.  had 


ORGANIZATION"  AND  TACTICS.  331 

a  four-wheeled  carriage,  and  spare  carriages  for  all  the 
large  pieces  accompanied  the  train. 

Henry's  great  contemporary,  Maurice  of  Nassau,  re- 
duced the  number  of  calibers  in  the  Dutch  artillery  to  four ; 
namely,  48-,  24-,  12-,  and  6-pdrs.,  which  were  designated 
as  cannons,  half-cannons,  quarter-cannons,  and  falcons. 
The  strength  of  the  artillery  at  this  time  was  in  the  pro- 
portion of  1  gun  to  every  1,000  men  of  the  other  arms. 

The  Thirty  Years7  War.— The  military  genius  of  Gus- 
tavus  Adolphus,  which  placed  its  stamp  upon  every  feat- 
are  of  military  art,  was  shown  in  the  great  improvement 
of  the  artillery  as  well  as  the  infantry  and  cavalry  of  the 
Swedish  Army.  Recognizing  that  with  artillery,  as  witn 
the  other  arms,  mobility  is  one  of  the  greatest  elements 
of  power,  the  king  created  an  artillery  which  could  not 
only  fire  quickly,  but  could  accompany  the  other  arms 
and  rapidly  change  its  position  according  to  the  exigen- 
cies of  battle.  In  the  war  with  Poland,  he  used  his  fa- 
mous "leather  guns,"  which  were  light  pieces  consisting 
of  a  copper  cylinder  screwed  into  a  brass  breech,  and 
strengthened  with  iron  bands  and  coiled  rope,  the  whole 
covered  with  leather.  These  pieces  not  being  altogether 
satisfactory,  they  were  replaced,  in  the  German  cam- 
paigns, with  iron  4-pdrs.,  each  drawn  by  two  horses;  two 
of  these  guns  being  attached  to  each  infantry  regiment, 
and  placed  under  the  orders  of  its  colonel.  The  cannon- 
eers being  thoroughly  drilled,  and  cartridges  being  used, 
the  guns  were  served  with  great  celerity;  a  cannon  firing 
three  times  as  rapidly  as  an  infantry  musket.  The  guns 
fired  both  solid  shot  and  canister.  In  addition  to  his  light 
regimental  pieces,  Gustavus  employed  strong  batteries  of 
larger  guns,  consisting  of  6-,  12-,  16-,  and  30-pdrs.  These 
batteries  were  placed  on  the  wings  and  in  the  center  of 
the  line,  and  their  fire  had  a  great,  if  not  decisive,  influ- 
ence in  gaining  the  victory  of  Liitzen.  The  guns  in  the 
Swedish  Army  were  in  the  proportion  of  6  to  1,000  men  of 
the  other  arms. 

Opposed  to  this  efficient  artillery,  the  Imperialists 
employed  cumbersome  guns,  each  drawn  by  twenty  horses, 
and  loaded,  by  means  of  a  ladle,  with  loose  powder. 


332  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

About  this  time  bombs  came  into  general  use,  being 
introduced  by  the  French.* 

The  Wars  of  Louis  XIV. — During  the  wars  of  Louis 
XIV.  great  improvements  were  made  in  the  French  artil- 
lery. The  guns  were  made  both  of  bronze  and  iron,  and 
the  calibers  which  were  made  uniform,  were  limited  to 
4-,  6-,  8-,  12-,  18-,  24-,  and  36-pdrs.  Canvas  cartridges  were 
used,  and  grapeshot  was  introduced.  In  the  struggle  be- 
tween William  of  Orange  and  Louis,  howitzers  and  mor- 
tars came  into  use,  and  explosive  projectiles  began  to  be 
used  by  field  artillery,  being  employed  principally  by  the 
English  and  Dutch.  Louis  raised  a  regiment  of  artillery, 
composed  of  gunners  and  artificers,  which  may  be  termed 
the  first  permanent  organization  of  field  artillery.  In 
other  armies,  cannoneers  and  artificers  were  organized  in 
companies,  which  were  distributed  among  the  various  gar- 
risons in  time  of  peace,  but  no  special  corps  or  regimental 
organization  existed.  Louis  also  established  schools  for 
the  instruction  of  officers  in  the  science  of  gunnery. 

The  English  artillery  at  this  time  consisted  of  many 
different  kinds  of  pieces  known  by  various  names.  The 
guns  were  all  enormously  heavy,  a  30-pdr.  "demi-cannon" 
weighing  6,000  Ibs.,  and  a  5-pdr.  "saker"  weighing  1,500 
Ibs.;  these  weights  being  exclusive  of  the  carriages,  which 
were  correspondingly  heavy.  In  the  War  of  the  Spanish 
Succession  the  artillery  of  the  contending  armies  consisted 
of  more  than  4  pieces  to  every  1,000  men;  and  the  guns 
were  used  with  a  degree  of  skill,  and  with  an  effect,  never 
before  known.  The  influence  of  the  artillery  was  strongly 
felt  in  every  battle  of  the  war,  especially  at  Blenheim 
(August  13,  1704)  and  Malplaquet  (September  11,  1709). 

*Bombs  seem,  however,  to  have  been  known  at  a  much  earlier 
period.  Brazen  balls,  filled  with  powder,  are  mentioned  by  a  write! 
of  the  fifteenth  century;  and  in  the  reign  of  Henry  VIII.  there  were 
made  in  England  "certain  hollow  shot  of  cast  yron,  stuffed  with  fire- 
works, or  wild-fire;  whereof  the  bigger  sort  for  the  same  had  screws 
of  yron  to  receive  a  match  to  carry  fire  kindled,  that  the  fire-work 
might  be  set  on  fire  to  break  in  pieces  the  same  hollow  shot;  where- 
cf  the  smallest  piece  hitting  any  man  would  kill  or  spoil  him."— 
Grose's  "Military  Antiquities,"  Vol.  I.,  p.  384. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  333 

In  the  former  battle  a  strong  battery  on  the  right  of  the 
Allies  enfiladed  the  French,  and  contributed  materially 
to  Marlborough's  victory.  In  the  latter  battle  the  same 
commander  advanced  a  battery  of  40  pieces  against  the 
French  center,  where  it  was  used  with  telling  effect.  In 
this  action  the  French  guns  were  also  handled  very  effect- 
ively; and  their  in-creased  mobility  is  shown  by  the  fact 
that,  though  they  continued  to  fire  up  to  the  moment  of 
assault,  only  eight  or  ten  were  taken  by  the  Allies.*  Marl- 
borough  may  be  characterized  as  a  general  who  used  with 
consummate  skill  every  arm  as  he  found  it,  but  who  failed 
to  make  the  slightest  improvement  in  the  organization, 
arms,  or  equipment  of  any;  and  the  close  of  his  campaigns 
found  the  field  artillery  practically  in  the  same  condition 
as  at  the  beginning  of  the  war. 

The  Wars  of  Frederick  the  Great. — In  Frederick's  earlier 
Silesian  campaigns,  though  the  guns  and  carriages  had 
been  lightened,  and  guns  of  the  same  caliber  had  been 
united  in  batteries  and  brigades,  the  pieces  were  still  so 
heavy  that  the  field  artillery  was  sadly  lacking  in  the  es- 
sential quality  of  mobility.  The  horses  employed  in  trans- 
porting the  artillery  were  kept  under  cover  as  near  the 
batteiry  as  safety  permitted,  and  the  guns  were  maneu- 
vered on  the  field  entirely  by  hand.  The  field  artillery 
was  classified  as  batteries  of  position  and  regimental  or 
battalion  guns.  The  former,  consisting  of  heavy  pieces, 
were  assembled  in  large  batteries  on-  the  wings  or  in  front 
of  the  line;  the  latter,  consisting  of  3-  or  4-pdrs.,  were  as- 
signed to  the  infantry,  two  to  each  battalion.  The  follow- 
ing description,  by  Decker,  of  the  tactics  of  the  battalion 

*Duparcq  makes  the  remarkable  statement  that  in  this  battle 
a  French  battery  of  fifty  guns  placed  2,000  of  the  enemy  Jiors  de 
cow&fli  by  a  single  discharge  of  grape.  In  what  manner  the  casu- 
alties caused  by  this  deadly  salvo  were  ascertained  he  neglects,  how- 
ever, to  state,  and  it  can  scarcely  be  believed  that  a  single  discharge 
from  the  great  battery  could  have  inflicted  upon  the  Allies  one-ninth 
of  all  the  losses  suffered  by  them  in  the  battle.  The  statement  may, 
however,  be  accepted,  with  due  allowance,  as  evidence  that  the 
French  artillery  was  used  with  great  effect— a  fact  in  which  all 
accounts  concur. 

-23- 


334  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

guns,  gives  a  good  idea  of  the  crude  handling  of  the  field 
artillery  of  that  time,  and  of  the  short  ranges  at  which 
fire  action  was  then  conducted: 

"The  direction  of  the  two  pieces  was  entrusted  to  a 
corporal,  to  whom  all  initiative  was  forbidden.  The  com- 
mander of  the  battalion  alone  had  the  ri^ht  to  control 
the  guns;  but  he  was  too  much  occupied  with  his  men 
to  think  of  the  cannon.  The  consequence  was  that  the 
two  pieces  marched  quietly  behind  the  battalion,  but  upon 
arriving  within  500  paces  of  the  enemy  they  unlimbered 
and  continued  to  advance,  dragged  by  the  men.  It  is  very 
doubtful  whether  the  corporal  had  any  particular  instruc- 
tions for  the  fight.  We  only  know  that  he  had  orders  not 
to  fire  grape  until  within  350  paces,  and  always  to  keep 
himself  50  paces  in  front  of  the  battalion;  a  very  con- 
venient n?easure  doubtless,  but  which  did  not  take  into 
consideration  that  artillery  is  effective  only  in  position, 
and  not  while  marching.  Worst  of  all,  when  the  battalion 
was  beaten,  the  loss  of  the  pieces  was  almost  always  in- 
evitable, for  want  of  time  to  limber  up."* 

Frederick's  neglect  of  his  artillery  in  his  earlier  cam- 
paigns is  surprising.  With  the  finest  and  most  perfectly 
drilled  infantry  in  the  world,  and  with  a  cavalry  the  like 
of  which  had  never  been  seen  since  the  days  of  Hannibal, 
his  artillery  was  treated  almost  with  contempt,  until  an 
appreciation  of  its  value  was  forced  upon  him  by  his  own 
experience.  In  his  two  greatest  battles  his  artillery  per- 
formed memorable  service.  At  Kossbach  (November  5, 
1757),  18  guns  posted  on  the  Janus  Hill  wrought  havoc  in 
the  ranks  of  the  Allies,  and  greatly  assisted  the  cavalry 
charge  of  Seidlitz;  and  at  Leuthen  (exactly  a  month  later) 
the  Prussian  guns  constantly  playing  on  the  angle  formed 
by  the  Austrian^  as  they  endeavored  to  change  front  to 
meet  Frederick's  flank  attack,  contributed  greatly  to  the 
victory.  Nor  was  Frederick's  artillery  less  valuable  in 
defeat.  Surprised  at  Hochkirch  (October  14,  1758)  by  an 
Austrian  attack  in  the  early  morning,  he  was  saved  from 

*"BatailIes  et  Principaux  Combats  de  la  Guerre  de  Sept  Ans," 
page  9. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  335 

utter  rout  and  destruction  only  by  the  heroic  stand  made 
by  the  artillery,  which  for  some  time  checked  the  Aus- 
trians, and  finally  sacrificed  itself  to  cover  the  retreat  of 
the  rest  of  the  army.  Appreciating  at  last  the  importance 
of  this  arm,  it  received  more  attention  from  him;  and  as 
his  carefully  trained  and  disciplined  infantry  began  to  dis- 
appear in  the  carnage  of  a  long  war,  and  their  places 
began  to  be  taken  by  imperfectly  instructed  recruits,  lie 
increased  the  number  of  guns  in  his  army  until  he  had 
more  than  5  to  every  1,000  men  of  the  other  arms.  He 
also  created  a  horse  artillery,  which  consisted  of  ten  light 
G-pdrs.  sufficiently  mobile  to  accompany  his  cavalry  wher- 
ever it  went.  His  field  artillery  consisted  of  3-,  6-,  and 
12-pdr.  guns,  and  7-,  10-,  and  25-pdr.  howitzers.*  The  or- 
ganization of  Frederick's  artillery  was,  however,  never 
satisfactory;  it  never  had  a  chief  of  suitable  rank,  and  at 
the  time  when  the  king  was  engaged  in  a  struggle  with 
nearly  all  Europe,  the  inspector-general  of  the  Prussian 
artillery  was  only  a  lieutenant-colonel. 

In  both  organization  and  tactics  the  Austrian  artil- 
lery was  much  in  advance  of  that  of  Prussia.  It  consisted 
of  battalion  and  position  guns,  and  was  under  the  imme- 
diate command  of  Prince  Wenzel  Lichtenstein,  who  was 
made  chief  of  artillery  with  appropriate  rank  as  a  general 
officer.  The  position  guns  were  separated  into  four  di- 
visions, designated  as  "reserves,"  one  for  the  center,  one 
for  each  wing,  and  the  fourth  as  a  general  reserve  to  be 
used  as  exigencies  might  require.  Throughout  the  entire 
Seven  Years7  War  the  Austrian  artillery  was  efficiently 
handled.  At  Prague  (May  6,  1757)  it  constituted  the  real 
strength  of  the  Austrians,**  and  at  Torgau  (November  2, 

*"These  designations  of  howitzers  were  taken  from  the  weight 
cf  stone  balls  which  would  fit  their  respective  bores;  their  shells 
weighed  15,  20,  and  50  Ibs.  respectively." — Owen's  "Modern  Artil- 
lery," p.  349. 

"""Redoubts,  cannon  batteries,  as  we  have  said,  stud  all  the 
field;  the  Austrian  stock  of  artillery  is  very  great;  arrangement  of 
it  cunning,  practice  excellent;  does  honor  to  Prince  Lichtenstein, 
and  indeed  is  the  real  force  of  the  Austrians  on  this  occasion." — 
Carlyle's  "History  of  Frederick  the  Great,"  Vol.  V.,  p.  28. 


336  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

1760)  a  remarkable  accident  nearly  caused  the  Austrian 
artillery  to  give  Frederick  a  heavy  defeat.  Daun,  the 
Austrian  commander,  having  taken  up  a  strong  position, 
in  which,  however,  he  was  cramped  for  room,  placed  all 
of  his  general  reserve  artillery  in  his  rear,  mainly  as  a 
means  of  getting  it  out  of  the  way.  Frederick,  directing 
Ziethen  to  attack  in  front,  moved  around  the  Austrian 
right  and  attacked  Daun's  rear.  The  Austrians  changed 
front  to  rear  as  quickly  as  possible,  and  found  their  entire 
new  front  garnished  with  the  accidentally  posted  reserve 
artillery,  consisting  of  400  guns.  These  received  the  Prus- 
sians with  such  a  murderous  fire  of  grape  that  Frederick'* 
attacks  were  frustrated,  and  the  battle  would  probably 
have  resulted  in  a  victory  for  Daun,  had  not  Ziethen  been 
at  last  successful  in  his  attack  on  the  former  front  of  the 
Austrian  position.  It  is  a  remarkable  fact  that  the  most 
effective,  and  tactically  the  best,  use  of  artillery  in  the 
entire  eighteenth  century  was  thus  due  to  pare  accident. 

The  artillery  was  frequently  massed  in  great  batteries 
by  Frederick  as  well  as  by  his  opponents;  but  the  fire  jf 
the  guns  was  not  concentrated,  nor,  indeed,  was  the  range 
of  the  field  artillery  of  that  day  such  as  to  enable  the  fire 
of  a  great  number  of  guns  to  be  directed  upon  the  same 
object.  The  experience  of  the  artillery  in  this  war  resulted 
ii>  the  separation  of  the  position  guns  into  batteries,  which 
were  distributed  among  the  brigades  of  infantry;  the  union 
of  howitzers  into  separate  batteries;  and  the  creation  of 
horse  artillery. 

The  Reforms  of  Gribeauval.  —  Vaquette  de  Gribeauval 
may  be  termer!  the  father  of  modern  field  artillery.  An 
officer  of  French  artillery,  he  had  served  with  the  Aus- 
trian Army  in  the  Seven  Years'  War,  holding  an  important 
command  under  Lichtenstein.  Returning  to  France,  and 
being  ordered,  in  1765,  to  reconstruct  the  French  artillery, 
he  provided  a  distinct  materiel  for  field,  siege,  garrison,  and 
sea-coast  service.  The  field  batteries  were  limited  to  4-, 
8-,  and  12-pdr.  guns  and  the  6-inch  howitzer.  The  pieces 
were  reduced  in  length  and  weight,  were  cast  solid  and 
bored  out,  and  had  a  plain  exterior;  the  profuse  ornamcm- 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  337 

tation  which  characterized  the  guns  of  an  earlier  day  be- 
ing altogether  discarded.  They  were  provided  with  light- 
er carriages,  having  iron  axle-trees  and  being  otherwise 
strengthened.  The  charge  of  the  field  guns  was  dimin- 
ished from  one-half  to  one-third  that  of  the  shot,  but,  a 
reduction  being  made  at  the  same  time  in  the  windage, 
there  was  no  sensible  diminution  of  the  range.  The  es- 
sence of  GribeauvaPs  reforms  consisted  in  making  every- 
thing strong,  light,  and  uniform.  All  parts  of  the  guns 
and  carriages  manufactured  at  the  different  arsenals  were 
made  according  to  the  same  pattern,  so  as  to  be  inter- 
changeable. The  introduction  of  tangent  scales  and  ele- 
VKting  screws  rendered  the  laying  of  the  piece  mo/re  accu- 
rate and  expeditious. 

The  field  guns  were  divided  into  battalion  guns,  and 
three  reserves  for  the  right,  left,  and  center  of  the  army, 
respectively.  The  former  were  distributed  among  the  in- 
fantry, two  to  each  battalion,  and  a  company  of  artillery 
was  assigned  to  each  infantry  brigade  (of  four  battalions) 
for  the  service  of  these  pieces.  The  reserve  artillery  was 
organized  in  "divisions"  of  eight  pieces,  of  uniform  caliber, 
a  company  of  artillery  being  assigned  to  each. 

The  horses  of  the  batteries  were  now  harnessed  in 
pairs,  instead  of  in  file,  and  a  rope  prolonge  was  provided 
to  unite  the  trail  with  the  limber,  and  thus  enable  firing 
to  be  maintained  while  slowly  withdrawing.  A  new  am- 
munition wagon,  light  and  strong,  was  provided,  fixed 
ammunition  was  introduced,  and  the  Iricole  (a  collar  with 
rope  and  hook),  to  which  the  cannoneers  harnessed  them- 
selves for  moving  the  piece  by  hand,  was  adopted.*  There 
were  but  two  serious  defects  in  GribeauvaPs  system; 
namely,  the  drivers  were  not  a  part  of  the  military  or- 
ganization, and  a  large  portion  of  the  pieces  were  dis- 
persed in  battalion  guns,  instead  of  being  all  united  in 
batteries. 

Horse  artillery  was  instituted  in  the  French  Army  in 
1791,  and  in  the  British  Army  in  1793. 


*Both  the  elevating  screw  and  the  prolonge  had  been  invented 
•at  an  earlier  date,  but  do  not  seem  to  have  been  generally  used  un- 
til the  time  of  Gribeauval. 


338  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

The  Napoleonic  Era. — The  whole  tendency  of  the  re- 
organization of  the  French  Army  in  the  time  of  the  Rev- 
olution being  in  the  direction  of  flexibility  and  mobility, 
the  battalion  guns  were  soon  found  to  be  more  of  an  in- 
cumbrance  than  -an  advantage.  In  his  first  Italian  cam- 
paign, Napoleon  accordingly  assembled  them  into  bat- 
teries, which  he  distributed  among  the  infantry  divisions, 
thus  creating  divisional  artillery.  Himself  an  artillery 
officer,  with  a  predilection  for  the  use  of  that  arm,  and 
with  an  appreciation  of  its  power,  Napoleon,  when  First 
Consul,  raised  the  artillery  to  a  degree  of  importance  be- 
fore unknown.  The  number  of  guns  in  a  battery  was  re- 
duced from  8  to  6.  The  field  batteries  were  armed  with 
6-pdr.  guns  and  24-pdr.  howitzers;  the  horse  batteries, 
with  4-pdrs.  The  old  system  of  employing  teamsters  by 
contract  or  by  impressment  was  abolished,  and  a  corps 
of  special  troops  consisting  of  drivers  was  organized  in 
1800.  These  drivers  were  uniformed  and  disciplined,  and 
constituted  a  part  of  the  regular  military  force.  When 
Napoleon  was  at  the  height  of  his  power,'  his  artillery 
numbered  60,000  men. 

Artillery  played  an  important  part  in  every  feature 
of  Napoleon's  tactics.  If  the  infantry  assaulted,  its  way 
was  prepared  by  artillery  fire;  if  cavalry  charged,  it  was 
to  complete  the  work  begun  by  the  guns;  and  if  a  portion 
of  the  army  remained  on  the  defensive,  its  power  rested 
largely  in  its  cannon.  The  divisional  batteries  were  posted 
in  the  brigade  intervals  and  on  the  flanks,  or  combined 
in  powerful  masses  where  most  needed  at  the  decisive 
moment.  The  artillery  of  the  Guard,  which  consisted  of 
96  guns,  constituted  a  general  reserve,  and  was  under  the 
immediate  control  of  the  Emr>eror.  "It  is  the  artillery 
of  my  Guard/'  said  Napoleon,  "which  decides  most  of  the 
battles;  because,  having  it  always  in  hand,  I  am  able  to 
use  it  whenever  it  is  necessary."  Senarmont  and  Drouot 
were  as  illustrious  in  the  artillery  service  as  were  Nan- 
souty  and  Lassalle  in  that  of  the  cavalry.  At  Friedland 
(June  14,  1807),  Senannont,  collecting  the  divisional  artil- 
lery of  Victor's  corps  (36  pieces)  into  two  batteries  of  15 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  339 

guns  each  and  a  reserve  of  6  guns,  subjected  the  advanc- 
ing Kussians  to  such  a  destructive  cross-fire  as  to  check 
their  assault.  Then  pushing  onward,  in  advance  of  the 
supporting  infantry,  he  opened  fire  at  a  range  of  200,  and 
finally  130  yards,  and  with  rapid  and  effective  discharges 
of  canister  drove  the  Kussian  left  from  the  field.  Napo- 
leon seems  to  have  been  profoundly  impressed  with  'Senar- 
mont's  audacious  handling  of  the  artillery  on  this  occa- 
sion, and  to  have  profited  by  the  lesson  in  future  battles.* 
At  Wagram,  Napoleon  collected  a  grea4:  battery  of 
100  pieces,  consisting  of  60  guns  of  the  Guard  and  40 
drawn  from  adjacent  corps,  and  with  their  fire  prepared 
the  way  for  MacDonald's  famous  attack  against  the  Aus- 
trian center.  In  the  same  battle  a  decisive  attack  against 
the  enemy's  left  by  Davout  and  Ordinot  was  prepared  by 
massing  the  artillery  of  their  two  corps,  and  bringing  to 
bear  such  an  effective  and  well-sustained  fire  that  nearly 
all  the  Austrian  guns  on  that  flank  were  dismounted  and 
the  hostile  infantry  badly  shaken.  At  Borodino,  Napoleon 
massed  120  gnns  in  three  batteries  to  prepare  the  way 
for  the  first  attack  upon  the  great  redoubt;**  and  later  in 
the  day  he  assembled  200  pieces  in  a  great  battery,  which 
played  with  terrible  effect  upon  the  Kussian  infantry 
drawn  up  behind  the  ravine  of  Semenofskoi.  At  Lutzen, 
Napoleon  massed  80  guns  obliquely  on  his  right,  where 
they  enfiladed  the  Allied  infantry,  and  beat  back  the  cav- 
alry which  was  menacing  Marmont's  corps.  But  to  de- 
scribe the  cases  in  which  Napoleor  made  effective  use  of 
his  artillery  would  be  to  write  a  history  of  his  battles. 

*It  is  said  that  Napoleon,  alarmed  at  the  exposure  of  the  guns, 
sent  an  aide  to  caution  Senarmont  against  rashness,  and  that  the 
latter  replied,  "Let  me  alone.  I  will  answer  for  the  result."  Napo- 
leon, seeing  the  effect  of  the  fire  and  amused  by  Senarmont's  reply, 
merely  remarked,  "Well,  he  is  a  pig-headed  fellow  (Ute  mauvaise); 
let  him  have  his  own  way."  Thiers,  however,  implies  that  Napo- 
leon directed  the  entire  operation  himself. 

'  ""'Massing  guns  does  not  consist  in  deploying  them  in  a  well- 
dressed  line,  as  at  a  review,  but  in  keeping  large  numbers  together 
under  unity  of  command  and  with  a  common  object,  and  posting 
them  according  to  the  facilities  offeree  by  the  feature?  of  the 
ground." — Owen. 


340  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

In  his  last  battle  the  great  attack  of  D'Er Ion's  corps 
against  Wellington's  left  was  prepared  and  supported  by 
the  fire  of  nearly  80  guns. 

Napoleon's  appreciation  of  the  power  of  field  artillery 
not  only  gained  him  many  victories,  but,  strangely  enough, 
it  may  be  said  to  have  been  one  of  the  causes  of  his  final 
overthrow.  Dro'uot  always  believed  himself  responsible 
for  the  loss  of  the  battle  of  Waterloo.  "The  Emperor  was 
aware,"  said  he,  "of  the  disposition  of  the  enemy's  forces 
at  the  break  of  day;  his  plan  was  decided  on;  he  intended 
to  commence  the  battle  at  8  or  9  in  the  morning  at  the 
latest.  I  observed  to  him  that  the  ground  was  so  broken 
up  by  the  rain  that  the  movements  of  the  artillery  would 
be  very  slow,  an  inconvenience  that  wrould  be  done  away 
with  by  a  delay  of  two  or  three  hours.  The  Emperor 
consented  to  make  this  fatal  delay.  Had  he  disregarded 
my  advice,  Wellington  would  have  been  attacked  at  7, 
beaten  at  10,  the  victory  would  have  been  completed  it 
noon,  and  Bliicher,  not  arriving  until  5,  would  have  fallen 
into  the  hands  of  a  victorious  army.  We  did  not  com- 
mence the  attack  until  noon,  and  left  all  the  chance  of 
success  to  the  enemy." 

It  is  a  noteworthy  fact  that  as  Napoleon's  infantry 
deteriorated,  through  the  losses  of  his  many  campaigns, 
he  increased  the  proportion  of  his  artillery.  At  Austerlitz 
the  proportion  was  2|  guns  to  1,000  men  of  the  other 
arms;  at  Wagram  it  was  nearly  4.  This  coincides  strikingly 
with  the  experience  of  Frederick  the  Great,  and  sustains 
the  view  that  an  infantry  weak  in  numbers  or  in  morale 
needs  the  support  of  a  numerous  and  efficient  artillery.* 
It  must  be  noted,  however,  that  both  these  great  com- 
manders showed  in  their  later  campaigns  a  greater  appre- 
ciation of  the  value  of  artillery,  and  more  skill  in  its  use, 
than  they  evinced  in  their  early  battles. 

The  British  Artillery. — At  the  beginning  of  the  great 
struggle  with  France  all  the  British  artillery  was  formed 
into  a  train  consisting  of  both  field  and  siege  guns.  There 
were  no  batteries,  but  the  guns  were  divided  into  nominal 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  341 

brigades  of  12  pieces,  the  personnel  of  each  -brigade  con 
sis  ting  of  a  company  of  100  men.  The  companies  were, 
however,  divided  among  the  infantry  battalions,  to  each 
of  which  two  guns  were  assigned.  Each  piece  was  drawn 
by  three  horses  in  single  file,  driven  by  a  teamster  on 
foot.  Improvement  was  rapid  in  the  British  artillery  in 
the  last  years  of  the  century.  Horse  artillery  was  intro- 
duced only  two  years  later  than  in  the  French  Army;  and 
in  the  institution  of  a  corps  of  drivers  the  Brit'sh  were 
actually  six  years  in  advance  of  Napoleon.  In  L802  the 
battalion  guns  were  abolished,  and  the  field  aid  horse 
batteries  of  six  guns  each  were  organized,  the  former  be- 
ing termed  "brigades"  and  the  latter  "troops."  The  driver 
corps  consisted  of  non-commissioned  officers,  aitificers, 
drivers,  and  horses,  and  was  divided  into  troops,  each  of 
which  was  under  the  command  of  a  subaltern  officer.  A 
driver  troop  assigned  to  a  company  of  foot  artillery  con- 
verted the  latter  into  a  field  brigade.  The  officer  of  the 
driver  troop  ranked  below  all  the  officers  of  the  artillery 
company,  and  had  no  authority  over  the  cannoneer*?.  The 
horses  were  now  harnessed  in  pairs,  the  drivers  riding  on 
the  off  horses;  and  the  eight  cannoneers  assigned  to  each 
piece  were  mounted  on  the  limbers  and  caissons.  Six 
horses  were  attached  to  each  gun  and  four  to  each  ca/sson. 
The  armament  of  each  battery  consisted  of  five  guns  and 
one  howitzer.  The  guns  in  each  field  battery  were  of  uni- 
form caliber,  either  6-,  9-,  or  12-pdrs.;  the  howitzers  were 
all  5^-inch  brass  pieces.  In  the  Peninsular  War  the  guns 
in  each  horse  battery  were  of  two  different  calibers — two 
9-  and  three  6-pdrs.;  but  before  the  Waterloo  campaign 
the  armament  of  many  of  the  horse  batteries  was  changed 
to  9-pdrs.  exclusively,  and  with  most  important  results; 
for  the  effective  fire  of  the  horse  artillery  contributed 
greatly  to  Wellington's  victory.* 

*"Sir  Augustus  Frazer,  commander  of  the  horse  artillery,  nad 
succeeded  in  getting  his  troops  equipped  with  9-pounder  guns  in- 
stead of  the  6-pounders  which  they  had  used  in  previous  campaigns 
— a  substitution  which  Wellington  opposed.  The  execution  done 
by  the  heavier  arm,  especially  at  the  time  of  the  ~reat  cavalry 
charges,  was  most  effective,  and  no  doubt  Frazer  was  quite  within 


342  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

A  great  improvement  in  the  effectiveness  of  the  Brit- 
ish artillery  fire,  in  the  Napoleonic  wars,  was  made  by  the 
introduction  of  shrapnel  and  rockets.  The  former  was  in- 
vented by  Lieutenant  Shrapnel  in  1792,  and  adopted  six- 
teen years  later,  when  the  demands  of  war  had  forced 
attention  to  the  projectile.  The  first  shrapnel  was  spher- 
ical, to  suit  the  smooth-bore  guns  then  in  use,  and  the 
bullets  were  mingled  with  the  bursting  charge;  but  they 
were  afterwards  separated  by  an  iron  diaphragm,  and  the 
projectile  was  termed  "diaphragm  shrapnel."  The  burst- 
ing charge  was  placed  next  to  the  fuse. 

Congreve  rockets  were  introduced  in  1806.  Their 
cases  were  made  of  sheet  iron,  and  they  could  be  used 
either  as  shell  or  solid  shot.  They  were  fired  from  tubes; 
were  of  four  sizes — namely,  3-,  6-,  12-,  and  24-pdrs.;  and 
were  served  by  separate  batteries  or  "brigades."  The 
moral  effect  of  these  projectiles  was  very  great,  and  they 
were  highly  regarded  by  the  British,  though  they  do  not 
seem  to  have  been  held  in  equal  esteem  by  other  nations. 
Thie  first  instance  of  the  use  of  rockets  im  battle  'was.  at 
Leipsic  (October  18,  1813),  by  the  rocket  brigade  of  Cap- 
tain Bogue.  So  great  was  the  effect  that  "a  solid  square 
of  French  infantry,  upon  the  flank  of  which  it  opened  its 
fire,  surrendered  in  a  few  minutes.*  Their  first  use  in 
the  Peninsular  War  was  at  the  passage  of  the  Lower 
Adour  (February  23,  1814),  where  they  quickly  dispersed 
the  French  detachments,  which  were  "terrified  by  the  un- 
wonted sight  and  sound."**  They  were  also  effectively 
used  against  the  raw  American  militia  at  Bladensburg 
(August  24,  1814). 

The  Crimean  War. — In  the  long  peace  following  the 
battle  of  Waterloo,  many  important  changes  were  made 


bounds  when  he  wrote,  'Had  the  troops  continued  with  light  guns, 
I  do  not  hesitate  to  say  the  day  had  been  lost.5-  But  when  the 
Duke's  dispatches  found  their  way  back  to  the  Army,  Frazer  looked 
vainly  for  any  recognition." — "Qnatre  Bras,  Ligny,  and  Waterloo" 
(1)11  Dorse?/  Gardner),  p.  874- 
*Alison. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  343 

in  the  organization  and  materiel  of  field  artillery.  In  1822 
the  corps  of  drivers  in  the  British  service  was  abolished, 
and  the  men  were  enlisted  as  both  cannoneers  and  drivers. 
In  1829  the  French  followed  the  lead  of  the  British  in 
this  respect,  and  also  made  considerable  changes  in  mate- 
riel. The  field  batteries  were  now  armed  with  four  guns 
and  two  howitzers  each,  the  guns  being  8-  and  12-pdrs., 
and  the  howitzers  24-  and  32-pdrs.  lengthened  to  corre- 
spond to  the  guns.  All  other  field  pieces  were  discarded, 
and  the  carriages  were  limited  to  two  sizes  to  fit  the  two 
classes  of  guns  and  howitzers.  The  weight  of  the  limber 
was  reduced,  and  an  ammunition  chest  was  placed  upon 
it.  Seats  for  the  cannoneers  was  provided  on  the  limber- 
chest  and  caisson,  and  the  two  flasks  which  formed  the 
trail  were  replaced  by  a  stock  consisting  of  a  single  piece. 

In  1852  the  Emperor  Napoleon  III.  substituted  for 
the  two  guns  and  two  howitzers  of  the  French  artillery 
a  single  12-pdr.  piece,  known  at  first  as  the  canon  obusier, 
or  gun-howitzer,  but  afterwards  generally  designated  as 
the  Napoleon  gun.  The  French  artillery  was  now  divided 
into  horse  artillery,  in  which  the  cannoneers  were  mounted 
on  horses;  line  artillery,  in  which  they  rode  on  the  am- 
munition chests;  and  reserve  artillery,  in  -which  they 
marched  on  foot.  The  first  served  with  the  cavalry,  the 
second  with  the  infantry  divisions,  and  the  third  was  em- 
ployed as  batteries  of  position  and  in  the  attack  and  de- 
fense of  fortified  places.  This  was  the  organization  with 
which  the  French  artillery  entered  the  Crimean  War. 

The  British  artillery  in  the  same  war  consisted  of  po- 
sition, heavy  field,  field,  horse,  and  mountain  batteries, 
armed  respectively  with  18-,  12-,  9-,  6-,  and  3-pdr.  guns  and 
8-in.,  32-,  24-,  and  12-pdr.,  and  4-in.  howitzers.  A  rocket 
section  was  attached  to  each  battery  of  field  and  horse 
artillery. 

The  Crimean  War  being  equally  a  gigantic  siege,  the 
employment  of  field  artillery  was  limited.  In  the  battle 
of  the  Alma  the  Russian  guns  were  withdrawn  too  soon, 
and  were  out  of  the  fight  at  the  time  when  they  might 
have  been  employed  with  the  greatest  effect.  At  Balak- 


344  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

lava  the  guns  played  no  important  part,  and  only  at  the 
battle  of  Inkerman  (November  5,  1854)  was  artillery  used 
to  any  purpose.  In  this  battle  the  Russians,  under  cover 
of  a  fog,  posted  22  pieces  so  as  to  enfilade  the  right  flank 
of  the  Allies;  and  they  finally  brought  into  line  94  guns, 
of  which  number  54  were  field  guns  of  the  heaviest 
caliber.  The  British  opposed  to  this  formidable  battery 
36  pieces  of  lighter  caliber  (9-pdr.  guns  and  24-pdr.  how- 
itzers), which  were  overmatched  and  unable  to  produce 
any  appreciable  effect  until  they  were  reinforced  with  two 
18-pdr.  position  guns  and  three  French  batteries  of  12-pdr. 
Napoleons.  The  Russians  did  not  show  much  tactical 
skill  in  handling  their  artillery  on  this  occasion.  They 
used  it  with  some  success  in  preparing  the  way  for  the 
infantry  attack;  but  instead  of  pushing  forward  their  light 
guns  to  support  the  advancing  infantry,  they  kept  the 
entire  mass  of  artillery  in  its  first  position,  where  its 
range  varied  from  1,000  to  1,450  yards — a  rather  long 
range  for  the  field  guns  of  that  day.  In  this  battle  the 
Allied  infantry,  being  armed  with  rifles,  caused  infinite 
annoyance  and  great  loss  to  the  Russian  artillery;  and 
Todleben,  in  his  report,  says:  "A  perfect  cloud  of  riflemen, 
hid  in  thick  brushwood,  opened  a  very  violent  and  very 
accurate  fire  against  our  artillery  at  a  distance  of  800 
paces.  Some  of  our  guns,  from  time  to  time,  rained  case 
upon  them,  but  the  discharge  only  checked  the  fire  of  the 
enemy's  riflemen  for  a  moment."* 

This  war  rendered  it  plain  that  a  rifled  field  gun  was 
necessary  if  the  relative  effective  range  of  artillery  and 
infantry  was  to  be  maintained.  The  British  employed 
rifled  isiege  guns  at  Sebastopol,  the  guns  used  being  the 
68-pdr.  and  8-in.  Lancaster  guns;  but  they  were  not  a  suc- 
cess, and  were  soon  withdrawn  from  the  batteries.  Rifled 
field  guns  had  not  yet  appeared.** 

*The  range  at  which,  the  riflemen  delivered  this  destructive  fire 
would  seem,  however,  to  be  somewhat  exaggerated,  as  it  exceeds 
the  effective  range  of  the  rifles  of  this  period. 

**"It  is  very  remarkable  that  even  as  eany  as  1547  expert 
ments  must  have  been  carried  out  with  rifled  barrels,  for  there  is  a 
barrel  now  at  Woolwich,  with  that  date  on  it,  rifled  with  six  fine 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  345 

The  Italian  Far.  — In  the  Italian  War  of  1859  the 
French  had  a  powerful  artillery,  in  which  rifled  field  guns 
appeared  for  the  first  time.  Although  it  had  been  decided 
in  1858  to  adopt  rifled  guns,  and  200  batteries  had  been 
ordered,  the  arsenals  were  able  to  furnish  only  37  rifled 
pieces,  and  240  rounds  of  ammunition  for  each,  in  time  for 
the  campaign  in  Lombardy.  Many  of  the  French  batter- 
ies went  to  the  war  with  empty  carriages,  the  guns  being 
sent  to  them  after  they  had  left  France.  Other  batteries, 
field  and  horse,  were  armed  with  the  12-pdr.  Napoleon  gun. 
The  new  rifled  guns  were  4-  and  12-pdr.  muzzle-loaders. 
The  Austrian  artillery,  which  was  altogether  inferior  to 
the  French,  consisted  entirely  of  smooth-bores,  6-  and  12- 
pdrs.,  and  "long  howitzers" — "obusiers  longs"  evidently  32- 
pdr.  howitzers.  The  French  artillery  played  an  important 
part  in  the  campaign,  and  made  its  weight  felt  in  every 
battle.  At  Solferino  it  was  used  with  effect  at  a  range 
of  2,500  yards;  destroyed  opposing  batteries  at  nearly 
3,700  yards;  and  demoralized  the  Austrian  reserves,  by 
shelling  them  at  ranges  at  which  they  had  deemed  them 
selves  perfectly  safe.  The  Austrians,  on  the  other  hand, 
used  their  guns  with  feeble  effect;  their  artillery  reserve 
did  not  fire  a  shot,  and  scarcely  half  of  their  great  force 
of  800  pieces  wras  brought  into  action.  On  several  occa- 
sions the  Austrian  artillery  actuaPy  employed  solid  shot 
against  French  skirmishers. 

The  War  of  Secession. — At  the  beginning  of  the  War 
of  Secession  the  field  artillery  of  the  United  States  Army 
consisted  of  8  batteries,  two  from  each  of  the  four  regi- 
ments maintained  in  the  regular  service.  These  were 
quickly  augmented  by  converting  most  of  the  regular  arti! 
lery  into  field  batteries,  and  by  raising  volunteer  organi- 

grooves,  having  a  twist  of  one  turn  in  26  inches.  This  barrel  is 
also  fitted  for  breech-loading;  and  thus  we  may  learn  that  it  has 
taken  three  centuries  to  develop  breech-loading  and  rifled  cannon 

into  their  present  position We  now  have  the  most 

pei  feet  machinery  at  our  disposal,  without  which  we  could  no  more 
construct  guns,  or  mountings,  or  projectiles,  than  our  forefathers 
could;  and,  what  is  quite  as  essential  to  success,  we  have  scientific 
instruments  of  accuracy,  with  which  to  study  results  and  learn 
where  improvement  is  needed,"— L loyd  and  Hadcock. 


346  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS 

zations,  until  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  alone  the  num- 
ber of  light  batteries  numbered  92,  aggregating  12,500 
men  and  520  guns.  The  field  guns  consisted  of  3-inch  ri- 
fles and  12-pdr.  Napoleons.  Though  the  latter  guns  had 
been  discarded  in  Europe  after  the  Italian  War,  they  were 
fortunately  retained  in  our  service,  half  the  batteries  be- 
ing armed  with  them.  They  did  excellent  work,  being 
better  than  the  rifled  guns  at  the  shorter  ranges,  and 
were  employed  until  the  end  of  the  war.  At  the  request 
of  General  Buford,  several  horse  batteries  were  armed 
with  Napoleon  guns;  but  most  of  the  horse  artillery  was 
supplied  with  rifled  pieces.  In  the  latter  part  of  the  war 
each  horse  battery  had  both  guns  in  equal  proportions. 
The  extreme  effective  range  of  the  3-inch  rifled  ''ordnance 
gun"  was  nearly  2,800  yards;  that  of  the  12-pdr.  Napo- 
leon, 1,520  yards.*  Beyond  600  yards,  however,  the  effect 
of  the  fire  of  the  smooth-bore  guns  was  very  uncertain; 
and  at  a  range  of  1,000  yards  only  a  third  of  the  shot 
could  be  depended  upon  to  hit  a  target  six  feet  high  and 
fifty  yards  long. 

In  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  each  field  and  horse  bat- 
tery contained  at  first  6  pieces,  though  in  the  latter  part 
of  the  war  the  number  was  reduced  to  4.  Four  batteries 
were  assigned  to  each  division,  and  when  several  divis- 
ions were  organized  into  a  corps,  at  least  half  of  the 
divisional  batteries  were  grouped  into  a  corps  reserve. 
For  the  army,  a  reserve  of  100  guns  was  provided,  con- 
sisting of  field  and  position  batteries,  and  all  the  horse 
artillery  not  employed  with  masses  of  cavalry.  One  <-f 
the  batteries  assigned  to  each  division  was  a  regular  bat- 
tery, whO'Se  captain  commanded  all  the  divisional  artil- 
lery. In  the  Gettysburg  campaign  the  horse  artillery  was 
attached  to  the  cavalry  corps.  It  consisted  of  12  bat- 
teries, and  was  divided  into  two  brigades,  each  com- 
manded by  its  senior  captain.  Later  in  the  war  the  horse 
artillery  consisted  of  two  brigades  of  8  and  10  batteries 
respectively;  the  former  being  detached  with  the  cavalrv 

*Ranges  obtained  at  the  Washington  Arsenal,  in  1865,  with 
elevations  of  10  and  5  degrees  respectively. 


OttGANJZATlOX    AXD    TACTICS.  347 

corps,  and  the  latter  belonging  to  the  artillery  reserve. 
In  1863  the  divisional  artillery  was  abolished,  and  all  the 
batteries  of  each  corps  were  consolidated  into  an  "artil- 
lery brigade,"  which  organization  was  retained  until  the 
close  of  the  war.  The  number  of  batteries  in  a  brigade 
varied;  being  in  some  cases  as  low  as  4,  and  in  others  aa 
high  as  12.  In  the  campaign  of  1864  a  battalion  of  foot 
artillery  was  attached  to  the  artillery  brigade  of  each 
corps,  for  guard  and  escort  duty,  and  to  furnish  a  reserve 
of  men  for  the  batteries.  In  the  same  campaign  the  ar- 
tillery reserve  was  broken  up,  owing  to  the  wooded  nature 
of  the  theater  of  operations;  but  it  was  again  organized 
during  the  siege  of  Petersburg. 

The  organization  of  the  artillery  of  the  Western 
armies  differed  somewhat  from  that  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac.  In  those  armies  a  battery  of  artillery  wras  as- 
signed to  each  brigade  of  infantry,  and  this  vicious  organ- 
ization was  retained  until  after  the  battle  of  Chickamauga 
(September  19-20,  1863).  After  that  battle,  the  brigade 
artillery  was  united  as  divisional  artillery,  and  a  general 
reserve  was  organized  in  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland.  A 
similar  organization  was  adopted  by  the  Army  of  the  Ten- 
nessee about  the  same  time. 

In  the  Confederate  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  the 
artillery  organization  was  practically  the  same  as  the  ono 
since  adopted  in  Europe  and  now  in  almost  universal  use. 
To  each  division  a  "battalion"  of  artillery,  generally  con- 
sisting of  4  batteries,  was  assigned.  There  were  also  two 
battalions  of  corps  artillery  in  each  army  corps.  There 
was  no  general  reserve.* 

Almost  from  the  beginning  of  the  war,  the  field  artil- 
lery in  the  United  States  armies  was  noted  for  its  excel- 
lence, and  was  spoken  of  in  terms  of  the  highest  praise, 
not  only  by  foreign  observers,  but  by  its  own  opponents. 
In  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  it  was  especially  good,  be- 
ing, fortunately,  during  the  greater  part  of  the  war,  undfer 
a  chief,  General  Henry  J.  Hunt,  whose  ability  as  an  organ- 

*There  was  at  first  a  large  artillery  reserve,  but,  early  In  1863, 
i  was  broken  up  and  the  batteries  were  distributed  among  the  corps 


348  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

izer  and  a  commander  of  artillery  places  him  in  the  same 
rank  with  Lichtenstein,  Senarmont,  and  Drouot.  The  to- 
pography of  the  battle-fields  often  limited  the  use  of  artil- 
lery, and  in  some  instances,  as  at  the  Wilderness,  prac- 
tically ruled  it  oft'  the  field;  but  whenever  suitable  oppor- 
tunities were  presented  for  its  employment,  it  was  used 
with  gallantry,  skill,  and  effect. 

The  first  important  use  of  artillery  in  the  War  of  Se- 
cession was  at  Shiloh,  where  Grant  placed  in  position, 
about  half  a  mile  from  the  Landing,  two  batteries  of  heavy 
siege  guns,  to  which  he  added  the  batteries  and  parts  of 
batteries  of  field  artillery  which  drifted  to  the  rear  as  the 
Union  troops  were  pushed  back.  Some  50  guns  were  thus 
assembled,  wrhich  were  manned  by  detachments  of  artil- 
lery and  infantry  volunteers.  Towards  the  close  of  the 
first  day's  battle,  only  this  line  of  guns,  supported  by 
about  4,000  infantry,  remained  to  oppose  the  victorious 
Confederates;  but  under  the  heavy  fire  of  the  great  bat- 
tery the  assailants  were  checked,  and  the  tide  of  battle 
first  began  to  turn  in  favor  of  the  Union  Army.* 

In  the  battle  of  Malvern  Hill  ((July  1,  1862),  the  United 
States  artillery  played  a  very  important  part;  all  the  Con- 
federate attacks  being  met  with  an  overwhelming  rain  of 
shrapnel  from  the  Union  batteries,  and  the  final  and  most 
desperate  charge,  encountering  the  fire  of  "an  almost  con- 
tinuous battery  of  60  pieces,"  skillfully  posted  and  di- 
rected by  General  Hunt.  Of  this  battle  General  D.  H. 
Hill,  of  the  Confederate  Army,  says:  "Our  loss  was  double 
that  of  the  Federals  at  Malvern  Hill.  Not  only  did  the 
fourteen  brigades  which  were  engaged  suffer,  but  also  the 
inactive  troops  and  those  brought  up  as  reserves  too  late 
to  be  of  any  use  met  many  casualties  from  the  fearful 
artillery  fire  which  reached  all  parts  of  the  woods.  Hence, 

*Tihe  number  of  guns  in  this  important  battery  is  a  matter  of 
considerable  doubt.  Different  authorities  (apparently  all  reliable) 
place  it  ait  "twenty  or  more,"  "twenty-two,"  "thirty-five  to  fifty," 
"some  eighty,"  etc.  Of  one  thing,  however,  there  can  be  no  doubt; 
namiely,  that  'tihe  advance  of  the  Confederates  was  finally  checked 
by  the  fire  of  a  "scratch"  'battery  containing  many  pieces. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  349 

more  than  half  the  casualties  were  from  field  pieces — an 
unprecedented  thing  in  war."* 

At  the  battle  of  Stone's  Bdver  (January  2,  1863),  a  most 
effective  use  of  artillery  was  made  by  Major  Mendenhall, 
the  chief  of  artillery  of  the  left  wing.  Van  Cleve's  divis- 
ion, having  been  attacked  by  a  superior  force  under  Breck- 
inridge,  was,  after  a  brief  resistance,  driven  back  in  great 
disorder;  but  the  victorious  Confederates,  while  in  the  full 
tide  of  success,  suddenly  encountered  the  fir*0-  of  58  guns 
massed  by  Mendenhall,  which  first  checked  their  advance, 
and  then  drove  them  back  in  confusion.  "Before  this  bat- 
tle,"  says  General  Crittenden,  "I  had  been  inclined  to  un- 
derrate the  importance  of  artillery  in  our  war,  but  I  never 
knew  that  arm  to  render  such  important  service  as  at 
this  point.  The  sound  judgment,  bravery,  and  skill  of 
Major  John  Mendenhall,  who  was  my  chief  of  artillery, 
enabled  me  to  open  58  guns  almost  simultaneously  OB 
Breckinridge's  men  and  to  turn  a  dashing  charge  into  a 
sudden  retreat  and  rout,  in  which  the  enemy  lost  1,700  or 
1,800  men  in  a  few  moments.  I  witnessed  the  effect  of  this 
cannonade  upon  the  Confederate  advance.  MendenhalPs 
guns  were  about  100  yards  back  from  the  river.  Van 
Cleve's  division  of  my  command  was  retiring  down  the 
opposite  slope,  before  overwhelming  numbers  of  the  en- 
emy, when  the  guns,  the  fire  of  which  had  been  held  until 
our  men  should  no  longer  be  exposed  to  it,  opened  upon 
the  swarming  enemy.  The  very  forest  iseemed  to  fall  be- 
fore our  fire,  and  not  a  Confederate  reached  the  river."** 
The  effect  of  this  tremendous  fire  being  supplemented  by 
a  charge  of  four  brigades  of  infantry,  Breckinridge  wa« 
driven  back  to  the  position  from  which  he  haxJ  emerged 
to  the  assault. 

At  Chancellorsville  (May  2,  1863),  General  Pleasonton, 
first  gaining  time  by  the  sacrifice  of  a  regiment  of  cavalry 
in  a  charge  upon  the  enemy,  assembled  22  guns  in  a  con- 
tinuous battery,  and  met  Stonewall  Jackson's  attack  with 

""Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War,"  Vol.  II.,  p.  394. 
**IMd.,  Vol.  III.,  p.  633. 


350  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

a  well-directed  and  rapid  fire  of  double-shotted  canister.* 
In  twenty  minutes  the  Confederate  advance  was  checked. 

Another  conspicuous  use  of  the  concentrated  fire  of 
field  artillery  was  made  at  Gettysburg  (July  3,  1863), 
where  General  Hunt  assembled  80  guns,  first  to  reply  to 
the  fire  of  120  guns  with  which  the  Confederates  opened 
upon  the  Union  position,  and  afterwards  to  oppose  the 
assault  of  the  Confederate  infantry.  After  replying  de- 
liberately for  some  time  to  the  enemy's  cannonade,  Hunt 
ceased  firing,  for  the  double  purpose  of  reserving  his  am- 
munition for  the  assault  which  he  foresaw  to  be  inevit- 
able, and,  at  the  same  time,  to  induce  the  enemy  to  be- 
lieve that  the  Union  batteries  had  been  silenced,  and  thus 
precipitate  the  attack.  When  the  Confederate  infantry 
advanced,  it  was  received  with  a  terrific  artillery  fire,  and 
it  would  probably  have  been  stopped  before  it  encoun- 
tered the  Union  infantry,  had  not  some  of  the  batteries*, 
acting  under  the  orders  of  their  corps  commander,  ex- 
hausted their  long  -  range  projectiles  before  the  assault 
began.* 

Many  more  instances  of  the  effective  use  of  field  artil- 
lery in  the  War  of  Secession  might  be  cited;  but  they  were 
entirely  on  the  defensive,  and  the  war  presents  few  or  no 
illustrations  of  the  preparation  of  an  infantry  attack  by 
an  effective  cannonading  of  the  enemy's  position.  The 
range  of  the  guns  then  in  use  did  not  admit  of  the  con- 
centration of  the  fire  of  such  powerful  masses  of  artillery 
fts  those  which  can  now  be  brought  to  bear  upon  the  ob- 

*"The  steady  fire  from  McGilvery  and  Rittenhouse  on  their 
right  caused  Pickett's  men  to  'drift'  in  the  opposite  direction,  so 
that  the  weight  of  the  assault  fell  upon  the  positions  occupied  by 
Hazard's  batteries.  I  had  counted  on  an  artillery  cross-fire  that 
would  stop  It  before  it  reached  our  lines,  but,  except  a  few  shots 
here  and  there,  Hazard's  batteries  were  silent  until  the  enemy  came 
within  canister  range.  They  had,  unfortunately,  exhausted  their 
Jong-range  projectiles  during  the  cannonade,  under  the  orders  of 
their  corps  commander,  and  it  was  too  late  to  replace  them.  Had 
my  instructions  been  followed  here,  as  they  were  by  McGilvery,  I 
*lo  not  believe  that  Pickett's  division  would  have  reached  our  line." 
— General  Hunt,  in  "Battles  and  Leaders  of  tJie  Civil  War,"  Vol. 
III.,  p.  575. 

\ 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  351 

jective  of  the  infantry  attack;  and  many  other  causes  com- 
bined to  prevent  the  fullest  use  of  artillery  in  this  import- 
ant function.  Chief  of  these  were  the  wooded  and  broken 
nature  of  many  of  our  battle-fields,  the  limited  and  ill- 
defined  authority  of  the  chiefs  of  artillery,  and  the  lack 
oi'  appreciation  of  the  proper  tactical  use  of  artillery  some- 
times evinced  by  corps  and  division  commanders.  To  il- 
lustrate these  conditions,  the  following  facts  may  be  cited: 
In  the  battle  of  Spottsylvania  the  terrain  was  so  heavily 
wooded  that  the  direction  of  the  attack  had  to  be  deter- 
mined by  the  compass;  and  on  such  ground  artillery  could 
neither  be  massed  in  good  positions,  nor  its  fire  directed 
upon  a  visible  target.  At  Fredericksburg  (December  13, 
1862),  Hunt  covered  the  crossing  of  the  Army  of  the  Po- 
tomac over  the  Rappahannock  with  the  fire  of  149  guns 
posted  on  -Stafford  Heights;  but  as  soon  as  the  crossing 
was  effected,  the  divisional  batteries  rejoined  their  divis- 
ions, and  in  no  case  was  the  attack  upon  the  Confederate 
position  prepared  by  such  fire  as  to  silence  the  enemy's 
artillery  and  shake  his  infantry.  Hunt  was  not  informed 
of  the  intended  attack  by  Meade  and  Gibbon,  which  he 
could  have  supported  by  the  fire  of  100  guns  drawn  from 
the  divisional  artillery,  most  of  which  stood  idle  in  the 
streets  of  Fredericksburg.*  At  Gettysburg,  Lee  assembled 
120  guns,  "apparently  in  one  unbroken  mass,"  with  which 
he  opened  a  furious  fire  upon  the  Union  position;  but  the 
lire,  instead  of  being  concentrated  on  a  decisive  point,  was 
scattered  along  the  whole  front  of  the  opposing  army, 
and  had  no  appreciable  effect  on  the  attack  which  followed. 
In  the  Western  armies  the  offensive  use  of  artillery 
was  still  less.  For  instance,  at  Kenesaw  Mountain  (June 
27,  1864),  the  attack  was  preceded  by  a  puny  artillery  fire, 
the  only  effect  of  which  was  to  warn  the  enemy  of  the 
approaching  attack,  and  rouse  him  to  active  measures  to 
receive  it.  So  ineffective,  in  fact,  had  the  artillery  prep- 
aration generally  been  in  the  Western  armies,  that  Gen- 
eral Hazen,  in  his  attack  on  Fort  McAllister  (December  13, 

*General  Hunt,  in  a  paper  on  "Artillery  Administration,"  read 
before  the  Massachusetts  Historical  Society,  in  1888. 


352  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

1864),  dispensed  with  a  preliminary  cannonade  altogether, 
as  a  proceeding  which  would  only  forewarn  the  enemy, 
without  appreciably  aiding  the  attack. 

This  unsatisfactory  preparation  of  infantry  assault  by 
artillery  fire  must  be  attributed  to  causes  for  which  that 
arm  was  not  itself  responsible;  for  besides  the  superb  de- 
fensive use  of  artillery  almost  uniformly  made,  the  indi- 
vidual batteries  were  handled  with  skill  and  great  gal- 
lantry on  the  offensive.  The  guns  were  not  infrequently 
pushed  forward  to  the  skirmish  line;  and  at  Spottsylvania 
the  artillery,  when  it  could  be  employed  at  all,  was  used 
with  unparalleled  daring.  In  that  battle  a  section  [pla- 
toon] of  Battery  C,  5th  U.  S.  Artillery,  and  a  section 
[platoon]  of  Brown's  Khode  Island  Battery,  dashed  for- 
ward ahead  of  the  infantry,  and,  though  under  a  heavy 
rifle  fire  from  the  enemy,  fired  from  nine  to  fourteen 
rounds  of  double  canister,  at  close  range,  into  the  Con- 
federate works,  with  frightful  effect.  The  guns  were  aban- 
doned only  when  all  the  cannoneers  and  drivers  had  been 
killed  or  wounded. 

The  War  of  Secession  gave  the  tactics  ftf  artillery  a 
long  stride  forward.  It  developed  the  use  of  masses  of 
guns  to  an  extent  unknown  since  the  days  of  Napoleon; 
it  infused  into  the  handling  of  that  arm  a  degree  of  audac- 
ity foreshadowing  the  tactics  of  1870;  and  if  its  offensive 
use  in  masses  had  not  been  all  that  could  be  wished,  it 
was  due  to  causes  beyond  the  control  of  the  arm  itself. 

The  Austro-Prussian  War. — In  the  Seven  Weeks'  War 
between  Austria  and  Prussia,  in  1866,  each  of  the  armies 
took  the  field  with  a  large  and  well-appointed  force  of  ar- 
tUlery.  In  the  Prussian  service  4  batteries  were  assigned 
to  each  infantry  division,  and  in  the  First  Army  (com- 
manded by  Prince  Frederick  Charles)  there  was  a  general 
reserve  of  16  batteries,  besides  which  one  of  the  corps  had 
a  reserve  of  4  batteries.  In  the  Second  Army  (commanded 
by  the  Crown  Prince)  there  was  no  general  artillery  re- 
serve; but  eaich  corps  had  a  reserve  of  from  5  to  7  bat- 
teries. Two  horse  batteries  were  attached  to  each  cav- 
alry division,  and  one  of  the  cavalry  corps  had  an  addi- 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  353 

tional  horse  battery  as  a  reserve.  There  was  accordingly 
a  combination  of  divisional,  corps,  and  reserve  artillery. 
Each  field  battery  contained  6  guns,  which  were  generally 
steel,  breech-loading,  rifled  cannon,  though  the  12-pdr. 
smooth-bore  had  not  altogether  disappeared.*  The  rifled 
pieces  were  designated  as  6-pdrs.  and  4-pdrs.,  though  the 
larger  gun  fired  a  shell  weighing  fifteen  pounds,  aind  the 
smaller  one  used  a  similar  projectile  weighing  nine 
pjounds.**  Shell  fire  was  'almost  exclusively  used,  and 
the  shells  were  all  provided  with  percussion  fuses.  The 
horse  batteries  were  armed  with  4-pdr.  rifles.  The  propor- 
tion of  artillery  in  the  Prussian  Army  at  the  battle  of 
Koniggratz  was  3.6  guns  to  1,000  men. 

The  Austrian  artillery  differed  from  that  of  the  Prus- 
sian Army  in  several  important  features  of  organization 
and  materiel.  Its  guns  were  muzzle-loading  rifles,  desig- 
nated as  8-pdrs.  and  4-pdrs.,  and  each  battery  contained 
8  pieces.  The  system  of  brigade  artillery,  which  had  been 
discarded  after  thorough  trial  in  America,  was  still  re- 
tained in  the  Austrian  service,  a  battery  of  4-pdrs.  being 
attached  to  each  infantry  brigade.  Four  field  and  two 
horse  batteries  were  attached  to  each  corps  as  reserve 
artillery.***  A  rocket  battery  was  also  attached  to  each- 
corps;  brigade  artillery  and  rocket  batteries  appearing 
for  the  last  time  in  this  campaign. 

The  Prussian  artillery  was  handled  in  a  remarkably 
impotent  manner  in  this  war.  Its  personnel,  materiel,  and 
training  bespoke  for  it  a  brilliant  part  in  the  campaign; 
but  in  no  case  did  it  exert  an  appreciable  influence  in  de- 
ciding the  battle.  Although  equaling  in  number  of  pieces 
the  opposing  artillery,  it  was  so  poorly  handled  that  on 
only  one  occasion  in  the  whole  war  did  it  succeed  in  gain- 
ing a  numerical  superiority  in<  battle  over  its  opponent. 

*Thus  in  the  Guard  corps,  one-third  of  the  field  guns  consisted 
of  12-pdr.  smooth-bores. 

**These  guns  were  classed  not  according  to  the  weight  of  the 
projectile,  but  according  to  the  diameter  of  the  bore.  Thus  the  gua 
firing  a  15-lb.  shell  was  rated  as  a  6-pdr.,  because  the  diameter  of 
its  bore  was  the  same  as  that  of  a  6-pdr.  smooth-bore  gun. 

***Three  of  the  corps  had,  however,  but  five  batteries  each. 


354  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

At  Trautenau  (June  27,  1866),  though  the  Prussians  had 
96  guns,  they  brought  only  32  into  action.  Forty-two 
guns  remained  in  the  immediate  vicinity  without  firing 
a  shot,  and  the  rest  were  not  even  brought  on  the  field. 
In  all  the  other  battles  up  to  Koniggratz  the  same  con- 
dition existed — plenty  of  Prussian  artillery,  but  only  a 
small  portion  of  the  guns  brought  into  action,  and  those 
without  appreciable  effect.  At  Koniggratz  (July  3,  1866), 
where  the  attack  of  Frederick  Charleys  should  have  been 
prepared  by  a  vigorous  cannonade  upon  the  Austrian  posi- 
tion, the  Prussian  batteries,  according  to  Captain  May, 
"planted  themselves  here  and  there  among  the  reserves, 
and  never  found  places  anywhere  to  engage."  The  Prus- 
sian artillery  seems  to  have  been  afraid  of  encountering 
infantry  fire,  and  to  have  had  a  bad  habit  of  withdrawing 
to  refit  and  to  renew  its  ammunition.  On  the  march  it 
was  generally  kept  too  far  to  the  rear,  and,  owing  to  its 
inefficient  action,  the  infantry,  long  before  the  close  of  the 
campaign,  showed  a  disposition  to  despise  its  help,  and 
to  hurry  into  action  without  it,  crowding  the  -roads  and 
refusing  to  make  way  for  the  guns  to  pass. 

The  Austrians  far  surpassed  their  adversaries  in  the 
skill  and  effectiveness  with  which  they  handled  their  artil- 
lery. From  the  beginning  of  the  campaign,  it  was  an  im- 
portant factor  in  every  engagement,  and  at  Koniggratz 
it  was  handled  superbly.  On  the  heights  between  Lipa 
and  Langenhof  160  guns  were  concentrated  in  a  great  bat- 
tery, and  on  the  entire  line  opposed  to  Frederick  Charles 
250  guns  belched  forth  such  a  "hailstorm  of  shells"  as  to 
baffle  the  attack  and  hold  the  Prussians  at  a  standstill. 
When  the  arrival  of  the  Crown  Prince's  army  turned  the 
tide  of  battle  against  the  Austrians,  the  artillery  of  the 
latter  heroically  kept  its  position  until  the  Prussian  in- 
fantry was  at  the  very  muzzles  of  the  pieces;  and,  at  the 
sacrifice  of  many  guns  and  many  lives,  it  made  repeated 
stands  to  cover  the  retreat  of  the  infantry.  But  great  as 
was  the  value  of  the  Austrian  batteries  in  this  campaign, 
their  use  was  entirely  defensive,  and  the  Austrian  artil- 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  355 

lerists  originated  no  novel  features  of  tactics  and  taught 
the  military  world  nothing  new. 

The  Franco-German  War. — 'Among  the  critics  whose 
comments  were  turned  against  the  Prussian  artillery  for 
its  feebleness  in  the  war  of  1866,  none  were  iso  severe  as 
the  Prussians  themselves;  and  with  a  freedom  from  big- 
otry and  a  determination  to  improve,  the  artillery  officers 
set  earnestly  to  work  to  remedy  the  defects  of  their  arm. 
The  result  was  apparent  four  years  later  in  a  use  of  artil- 
lery so  brilliant  and  effective  a>s  to  raise  that  arm  to  a 
degree  of  importance  which  even  the  Napoleonic  and  Amer- 
ican wars  had  not  given  it. 

The  changes  in  organization  and  nomenclature  fore- 
shadowed the  aggressive  tactics  upon  which  the  Prussian 
artillery  had  resolved.  The  reserve  artillery  disappeared 
both  in  fact  and  in  name,  and  divisional  and  corps  artil- 
lery alone  were  employed.  Each  division)  had  4  batter- 
ies of  field  artillery,  and  in  each  corps  the  "corps  artil- 
lery" consisted  of  4  batteries  of  field  and  3  of  horse  artil- 
lery, making  a  total  of  15  batteries,  aggregating  90  guns, 
tc  each  corps.* 

Each  cavalry  division  had  2  batteries  of  horse  artil- 
lery. The  guns  were  all  steel,  breech-loading  rifles,  6- 
and  4-pdrs.  Half  of  the  field  batteries  were  armed  with 
the  former,  and  half  with  the  latter  caliber.  The  horse 
batteries  were  all  armed  with  the  latter.  Shells  with  per- 
cussion fuses  were  almost  exclusively  used.  The  propor- 
tion of  the  artillery  was  3.7  guns  to  1,000  men. 

In  the  French  Army  the  artillery  was  divided  into 
divisional  and  corps  artillery  and  an  artillery  reserve. 
The  first  consisted  of  3  batteries  of  guns  and  1  of 
mitrailleuses  to  each  infantry  division,  and  a  battery  of 
horse  artillery  to  each  cavalry  division;  the  second  con- 
sisted of  5  batteries  to  each  corps;  and  the  artillery  re- 
serve was  composed  of  96  guns.  Each  battery  of  guns 

*The  entire  artillery  of  an  army  corps,  as  given  above,  con- 
sisted of  one  regiment,  divided  into  three  aUheilungen  of  light 
and  one  of  horse  artillery,  each  abtheilung  containing  four  batteries, 
except  the  horse  abtheilung,  which  consisted  of  three.  The  German 
corps  contained  two  infantry  divisions. 


366  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

and  mitrailleuses  containing  6  pieces,  and  each  corps  be- 
ing composed  of  from  two  to  four  divisions  of  infantry  and 
one  of  cavalry,  the  total  number  of  guns  to  a  corps  va- 
ried from  72  to  108,  and  the  number  of  mitrailleuses 
from  12  to  24.  The  guns  were  muzzle  -  loading  rifles, 
8-  and  4-pdrs.  A  few  12-pdr.  Napoleon  guns  seem  also 
ta  have  been  used.  The  mitrailleuse  was  a  machine  gun 
consisting  of  37  rifled  steel  barrels  fitted  and  soldered 
into  a  wrought -iron  tube  somewhat  resembling  a  field- 
piece.  It  was  a  "volley  gun,"  the  barrels  being  fired 
simultaneously.  The  proportion  of  artillery,  exclusive  of 
mitrailleuses,  was  3  guns  to  1,000  men. 

From  the  beginning  of  the  campaign,  the  French  artil- 
lery was  out-numbered,  out-maneuvered,  and  out-fought. 
The  Prussian  guns  were  handled  with  audacity  and  skill, 
and  made  their  power  felt  from  the  beginning  of  every 
battle  to  its  close.  At  Worth  (August  6,  1870),  a  great 
battery  of  120  guns,  which  came  into  action  in  the  pre- 
paratory phase  of  the  fight  and  covered  the  deployment 
of  the  infantry,  poured  an  unceasing  and  concentrated  fire 
upon  the  French,  while  the  batteries  of  the  latter,  com- 
ing into  action  piece-meal,  were  speedily  knocked  to  pieces. 
In  the  frontal  attack  of  the  V.  Corps  on  Froschweiler,  in 
the  same  battle,  the  artillery  was  employed  on  the  skir- 
mish line.  At  Oolombey  (August  14)  and  at  Mars-la-Tour 
(August  16)  the  reconnaissance  was  begun  by  the  artillery, 
and  in  the  latter  battle  that  arm  was  employed  with  ex- 
traordinary skill  and  daring.  It  being  of  importance  to 
carry  the  French  position  at  the  village  of  Flavigny,  the 
fire  of  eight  batteries  was  concentrated  upon  it,  and  the 
village  was  soon  in  flames.  "Two  dense  columns  of  in- 
fantry," says  Hoffbauer,  "issuing  suddenly  from  the  farm 
buildings  to  the  northeast  and  southeast,  were  shelled  by 
the  whole  of  the  batteries  at  a  range  of  1,500  or  1,600 
paces,  and  retreated  on  Rezonville,  leaving  the  ground 
literally  covered  with  corpses;  while  strong  French  col- 
umns which  advanced  from  the  hill  to  re-occupy  the  village 
met  the  same  fate.  It  is  reported  by  the  artillery  that 
the  occupation  of  Flavigny  was  then  effected  by  the  in- 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  357 

fantry  without  much  fighting,  although  the  conflict  up  to 
that  time  had  been  most  bloo£y."*  Later  in  the  day,  nine- 
teen batteries,  massed  under  one  commander,  in  the  German 
center,  repulsed  repeated  attacks  of  the  French  infantry, 
which  was  invariably  stopped  at  a  distance  of  at  least 
800  paces  from  the  guns.  Far  from  displaying  the  timid- 
ity in  regard  to  infantry  fire  which  it  had  shown  four  years 
before,  the  artillery  was  now  pushed  forward  almost  with 
rashness.  In  the  X.  Corps  seven  batteries  were  advanced 
to  the  hills  of  Tronville  (a  position  of  great  importance) 
ahead  of  the  infantry,  and  by  their  fire  quickly  checked 
the  French  attack.  In  this  battle  "some  of  the  batteries 
lost  all  their  officers;  others  all,  or  nearly  all,  their  horses; 
while  a  few  lost  nearly  three-fourths  of  their  men."** 

In  the  battle  of  Gravelotte  (August  18)  there  was  a 
striking  exemplification  of  the  value  of  artillery  fire  in 
preparing  and  supporting  an  infantry  attack.  To  prepare 
the  way  for  an  assault  by  the  infantry  of  the  Prussian 
Guards,  a  fire  of  84  guns  was  concentrated  upon  the 
French  position  at  St.  Privat,  the  cannonade  continuing  for 
more  than  half  an  hour,  at  first  at  a  range  of  about  2,200 
yards,  and  later  at  about  1,650.  The  enemy's  guns  having 
apparently  been  silenced,  it  was  assumed  that  the  French 
infantry  had  also  been  badly  shaken  by  the  cannonade,  and 
the  attack  was  ordered.  The  Guards  advanced  with  great 
gallantry;  but  the  artillery  had  produced  but  little  effect 
on  the  opposing  infantry,  the  French  guns  had  merely  sus- 
pended their  fire  to  await  the  assault,  and  the  Prussians 
were  received  with  suich  a  storm  of  rifle  bullets  and  shrap- 
nel as  to  stop  their  progress,  with  fearful  loss,  at  a  dis- 
tance of  500  to  800  yards  from  the  position.***  The  batter- 
ies were  then  reinforced  until  they  numbered  192  guns, 
and  they  again  opened  fire  upon  St.  Privat,  at  ranges  from 
1,650  to  1,000  yards.  Finally,  after  a  furious  cannonade 

*"The  German  Artillery  in  the  Battles  near  Metz,"  by  Captain 
E.  Hoffbauer  (tr.  by  Hollist),  p.  82. 
**Hoffbauer. 
***See  p.  106  ante. 


358  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

of  nearly  two  hours,  the  Tillage  was  in  flames,  the 
houses  and  walls  were  demolished,  all  the  French  batter- 
ies in  the  vicinity  were  driven  away,  and  the  Guards  and 
the  Saxon  infantry  assaulted  the  position  and  carried  it. 
Sedan  (September  1)  was  the  great  artillery  battle  of 
the  war,  and,  indeed,  the  greatest  recorded  in  all  military 
history.  In  this  battle  the  German  batteries,  aggregating 
540  guns,  formed  a  veritable  "circle  of  fire"  around  Mac- 
Mahon's  army,  upon  which  they  showered  their  projectiles 
from  all  sides.  Attempts  of  the  French  infantry  to  ad- 
vance against  the  encircling  masses  of  guns  were  repeat- 
edly checked  by  the  fire  of  the  latter,  generally  at  a  dis- 
tance of  fully  2,000  paces.  All  accounts  concur  in  regard 
to  the  fearful  effect  of  the  German  artillery  fire  in  this 
battle.  General  Douay,  commanding  the  French  VII. 
Corps,  declares:  "Our  adversaries  reduced  as,  so  to  speak, 
by  their  artillery  fire  alone,  for  it  was  only  toward  the 
end  of  the  battle,  when  their  guns  had  crushed  and  partly 
disorganized  our  batteries,  our  infantry,  and  our  cavalry, 
that  their  troops  advanced  in  considerable  numbers."  Sim- 
lar  statements  are  made  by  Generals  Duerot  and  Le  Brun, 
the  other  corps  commanders;  and  a  correspondent  of  the 
London  Daily  News,  who  passed  over  the  field  the  next 
day,  wrote:  "The  ghastly  wounds  inflicted  on  most  of  the 
French  dead  whom  I  saw  upon  the  hill  showed  that  they 
had  fallen  under  an  artillery  fire;  and  the  ground  was  in 
many  places  so  plowed  up  that  a  blanket  could  scarcely 
Lave  leen  laid  on  it  without  covering  some  spot  where  a 
shell  had  exploded."  The  German  "Official  Account"  says: 
"The  German  artillery  in  the  battle  of  Sedan  produces  an 
especially  grand  and  decisive  effect.  Only  the  surprise  un- 
dertaken during  the  morning  mist  towards  Bazeilles,  as 
demanded  by  this  sort  of  attack,  is  made  by  the  infantry 
alone,  but  at  all  parts  of  the  extensive  battle-field  the 
whole  strength  of  the  batteries  is  brought  into  play  from 
the  outset.  Inserting  themselves  in  the  columns  of  route 
in  a  position  favorable  to  early  deployment,  they  hasten 
forward  to  the  battle-field  with  the  advanced  parties  of 
the  infantry.  The  batteries  of  the  V.  and  XI.  Corps,  which 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  359 

have  to  traverse  the  difficult  road-defile  at  the  Bois  de  la 
Falizette,  deploy,  trusting  mainly  to  their  own  strength, 
in  one  long  line,  though  in  view  of  the  hostile  masses  of 
horse  threatening  them  and  with  their  backs  to  the  Bel- 
gian frontier.  As  a  general  rule,  the  attack  of  the  in- 
fantry is  deferred  until  the  artillery  has  produced  its  full 
effect.  From  the  Galvaire  d'llly  the  enemy  is  almost  ex- 
clusively driven  off  by  the  fire  of  the  guns,  whereupon  a 
few  companies  take  possession  of  this  important  height 
without  a  struggle.  The  shells  bursting  thickly  in  the  Bois 
de  la  Garenne  prepare  the  attack  of  the  battalions  of  the 
Guard  and  spare  the  tremendous  losses  with  which  pre- 
vious victories  had  been  purchased." 

The  characteristic  features  of  the  artillery  tactics  if 
the  Franco-German  War  may  be  summed  up  as  follows: 
On  the  march,  the  German  artillery  was  no  longer  kept 
in  rear  of  columns  of  infantry,  but  was  pushed  well  to  the 
front,  being  preceded  by  only  enough  infantry  to  protect 
it  from  surprise.  It  was  brought  into  action  at  the  very 
first  opportunity,  and  almost  invariably  in  large  masses, 
which  concentrated  their  fire  upon  the  objective  of  the 
infantry  attacks.  Its  fire  was,  in  almost  every  case,  delib- 
erate and  accurate,  and  was  employed  at  ranges  varying 
from  3,300  to  650  yards;  while  the  French  wasted  their 
ammunition  in  a  rapid  fire  at  ranges  too  long  for  the  best 
effect.  The  French  committed  the  further  fault  of  retain- 
ing their  batteries  too  long  in  reserve,  and  employing  them 
too  often  singly  instead  of  in  masses.  The  mitrailleuse 
did  not  meet  the  high  expectations  that  had  been  formed 
of  it,  though  its  effect  was  sufficient  to  foreshadow  the 
extensive  use  of  machine  guns  in  future  wars.  Borbstaedt 
acknowledges  that  these  guns  did  "produce  a  considerable 
effect,  partly  from  the  strange  rattling  noise  they  made, 
partly  from  the  rapidity  with  which  an  immense  number 
oi  projectiles  were  fired";  and  he  says:  "It  cannot  be  de- 
nied that  the  French  mitrailleuses  caused  heavy  losses 
to  the  attacking  German  troops,  especially  in  positions 
where  it  was  possible  to  keep  them  concealed  till  the  de- 


360  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

cisive  moment  had  arrived."*  The  mistake  of  pitting  these 
guns  against  the  German  field  artillery  was  frequently 
and  disastrously  made  by  the  French.  They  were  good 
only  in  the  defense  of  positions. 

The  Russo-TurTcish  War. — The  Russian  artillery  in  1877 
was  inferior  to  that  of  Prussia,  seven  years  before,  in  or- 
ganization, materiel,  and  tactical  handling.  It  was  divided 
into  field  and  horse  artillery,  the  batteries  of  the  former 
having  8,  and  those  of  the  latter  6  gurs.  The  field  batter- 
ies were  organized  into  brigades  of  6  batteries  each,  and 
one  of  these  brigades  was  attached  to  each  infantry  di- 
vision. Two  horse  batteries  wtre  attached  to  each  cavalry 
division.  There  was  no  general  reserve  of  field  artillery, 
and  all  the  artillery  of  the  etrps  was  divided  among  the 
infantry  divisions.  The  guns  were  bronze,  breech-loading 
rifles,  the  ^leavy  guns  being  9-,  and  the  light  6-pdrs.  Half 
of  the  batteries  of  each  brigade  were  armed  with  guns 
of  the  former,  and  half  with  tto.se  of  the  latter  caliber. 
The  horse  batteries  were  armed  exclusively  with  4-pdrs. 
The  projectiles  used  were  shell,  shrapnel,  and  canister.** 
The  proportion  of  artillery  <  the  Russian  Army  was  3.9 
guns  to  1,000  me--. 

In  materiel  the  Turkish  artillery  was  superior  to  that 
of  the  Russians,  being  composed  of  Krupp  steel,  breech- 
loading,  rifled  guns,  of  8  and  9  centimeters  caliber.  The 
Turks  had,  however,  only  2.2  guns  per  1,000  men. 

In  few  cases  only  was  the  Russian  artillery  used  with 
appreciable  effect  in  the  campaigns  in  Turkey.  At  Lovtcha 
(September  3,  1877),  the  Russian  artillery  cannonaded  the 
Turkish  position  for  eight  hours  before  the  infantry  as- 
saulted. The  effect  of  this  fire  was  such  that  the  infantry 
attack  succeeded  easily  and  with  slight  loss.  At  the  bat- 
tle of  Aladja  Dagh  (October  15,  1877),  the  Russians  con- 
centrated the  fire  of  64  guns  upon  a  portion  of  the  Turk- 
ish lines,  and  after  an  effective  cannonade  of  six  hours  at 

*"The  Franco-German  War"    (tr.  by  Dwyer),  p.  154. 

**The  shell  and  shrapnel  for  the  9-pdr.  gun  weighed  24.30  and 
29.48  Ibs.  respectively.  The  corresponding  projectiles  for  the  4-pdr. 
gun  weighed  12.6  and  15.19  Ibs.  respectively. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  361 

a  range  of  1,500  yards,  the  position  was  easily  carried 
by  the  infantry.  The  battle  of  Telis  (October  28,  1877), 
where  the  concentrated  fire  of  72  Russian  guns  caused  the 
surrender  of  a  redoubt  without  the  necessity  of  an  in- 
fantry assault,  furnishes  the  only  other  instance  in  which 
the  Russian  artillery  was  used  with  noticeable  effect. 
"With  these  few  exceptions,"  says  Greene,  "it  contributed 
to  no  victory,  and  averted  no  defeat.  It  consumed  several 
thousand  tons  of  ammunition,  transported  with  enormous 
difficulty  and  expense,  it  hammered  away  at  earthworks 
for  weeks  at  a  time  without  producing  any  substantial 
result,  and  the  total  losses  inflicted  by  it  were  probably 
but  little  over  1  per  cent  of  those  inflicted  by  the  infantry, 
and  these  were  nearly  all  by  shrapnel."*  The  same  au- 
thority attributes  the  inefficiency  of  the  Russian  artillery 
largely  to  the  fact  that  the  Turkish  rifle  fire  kept  the 
Russian  guns  at  distances  of  1,000  yards  or  more,  and  that 
at  such  ranges  the  angle  of  fall  of  the  projectile  was  so 
great  with  the  gums  then  in  use,  that  the  shell  generally 
buried  itself  in  the  ground  and  expended  its  whole  force 
in  throwing  up  a  cloud  of  earth,  while  the  pieces  remained 
in  the  crater. 

According  to  Von  Trotha,  the  slight  effect  of  the 
Russian  artillery  was  due  to  the  distribution  of  the  bat- 
teries along  the  general  line  instead  of  massing  them;  to 
opening  frontal  fire  at  very  long  ranges  and  making  no 
attempt  to  use  enfilade  or  oblique  fire;  to  the  fact  that 
the  frontal  positions  of  the  artillery  rendered  it  necessary 
to  suspend  its  fire  almost  as  soon  as  the  infantry  attack 
commenced;  to  the  failure  of  the  batteries  generally  to 
follow  up  the  infantry  attack  and  support  it;  and,  above 
all,  to  the  fact  that  it  was  almost  invariably  used  against 
infantry  behind  natural  or  artificial  cover — a  condition,  it 
may  be  remarked,  which  had  often  been  encountered  in 
the  War  of  Secession,  but  rarely  in  the  Franco-German 
War. 

Since  the  Russo-Turkish  War,  there  had  been  no  con- 
flict of  sufficient  magnitude  to  bring  into  use  any  oonsid- 

*"Russian  Campaigns  in  Turkey,"  p.  454. 


362  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

erable  force  of  field  artillery;  and  practical  experience  in 
the  tactics  of  that  arm  virtually  ceases  with  the  year  1877. 
In  considering  the  history  of  field  artillery,  it  is  evi- 
dent that  the  development  of  that  arm  has  been  on  the 
same  lines  as  the  development  of  infantry;  namely,  in- 
creased mobility  and  more  effective  fire  action.  The  whole 
end  and  aim  of  artillery  tactics  has  been  to  bring  an  over- 
whelming fire  upon  some  part  of  the  enemy's  line  at  a 
critical  period  of  the  battle.  In  the  early  days  of  artil- 
lery, the  limited  mobility  of  the  guns  rendered  it  difficult 
to  assemble  them  in  masses,  and  their  short  range  made 
a  concentration  of  the  fire  of  many  pieces  quite  imprac- 
ticable. As  their  mobility  increased,  they  were  easily 
moved  from  one  part  of  the  field  to  another  and  massed 
in  great  batteries;  and  it  became  possible  to  have  them  in 
the  right  place  at  the  decisive  moment,  while  their  in- 
creased range  enabld  a  fire  of  many  guns  to  be  concen- 
trated upon  a  single  point.  With  the  enormous  range  of 
the  present  artillery,  the  guns  can  turn  their  fire  upon 
many  parts  of  the  hostile  line  without  even  changing 
their  position;  and  their  great  mobility  and  the  destruct- 
iveness  of  their  projectiles  have  further  added  to  their 
power  to  such  a  degree  that  it  seems  probable  that  field 
artillery  will,  in  future  wars,  play  a  part  compared  with 
which  even  its  greatest  achievements  in  the  past  will  seem 
insignificant. 


APPENDIX  I. 

QUESTIONS. 

The  following  questions  have  been  prepared  with  a  view  to  their 
use  in  a  general  review  of  the  book.  The  number  in  parentheses 
indicates  the  page  on  which  the  answer  to  the  question  is  to  be 
found. 

CHAPTER  I. 
INTRODUCTION. 

1.  State  the  two  great  divisions  of  the  art  of  war,  and  define  each. 

(1.) 

2.  Give  other  divisions,  and  define  them.     (1.) 

3.  How  may  the  subject  of  tactics  be  divided     (2.) 

4.  What  furnishes  the  connecting  link  between  strategy  and  tac- 

tics,  and   why?      (2.) 

5.  Why  should  organization  and  tactics  be  considered  together? 

(2.) 

CHAPTER  II. 
ORGANIZATION  AND  DISCIPLINE. 

6.  Define  tactical  organization.     (3.) 

THE    LINE. 

7.  Upon  what  unit  should  the  organization  of  an  army  be  based? 

(4.) 

8.  What  are  the  advantages  of  the  battalion  as  a  tactical  unit  in 

our  service?     (4-5.) 

9.  State  the  subdivisions  of  the  battalion  down  to  and  including 

the  squad.     (5.) 

10.  What  organization  is  the  administrative  unit,  and  why  is  it  so 

regarded?     (5.) 

11.  What  is  the  necessity  for  grouping  the  battalions  into   regi- 

ments?    (5-6.) 

12.  What  is  the  composition  of  the  brigade?     (6.) 

13.  What  is  the  tactical  unit  of  artillery,  and  how  many  guns  does 

this  unit  contain?     (6-7.) 

14.  How  is  artillery  united  into  larger  organizations?     (7.) 


364  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

15.  What  is  the  tactical  unit  of  cavalry  in  our  own  and  in  other 

armies?     (7.) 

16.  In  cavalry  what  kind  of  organization  is  the  regiment,  and  of 

what  does  it  consist?     (8.) 

17.  What  is  the  organization  of  foreign  cavalry  regiments?     (8.) 

18.  What  is  the  largest  independent  cavalry  organization  in  our 

service?     (8.) 

19.  State  the  composition   of  the  cavalry   brigade,   division,   and 

corps.     (8-9.) 

20.  State  the  composition  of  an  infantry  division.     (9-10.) 

21.  What  kind  of  unit  is  an  army  corps,  and  what  should  it  consti- 

tute?    (10.) 

22.  In  the  United  States,  who  grants  authority  for  the  organization 

of  corps,  and  how  are  they  numbered?     (10.) 

23.  What  is  the  ordinary  strength  of  an  army  corps  in  round  num- 

bers?     (10-11.) 

24.  What  considerations  govern  the  strength  of  an  army  corps? 

(11-12.) 

25.  What  considerations  govern  in  the  grouping  of  army  corps  into 

armies?    (12.) 

26.  Upon  what  does  the  question  of  the  proportion  of  the  three 

arms  depend?     (12-13.) 

27.  State  the  rule  for  the  proportion  of  artillery  in  general  and 

under  unfavorable  conditions.     (13-14.) 

28.  How  and  why  does  the  proportion  of  guns  to  infantry  vary  dur- 

ing the  campaign?     (14.) 

29.  In  general  terms,  how  much  artillery  should  an  army  have? 

(14.) 

30.  How  does  the  proportion  of  cavalry  vary,  and  what  should  be 

the  rule  with  us?     (14-15.) 

SPECIAL  TROOPS. 

31.  What  are  the  special  troops  of  our  own  and  other  services? 

(15.) 

32.  What  are  the  duties  of  engineer  troops  in  the  United  States 

Army?     (15-16.) 

33.  What  is  the  capacity  of  the  bridge  train  of  a  German  army 

corps?     (16-17.) 

34.  How  are  the  bridge  trains  of  our  Army  organized  and  han- 

dled?    (17.) 

35.  State  the  strength,  duties,  and  equipment  of  the  signal  troops. 

(18.) 


t  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  365 

36.  State  the  medical  force  attached  to  a   regiment  of  infantry, 

squadron  of  cavalry,  and  battery  of  artillery.     (18.) 

37.  State  the  medical  staff  of  a  brigade  and  of  a  division.     (18-19.) 

38.  State  the  sanitary  organizations  of  a  division  and  their  duties. 

(18-19.) 

39.  Describe  the  purpose  and  position  of  general  hospitals,  and  the 

supervision  of  them  by  the  army  commander.     (19.) 

40.  What  is  the  method  pursued  in  the  United  States  in  providing 

for  the  military  police  of  the  Army?     (19-20.) 

41.  Describe  the  qualifications,  equipment,  and  duties  of  mounted 

couriers.      (20.) 

THE   TRAIN. 

42.  What  is  the  amount  of  small-arm  ammunition  with  which  the 

infantry  should  be  promptly  supplied,  and  how  is  it  car- 
ried?    (20-21.) 

43.  What  is  the  amount  of  artillery  ammunition  carried-  for  field 

batteries?     (21.) 

44.  What  is  the  amount  of  ammunition  carried  for  horse  batteries? 

(21.) 

45.  How  is  the  ammunition  column  commanded,  how  is  it  divided, 

and  to  what  is  it  attached?    (21.) 

46.  The  personnel  of  the  ammunition  column  is  composed  of  what? 

(21.) 

47.  What  supplies  accompany  the  troops,  and  how  are  they  car- 

ried?    (21.) 

48.  What  is  the  standard   army  wagon,   and   how  much   does   it 

carry?     (21.) 

49.  What  is  the  allowance  of  wagons  for  corps,  division,  brigade, 

and  regimental  headquarters.      (21.) 

50.  What   is   the  allowance   of  transportation   for   a  battalion   of 

infantry  or  artillery,  or  a  squadron  of  cavalry:    for  com- 
pany, troops,  or  battery?     (21-22.) 

51.  What  is  the  allowance  for  all  other  troops?     (22.) 

52.  What  do  the  company  and  troop  wagons  carry,   and  how  Is 

the  average  weight  reached?     (22.) 

53.  What  constitutes  the  regimental  train?     (22.) 

54.  What  constitutes  the  light  train?     (22.) 

55.  How  are  the  ammunition  wagons  distributed?     (22.) 

56.  How  may  the  allowances  of  transportation  be  changed?     (22.) 

57.  State  the  organization   of  the   supply  column:  'wagon   train, 

and  pack  train?      (22-23.) 

58.  How   are    the    supply    columns    handled,    and   what    do    they 

carry?     (22-23.) 


366  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

59.  What  is  the  reserve  supply  column?     (23.) 

60.  State  the  location  of  all  trains  on  the  march.     (23-24.) 

61.  What  is  the  total  transportation  of  the  division?     (24.) 

62.  What  the  best  means  of  obtaining  an  efficient  train  service,  and 

why?     (24-25.) 

THE  STAFF. 

63.  What  are  some  of  the  duties  of  a  commanding  general,  and 

how  is  he  relieved  from  a  portion  of  them?     (25-26.) 

64.  State  the  duties  and  responsibilities  of  a  chief  of  staff.    (26-28.) 

65.  What  officers  should  be  under  the  command  of  the  chief  of  staff, 

and  what  officers  constitute  the  military  staff?     (28.) 

66.  What  are  the  duties  of  the  provost-marshal  general?     (28-29.) 
6T.    What  are  the  duties  of  the  chief  signal  officer?     (29.) 

68.  What  are  the  duties  of  the  chief  of  artillery?     (29.) 

69.  What  are  the  duties  of  the  chief  of  cavalry?     (29.) 

70.  What  are  the  duties  of  the  chief  engineer?     (29-30.) 

71.  State  what  officers  compose  the  administrative  staff,  and  give 

the  duties  of  each.     (30-31.) 

72.  Through  what  channel  should  the  correspondence  of  the  staff 

departments  be  conducted?     (31-32.) 

73.  Describe  the  responsibilities  of  officers  of  supply  departments 

in  the  French  Army  since  reorganization.    (31-32.) 

74.  What  is  the  rule  as  to  the  number  of  persons  on  a  staff?    (32.) 

75.  Of  what  officers  should  the  staff  of  an   army  corps   consist? 

(33.) 

76.  Of  what  officers  should  the  staff  of  a  division  consist?     (33-34.) 

77.  Of  what  officers  should  the  staff  of  a  brigade  consist?    (34.) 

78.  How  should  clerks  and  messengers  be  obtained  for  the  several 

headquarters?     (34.) 

79.  State  the  composition  of  the  division  (its  different  units),  and 

its  aggregate  strength.    (34.) 

RANK   AND   COMMAND. 

80.  State  the  proper  rank  of  the  commanders  of  the  different  organ- 

izations.    (35.) 

81.  What  has  been  the  practice  in  the  United  States  Army,  and 

what  are  the  objections  to  such  a  system?     (35.) 

RECRUITMENT. 

82.  What  is  the  necessity  for  recruiting?     (35-36.) 

83.  Give  the  two  general  methods  of  recruiting  an  army,  and  dis- 

cuss each.     (36-37.) 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  367 

DISCIPLINE. 

84.  Define  discipline.     (37.) 

85.  What  two  general  means  are  there  for  promoting  discipline, 

and  which  is  usually  the  better?     (37-38.) 

86.  In  what  are  the  best  evidences  of  true,  discipline  found?     (39.) 

CHAPTER  III. 
CHARACTERISTICS    OP   THE    THREE   ARMS. 

INFANTRY. 

87.  State  the  powers  and  limitations  of  infantry.    (43.) 

88.  Describe  the  arms  and  the  action  of  infantry.      (43-45.) 

89.  What  is  the  pace  of  infantry  under  various  conditions?     (46.) 

90.  State  the  essential  qualities  of  infantry.     (46.) 

CAVALRY. 

91.  Of  what  does  the  action  of  cavalry  consist?     (47.) 

92.  When  is  shock  action  of  value,  on  what  does  its  effect  depend, 

and  how  is  it  supplemented?     (47.) 

93.  Why  must  cavalry  be  armed  with  the  carbine,  and  what  oppor- 

tunities  are   afforded   for   dismounted   fire   action?      (47.) 

94.  When  may  mounted  fire  action  with  the  carbine  be  used? 

(47-48.) 

95.  Why  is  the  independent  action  of  cavalry  of  special  import- 

ance, and  of  what  does  it  consist?     (48.) 

96.  How  is  cavalry  divided  and  classified?     (48-49.) 

97.  Describe  heavy  and  light  cavalry  and  their  uses.     (49.) 

98.  Describe  medium  cavalry.     (49.) 

99.  Describe  the  equipment  of  the  various  classes  of  cavalry.    (49.) 

100.  How  is  all  cavalry  now  armed  and  trained?     (49.) 

101.  To  what  type  are  all  cavalrymen  approaching?     (49.) 

102.  Give  the  present  requirements  of  cavalry.     (49-50.) 

103.  What  are  the  arms  of  the  trooper  in  the  United  States  and 

Europe?     (50.) 

104.  What    is    the    pace    of    cavalry    under    various    conditions? 

(51-52.) 

105.  State  the  powers  and  limitations  of  cavalry.     (52.) 

106.  Discuss  the  subject  of  mounted  infantry.     (52-53.) 

ARTILLERY. 

107.  How  is  artillery  primarily  divided?     (53.) 

108.  What  does  siege  artillery  embrace?     (53.) 


368  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

109.  What   does  heavy  field  artillery   include?      (53-54.) 

110.  What  does  light  field  artillery  comprise?     (54.) 

111.  For  what  is  horse  artillery  especially  designed:   what  is  its 

essential  characteristic,  how  is  it  armed?     (54-55.) 

112.  State  the  use  of  mountain  artillery.     (55.) 

113.  What  are  the  arms  of  artillery?     (55-56.) 

114.  What  is  the  pace  of  artillery  under  various  conditions?     (56.) 

115.  What  are  the  powers  and  limitations  of  artillery?     (56-57.) 

116.  What   are   the   ranges   of   field   artillery   and   how   are   they 

classified?     (57.) 

117.  How   is   artillery   classified    as   to   its    trajectory?     Describe 

each  kind.     (57.) 

118.  How  is  artillery  fire  classified  as  to  direction?    Describe  each 

kind.     (57-58.) 

119.  What  projectiles  are  used  by  field  artillery?     Describe  each. 

(58-59.) 

120.  Give  the  classification  of  fuses?    Describe  each.     (59.) 

121.  State  the  use  of  the  different  projectiles.     (59-60.) 

122.  For  what  are  field  mortars  designed?     (60.) 

123.  Define  rapid-firing  guns.     (60.) 

124.  Define  machine  guns,  and  discuss  their  use  on  the  field  of 

battle.      (60-61.) 

125.  What  two  kinds  of  cover  may  be  obtained  for  field  guns?    (62.) 

126.  Describe  the  gun  shield.     (62.) 

CHAPTER  IV. 
INFANTRY  IN  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE. 

127.  Discuss  the  general  theory  of  the  infantry  attack.     (63-67.) 

128.  How  have  the  functions  of  the  skirmishers   changed,   what 

dfficulty  has   accordingly   arisen,   and   what   measures   are 
taken  for  obviating  this  difficulty?      (67-68.) 

•  129.  What  should  each  man  be  instructed  to  do  when  separated 
from  his  squad,  and  how  should  new  squads  be  formed? 
(68.) 

130.  State  what  is  meant  by  "fire  discipline,"  and   give  the  five 

rules  required  by  it.     (68-69.) 

131.  Why  is  the  observance  of  the  simple  rules  which  regulate  fire 

discipline  a  matter  of  great  difficulty  in  battle?     (69.) 

132.  Upon  what  will  the  time  of  beginning  the  firing  depend,  and 

why  is  long-range  firing  generally  to  be  deprecated?    (70-71.) 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  369 

133.  How  may  long-range  fire  be  forced  upon  the  assailant,  and 

what  should  he  then  do?     (71.) 

134.  When  long-range  fire  is  used  by  the  assailant,  it  will  generally 

be  by  what  troops,  and  how?     (71.) 

135.  If  possible,  the  attacking  infantry  should  advance  how  close  to 

the  enemy  before  opening  fire,  and  how  close  can  it  usually 
advance?  (71-72.) 

136.  How  must  the  attacking   infantry  obtain   protection,   at   the 

longer  ranges?     (71.) 

137.  State  why  volley  firing  is  desirable,  the  objections  to  it,  when 

it  is  possible,  and  what  should  be  done  when  the  men,  are 
becoming  disconcerted.  (72-73.) 

138.  If  good  results  are  to  be  obtained  from  individual  fire,  the  dis- 

cipline must  be  such  as  to  insure  what?     (73.) 

139.  How  is  individual  fire  classified?   Describe  each  class.    (73-74.) 

140.  How   is  protection  from  the  enemy's  fire   obtained?      What 

qualifications  must  the  cover  possess?     (74.) 

141.  In  regard  to  cover,  what  two  things  should  the  men  be  taught? 

(74-75.) 

142.  Why  are  rushes  necessary,  what  regulates  their  distance,  and 

how  are  they  made?     (74-76.) 

143.  Why  should  the  fractions  of  the  line  alternately  rushing  be 

large?      (76.) 

144.  What  measures  should  be  taken  to  delay  and  minimize  the  un- 

avoidable evil  of  the  intermingling  of  different  organiza- 
tions on  the  firing  line,  and  at  the  opening  of  the  fight 
what  proportion  of  the  men  should  be  in  the  firing  line? 
(77.) 

145.  Why  should  great  care  be  taken  to  give  the  proper  direction  to 

the  firing  line  when  it  first  moves  to  the  attack?     (77.) 

146.  The  firing  line  is  essentially  what?     (77-78.) 

147.  How  and  why  are  scouts  used  in  an  infantry  attack?     (78.) 

148.  What  is  the  two-fold  object  of  the  support?     (79.) 

149.  State  the  considerations  which  affect  the  strength  of  the  sup- 

port.    (79.) 

150.  What  is  usually  the  distance  of  the  support  from  the  firing 

line  at  the  beginning  of  the  fight,  and  how  do  the  consid- 
erations of  terrain  and  fire  affect  this  distance?  (79-80.) 

151.  When  is  the  use  of  small  columns  in  the  support  generally 

practicable,  and  when  should  each  extension  of  the  support 
from  column  or  close-order  line  be  made?  (80-81.) 

152.  Describe  the  reinforcement  of  the  firing  line  from  the  sup- 

port.    (81.) 


370  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

158.    Why  is  the  choice  of  the  time  of  reinforcing  the  firing  line  a 

matter  of  great  importance?     (82.) 
154.    State  the  general  objects  of  the  reserve?     (82.) 
15i.    How  should  the  reserve  be  formed,  and  where  should  it  be 

held  relatively  to  the  troops  in  front?     (82-83.) 

156.  What  should  be  the  distance  of  the  reserve  from  the  bodies 

in  front  at  the  beginning  of  the  attack,  and  how  does  this 
distance  change  as  the  attack  progresses?     (83.) 

157.  How  must  the  distance  of  the  reserve  from  the  firing  line 

compare  with  the  distance  of  the  latter  from  the  enemy? 
(83.) 

158.  How  and  when  are  reinforcements  sent  forward  from  the  re- 

serve?    (83-84.) 
158.    What  should  be  the  strength  of  the  reserve  in  proportion  to 

the  firing  line  and  support;   and  what  should  the  strength 

always  be  at  the  opening  of  the  fight?     (84.) 
160.    What  are  the  objects  of  the  second  line?     (84.) 
181.    What  should  be  the  strength  of  the  second  line,  its  distance 

from  the  first  line,  and  who  should  command  it?     (85.) 
162.    What  are  the  duties  of  the  third  line,  and  by  what  other  line 

are  these   duties  sometimes   performed?      (85-86.) 
168.    Who  commands  the  third  line,  what  is  its  distance  from  the 

second  line,  and  what  is  its  strength?     (86.) 

164.  Describe  the  method  of  attack  by  a  regiment  of  infantry.    (94.) 

165.  Describe   the   method    of    attack   by   a   brigade   of    infantry. 

(94-96.) 

166.  Give  the  general  rules  to  be  observed  in  conducting  an  in- 

fantry attack.     (96.) 

167.  Define    the    three    distinct    phases    of    the    infantry    attack. 

(96-97.) 

168.  What  is  requisite  for  the  success  of  a  front  attack,  and  what 

advantages  are  gained  by  a  flank  attack?  (98.) 

169.  Why  is  a  combination  of  front  and  flank  attacks  necessary, 

and  why  does  this  combination  promise  success?     (98.) 

170.  In  what  two  ways  may  a  flank  attack  be  made?    (98-99.) 

171.  Define  a  turning  movement,  and  state  what  is  necessary  in 

order  that  it  may  be  successful.     (99.) 

172.  State  when  the  troops  for  the  flank  attack  are  generally  con- 

centrated before  the  flank  which  is  to  be  attacked,  and  dis- 
cuss the  conduct  of  a  flank  attack.      (99-100.) 
17*.    What  is  the  object  of  the  force  on  the  defensive,  what  are  the 
essential  conditions  to  a  good  defense,  and  how  are  these 
conditions  best  fulfilled?    (100-101.) 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  371 

174.  Describe  the  general  characteristics  of  the  defense.     (101.) 

175.  When  and  how  should  the  defensive  position  be  occupied  by 

the  firing  line?     (102.) 

176.  Why  can  long-range  fire  generally  be  more  effectively  nsed 

by  the  defenders  than  by  the  assailants?     (102-103.) 

177.  What  should  be  the  objective  of  the  fire  of  the  firing  line  on 

the  defensive?     (103-104.) 

178.  Discuss  the  subject  of  the  support  in  defense— its  distance 

from  the  firing  line;  when  it  begins  to  reinforce  the  fir- 
ing line;  when  it  will  probably  be  entirely  absorbed;  its 
strength  relative  to  the  firing  line;  and  how  it  may  be  em- 
ployed to  increase  the  volume  of  fire  or  extend  the  front 
at  the  beginning  of  the  fight.  (105.) 

1?9.  Discuss  the  subject  of  the  reserve  in  defense — how  it  is 
usually  posted;  the  consideration  of  shelter;  distance  from 
the  support;  its  relative  strength;  when  it  should  reinforce; 
its  use  in  counter-attacks.  (105-106.) 

18$.  Discuss  the  subject  of  the  second  line  in  defense — its  func- 
tions; its  location;  the  consideration  of  shelter;  distance 
from  first  line;  when  it  should  charge;  distance  from  firing 
line  at  crisis  of  fight.  (106.) 

181.  Discuss  the  subject  of  the  third  line  in  defense — its  functions; 

when  and  how  counter-attacks  may  be  made;  what  the 
third  line  constitutes;  where  it  should  be  stationed.  (107- 
108.) 

182.  What  considerations  affect  the  relative  strength  of  the  three 

lines?    (108-109.) 

188.  State  the  first  and  most  important  requisite  of  an  infantry 
position;  the  next  in  importance;  an  especially  desirable 
position,  and  why  a  position  on  a  steep  hillside  is  not  de- 
sirable. (109-110.) 

184.  How  should  a  position  on  a  hill  be  occupied?     (110-111.) 

185.  To  what  should  the  position  be  suited  in  its  extent,  and  what 

may  be  constructed  in  front  of  it?     (111.) 

186.  When  the  enemy  is  encountered,  and,  in  the  course  of  rein- 

forcing the  advance  guard,  the  defensive  is  assumed  either 
by  choice  or  from  necessity,  state  what  is  done.  (111-112.) 

187.  Discuss    the    subject    of   hasty    intrenchments    for    infantry. 

(112-113.) 

188.  Discuss  the  relative  advantages  of  the  offensive  and  defensive. 

(113-114.) 

189.  Discuss  the  subject  of  withdrawal  from  action.     (114-116.) 


372  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

190.  Discuss    the    supply   of    infantry    ammunition    on    the    field. 

(116-117.) 

191.  Describe  how  infantry  should  receive  cavalry — if  in  battle  for- 

mation; if  in  skirmish  line;  if  attacked  in  flank;  if  in  line; 
it  short  of  ammunition  or  shaken  by  heavy  losses.  (117- 
118.) 

192     What  are  the  first  duties  of  an  infantry  commander  opposed 
to  cavalry?     (118.) 

CHAPTEK  V. 

CAVALRY  IN  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE. 

193.  Discuss  the  tactical  use  of  cavalry  on  the  battlefield;    what 

arm  will  be  used  and  under  what  circumstances.     (119.) 

194.  What  is  the  essential  distinction  between  cavalry  and  mounted 

infantry?     (119-120.) 

195.  What  is  the  true  function  of  modern  cavalry?     (120.) 

196.  Discuss  the  formation  of  cavalry  for  the  charge  in  line — how 

the  charge  is  made,  and  on  what  its  effect  depends;  the 
necessity  for  and  position  of  the  support;  same  of  the  re- 
serve; when  these  bodies  may  be  combined;  the  three  parts 
of  which  an  attacking  force  of  cavalry  generally  consists, 
and  the  relative  strength  of  these  parts;  the  distances  be- 
tween these  parts;  the  proper  formation  for  maneuvering 
cavalry,  and  when  deployment  should  be  effected.  (120-123.) 

197.  Draw  a  diagram  representing  the  normal  attack  formation  of 

a  brigade  of  cavalry.     (123.) 

198.  What  are  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  charging  in 

single  rank  and  in  double  rank?     (122-124.) 

199.  Discuss  the  conduct  of  the  cavalry  charge — the  pace  at  which 

it  is  made;  the  distance  covered  by  the  charge;  the  pace 
and  conduct  of  the  support  and  reserve;  the  positions  of 
the  officers;  the  duty  of  unoccupied  detachments;  what  is 
done  when  the  charge  is  successful,  and  what  when  it  IB 
unsuccessful.  (124-126.) 

200.  Discuss   the   influence   of   the   terrain    on   a   cavalry   charge. 

(126-127.) 

201.  Describe  the  use  of  ground  scouts  and  combat  patrols.     (127- 

128.) 

202.  Discuss  the  subject  of  flank  attacks  in  cavalry  charges — their 

effect;  the  two  ways  in  which  they  may  be  made;  when  the 
charge  on  the  enemy's  flank  in  conjunction  with  a  front 
attack  is  most  effective.  (128-129.) 


ORGANIZATION  AN!)  TACTICS.  373 

203.  Why  is  it  the  first  consideration  in  a  cavalry  attack  that  the 

charge  should  be  opportune?      (129.) 

204.  What   are   the   necessary   qualifications    for    a   good    cavalry 

leader?     (129.) 

205.  In  the  charge  in  column,  what  should  be  the  distance  between 

the  subdivisions;  their  formations;  what  does  the  charge 
in  column  of  subdivisions  produce;  and  when  is  it  pref- 
erable to  a  charge  in  line?  (130-131.) 

206.  How  should  the  charge  in  column  of  fours  be  made?     (131.) 

207.  How  is  the  charge  as  foragers  conducted,   and   under  what 

circumstances  may  this  method  of  charging  be  advanta- 
geously employed.  (131-132.) 

208.  Why  will  the  number  of  cavalry  battles  probably  be  greater 

in  the  future  than  it  has  been  in  the  past?     (132.) 

209.  What  circumstances  may  justify  the  charge  of  a  small  force 

of  cavalry  upon  a  large  one?     (132.) 

210.  When  are  the  best  opportunities  offered  for  an  attack  upon 

the  enemy's  cavalry?     (133.) 

211.  By  what  bodies  will  the  combats  of  cavalry  with  cavalry  gen- 

erally be  fought?     (133.) 

212.  State  the  different  circumstances  under  which   cavalry  may 

be  used  with  effect  in  charging  infantry.     (133-134.) 

213.  Discuss  the  conduct  of  a  cavalry  charge  on  infantry — forma. 

tion  of  cavalry  when  infantry  is  in  masses  or  close-order 
line;  when  infantry  is  in  extended  order;  the  line  that 
the  cavalry  should  take,  and  where  it  should  strike  the 
infantry;  direction  from  which  it  should  approach  if  strik- 
ing infantry  in  front;  effect  of  a  slight  slope;  when  tb« 
gallop  should  be  taken;  what  the  cavalry  must  be  careful 
not  to  do  in  regard  to  its  own  infantry  and  artillery.  (13*.  • 
135.) 

214.  Why  is  the  use  of  cavalry  against  infantry  not  a  thing  of 

the  past?     (135.) 

215.  State  the  cases  in  which  artillery  may  be-  attacked  by  cav- 

alry.    (135-136.) 

216.  What  should  be  the  method  of  attack  by  cavalry  upon  ar- 

tillery; and  what  measures  should  be  taken  on  capturing 
a  battery?  (136-137.) 

217.  How  may  shock  action  be  used  as  a  part  of  a  general  defensive 

plan?     (137.) 

218.  State  the  purposes  for  which  dismounted  action  of  cavalry 

may  be  usefully  employed.     (138-139.) 


374  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

219.  To  what  is  the  increased  value  of  dismounted  action  solely 

due?     (139.) 

220.  How  does  cavalry  prepare  for  dismounted  action;   what  kind 

of  reserve  is  retained;  what  is  the  proportion  of  men  dis* 
mounted,  and  how  does  it  vary;  when  may  the  horse- 
holders  dismount;  where  should  the  horses  be  held,  and 
how  are  the  dismounted  men  maneuvered  and  fought? 
(139-140.) 

221.  When  may  mounted  skirmishers   dismount  and   retain  their 

horses  on  the  line?     (140.) 

222.  How  is  the  offensive  action  of  dismounted  cavalry  conducted? 

(140-141.) 

223.  How  is  the  defensive  action  of  dismounted  cavalry  conducted; 

if  opposed  to  mounted  cavalry;  if  opposed  to  infantry? 
(141.) 

224.  When  may  mounted  fire  action  with  the  carbine  be  employed, 

and  in  what  formation  should  the  cavalry  be  when  using 
it?  (142.) 

225.  State  the  objects  for  which  cavalry  raids  may  be  undertaken. 

(142-145.) 

226.  When  are  raids  practicable,  and  why  should  they  not  be  un- 

dertaken without  an  important  object?     (145-147.) 

227.  Describe  the  composition  and  preparation  of  a  raiding  force. 

(148-149.) 

228.  Discuss  the  conduct  of  a  raid.     (150-151.) 

229.  Against  what  will  the  principal  destructive  efforts  of  a  raid- 

ing force  be  directed,  and  how  should  the  destruction  be 
effected  in  each  case?  (151-152.) 

230.  What  does  the  tactics  of  cavalry  embrace?     (152.) 

CHAPTER  VI. 

ARTILLERY  IN  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE. 

231.  Discuss  the  general  theory  of  the  employment  of  artillery  in 

attack.     (153-155.) 

232.  Who  is  responsible  for  the  technical  handling  of  field  artil- 

lery?    (156.) 

233.  How  is  artillery  fought,  and  what  effect  has  the  change  in 

materiel  had  upon  the  selection  of  the  artillery  position? 
(157.) 

234.  State  the  principal  requirements  of  a  good  artillery  position, 

(157-158.) 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  375 

235.  Upon  what  does  the  relative  importance  of  these  requirements 

depend?     (158.) 

236.  What  reconnaissance  should  be  made  of  the  ground  before  it 

is  occupied  by  artillery?     (158-159.) 

237.  How  are  the  guns  brought  into  the  position?     (159.) 

238.  Discuss  changes  of  position?     (159.) 

239.  By  Whom  is  the  fire  of  all  the  guns  supervised?    Under  what 

circumstances    may    fire    be    opened    without   his    orders? 
(159.) 

240.  What  is  the  objective  of  artillery  fire?     (159.) 

241.  Describe  the  .preliminary  reconnaissance  of  the  hostile  posi- 

tion.    (160-161.) 

242.  What  is  meant  by  concentrating  guns;  and  what  is  the  small- 

est tactical  division  which  should  be  employed?     (161.) 

243.  What  commander  is  responsible  for  the  tactical  [handling  of 

the  artillery?     (161-162.) 

244.  Describe  the  artillery  duel.     (162-163.) 

245.  What  is  done  in  case  the  defender  declines  the  duel?     (163.) 

246.  Describe  the  method  of  handling  the  artillery  in  the  third 

phase  of  the  action.     (163-168.) 

247.  How  do  the  'batteries  advance  from  one  position  to  another? 

(168.) 

248.  Describe  the  occupation  of  the  hostile  position;  and  what  bat- 

teries are  employed  in  the  pursuit.     (168.) 

249.  What  should  be  the  target  of  the  guns  in  the  pursuit?     (169.) 

250.  Describe  the  action  of  the  artillery  in  case  the  attack  is  re- 

pulsed?    (169.) 

251.  What  succession  of  changes  of  'position  will,  in  general,  be 

made  by  the  artillery?     (169.) 

252.  What  advantage  is  possessed  by  the  artillery  of  the  defense? 

(170.) 

253.  How  should  the  guns  be  placed  on  the  defensive?     (170.) 

254.  What  changes  of  position  are  made  by  the  artillery  of  the 

defense?     (170-171.) 

255.  What   precautions   against   surprise   must  be   taken    by    bat- 

teries on  the  defensive?     (171.) 

256.  Under  what  disadvantage  is  the  defender  placed  as  regards 

'the  distribution  of  his  guns;  what  advantage  accrues  rela- 
tive to  fire  control?     (171.) 

257.  Discuss  the  occupation  of  advanced  positio<ns,  and  what  bat- 

teries should  be  employed?     (171-172.) 

258.  Where  are  the  heavy  guns  of  the  defense  placed?     (172.) 

259.  At  what  ranges  should  fire  be  opened?     (172-173.) 


376  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

260.  How  are  targets   assigned  to  batteries?      (173.) 

261.  Describe  the   artillery  duel   from   the   standpoint  of  the   de- 

fense?    (173-174.) 

262.  Describe   the    third   phase   of   the   action   on   the    defensive. 

(174-176.) 

263.  What  reserve  is  used  on  the  defensive?    (176.) 

264.  Describe  the  duty  of  tne  artillery  in  case  the  attack  is  suc- 

cessful.    (176./ 

265.  What  is  the  duty  of  the  artillery  in  covering  the  retreat? 

(176-1??., 

266.  What  considerations  govern  the  position  of  artillery   in   an 

advancing  column?     (177.) 

267.  Mow  is  the  artillery  placed  on  the  march?     (177-178.) 

268.  Describe  the  action  of  the  advance  guard  artillery  on  encoun- 

tering the  enemy.     (178.) 

269.  How   is    artillery   employed    in  rear   guards    on   the   march? 

(178.) 

270.  How   is  artillery   employed   by  a   retreating   column   on   the 

march?     (17S., 

271.  How  is  artillery  employed  in  flank  guards  on  the  march? 

(178-175)., 
272     How  is  artillery  employed  in  outpost  duty?     (179.) 

273.  Give  the  summary  of  the   general   principles   governing  the 

employment  of  artillery  in  battle.     (179-180.) 

! 

CHAPTER  VII. 
THE  THREE  ARMS  COMBINED. 

THE    OFFENSIVE. 

274.  What  decisions  and  arrangements  constitute  the  plan  of  bat- 

tle?    (181.) 

275.  How  is  the  question  of  the  offensive  or  defensive  usually  set- 

tled; what  will  often  be  the  condition  of  large  armies  in 
regard  to  the  offensive  and  defensive  on  different  parts  of 
the  field?  (181-182.) 

276.  Where  the  choice  of  the  offensive  or  defensive  rests  with  the 

commander,  what  questions  should  he  carefully  weigh? 
(182.) 

277.  State  tne  objections  to  a  frontal  attack;   when  such  attacks 

may  be  expedient;  and  what  a  frontal  attack  requires,  in 
order  that  it  may  be  successful.  (184.) 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  377 

278.  Why  are  flank  attacks  necessary;  with  what  are  they  usually 

combined;  and  what  has  led  naturally  to  this  form  of  com- 
bined attack?  (185-186.) 

279.  While  acting  aggressively  against  the  enemy  with  the  rein- 

forced part  of  the  line,  why  and  how  must  the  other  part 
be  protected?  (186.) 

280.  What  may  generally  be  said  about  an  attempt  to  attack  simul- 

taneously both  flanks  of  an  equal  force?     (186-187.) 

281.  What  is  the  effect  of  piercing  the  enemy's  front;  and  why  Is 

this  plan  very  difficult  under  modern  conditions?      (187.) 

282.  What  is  meant  by  the  term  "order  of  battle"?     (187-188.) 

283.  What  are  the  three  orders  of  battle;  and  how  is  each  brought 

about?     (188.) 

284.  State  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  the  concave  order 

of  battle.     (188-189.) 

285.  When  is  the  convex  order  of  battle  necessary  on  the  offensive; 

and  what  are  its  disadvantages?     (189.) 

286.  Whatever  the  order  of  battle  may  be,  what  must  the  army  be 

prepared  to  do  in  case  of  a  successful  attack?     (189.) 
287-    In  determining  the  point  on  which  the  main  attack  is  to  fall, 
when  should  tactical,  and  when  should  strategical,  consider- 
ations be  given  the  greater  weight?     (189-190.) 

288.  State  the  influence  of  strategical  considerations  in  determining 

the  point  of  attack  in  the  following  cases:  When  the  hos- 
tile army  is  connected  with  its  base  by  one  flank;  when 
the  hostile  army  is  connected  by  a  flank  with  another  army, 
a  fortress,  or  any  important  strategic  point;  when  the  line 
of  retreat  lies  obliquely  in  rear  of  one  wing.  (190-191.) 

289.  When  the  attacking  army  is  connected  by  a  flank  with  an 

allied  army,  with  its  base,  with  a  fortress,  or  any  import- 
ant strategic  point,  with  what  part  of  its  front  should  It 
make  the  attack?  (191.) 

290.  Among  the   tactical   considerations   influencing   the   selection 

of  the  point  of  attack,  discuss  the  following:  The  enemy's 
advanced  posts;  a  strongly  fortified  post  in  the  line  of  bat- 
tle; when  the  fortified  post  or  some  natural  feature  in  the 
enemy's  line  secures  his  line  of  retreat,  or  commands  the 
other  parts  of  the  field;  when  one  of  the  enemy's  flanks 
rests  on  an  impassable  obstacle;  any  commanding  ground 
which  will  afford  a  view  of  the  enemy's  dispositions  in  the 
preliminary  stage  of  an  action.  (191-193.) 

291.  How  is  the  information  gained  on  which  a  general  bases  his 

plan  of  battle?     (193-194.) 


378  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

292.  What   should  the  order  set  forth   clearly;    and   in   what   se- 

quence?    (194-195.) 

293.  Give  the  model  order  for  an  attack.     (195.) 

294.  Discuss  the  position  and  functions  of  the  comimiantder  in  bat- 

tle; -state  what  precautions  should  he  taken  in  regard  to 
his  successor;  and  state  (how  reliable  alids  may  he  utilized 
to  represent  the  commanding  officer,  what  information,  and 
discretionary  power  may  be  given  to  them,  and  how  they 
should  exercise  the  authority  thus  delegated.  (196-199.) 
296.  Discuss  the  reserve — its  object,  its  size,  the  local  reserves,  the 
general  reserve,  the  time  of  employing  the  reserve.  (199- 
200.) 

296.  State  the  only  fundamental  rule  that  can  be  established  for 

the  employment  of  the  three  arms  combined;  state  briefly 
the  functions  of  each  arm  when  used  in  combination  with 
the  others;  and  state  the  three  parts  into  which  the  attack 
may  be  divided.  (200-201.) 

297.  Describe  the  preparatory  stage  of  the  attack.     (201-202.) 

298.  Describe  the  decisive  action  in  the  attack.     (202-203.) 

299.  Describe  the  occupation  of  the  hostile  position,  and  the  pur- 

suit after  a  successful  attack.     (203-205.) 

300.  How  should   the   withdrawal   be  conducted   after   a   repulse? 

(205.) 

30L  State  the  special  points  to  be  considered  in  preparing  and 
carrying  out  an  attack  by  a  force  consisting  of  all  three 
arms.  (205-206.) 

THE   THREE   ARMS    IN   DEFENSE. 

302.  When  a  commander  assumes  the  offensive,  either  from  choice 

or  through!  necessity,  he  should  endeavor  to  occupy  a  posi- 
tion that  will  afford  what  three  advantages?  (206.) 

303.  What   circumstances   may   render   a  purely   defensive   action 

sufficient?     (206-207.) 

304.  How  are  troops  divided  on  tlhe  defensive?     (207.) 

305.  Discuss  the  features  and  conditions  of  the  ground  in  front  of 

a  defensive  position.     (207-210.) 

306.  What  is  one  of  the  very  first  requisites  of  a  defensive  posi- 

tion, and  how  many  men  may  be  allowed  to  each  yard  of 
front?  (210.) 

307.  What  cover  may  generally  toe  found  in  a  defensive  position, 

and  what  must  be  provided?     (211.) 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  379 

808.  What  advantage  do  Sntrenchmenis  give  to  a  commander;  into 
what  two  zones  may  the  field  'be  divided  for  defensive  pur- 
poses, and  how  should  the  intrenchinents  lie  constructed  on 
each?  (211.) 

309.  When,    and    by    whom,    should    the    intrenchments    be    con- 

structed?    (212.) 

310.  What  conditions  are  necessary,   in  order  that  strong  points 

may  be  advantageously  held  in  the  line  itself?     (212-213.) 
til.    How  should  the  flanks  be  supported,  and  why  is  it  not  desir- 
able to  rest  them  upon   impassable  obstacles?      (213-214.) 
312.    Why  does  an   impassable  obstacle  intersecting  the   position 

constitute  a  serious  defect  in  it?     (214.) 

t!3.  What  should  be  the  mature  of  the  ground  in  rear  of  a  posi- 
tion? (215.) 

314.  Why  is  a  position  with  a  river  at  its  back  generally  a  had 

one.  and  when  may  such  a  position  be  an  admissible  one? 
(215-216.) 

315.  State  the  requirements  of  a  perfect  defensive  position. 

217.) 

316.  What  orders  of  battle  may  be  adopted  on  the  defensive, 

'Which  is  generally  the  best?     (217.) 

317.  When  is  the  concave  order  of  battle  peculiarly  suited  to  the 

defensive,  and  what  is  'Che  indispensable  condition  In  this 
case?     (217.) 

318.  When  may  the  convex  order  of  battle  be  advantageously  used 

on  the  defensive?    (218.) 

319.  How  is  the  crotchet  order  of  battle  produced,  and  what  are 

the  objections  to  it?     (218.) 

320.  Notwithstanding   its   disadvantages,   when   may   the   crotchet 

order  of  battle  be  adopted  with,  advantage?     (218-210.) 

321.  State  how  the  commander  on  the  defensive  gains  the  informa- 

tion on  which  to  base  his  plans,  and  when  and  how  li« 
formulates  his  orders?    (219.) 

322.  Give  the  model  for  orders  directing  the  assumption  of   the 

defensive.     (219-220.) 

323.  Of  what  three  stages  does  the  defense  consist?    Discuss  each. 

(220-222.) 

324.  What  are  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  a  night  attack? 

(222-223.)  $ 

325.  What  knowledge  is  necessary  to  the  success  of  a  night  attack; 

what  precautions  should  be  taken  in  preparing  for  the  at- 
tack, and  how  should  the  attack  be  conducted?     (223-224.) 


380  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

326.  To  what  forces  are  night  attacks  best  adapted,  by  what  are 

they  generally  made,  and  what  kind  of  night  is  best  suited 
for  such  operations?     (224.) 

327.  Though  night  attacks  are  open  to  many  objections,  and  their 

success  is  problematical  at  best,  how  may  the  darkness  of 
night  be  utilized  in  military  operations?     (226.) 

328.  Discuss  the  use  of  the  different  arms  in  night  attacks.     (227- 

228.) 

329.  Under  what  conditions  will  actual  attacks  at  night,  by  large 

forces,  be  advisable?     (228.) 

CHAPTEE  VIII. 
CONVOYS. 

330.  How  is  the  transport  supplying  an  army  primarily  divided? 

(229.) 

331.  How  are  the  convoys  broadly  classed?     (229.) 

352.  In  what  different  ways  is  transportation  on  land  effected,  and 
what  are  the  two  chief  methods?  (229-230.) 

333.  What  kind  of  animals  and  wagons  are  employed  in  the  wagon- 
trains  in  the  U.  S.  service?  (230.) 

834.  Discuss  the  organization  of  a  wagon-train — under  whose  com- 
mand it  should  be;  of  what  the  personnel  of  the  train  should 
consist;  who  commands  the  train  and  escort,  and  what  his 
qualifications  and  equipment  should  be;  how  the  train  should 
be  divided  and  subdivided;  how  thi  wagons  should  be  ar- 
ranged according  to  their  contents;  how  drivers  should  be 
armed;  what  each  section  should  be  provided  with;  the 
strength  and  duties  of  the  police  guard.  (230-231.) 

3351  Discuss  the  march  of  the  convoy  when  the  transport  is  by 
wagon — average  speed;  what  should  be  done  when  the  road 
is  wide  enough;  with  what  the  train  should  be  supplied, 
and  what  each  wagon  should  carry;  inspection;  broken- 
down  wagons;  distances  between  wagons  and  sections; 
halts;  hour  of  starting.  (232-233.) 

336.  Discuss  the  selection  and  occupation   of  camps  for  convoys, 

describe  the  several  methods  of  parking  the  wagon-train, 
and  state  when  each  method  should  be  used.  (233-234.) 

337.  On  what  do  the  size  and  composition  of  the  escort  of  a  wagon 

convoy  depend,  what  proportion  should  the  number  of  men 
bear  to  the  number  of  wagons,  what  may  be  regarded  as  the 
smallest  allowable  escort  for  a  train  of  fifty  or  sixty  wagons, 
and  into  what  part  is  the  convoy  usually  divided?  (234-236.) 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  381 

838.  Describe  the  functions  of  the  advanced  cavalry  of  a  convoy — 
in  open  country,  where  it  should  march  and  the  precautions 
it  should  take;  at  a  bridge;  at  a  defile;  when  the  enemy  ig 
encountered;  in  a  close  country.  (236-237.) 

339.  Describe  the  advance  guard  of  a  convoy — its  strength;  where  it 

marches;  its  duties;  its  formation;  by  what  it  should  be 
accompanied;  its  reserve;  at  bridges  and  defiles;  what  the 
advance-guard  commander  should  constantly  observe,  and 
what  he  should  do  if  attacked.  (237-238.) 

340.  State  the  composition,  distribution,  and  general  functions  of 

the  main  body  of  the  escort  of  a  wagon  convoy.     (238-239.? 
841.    State  the  strength  and  duties  of  the  rear  guard  of  a  wagon 
convoy.     (239.) 

342.  Discuss  the  defense  of  the  convoy — when  convoy  is  not  SUB 

prised  and  enemy  is  not  in  superior  force;  if  the  enemy  b« 
repulsed;  if  attack  be  made  by  irregular  troops  or  armed 
inhabitants;  the  passage  of  a  defile;  when  enemy  is  reported 
in  strength;  when  enemy  is  in  position  at  the  entrance  of  a 
defile;  when  main  attack  is  made  on  one  flank;  when  attack 
is  on  both  flank;  when  enemy  bars  the  road  in  front;  when 
strength  of  enemy  makes  it  necessary  to  form  corral;  in- 
trenchments;  if  enemy  should  carry  first  position;  when 
cargo  consists  of  ammunition;  when  the  defeat  of  the  escort 
seems  certain.  (239-242.) 

343.  Summarize  briefly  the  principles  of  attack  on  a  convoy.    (242.) 

344.  Describe  the  strength,  composition,  and  conduct  of  convoys  of 

prisoners.     (243-244.) 

345.  Discuss  the  subject  of  convoys  by  railroad — the  usual  method 

of  insuring  safety;  when  this  is  impossible  or  insufficient; 
the  composition  of  a  pioneer  train;  the  train  to  be  guarded: 
if  enemy  has  destroyed  or  obstructed  the  track;  if  track  oe 
undisturbed  and  enemy  without  artillery;  when  it  in  not 
practicable  to  have  the  convoy  preceded  by  a  pioneer  train 
(244-245.) 

346.  How   should   railroad   trains  be  convoyed   in   railroad   rlota? 

(245). 

347.  Discuss  the  subject  of  convoys  by  water.     (245-246.) 


—26— 


INDEX. 

Action  of  artillery  in  case  of  repulse  of  attack,  169. 

Action  of  infantry  against  cavalry,  117,  118. 

Advance  guard,  convoy,  strength  and  duties  of,  237,  238. 

Aginoourt,  battle  of,  288. 

Aides,  duties  of,  28. 

Aladja  Dagh,  -battle  of,  360. 

Alma,  (battle  of,  193,  263,  343. 

American  Revolution,  inifantry  in,  252,  253. 

Ammunition,  supply  of,  20,  21;  columns,  organization  of,  21;  supply 
of  on  the  field,  general  rules  for,  116,  117. 

Antietam,  battle  of,  143,  191,  200, 

Arcola,  battle  of,  255. 

Army,  organization  of,  12. 

Army  corps,  a  strategical  unit,  10;  organization  of,  10,  11,  12. 

Army  of  Cumberland,  details  from,  line,  25. 

Army  of  Potomac,  total  transportation,  24. 

Artillery  action,  final  phase,  163,  164. 

Artillery,  attack  and  defense,  general  theory  of  employment,  153, 
154,  155;  chances  of  precluding  inifantry  attack,  173;  clearing 
roads  for,  177;  concealed  positions,  173;  cross  fire,  value  of,  175; 
defensive,  reopening  fire  after  withdrawal,  175;  defensive,  with- 
drawal from  position,  176;  flanks  most  vulnerable,  177;  forma- 
tion of  in  flank  guard,  178. 

Artillery,  general  engagement  on  defensive,  173;  may  come  as  sur- 
prise, 175;  orfianizaition,  6,  7;  on  the  march,  considerations  de- 
termining position  of,  177;  position  of  in  prospect  of  general 
action,  'how  ©elected,  178;  relative  strength  of  in  rear  guard, 
178;  support  of  infantry  attack,  162,  166;  use  of  in  flank  guard, 
178;  use  of  in  rear  guard,  178;  use  of  in  retrograde  movement. 
178;  use  of  in  outposts,  179;  use  with  advance  guard,  177,  178; 
weapons,  'comparative  effect  on  defensive  and  offensive,  169,  170. 

Attack,  repulse  of  by  defense,  use  of  artillery  in  pursuit,  176;  phases, 
summary  of,  96,  97;  flank,  97,  98,  99,  100. 

Attacks,  flank,  128,  129;  time  cflor,  129. 

Auerstadt,  battle  of,  135,  257. 

AuflterUtz,  battle  of,  135,  186,  187,  256,  294,  340. 


384  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

Austro-Prussian  War,  artillery  in,  352;  cavalry  in,  9,  314,  315;  inr 
fantry  in,  43,  69,  73,  272,  273,  274. 

Balaklava,  battle  of,  299,  344. 

Balkans,  expedition  across,  323,  324,  325. 

Base,  commander  of,  27;  staff  of,  27. 

Battalion,  organization  of,  4. 

Batteries,  division  of,  161;   concentration  of,  162. 

Bautzen,  battle  of,  192,  260. 

Bearers,  duties  of,  19. 

Beaumont,  battle  of,  316,  317. 

Beverly  Ford,  battle  of,  308. 

Big  Bethel,  battle  of,  223. 

Bladensburg,  battle  of,  342. 

Blenheim,  battle  of,  213,  287,  332. 

Boonsboro,  battle  of,  131. 

Borodino,  battle  of,  135,  200,  259,  3S9. 

Brandy  Station,  battle  of,  136. 

Brigade,  organization  of,  6;   cavalry,  8. 

Bull  Run,  battle  of,  110,  215. 

Busaco,  battle  of,  222. 

Caldiero,  battle  of,  261. 

Campaign  in  Virginia,  artillery  in,  13;   staff,  S3. 

Capture  of  battery,  measures  to  be  taken,  136,  137. 

Castiglione,  battle  of,  255,  259. 

Cavalry,  action  of,  47;  arms  of,  50;  independent  action,  48;  classes 
of,  48,  49;  pace  of,  51;  powers  and  limitations  of,  52;  attack  and 
defense,  general  discussion  of,  119,  120;  charge  in  line,  forma- 
tion, 120,  121,  122;  brigade  of,  formation,  123;  influence  of  ter- 
rain on,  126,  127;  against  cavalry,  132,  133;  against  infantry, 
133,  134;  organization,  7,  8,  9;  use  against  infantry  not  a  thing 
of  the  past,  135;  against  artillery,  135,  136;  formation  for  at- 
tack on  artillery,  136. 

Cessation  of  fire,  when  made,  165. 

Champagne,  campaign  in,  260. 

Chancellorsville,  battle  of,  108,  186,  198,  349. 

Charge,  cavalry,  pace  and  conduct  of,  124,  125,  126;  in  column  and 
as  foragers,  130,  131,  132. 

Chief  of  artillery,  duties  of,  29. 

Chief  of  cavalry,  duties  of,  29. 

Chief  of  commissary  of  subsistence,  duties  of,  30. 

Chief  engineer,  duties  of,  29,  30. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  385 

Chief  ordnance  officer,  duties  of,  31. 

Chief  paymaster,  duties  of,  30. 

Chief  quartermaster,  duties  of,  30. 

Chief  signal  officer,  duties  of,  29. 

Cold  Harbor,  battle  of,  42,  144,  184,  217. 

Coloznbey,  battle  of,  356. 

Commander,  the,  position  of,  196,  197,  198;  disabled,  198,  199. 

Commanding  general,  duties  of,  25;  26. 

Company,  organization  of,  5;    pioneer,   17;   ponton,   17;    signal,   18. 

Convoys,  advance  cavalry,  duties  of,  236,  2J37;  general  discussion, 
229;  classification  of,  229;  defense  of,  239,  240,  241,  242;  attack 
of,  242,  243;  of  prisoners,  243,  244;  march  of,  232,  233;  camps, 
233;  park  of,  233,  234;  escort  of,  size  and  composition,  234, 
235,  236. 

Convoys  by  land,  classification  of,  229,  230. 

Convoys  by  railroads,  244,  245. 

Convoys  by  water,  245,  246. 

Corral,  formation  of,  by  convoy,  234. 

Cossacks  against  Tcherkesses,  48. 

Coutras,  battle  of,  285. 

Couriers,  mounted,  duties  and  assignment,  20. 

Cover,  use  of,  74,  75. 

Covering  detachments,  use  of  on  defensive,  171;  strength  in  artil- 
lery, 172;  use  of  horse  artillery  in,  172;  position  of  skirmishers 
in  with  respect  to  artillery,  172. 

Cowpens,  216. 

Cr6cy,  artillery  in,  328. 

Crimean  War,  41;  infantry  in,  263,  264;  cavalry  in,  298,  299,  300; 
artillery  in,  343,  344. 

Curved  fire,  57. 

Decisive  action,  in  attack,  202,  203;  defensive,  221,  222;  defensive, 
objective  of  artillery  fire,  176;  rate  of  fire  during,  176. 

Defensive,  object  of  force  on,  100;  discussion  and  characteristics, 
100,  101,  102. 

Dinwiddie  Court  House,  battle  of,  309. 

Direct  fire,  57. 

Directions  of  attack,  classification  of,  184,  185. 

Discipline,  37,  38,  39,  40,  41,  42;   evidences  of  true,  39. 

Dismounted  action,  cavalry,  discussion,  137,  138;  purposes  for  which 
employed,  138,  139;  increased  value  of,  139;  formation  for,  139, 
140;  on  the  offensive,  140,  141;  on  the  defensive,  141. 

Dismounted  fire  action,  47. 


386  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

Division,  strength  and  composition  of,  34;   cavalry,  8;  organization 

of,  9,  10. 

Dresden,  battle  of,  295. 
Duel,  artillery,  defenders'  guns  silenced,  174;    new   dispositions  of 

artillery  for  next  phase,  174;  avoidance  of  by  defensive,  173,  174. 

EckmUhl,  battle  of,  292,  293,  296. 

Egypt,  campaign  in,  325. 

Engineers,  duties  and  organization  of,  15,  16,  17. 

Essling,  battle  of,  110,  189,  262. 

Eylau,  battle  of,  258,  262,  295,  296. 

Fair  Oaks,  battle  of,  212,  214. 

Field  artillery,  tactics  of,  155;  technical  and  tactical  handling,  156; 
change  in  materiel,  156;  formation,  157;  classification  of,  53; 
siege,  53;  heavy  field,  53;  light  field,  54;  horse,  54;  mountain, 
55;  arms  of,  55,  56;  pace  of,  56;  powers  and  limitations  of,  56, 
57;  range  of,  57:  fire  of,  classification,  57,  58. 

Fire,  artillery,  supervision  of,  159;  objective  of,  159;  enfilade,  oppor- 
tunities for,  160;  range  at  which  opened  from  main  position, 
172,  173;  sectors  of,  when  assigned,  173. 

Field  mortars,  60. 

Fire  at  will,  73. 

Fire  control,  artillery,  defensive,  171. 

Fire  discipline,  definition  of,  68,  69;   rules  for,  69. 

Fire,  infantry,  objective  of,  103,  104,  105. 

Fire  with  counted  cartridges,  73. 

Firing  line,  measures  for  control,  67,  68;  composition  of,  77,  78; 
reinforcement  of,  81,  82;  on  defensive,  preliminary  disposi- 
tions, 102. 

Five  Forks,  battle  of,  309,  310,  311. 

Flank  attack,  three  arms  combined,  185,  188,  187. 

Flanking  fire,  by  artillery,  defensive,  provision  for,  170;  importance 
of,  170. 

Flavigny,  battle  of,  356. 

Formation  for  attack,  cavalry,  134,  135. 

P'orrest's  raids,  142,  143,  148. 

Fort  Brown,  defense  of,  242. 

Fort  Donelson,  265,  266. 

Fort  McAllister,  artillery  in,  357. 

Franco-German  War,  artillery  in,  14,  355,  359,  361;  infantry  in,  73, 
74,  274-279;  cavalry  in,  315,  323. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  387 

Franco-German-Spanish  Wars,  artillery  in,  329. 
Franklin,  battle  of,  85,  203,  209. 
Fredericksburg,  battle  of,  109,  212,  266,  267,  351. 
French  Religious  War,  artillery  in,  330. 
Friedland,  battle  of,  191,  338. 
Froschweiler,  battle  of,  356. 

General  theory  of  infantry  attack,  63,  64,  65,  66,  67. 

Georgia,  campaign  in,  14,  40,  112,  304. 

German  Army,  total  transportation  of,  24. 

Gettysburg,  battle  of,  107,  129,  130,  192,  214,  219,  306,  346,  350,  351. 

Gravelotte,  battle  of,  110,  1.90,  357. 

Grierson's  raid,  148,  312. 

Ground  scouts  and  combat  patrols,  127,  128. 

Guarding  the  flanks,  108. 

Guns,  cover  for,  62;  shields  for,  62. 

Guntown,  Miss.,  skirmish  at,  302. 

Hasty  intrenchments,  use  of  by  infantry,  112,  113. 

Heavy  guns,  position  for,  164. 

Heavy  guns,  position  and  dispersion  of,  on  defensive,  172. 

High-angle  fire,  57. 

Hochkirch,  battle  of,  226,  334. 

Hoover's  Gap,  battle  of,  314. 

Hospitals,  field,  organization,  18,  19;   general,  19. 

Hostile  infantry,  approach  of,  within  range  of  artillery  position,  174. 

Indirect  fire,  57. 

Individual  fire,  classification  of,  73. 

Infantry,  powers  and  limitations  of,  43;  arms  and  action  of,  43,  44, 
45;  pace  of,  46;  essential  qualities  of,  46;  regiment  of  in  attack, 
formation  and  description,  87,  88,  89,  90,  91,  92,  93,  94;  brigade 
of,  in  attack,  94,  95,  96;  general  rules  for  attack,  96. 

Inkerman,  battle  of,  263,  264. 

Intrenching  tool,  45. 

Invasion  of  Russia,  Murat's  cavalry,  9. 

Italian  War,  infantry  in,  264;  cavalry  in,  298,  299,  300;  artillery 
in,  345. 

James  River,  ponton  bridge  on,  16. 
Jena,  battle  of,  257,  258. 
Judge-advocate,  duties  of,  31. 


388  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

Kars,  battle  of,  224. 

Kearneysville,  battle  of,  47. 

Kelly's  Ford,  battle  of,  131. 

Kenesaw  Mountain,  battle  of,  115,  268,  269,  351. 

Kilpatrick's  raid,  145. 

Kdniggriitz,  battle  of,  69,  70,  127,  188,  207,  212,  215,  314,  315,  353,  354. 

Laon,  battle  of,  228. 

La  Placilla,  battle  of,  325. 

Le  Bourget,  battle  of,  278. 

Leipsic,  battle  of,  260,  286,  342. 

Leuthen,  battle  of,  334. 

Ligny,  battle  of,  191. 

Logistics,  definition  of,  1. 

Loire,  campaign  on,  321. 

Long-range  fire,  70,  71,  102,  103. 

Lovtcha,  battle  of,   104,  360. 

Liitzen,  battle  of,  260,  286,  331,  339. 

Machine  guns,  types  of,  60;  batteries,  organization  of,  61;  use  of,  61, 

Main  body,  convoys,  formation  and  duties  of,  238,  239. 

Main  reserve,  108. 

Majuba  Hill,  battle  of,  69. 

Malplaquet,  battle  of,  287,  332. 

Malvern  Hill,  battle  of,  348. 

Marengo,  battle  of,  129,  135,  255,  294. 

Marignano,  battle  of,  330. 

Mars-la-Tour,  battle  of,  317,  318,  356. 

Medical   Department,   organization  of,   18,   19;    assignment  to  line 

troop,  18. 

Medical  director-general,  duties  of,  30. 
Metz,  siege  of,  244. 

Middle  ages,  the,  infantry  in,  247,  248. 
Military  engineering,  definition  of,  1. 
Military  police,  19,  20. 
Morgan's  raid,  142,  144,  145,  146,  148. 
Mounted  fire  action,  47,  48;   when  used,  142. 
Mounted  infantry,  52,  53. 
Movements  of  troops  by  night,  226,  227,  228. 
Mud  Creek,  battle  of,  271,  272. 
Mukden,  battle  of,  183. 
Murfreesboro,  battle  of,  303. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  389 

Musket,  introduction  of,  248. 
Mustering  officer,  duties  of,  31. 

Nachod,  battle  of,  315. 

Napoleonic,  era,  infantry  in,  253-263;  cavalry  in,  291-298. 

Nashville,  battle  of,  311,  312. 

New  Orleans,  battle  of,  44,  182,  263. 

Night  attacks,  advantages  of,  222,  223;  objections  to,  226;  general 
discussion  of,  222,  223,  224;  forces  employed  in,  227,  228;  cap- 
ture of  Kars  by,  224,  225,  226;  conditions  governing,  228. 

Noisseville,  battle  of,  320. 

Novara,  battle  of,  28. 

Occupation  of  hostile  position  by  batteries  of  attack,  168. 

Okolona,  battle  of,  302. 

Olmtitz,  siege  of,  241,  242. 

Opening  fire,  time  of,  71,  72. 

Orders  for  attack,  194,  195,  196. 

Orders  for  taking  up  defensive  position,  219,  220. 

Orders  of  battle,  definition,  187,  188;  classification  of,  188;  discus- 
sion of,  188,  189;  offensive,  187,  188,  189;  on  the  defensive,  217, 
218,  219;  crotchet,  objections  to,  218. 

Organization,  definition  of,  3. 

Paris,  siege  of,  244. 

Part  taken  in  pursuit  by  artillery,  168,  169. 

Pavia,  battle  of,  330. 

Peninsula  War,  261,  341,  342. 

Peschiera,  battle  of,  264. 

Petersburg,  siege  of,  211,  226. 

Piercing  the  enemy's  front,  187. 

Pioneer  trains,  244,  245. 

Plan  of  battle,  offensive,  181;  defensive,  219;  formulation  of  on  the 

offensive,  193,  194;  formulation  of  on  the  defensive,  219. 
Plevna,  siege  of,  103,  104,  281. 
Points  of  attack,  189,  190,  strategical  considerations  governing,  190, 

191.  tactical  considerations  governing,  191,  192,  193. 
Pont-a-Mousson,  320. 
Poolesville,  Md.,  skirmish  at,  307. 
Port  Gibson,  battle  of,  209. 


390  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

Position,  artillery,  choice  of,  157;  principal  requirements  of,  157, 
158;  reconnaissance  of,  158,  159;  occupation  of,  159;  changes  of, 
159;  successive  occupations  of,  160,  161;  artillery  defensive, 
reconnaissance  of,  170;  successive,  170,  171. 

Position,  three  arms  combined,  considerations  governing,  207;  ground 
in  front  of,  207,  208,  210;  requisites  for  position  proper,  210, 
211,  212,  213,  214;  defects  of,  214,  215;  ground  in  rear  of,  215^ 
216;  requirements  of  good,  216,  217;  selection  and  occupation  o^ 
109;  cases  to  be  considered,  109;  good  defensive,  requirements  of, 
109,  110,  111;  intrenchment  of,  general  rule  for,  110;  occupation 
of  by  offensive,  203,  204. 

Prague,  battle  of,  218,  335. 

Prevention  of  counter-attack,  action  of  artillery,  168. 

Preparatory  stage  of  attack,  201,  202. 

Principles  governing  attack  by  all  arms,  summary  of,  205,  206. 

Projectiles,  classification  of,  58. 

Provost-marshal-general,  duties  of,  28,  29. 

Pursuit,  by  offensive  in  case  of  success,  204,  205. 

Quartermaster's  corps,  need  of,  24,  25;  details,  from  the  line,  evil 
of,  25. 

Raids,  cavalry,  when  undertaken,  142,  143,  144,  145,  146,  147,  148. 

Raid,  conduct  of,  150,  151;  destruction  of  communications,  151,  152. 

Raiding  force,  composition  and  preparation  of,  148,  149;  objective 
of,  149. 

Ramillies,  battle  of,  287. 

Range-finding,  171. 

Rank,  and  command,  35. 

Rapid  fire,  73,  74. 

Rapid-firing  guns,  60. 

Rappahannock,  position  at,  183. 

Rear  guard,  convoys,  strength  and  duties,  239. 

Rear,  service  of,  19. 

Recruitment,  35,  36,  37. 

Regiment,  organization  of,  5,  6. 

Relative  advantages  of  the  offensive  and  defensive,  113,  114,  181, 
182,  183,  184. 

Repulse,  of  attack,  withdrawal  after,  205. 

Reserve,  object  of,  82;  formation  of,  82,  83;  distance  of  from  bodies 
in  front,  83;  reinforcement  by,  83,  84;  strength  of,  84;  infantry 
on  the  defensive,  use  of,  105,  106;  location,  105;  on  the  offen- 
sive, 199,  200;  protection,  105,  106;  relative  strength  of,  106. 

Reserve,  artillery,  use  of  on  defensive,  173. 


OKGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  391 

Retreat,  covering  of  by  artillery,  176;  most  dangerous  enemy,  176; 

mission  of  artillery  in,  177. 
Rezonville,  battle  of,  356. 
Richmond  campaign  (1865),  190. 
Rivoli,  battle  of,  4,  255. 
Rossbach,  battle  of,  290,  334. 
Russo-Turkish  War,  infantry  in,  279,  280,  281;  cavalry  in,  323,  324, 

325;  artillery  in,  360. 
Rushes,  75,  76,  77. 

Salamanca,  battle  of,  261. 

Sau  Jacinto,  battle  of,  216. 

Scouts,  78. 

Scouts,  artillery,  171. 

Sebastopol,  siege  of,  344. 

Second  line,  object  of,  84;  strength  of,  85;  distance  from  first  line^ 
85;  command  of,  85;  infantry  on  the  defensive,  functions  of,  106, 

Sedan,  battle  of,  135,  198,  276,  277,  314,  320,  357. 

Seven  Years'  War,  artillery  in,  335,  336. 

Shell,  description,  58;   use  of,  59. 

Shenandoah,  Sheridan's  cavalry  in,  9,  14. 

Sheridan's  raid,  148. 

Shiloh,  battle  of,  204,  348. 

Shock  action,  cavalry,  47;  defensive  use  of,  137. 

Shrapnel,  description  of,  58;  use  of,  59,  60;  diaphragm,  79. 

Signal  corps,  organization  of,  18;   duties,  18. 

Silesia,  campaign  of,  333. 

Spottsylvania,  battle  of,  44,  82,  85,  196,  197,  269,  270,  271,  351,  352. 

Sohr,  battle  of,  130. 

Solferino,  battle  of,  300,  345. 

Somosierra,  battle  of,  295. 

Special  troops,  classification  of,  15. 

Spicheren,  battle  of,  98,  99,  320. 

Squadron,  organization  of,  8. 

Staff,  duties  of,  26,  27,  28,  29,  30,  31,  32;  chief  of,  26,  27,  28;  military, 
28,  29,  30;  administrative,  30,  31;  correspondence  of,  31;  size 
of,  32,  33;  army  corps,  33;  division,  33;  brigade,  34. 

Stages  of  attack,  201. 

Stages  of  defensive  action,  classification,  220,  221. 

Stoneman's  raid,  145. 

Stone  River,  battle  of,  186,  349. 

St  Privat,  battle  of,  98,  103,  274,  275,  276,  357. 

Strategy,  definition  of,  1. 


392  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS. 

Strength  of  the  three  lines,  on  the  defensive,  108,  109. 

Stuart's  raids,  143,  144,  145,  147. 

Suakim,  battle  of,  244. 

Summary  of  general  principles  governing  use  of  artillery  in  battle, 

179,  180. 

Summary  of  positions  in  attack,  169. 
Supply  columns,  organization  of,  22,  23;  reserve,  23. 
Support,  object  of,  79;   omission  of.  79;   strengtn  of,  79;    distance 

of  from  the  firing  line,  79,  80;  formation  of,  80,  81;  infantry  on 

defensive,  use  of,  105. 

Tactical  unit,  infantry,  4;   definition  of,  4;  artillery,  6;   cavalry,  7. 

Tactics,  definition  of,  1;  minor,  definition  of,  2;  grand;  definition 
of,  2;  maneuver,  definition  of,  2;  fighting,  2. 

Target  of  artillery  in  third  phase  of  attack,  on  defensive,  175. 

Tel-el-Kebir,  battle  of,  82,  227. 

Telis,  battle  of,  361. 

Thames,  battle  of,  48. 

Third  line,  object  of,  85,  86;  command  of,  86;  distance  of  from 
second  line,  86;  strength  of,  86;  infantry  on  the  defensive,  use 
of,  107. 

Thirty  Years'  War,  infantry  in,  249;  cavalry  in,  286;  artillery  In, 
331. 

Three  arms  combined,  defensive,  206,  207;  offensive,  181. 

Three  arms  in  attack,  200.  201. 

Three  arms,  proportions  of  the,  12,  13,  14,  15. 

Tom's  Brook,  battle  of,  309. 

Torgau,  battle  of,  335. 

Train,  ammunition,  20,  21;  ordnance,  21;  wagon,  21,  22;  organiza- 
tion of,  22,  23;  light,  22;  regimental,  22;  pack,  23;  headquar- 
ters, 21,  22;  location  of  on  the  marrh,  23;  bridge,  German,  17: 
U.  S..  17. 

Transportation,  total  of  the  division,  24. 

Tronville,  battle  ot  357. 

Troop,  organization  of,  8. 

Ulm,  campaign  of,  1. 

Uses  of  cavalry,  summary,  152. 

Van  Dora's  raid,  143,  147. 
Vicksburg,  siege  of,  182,  246. 
Vimiero,  battle  of,  262. 
Volley  firing,  72;   when  possible,  72,  73. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICS.  393 

Wagons,  load  of,  22;  allowance  of,  21;  distribution  of  ammunition, 

22;  numbers  increased  or  diminished,  22. 
Wagon  trains,  230;   organization  of,  230,  231. 
Wagram,  battle  of,  121,  259,  295,  3S9,  340. 
War  of  Secession,  infantry  in,  265-272;   cavalry  in,  300-314. 
Wars  of  Frederick  the  Great,  infantry  in,  250,  251,  252;  cavalry  in, 

287,  288,  289,  290,  291. 

Wars  of  Louis  XIV.,  infantry  in,  249,  250;  cavalry  in,  287. 
Waterloo,  battle  of,  44,  107,  110,  124,  188,  190,  192,  204,  205,  207,  222, 

260,  262,  340,  341. 

Wilderness,  the,  battles  of,  70,  85,  348. 
Wilson's  cavalry  command,  9. 
Wilson's  raids,  145,  147,  148,  312,  313. 
Winchester,  battle  of,  308,  309. 
Withdrawal  from  action,  infantry,  114,  115,  116. 
Worth,  battle  of,  82,  97,  135,  192,  317,  356. 

Zagonari,  battle  of,  283. 


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